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ABSTRACT 
 
The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a popular instrument for public service 
delivery.  It is important that public managers will be able to recognize when a PPP 
would be an appropriate service delivery option, and will be able to maximize a PPP‘s 
chances of success when it is the chosen service delivery instrument. 
 
The research question addressed in this dissertation is: 
 
―What are the critical factors that can be replicated that separate successful PPPs 
from PPPs that do not deliver or that collapse? 
 
In this dissertation critical success factors for PPPs are identified through a step-by-
step process in which different sources of success factors are analysed and where 
successively identified sets of success factors are compared and combined in a 
repetitive layered process of synthesis.  A list of success factors is created and 
expanded through an iterative process of evaluation, removal of duplications, 
combination of related success factors and listing of unique success factors. 
 
Success factors are found in literature while describing the PPP concept and 
partnership mechanics and management.  Success factors are identified in 
partnership literature, in public governance literature, in private sector collaboration 
literature, in entrepreneurial studies and in a collection of perspectives on success.  
These perspectives include those of stakeholders, of private operators, of the third 
sector as well as perspectives from disciplines and knowledge and practice 
frameworks such as project management, corporate governance, enterprise risk 
management and organisational design. Additional success factors are identified in a 
discussion on the evaluation of partnerships, where it is shown that success factors 
can be derived from evaluation based on characterization, from partnership 
definitions, from the perspective of programme evaluation, from measuring the 
performance of business improvement districts, from alternating focus partnership 
evaluation (sector by sector, theme-based, local-level) and from service delivery 
evaluation.  The evaluation of partnership examples also provides insight into 
success factors.  The final filtering and synthesis of evidence uses the results of 
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questionnaires, from which success factors are derived, to conduct a final distillation 
and produce the final list of success factors identified.  
 
A total of 466 individual success factors are identified in this dissertation, these 
factors are grouped into 43 distinct categories.  The two most critical success factors 
for PPPs are identified as firstly delivering a publicly needed service and secondly 
achieving the objectives of the partnership.   
 
The answer to the research question described above is that critically, two conditions 
must be met to make a PPP successful, and that is that the goals of the PPP must be 
achieved and that a public need must be satisfied.  There are many additional 
success factors which can further define success and degrees of success, all of 
which are descriptions of desired conditions from the perspective of stakeholders. 
 
The exploratory and hypothesis-generating study culminates in a hypothesis that 
states that if public managers are faced with a choice of service delivery options, and 
the use of a PPP is one option, and if the manager applies the categories of 
recommended critical success factors identified in this dissertation, the manager will 
be able to determine whether a PPP would be an appropriate service delivery 
vehicle, and furthermore, if PPP is chosen as service delivery vehicle, the public 
manager would, through the application of the success factors identified in this 
dissertation, have a greater chance of successful implementation of the PPP through 
purposeful collaboration. 
 
The study contributes to the public management body of knowledge by covering new 
ground in terms of the evaluation and management of public-private partnerships. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Publiek-Privaat Vennootskappe (PPVe) is ‗n gewilde instrument vir die lewering van 
openbare dienste.  Dit is belangrik dat openbare bestuurders sal weet wanneer ‗n 
PPV ‗n goeie opsie sal wees vir openbare dienslewering en hoe om ‗n PPV se 
geleentheid vir sukses te verhoog as dit die gekose dienslewerings-instrument is. 
 
Die navorsings-vraag wat in hierdie proefskrif aangespreek word is: 
 
Wat is die kritieke sukses-faktore wat gerepliseer kan word wat suksesvolle PPVe 
onderskei van PPVe wat nie presteer nie of wat ineenstort? 
 
In hierdie proefskrif word kritieke suksesfaktore vir PPVe geïdentifiseer deur ‗n stap-
vir-stap proses waardeur verskillende bronne van suksesfaktore ge-analiseer word 
en agtereenvolgende stelle van suksesfaktore vergelyk en gekombineer word in ‗n 
herhalende, gelaagde proses van sintese.  ‗n Lys van suksesfaktore word geskep en 
uitgebrei deur ‗n iteratiewe proses van evaluasie, die verwydering van herhalings, die 
kombinasie van verwante faktore en die lys van unieke faktore. 
 
Suksesfaktore word gevind in literatuur terwyl die PPV konsep en vennootskap 
meganismes en -bestuur beskryf word.  Suksesfaktore word geïdentifiseer in 
vennootskap literatuur, in openbare bestuur literatuur, in privaatsektor 
samewerkingsliteratuur, in entrepeneur studies en in ‗n versameling perspektiewe op 
sukses.  Hierdie perspektiewe sluit in die van belanghoudendes, van private 
operateurs, van die derde sektor sowel as perspektiewe van dissiplines en kennis en 
praktyk raamwerke soos projekbestuur, korporatiewe bestuur, 
ondernemingsrisikobestuur en organisatoriese ontwerp.  Bykomende suksesfaktore 
word geïdentifiseer in ‗n bespreking oor die evaluasie van vennootskappe, waar dit 
aangedui word dat suksesfaktore afgelei kan word van karakter-gebaseerde 
evaluasie, van die prestasiemeting van besigheidsverbeteringsdistrikte (―Business 
Improvement Districts‖), van alternatiewelik-fokusende vennootskap-evaluasie 
(sektor-vir-sektor, tema-gebasseerd, plaaslike vlak) en van dienslewerings-evaluasie.  
Die evaluering van vennootskap voorbeelde voorsien ook insig in suksesfaktore.  Die 
finale filtrasie en sintese van bewyse gebruik vraelyste, waarvandaan suksesfaktore  
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afgelei word, vir ‗n finale distillasie en die saamstel van ‗n finale lys van 
geïdentifiseerde suksesfaktore. 
 
In totaal word 466 indiwiduele suksesfaktore in hierdie proefskrif geïdentifiseer, wat in 
43 aparte kategorieë gegroepeer word.  Die twee mees kritieke suksesfaktore wat 
uitgewys word is om eerstens ‗n benodigde publieke of openbare behoefte te 
bevredig of diens te lewer, en tweedens om die doelwitte van die vennootskap te 
bereik. 
 
Die antwoord op die navorsings-vraag wat hierbo beskryf word is dat daar krities aan 
twee voorwaardes voldoen moet word om ‗n PPV susksevol te maak, en dit is dat die 
vennootskap se doelwitte moet bereik word en dat ‗n openbare behoefte bevredig 
moet word.  Daar is verskeie bykomende suksesfaktore wat sukses en die mate van 
sukses verder kan definieer, waarvan almal beskrywings is van verlangde toestande 
uit die oogpunt van belanghebbendes. 
 
Die uitset van die verkennende en hipotese-vormende studie is ‗n hipotese wat lei 
dat, indien openbare bestuurders met ‗n keuse van dienslewerings opsies 
gekonfronteer word, en indien die gebruik van ‗n PPV een van hierdie opsies is, en 
indien die bestuurder dan die kategorieë van voorgestelde suksesfaktore wat in 
hierdie proefskrif geïdentiseer is toepas, sal dit vir die bestuurder moontlik wees om 
te bepaal of ‗n PPV ‗n toepaslike diensleweringsvoertuig kan wees, en verder dat, 
indien ‗n PPV die gekose diensleweringsvoertuig is, die openbare bestuurder deur 
die toepassing van die susksesfaktore wat in hierdie proefskrif geïdentifiseer is ‗n 
groter kans sal hê vir suksesvolle implementering van die PPV deur doelgerigte 
samewerking. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
In October 2007, the Public-Private Partnership Unit of the South African National 
Treasury had 73 registered public-private partnership (PPP) projects on its books.  Of 
these 73 projects, 18 were already active and had a joint value of more than R31 
billion (PPPU, Nov 2007).  In January 2011, the list of national and local PPPs in 
South Africa stood at 75 and the construction phase of the R25 billion Gautrain PPP 
project was nearing completion (PPPU, 2011).  In March 2007, PartnershipsUK had a 
database of 820 British PPPs and PFIs (Private Finance Initiatives – another 
incarnation of the PPP) that were completed since 1987. There were 143 projects on 
the database covering the period 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2007 with a total capital 
value of £13.6 billion.  In January 2011, Local Partnerships LLP (one of the spin-outs 
of the by then dissolved PartnershipsUK) had a list of 410 local partnerships on their 
books (Local Partnerships, 2011), while InfrastructureUK (the other spin-out from 
PartnershipsUK) estimated that the private sector would be spending £2.8 billion 
worth of capital on PFIs in the 2011-2012 financial year (HM Treasury, 2011).  It is 
clear that with such interest and investment, PPPs have been and continues to be 
seen as appropriate vehicles for the delivery of public services in these two countries. 
 
The Public-Private Partnership has enjoyed sustained support over many years as a 
viable and desirable service delivery option in both the public and the private sector, 
and is seen as a valuable implementation tool by many developmental agencies.  
Although there is definite resistance against specific types of partnership in specific 
societies, partnerships seem to have won generally positive support.  Evidence of the 
popularity of PPPs as public service delivery instruments can be seen in the 
mechanisms put in place to promote PPPs in nations as disparate as Sweden, India, 
the USA, France, Italy, China, Latvia, Egypt and Sri Lanka.  Central institutions to 
promote PPPs have been set up in among others the UK, US, South Africa, Brazil, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Japan, the Czech Republic, Nigeria, Zambia, Mauritius, 
Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Egypt and Australia (see Annexure A: List of PPP 
enablers per country on page 552). 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
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It is not only countries that promote PPPs.  The United Nations Development 
Programme is actively advocating the value of PPPs and encouraging their use, 
while the World Bank runs courses and workshops on implementing PPPs and the 
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) has a unit 
focusing on supporting PPP development within its member states (Hawkesworth, 
2010).  Similarly, private sector companies also proudly proclaim their involvement in 
PPPs at every opportunity as a way of expressing that they are important players 
involved in big projects and big business.   
 
But how substantive is the success of PPPs?   
 
Pronouncements by political leaders, government officials, private sector institutions, 
members of civil society and even organized labour would have one believe that 
partnerships are seen as the great new hope for public service delivery. This opinion 
is expressed by presidents, ministers, mayors, officials, investors, contractors and 
CEOs.  Often the names of freshly established partnerships are unquestioningly used 
to show how beneficial public-private partnerships are – with no reflection on the 
actual success or otherwise of these partnerships.  Existence seems to be equated 
with success.  Whether there is much to show in terms of the real success of PPPs is 
open to debate because the real success or failure of these PPPs is not receiving 
much independent academic attention. It seems as if, as soon as the PPP has been 
established, with great fanfare and posturing, interest wanes and all the 
commentators move on to the next PPP launch. One could argue that the activities of 
a PPP following its establishment would surely have more bearing on the success of 
that partnership than the launching ceremony at its inception. 
 
A literature survey has shown that the real success of any particular PPP is rarely 
investigated in depth, and that comparisons between different PPPs in terms of their 
success are limited.  This is especially true in South Africa.  Criticism of the PPP 
model is however not unusual.  Despite the positive light in which PPPs are regarded 
in many countries, there is considerable resistance against and criticism of PPPs. 
Organized labour see PPPs as disguised privatization.  Their opinion is supported by 
some countries calling their central bodies that promote PPPs names such as the 
―Ministry of Privatization and Enterprise Restructuring‖ in Nigeria, but is contrasted by 
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the South Australian government when they state in their guideline to promote PPPs 
that they are opposed to privatization and do not see PPPs as privatization.  The 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), which describes public-private 
partnerships as "a form of privatization" – and they view privatization in a consistently 
negative light – have indicated that private sector participation should not replace 
government, but should complement government capacity (Phasiwe, 2005).  Cosatu 
economist Neva Makgetla said in 2005 that private-sector contractors often lied about 
their capacity to deliver, especially to poor areas. Makgetla said private delivery "is 
fine where it will not compromise development aims" (Phasiwe, 2005).  The criticism 
against PPPs is also evident in labour organizations‘ comments on the inability of 
PPPs to provide value for money (Hall, 2010). 
 
PPPs face more than economic policy challenges. According to Van Ham and 
Koppenjan (2001), increasing dependencies between public and private 
organizations in recent years have led to a growing need for public-private 
partnerships. They believe, however, that cultural and institutional differences 
between the public and private domain and, in addition, the difficulties of bringing the 
two together, constitute a serious threat to successful public-private partnership. The 
formation of these partnerships is further hampered by confusion regarding the 
concept of public-private partnership. Van Ham and Koppenjan (2001) argue that the 
predominant model of contracting out restricts rather than enhances public-private 
interaction. 
 
The South African Treasury describes a PPP as "[a] contractual arrangement 
between a public sector entity and a private sector entity whereby the private sector 
performs a departmental function in accordance with an output-based specification 
for a specified, significant period of time in return for a benefit, which is normally in 
the form of financial remuneration.  It furthermore involves a substantial transfer of all 
forms of project life cycle risk to the private sector.  The public sector retains a 
significant role in the partnership project either as the main purchaser of the services 
provided, or as the main enabler of the project" (Republic of South Africa, 2001:A3).  
The 2001 definition was taken further by a more specific and also more 
comprehensive definition in Treasury Regulation 16 of 2005 (Republic of South 
Africa, 2005: 43-44), in which it was indicated that ―PPP‖ means a commercial 
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transaction between an institution (defined as including departments, constitutional 
institutions and public entities) and a private party in terms of which the private party 
performs an institutional function on behalf of the institution; and / or acquires the use 
of state property for its own commercial purposes; and assumes substantial financial, 
technical and operational  risks in connection with the performance of the institutional 
function and/or use of state property; and receives a benefit for performing the 
institutional function or from utilising the state property, either by way of (i) 
consideration to be paid by the institution which derives from a revenue fund or, 
where the institution is a national government business enterprise or a provincial 
government business enterprise, from the revenues of such institution; or (ii) charges 
or fees to be collected by the private party from users or customers of a service 
provided to them; or (iii) a combination of such consideration and such charges or 
fees. 
 
The 2001 definition is more compact than the later definition but contains a reference 
to output as well as the continued involvement of the public partner which the later 
one does not.  The earlier definition is still technically correct because an entity falling 
within the ambit of the 2001 definition will also comply with the slightly broader 2005 
definition.  The more restrictive 2001 definition will be used as an initial working 
definition for PPPs in this dissertation due its simpler construction and ease of use as 
checklist – a role it will be required to play from the next paragraph.  The 2001 SA 
Treasury definition of PPP can be used to formulate a checklist to determine whether 
a partnership would qualify as a PPP.  Table 1-1 below illustrates how the 
components of the definition can become points to use to evaluate a partnership and 
decide whether one could classify the specific venture as a PPP.  It would be 
possible to take an example of a partnership and evaluate it against this 8-point 
checklist to determine whether it would classify as a PPP in terms of the SA Treasury 
PPP definition.  Although the SA Treasury PPP definition is a useful starting point, it 
is only used as a working definition at this stage of this dissertation.  The checklist 
provided above is therefore merely an early working concept that will be returned to 
at a later stage. 
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Table 1-1: Proposed checklist to classify a partnership as a PPP 
Requirements for partnership classification as PPP 
Complies: 
Yes  / No 
1 A contractual arrangement is in place Responses to 
each 
requirement in 
the definition 
can be inserted 
here and a 
partnership can 
be ―scored‖ to 
determine 
whether it could 
be classified as 
a PPP 
2 …between a public sector entity and a private sector entity… 
3 …whereby the private sector performs a departmental function…. 
4 …in accordance with an output-based specification…. 
5 …for a specified, significant period of time… 
6 …in return for a benefit, which is normally in the form of financial 
remuneration. 
7 There is a substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle risk to 
the private sector. 
8 The public sector retains a significant role in the partnership project 
either as the main purchaser of the services provided, or as the main 
enabler of the project. 
 
The goal of this dissertation is not to argue the case for PPPs as a service delivery 
vehicle for public services.  The intention is rather to recognize the PPP as an 
important service delivery option, and then to investigate ways of ensuring that (1) 
when public managers consider service delivery options they can make confident 
decisions about whether or not a PPP would be a good choice, and (2) when they 
choose or are compelled to use existing PPPs as delivery instruments, they have the 
best possible chance of ensuring successful implementation and value for money.  
Flowing from this, the real questions to be asked regarding existing PPPs are how 
many PPPs deliver on their promises, and what causes one PPP to succeed while 
others collapse or limp along dysfunctionally.  Such information would enable the 
extraction and formulation of critical success factors for PPPs. 
 
Importantly, the public sector manager should ultimately be less concerned with the 
service delivery vehicle than the service delivery outcome.  Whether a PPP is used to 
provide water, or whether water is provided directly by the private sector, the clean 
running water when the taps in a specific jurisdiction are opened, should be the 
primary concern of the public manager. The second concern of the public manager is 
that the water arrives at the user at the lowest cost possible and in the most effective 
and efficient manner.  It is the opinion of the researcher that the real success of a 
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PPP and any other public service delivery vehicle would be visible in improved 
service delivery with more efficient use of resources.  Public managers must be able 
to determine when the use of partnerships would be a good service delivery option, 
and also be able to identify critical factors that could lead to the success or failure of 
a partnership.  Public managers need to know the tool and when to use it, and when 
used, know how to manage it so that it has the best possible chance of success.  
With the sustained amount of interest PPPs continue to enjoy, recommendations for 
the successful implementation of PPPs and knowledge of the pitfalls to avoid, will be 
valuable information for public managers who might become involved in a PPP. 
 
The area of investigation in this research will be decidedly multi-disciplinary as both 
public and private approaches to PPPs will need to be considered, and additional 
fields of study beyond public and development management will need to be 
interrogated for possible learning points that can be applied to PPPs.  In essence the 
aim of the study is to arrive at critical success factors for PPPs through a process of 
deductive reasoning.  It is envisaged that many factors which can contribute to 
success or failure will be identified.  These factors can then be used to suggest the 
pitfalls to avoid and the elements to encourage in public service delivery 
partnerships. Recommendations can be made for the successful use of partnerships, 
and public sector managers can be advised on when PPPs would be appropriate 
delivery mechanisms for public services. 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The researcher‘s premise is that successful PPPs will exhibit certain common 
characteristics which, if replicated, could increase the chance of success of other 
PPPs.  The problem or research question to be addressed in this dissertation 
therefore is: 
 
―What are the critical factors that can be replicated that separate successful PPPs 
from PPPs that do not deliver or that collapse? 
 
At this stage it should be noted that no hypothesis will be stated at this stage in the 
dissertation as the study is exploratory and hypothesis-generating as opposed to 
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hypothesis-testing.  This type of approach is described by writers such as Mouton 
and Marais (1990: 36; 42).  A hypothesis will be developed as part of the conclusion 
of this study, which is partly also a study of evaluation. 
1.2 DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
It is the opinion of Mouton & Marais (1990: 36) that researchers frequently have to 
investigate phenomena about which few established models or theories exist.  The 
success or falure of PPPs can be seen as such a phenomenon.  In this type of 
situation, according to Mouton & Marais (1990: 36), researchers have to attempt to 
generate new models or hypotheses by using exploratory studies. Such models or 
hypotheses can then be used as point of departure in subsequent research.  As the 
intention of the researcher was to conduct such an exploratory study regarding 
critical success factors for PPPs, the research design for this study was adapted to 
this purpose. 
 
The aims of exploratory studies may be: 
 To gain new insights into the phenomenon; 
 To undertake a preliminary investigation before a more structured study of the 
phenomenon; 
 To explicate the central concepts and constructs; 
 To determine priorities for future research; 
 To develop new hypotheses about an existing phenomenon (Mouton & 
Marais, 1990: 42). 
 
As already stated, the aim of this study is to determine critical success factors for 
PPPs, which relates to gaining new insights into a phenomenon.  Subsidiary aims 
include determining priorities for future research and developing a new hypothesis on 
PPP success which can form the basis for future research.  Mouton and Marais 
(1990:43) indicate three methods by means of which exploratory research may be 
conducted: 
 A review of related social science and other pertinent literature; 
 A survey of people who have had practical experience of the problem to be 
studied; 
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 An analysis of ―insight stimulating‖ examples. 
 
All three of these methods will be implemented in this study.  Because exploratory 
studies usually lead to insight and comprehension rather than the collection of 
accurate and replicable data, these studies frequently involve the use of in-depth 
interviews, the analysis of case studies, and the use of informants.  Hypotheses tend 
to be developed as a result of such research, rather than the research being guided 
by hypotheses.  The most important research design considerations which apply here 
are the need to follow an open and flexible research strategy, and to use methods 
such as literature reviews, interviews, case studies, and informants, which may lead 
to insight and comprehension.  The best guarantee for the completion of an 
exploratory study is to be found in the researcher‘s willingness to examine new ideas 
and suggestions and to be open to new stimuli.  The major pitfall to avoid is allowing 
preconceived ideas or hypotheses to exercise a determining influence on the 
direction or nature of the research (Mouton & Marais, 1990: 43). 
 
The research question indicated in the previous section will thus be pursued through 
an exploratory comparative study of public-private partnerships where opinions and 
later research results will be used in a step-by-step evidence-building approach.  
Case studies identified through literature, observation, questionnaires and expert 
interviews will be evaluated against each other to determine whether any pattern 
manifests itself in terms of successful or unsuccessful partnerships.  In order to 
compare successful and failed partnerships a robust instrument will first have to be 
developed to objectively assess such partnerships.  Once a distinction has been 
made between success and failure, it will be important to consider a representative 
and balanced sample of partnerships, with a particular focus on South Africa as the 
primary research area.  International samples will be used to increase the depth of 
information where appropriate. 
 
Information from literature will be used alongside results of questionnaires and expert 
interviews throughout the document.  The qualitative data from expert interviews and 
the quantitative information from questionnaires will be required to support or contest 
information gathered from publications.  In this study there is a risk that documented 
information on PPPs can be particularly prone to subjective positive bias because it is 
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frequently in the best interest of all involved to present a positive picture even if the 
outcomes of a PPP are in fact not all that positive.  It may be difficult to find a 
balanced opinion in literature.  Special effort has therefore been made to collect 
authoritative sources of information along with the more easily available but possibly 
more biased sources.    The research is based on real practice and empirical 
research using experience and observation aimed at determining how substantive 
the success of the PPP is, and what can be done to increase the success of 
partnerships where they are used as service delivery mechanisms.  The fact that 
PPPs are dynamic organizational organisms that develop and change as they 
progress through life stages has two implications for the research design.  Firstly it 
will be necessary to pay specific attention to the description of life cycle stages of 
PPPs, and secondly it will be necessary to establish a regime to monitor the 
development of PPPs over the duration of this research project. 
1.3 ARGUMENT STRUCTURE 
In this introductory chapter (Chapter 1) PPPs will be defined, the evident popularity 
of partnerships in public service delivery will be discussed and the need for guidance 
on critical success factors for such partnerships will be motivated.  The chapter 
includes the problem statement, the research design and methodology and the 
argument structure that will be used. 
 
In Chapter 2 and 3 an overview of PPPs and other public service delivery 
partnerships will be presented with more detailed discussion on the types of 
partnerships that are found, and the purposes for which partnerships are used.  The 
variety of partnership forms, the history of partnerships and governance 
arrangements for partnerships will be discussed. Where opinions on success factors 
are prominent in this overview they will be recorded and listed at the end of the 
chapter for further discussion in later chapters and evaluation in chapter six. At the 
end of the chapter, a start will be made with the design of a framework for the 
evaluation of partnerships which will be further developed in later chapters for 
eventual use in evaluating case studies. 
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It is understandably difficult for those involved in partnerships to express objective 
opinions about the success or failure of those partnerships, while outside 
commentators may be motivated to be overly negative or positive about a specific 
partnership due to ideological or personal reasons.  It is expected that even 
partnerships which have been objectively judged as failed could get positive write-
ups on the websites and in the publications of the role-players involved.  Public 
relations practitioners associated with these role-players could arguably try to present 
anything their companies or organizations were involved in, in the most positive light 
possible. Nevertheless, success factors identified in literature, and specifically 
opinions without empirical base, may still provide direction for investigations into 
partnerships‘ success.  Therefore Chapter 4 is specifically intended to capture the 
opinions available in literature regarding success factors for partnerships, with a 
specific focus on opinions that are not clearly based on exhaustive research and 
which may also not be objective.  These opinions will be listed as an untested source 
of factors which will be analysed in later chapters.  In this chapter, perspectives from 
related disciplines and concepts will also be explored and where appropriate, added 
to the untested list of success factors.  Critical success factors that have been 
identified through case-study research and through other academically robust 
measures will be addressed in Chapter 5. The framework for partnership evaluation 
that was commenced in Chapter 2 will be expanded at the end of Chapter 4 and will 
be the main topic of discussion in the next chapter.  
 
In order to be able to compare successful and failed partnerships, it is necessary to 
have a reliable way to differentiate between success and failure and to measure 
performance.  The goal of Chapter 5 is to discuss ways of evaluating partnerships 
and to define an appropriate success measure for partnerships, with the bulk of the 
chapter dedicated to discussing what exactly would constitute a failed or successful 
partnership and how one would recognize the success or failure of a partnership.  
The argument will be based on information gathered through literature study, 
questionnaires and interviews.  Upon the conclusion of the chapter a simple and 
robust success measurement instrument will be proposed.  Once again, where 
success factors become apparent in the discussion, they will be listed at the end of 
the chapter for analysis in later chapters. 
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In Chapter 6 several examples of partnerships will be discussed, based on the 
success measuring instrument developed in Chapter 5.  Several examples each of 
apparently failed or successful partnerships will be described. The examples will be 
chosen to provide as representative a sample as possible from a wide variety of 
countries, sectors and types. Particular attention will be paid to presenting a wide 
variety of examples from South Africa. The discussion will be based on findings from 
research described in literature, from expert interviews and questionnaires, and from 
direct observation by the researcher.  Success factors will be collected from each 
case study and listed at the end of the chapter for further discussion in Chapter 7.  
 
In Chapter 7 success factors identified in all previous chapters through literature 
study, expert interviews and questionnaires as well as case study analysis in 
literature and through direct observation will be compared in an effort to see whether 
any pattern can be discerned regarding factors that influence the success of 
partnerships.  Where patterns become apparent, the success factors that define 
those patterns will be captured and listed for further discussion in Chapter 8.  
 
In Chapter 8 the results of the pattern search from the previous chapters will be 
consolidated and presented with the aim of identifying critical success factors for 
public service delivery partnerships. Identified critical success factors will be 
discussed. The chapter will also summarize the research question, premise, research 
methodology and arguments presented in this dissertation, and will present the 
conclusions regarding critical success factors for public service delivery partnerships 
with a related hypothesis on the critical success factors for public-private partnerships 
and similar instruments.  Owing to the exploratory nature of the study, the hypothesis 
will only be generated in this chapter, based on the insights stemming from the 
search for critical success factors up to that stage. 
 
This study will contribute to the public management body of knowledge by covering 
new ground in terms of the evaluation and management of public-private 
partnerships.  Figure 1.1 on page 23 illustrates how evidence will be collected and 
filtered as the discussion progresses through the chapters as described above. 
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Figure 1.1: Layers of evidence in which success factors are identified also act as filters.  Each 
success factor gains legitimacy if confirmed through other filtering levels. 
1.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter the concept and apparent popularity of the Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP) as a vehicle for public service delivery was introduced.  A working definition of 
a PPP was established and a checklist was provided which can be used to determine 
whether a specific partnership or venture can be classified as a PPP.  The aim of this 
dissertation was established as the determination of factors that can contribute to or 
detract from the success of PPPs.  It was made clear that this dissertation is not 
aimed at supporting or discrediting PPPs, but rather at equipping public managers to 
know when a PPP will be an appropriate service delivery vehicle, and how a PPP can 
be managed most successfully once it has been chosen as service delivery vehicle.  
The problem statement was discussed and the research question to be answered 
through this dissertation was indicated as: ―What are the critical factors that can be 
replicated that separate successful PPPs from PPPs that do not deliver or that 
collapse?‖  The research design and methodology implemented was described and 
the argument structure used within the dissertation was explained.  In the next 
chapter, Chapter 2, a detailed overview of public-private partnerships will be 
 
Success factors from literature 
 
Success factors from PPP Examples / Case studies 
 
Success factors from Interviews 
Layers of evidence 
 
Critical Success Factors 
FILTERING ADDITION 
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presented to set the scene for further discussion of factors that influence the success 
or failure of PPPs. 
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Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 26 
2 PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: AN OVERVIEW 
In this chapter an overview of PPPs and other public service delivery partnerships will 
be presented with more detailed discussion of the types of partnerships that are 
found, and the purposes for which partnerships are used.  The variety of partnership 
forms and governance arrangements will be discussed. Where opinions on success 
factors are prominent in this overview they will be recorded and listed at the end of 
the chapter for further discussion in later chapters and evaluation in chapter six.  The 
aim of this dissertation is to identify critical success factors for public-private 
partnerships and other public service delivery partnerships.  In the previous chapter 
the SA Treasury definition of a PPP was presented as a working definition that will be 
used in this dissertation. In this chapter a more in-depth analysis of definitions 
relating to PPPs will be presented. 
2.1 THE HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIPS 
Opinions in literature that the PPP is a relatively new policy tool, are in contrast with 
other opinions that discuss the evolution of PPPs and see them not only as well-
known in public management history, but also as truly ancient ways of delivering 
public services and products.  The following table references the periods that will be 
discussed in the rest of this section.  It should be noted that the intention is not to 
create a chronological account of partnership history, but rather to illustrate that 
partnership in producing public service is not a new invention. 
 
Table 2-1: A summarised partnership timeline 
Time period Partnership examples 
1200 BC Egyptian use of mercenary armies 
600 BC Private medical practitioners contracted by Greek city-states 
580 BC Vassals of Babylonian and Persian empires, Persian public enterprises 
500 BC Water supply and public baths of Greek city-states 
330 BC Public management as a partnership 
1290 Water supply to Southampton by Church 
1500 Mercenary armies 
1585 Contracted private warships 
1600s to 1800s Privateers / Corsairs 
1602 VOC established 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
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Time period Partnership examples 
1800s Private prisons 
1890 – 1910 Public street car systems built in Paris 
1894 Electric tramway concession awarded to private person by Cape Town City 
Council 
1930s Political systems encouraging exclusionary public-private partnerships, e.g. 
Fascism in Italy 
1990s Reinventing Government movement promotes the PPP 
 
Early references to partnership include Aristotle calling the state a partnership of 
citizens (Aristotle, ca 335-323 BC: 53; Clayton, 2005).  From Aristotle‘s statement 
one could venture to say that public management in itself is a partnership.  It is the 
community working together to achieve common goals though collective action, 
appointing representatives to manage activities to achieve those goals.  Not all 
collective actions in different communities would take the same form, so there must 
be a continuum of partnership from a lower level to a higher level of cooperation 
between partners, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
The level of cooperation within a partnership is but one dimension of the character of 
a partnership.  Other dimensions of character will be identified in later sections.  
Based on Aristotle‘s statement and from a purely historic perspective, one would 
have to disagree with the assertion of Linder and Vaillancourt Rosenau (2000:2) that 
―[p]ublic-private partnerships were relatively rare in the past and the private sector 
hardly ever took on the admittedly few public responsibilities that did exist, not even 
for pay‖.  There are ample examples of structures, organizations and agreements 
similar to the modern-day PPP that existed more than a century ago.  Perhaps not 
called by the same name and recognized as such, PPPs nevertheless existed in 
large enough numbers and frequently enough to discredit any opinion that PPPs are 
new. 
Low level of 
cooperation 
High level of 
cooperation 
Figure 2.1: A basic continuum of cooperation within partnerships 
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One could argue that because these examples were not called PPPs, mainly 
because the concept of the formal PPP with a prescriptive definition attached to it is a 
recent development, one could not call historic partnerships PPPs. The counter-
argument is that one should see the definition as a guideline and then apply it to 
historical partnership examples – if the definition fits, then the name can surely also 
be applied.  In this dissertation past examples of partnerships that exhibit the 
characteristics of PPPs will be regarded as PPPs and will therefore add valuable 
insight to the exploration of the success or failure of PPPs.  The 8-point checklist 
developed in Chapter 1 from the SA Treasury PPP definition (see Table 1-1 on page 
16), can assist in determining whether past and even ancient partnerships would 
have qualified as PPPs if classified according to today‘s definition.  If a PPP is a 
formalized type of partnership between a public and a private entity, then a 
continuum of formalization with partnerships must exist in the same way that a 
continuum of cooperation exists.  Formalization implies the formal establishment of a 
contract as well as operating rules for a partnership.  It is conceivable that a 
partnership can be highly formalized or informal, and the continuum of formalization 
that this implies is illustrated in Figure 2.2 below. 
 
 
 
 
Formalization, then, is a second dimension of the character of a partnership after 
cooperation.  Returning to the historical cases of partnerships and PPPs, the 
argument that the PPP is not a new invention is supported by Linder and Vaillancourt 
Rosenau (2000:2) themselves when they admit that ―[p]rivate, for-profit prisons are 
not an entirely new invention.‖ Together with Schneider (2000:199–215) they 
acknowledge, for example, that private prisons were the norm in the 19th century.  
Buisson (2006:2) stresses the fact that the PPP is not a new concept.  According to 
him, most streetcar systems in France from 1890 to 1910 were built and operated by 
private concessionaires, often linked to electricity suppliers, rolling-stock 
Low level of 
formalization 
High level of 
formalization 
Figure 2.2: A basic continuum of formalization within partnerships 
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manufacturers or real-estate promoters. In Paris, the Metro‘s tunnel, tracks, energy, 
signalling, rolling-stock, and other elements were built by the private operator, a 
Belgian entrepreneur. 
 
From the colonial powers of the 17th and 18th centuries, to the pirates of the 
Caribbean, to the building of nuclear reactors, to the conservation of endangered 
species, public-private partnerships have more variety in implementation and history 
than generally realized.  The background and history of public-private partnerships 
will be discussed in this section – first in general and then with particular reference to 
partnerships in disaster risk reduction because of the researcher‘s personal 
experience in the disaster risk reduction field.  In the following subsections historical 
examples of PPPs will be described to further substantiate the opinion that PPPs do 
not constitute a new public management invention. 
2.1.1 Pirates, privateers and partnerships 
Early examples of governments assigning responsibilities for the delivery of 
traditionally public services (in this case the military protection and expansion of 
foreign trade routes) to private entities (in this case ship owners and operators) 
include the ―privateers‖ of the 17th and 18th centuries.  A privateer was a private 
warship authorised by a national government. At the time, many merchant vessels 
were armed with cannons, and naval officers and ratings expected to benefit from 
prize money if they captured an enemy ship. The privateer was distinguished by the 
legal framework he operated in—authorised to attack enemy shipping and be treated 
as prisoners of war if captured.  If war was not declared, or if the privateer preyed on 
neutral shipping, the privateer would be treated as a pirate by the enemy (Privateer, 
2008).  The privateer was an early sort of commerce raider, interrupting enemy trade, 
and was of great benefit to a smaller naval power, or one facing an enemy dependent 
on trade: they disrupted commerce and hence enemy tax revenue, and forced the 
enemy to deploy warships to protect merchant trade. Privateering was a way of 
mobilizing armed ships and sailors without spending public money or commissioning 
naval officers (Privateer, 2008).  
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 30 
Privateering was authorized through a letter of marque.  A letter of marque is an 
official warrant or commission from a government authorizing the designated agent to 
search, seize, or destroy specified assets or personnel belonging to a foreign party 
who has committed some offence under the laws of nations against the assets or 
citizens of the issuing nation, and was used to authorize private parties to raid and 
capture merchant shipping of an enemy nation.  A ship operating under a letter of 
marque and reprisal was privately owned and was called a "private man-of-war" or 
"privateer." The French sometimes used the term lettre de course for its letters of 
marque, giving rise to the term corsair (Letter of Marquee, 2008).   
 
The formal statement of the warrant was to authorize the agent to pass beyond the 
borders of the nation ("marque" or frontier), and there to search, seize or destroy an 
enemy's vessel or fleet. It was considered a retaliatory measure short of a full 
declaration of war, and, by maintaining a rough proportionality, was intended to justify 
the action to other nations, who might otherwise consider it an act of war or piracy.  
As with a domestic search, arrest, seizure, or death warrant, to be considered lawful, 
it needed to have a certain degree of specificity to ensure that the agent does not 
exceed the intent of the issuing authority.  A letter of marque given to Captain 
Antoine Bollo, via the ship owner Dominique Malfino from Gena, owner of the Furet, 
a 15-tonne privateer, on 27 February 1809 is illustrated in Figure 2.3 on page 31.  In 
current-day terminology, the letter of marque can be viewed as a founding document 
for a PPP between a government and a private entity for the delivery of a duty or 
service that would normally be delivered by a government itself. 
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Figure 2.3: Letter of Marque 
 
Agreements that corresponded with modern-day governance arrangements for PPPs 
thus existed as far back as the 1600s.  Even earlier, in the Spanish war of 1585 to 
1603, kings and queens chartered private ships for their war efforts. The English fleet 
under Drake that defeated the Spanish Armada in 1588 consisted of 197 ships, of 
which 163 were privately owned (Hodge & Greve, 2005:25, 28). 
 
The eight-point checklist proposed in Chapter 1 can now be used to determine 
whether the privateer arrangement would qualify as a PPP today.  In the table below, 
each requirement has been addressed and is positive, therefore qualifying the 
privateer arrangement as a PPP. 
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Table 2-2: Checklist to classify a partnership as a PPP: The Privateer Arrangement 
Requirements for partnership classification as PPP: 
THE PRIVATEER ARRANGEMENT, 1600’s – 1800’s 
Complies: 
Yes  / No 
1 A contractual arrangement is in place Yes 
2 …between a public sector entity and a private sector entity… Yes 
3 …whereby the private sector performs a departmental function…. Yes 
4 …in accordance with an output-based specification…. Yes 
5 …for a specified, significant period of time… Yes 
6 …in return for a benefit, which is normally in the form of financial 
remuneration. 
Yes 
7 There is a substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle risk to the 
private sector. 
Yes 
8 The public sector retains a significant role in the partnership project either 
as the main purchaser of the services provided, or as the main enabler of 
the project. 
Yes 
 
The letter of marque was the founding document and contractual arrangement for the 
PPP.  The state was involved and came to an agreement with the private owner of a 
ship.  The private owner performed a function normally performed by a governmental 
military force.  Specific outputs were expected of the privateer and a specific time 
frame was set for the agreement.  The privateer stood to benefit significantly in the 
financial sense if successful, but was exposed to significant financial and even 
physical risk in the process.  Finally, the government retained a significant role by 
having the power to revoke the agreement and by sharing in the ―profits‖ of the 
privateer, and also by sharing intelligence with the privateers.  If not in name, then at 
least in function and operation, the PPP is thus definitely a much earlier public 
service delivery mechanism than generally accepted.  
 
It is now opportune to return to the earlier discussion on continuums of formalization 
and cooperation, called dimensions of the character of a partnership in the previous 
subsection.  The partnership examples described above exhibit differing degrees of 
cooperation and formalization.  The two continuums of formalization and cooperation 
described in this section can be combined into a two-dimensional continuum and one 
would be able to place these examples on this continuum according to their levels of 
cooperation and formalization as illustrated below. 
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A chartered warship falling under direct control of a military officer such as an admiral 
would be involved in a highly formalized partnership that required intense levels of 
cooperation during battles at sea.  Such an arrangement would thus fall in the top 
right of the continuum. 
 
The private prisons mentioned in this section would also require significant levels of 
both formalization and cooperation but perhaps less so than in a military battle 
scenario.  It is possible that different prisons, depending on the type of inmate and 
the required relationship with law enforcement and judicial authorities in the specific 
jurisdiction, could exhibit differing levels of cooperation with the public sector and 
differing levels of formalization of the relationship with the public setor.  The privateer, 
in contrast, received a mandate and could then operate independently for months 
and even years, so although the relationship was highly formalized, direct 
Low level of 
formalization 
High level of 
cooperation 
Low level of 
cooperation 
High level of 
formalization 
Private 
Prisons 
Privateer
s 
Chartered 
war ships 
Figure 2.4: A two-dimensional continuum of cooperation and formalization within partnerships 
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cooperation with the public sector could be intermittent.  The privateer arrangement 
would thus fall in the middle-right part of the continuum.  This continuum will be 
discussed and developed further at a later stage.  At this point it is appropriate to 
return to the history of partnerships, and in the next subsection political systems that 
encourage public-private partnerships will be discussed. 
2.1.2 Political systems encouraging public-private partnerships 
Political systems from the 1930‘s that were supportive of public-private partnerships 
further support the argument that the PPP is not a new construct.  Some economists, 
in their description of fascism, make fascism sound like the ultimate public-private 
partnership among elites.  Fascists claimed to provide a realistic economic alternative 
that was neither laissez-faire capitalism nor communism (Morgan, 2003:168).  An 
inherent aspect of the fascist economy was economic dirigisme, meaning an 
economy where the government exerts strong directive influence, and effectively 
controls production and allocation of resources (Berend, 2005:93).  In general, apart 
from the nationalization of some industries, fascist economies were based on private 
property and private initiative, but these were contingent upon service to the state 
(Gregor, 2006:7). Fascism operated from a Social Darwinist view of human relations. 
Its aim was to promote "superior" individuals and weed out the weak (De Grand, 
1995:47).  
 
In terms of economic practice, this meant promoting the interests of successful 
businessmen while destroying trade unions and other organizations of the working 
class (De Grand, 1995:47). Lawrence Britt suggests that protection of corporate 
power is an essential part of fascism (2003:20).  Historian Gaetano Salvemini argued 
in 1936 that fascism makes taxpayers responsible to private enterprise, because ―the 
State pays for the blunders of private enterprise ... Profit is private and individual. 
Loss is public and social" (Salvemini, 1936).   It is of course not only the fascist 
political system that supports public-private partnership.  The liberal political-
economic policies of the United States under President Bill Clinton saw solid 
institutional support for partnerships.  It is also in this period that Osborne and 
Gaebler‘s ―Reinventing Government‖ came out in strong support of partnering 
between the public and private sectors.  The United Kingdom is another major 
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economy that has exhibited consistent support from its political system for PPPs (or 
PFIs), despite changes in the governing party from Conservative to Labour and back 
to a Conservative-led coalition.  At this time it is useful to reflect that the degree to 
which the political system within a country supports partnerships can be represented 
on a continuum from no or little support to strong support.   
 
 
 
 
This analysis provides a dimension of analysis of partnerships that relate more to the 
environment of the partnership and the characteristics of that environment than the 
characteristics of the partnership itself. The environment of a PPP can have 
significant impact on its success and wil be discussed in more detail at a later stage. 
The figure below illustrates how the dimensions of the character of partnerships can 
be combined in one analysis with the characteristics of the external environment. 
 
 
In the figure, the name of the partnership can be indicated in the blue circle. 
Dimensions of partnership characteristics can then be analysed in the area under the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dimensions of the character of the partnership 
Dimensions of the character of the partnership environment 
 
Partnership 
Level of support 
Level of Cooperation Level of Formalization 
Figure 2.5: A basic continuum of support for PPPs within a country’s political system 
Low level of 
support 
High level of 
support 
Figure 2.6: Dimensions of partnership and environment character 
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line, and dimensions of the characteristics of the environment can then be analysed 
in the area above the line.  The three character dimensions already identified are 
indicated in the respective areas.  One would now be able to use the arrows moving 
from the blue circle representing the partnership as the axis of the continuums for 
formalization, cooperation and support.  An example could thus look as follows: 
 
 
 
The red diamond on each line or dimension represents the degree to which a 
partnership or its environment exhibits the specific dimension of character indicated 
by the flags.  Each dimension has a score attached to it on a spiderweb chart, 
indicated by the position of a diamond on the line.  The closer to the blue circle or the 
centre of the web the diamond is, the lower the level that the partnership exhibits on 
the specific dimension, the closer the diamond is to the flag, the higher the level. 
 
The above figure can be simplified by using a figure as presented below with a 
simple ten-point scale applied to each dimension.  In this specific diagram, only three 
dimensions are indicated as an example.  A fictional ―Partnership X‖ is used as an 
example to illustrate how a partnership could be characterized by assigning values to 
its character pertaining to each character dimension. 
Figure 2.7: Example of dimensions of character diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dimensions of the character of the partnership 
Dimensions of the character of the partnership environment 
 
Partnership 
X 
Level of support 
Level of Cooperation Level of Formalization 
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Figure 2.8: Character dimensions of partnerships 
 
Returning to the historical analysis of partnerships, political systems that specifically 
encourage public-private partnerships, however nefarious the goals and however 
exclusive the benefit, again support the argument that public-private partnership is 
not a ―new‖ or even recent invention.    In the next section, arrangements similar to 
PPPs are traced as far back as ancient Egyptian times. 
2.1.3 Mercenary armies in partnership with governments 
The mercenary army presents another historic and ancient example of public-private 
partnership.  They also present an interesting contrast to the assumption (to be 
discussed in more detail elsewhere) that private entities deliver better quality services 
than public ones.  In the partnerships between governments and mercenary armies 
there are grounds for assuming that private-sector organizations would be less 
committed than their public counterparts in delivering the service they are contracted 
for.  Linder and Vaillancourt Rosenau (2000:3) describe how mercenary armies were 
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accused of generally putting personal individual interest first.  This is supported in a 
related quote from Machiavelli (1995:38)1:  
Anyone who relies on mercenary troops to keep himself in power will never be 
safe or secure, for they are factious, ambitious, ill-disciplined, treacherous… In 
peacetime they pillage you, in wartime they let the enemy do it.  This is why:  
They have no motive or principle for joining up beyond the desire to collect 
their pay.  And what you pay them is not enough to make them want to die for 
you. 
 
While private organizations may protest the company they are assigned, the 
classification of the relationships between governments and mercenary armies as 
public service delivery partnerships is still valid because the relationship would 
necessarily need to involve much more than just a paper contract.  The Satraps (or 
vassals) of the Babylonian and Persian empires also reminds one of partnership 
models. In the book Cyropedia written by Xenophon (circa 431–355 BC) an Athenian 
gentleman-soldier, the writer describes the vassal Cyrus the Great (circa 580–530 
BC). The Phoenician colony of Carthage used mercenary armies and income from 
trade to maintain power.  Before the Phoenicians, the first evidence of which places 
them as far back as 1200 BC, it was the Egyptians who used mercenary armies.  
 
In as far as the Egyptian monarchs and their appointed officials can be considered as 
public sector, and in as far as mercenary army commanders can be considered 
private, the use of mercenary armies by the ancient Egyptian civilization can be 
considered as at least contracting-out of traditional public responsibilities and at most 
public-private partnerships (Perl & Weihs, 1990).  This puts service delivery 
mechanisms akin to PPPs at the very dawn of civilization.  The use of private 
enterprise to deliver public goods also ventured into the public health domain in 
ancient times - Greek city-states provided public physicians (Porter, 1999:12), the 
Incas instituted an annual health ceremony which included cleaning all homes 
(Porter, 1999:13), and in Mediterranean Europe from about 600 BC individual cities 
                                            
 
 
1
 This work was originally written in Italian in 1513 and published by Antonio Blado d‘Asolo of Florence 
in 1532, the reference used here is to a reproduction of the original work. 
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began to appoint a physician who was paid an annual salary from local taxation but 
was still allowed to work for private fees as well (Porter, 1999:17).  In the next section 
the discussion turns away from a specific time period to the very mundane and 
everyday transactions between suppliers and customers that have been part of 
human life from time immemorial. 
2.1.4 Partnerships between suppliers and customers 
The relationship between suppliers and their customers can be equated with 
partnership. 
 
One trend today in modern business practice is based around partnerships 
between suppliers and customers.  To enjoy a long term relationship, both 
buyer and seller must reach mutual agreement about the business being 
transacted – not just price but a range of terms, conditions and other related 
ingredients.  To do that, they negotiate.  The skill of the negotiators will 
determine whether that relationship succeeds or fails. (Oliver, 2003:2) 
 
The way in which Oliver restricts these partnerships between suppliers and 
customers to ―modern business‖ can be questioned.  Trade has been part of human 
society since the dawn of time and it would be hard to imagine trade during the 
centuries happening without negotiation and a mutually acceptable outcome. 
 
Negotiation is a transaction in which both parties have a veto on the final 
outcome.  It requires voluntary consent on both sides.  It is a give and take 
process where the actual conditions of a transaction are agreed.  It is the act 
or process of bargaining to reach mutually acceptable agreement or objective. 
(Oliver, 2003:3) 
 
If a partnership is said to exist between customers and suppliers then the public 
sector, as a purchaser of certain private sector products and services, can already be 
said to be in partnership with the private sector.  Similarly, the private sector is often 
a customer of the public sector for services and infrastructure provision and one 
could thus talk of a deepened long-existing partnership between the public and 
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private sectors.  Whether this long-standing transactional partnership can be typified 
as a public-private partnership in as far as the term is used and understood in this 
dissertation is however arguable.  If considered on an individual basis, there may 
however be instances where such transactional partnerships have evolved to 
something that could very closely resemble a PPP.  Where the transaction is a 
complex and long-term project, the opportunity for evolution into a PPP is of course 
more than in a simple short-term transaction.  The current practice in Cape Town, 
where property developers can only develop a specific area after funding or 
physically establishing public infrastructure to be used by the new residents, such as 
roads and stormwater systems, is a case in point.  In the next sections the discussion 
returns to more partnerships in ancient times. 
2.1.5 Water Management in ancient Greece 
The way in which the supply of fresh water was managed in ancient Greece presents 
another example of an evolved partnership that approaches the description of a PPP.  
 
We are just beginning to realize that the development and ownership of water 
resources came not by ‗natural rights‘ nor a series of actions, but by conscious 
decisions of the social group and of individuals.  The community organized 
labor, materials, and money.  They worked out the legal aspects of ownership, 
maintenance and control. (Crouch, 1993:24) 
 
It is argued that the Greek communities learned that it was most effective to allocate 
some tasks, such as building and maintaining cisterns (underground storage tanks) 
to individuals.  Ordinary cistern water was private but had to be shared when the 
survival of the group was at stake. There is legal evidence from Athens that people 
were required to share well water with neighbours whose well or cistern had gone 
dry.  Public baths were present in the 5th century BC and the community also 
recognized the necessity of working together and spending common funds on water 
supply and drainage for common benefit (Crouch, 1993:26–27, 31). 
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2.1.6 The Roman Circus 
In the Roman Empire, cities were governed by the well-to-do, who formed a small 
ruling circle allied sympathetically to the central administration of Rome and later 
Constantinople (Tomlinson, 1992:11–12).  The games later known as the Roman 
Circus originated in religious ritual, but by the time of the Empire had developed into 
mass, popular entertainment. Tomlinson describes how a political breakdown caused 
by the transformation of the political role of the city (and that means of its citizens as 
inhabitants) inevitably caused a crucial change in its social conditions.  ―If our 
beginning is with the apparently autocratic system of the late Bronze Age, we run the 
whole range of political development in the cities, through controlling aristocracies, to 
broader-based citizen administration, back to aristocracies (or plutocracies) to 
outright autocracy again‖ (Tomlinson, 1992:12). 
 
The application of the PPP checklist already mentioned in earlier sections of this 
chapter to the Roman Circus will give an indication of whether it could be 
characterized as a PPP.  A contractual arrangement was in place between the state 
and the providers of the entertainment – the gladiator and charioteer masters.  
Certain departmental responsibilities, such as the execution of criminals or the 
condemned, were carried out on behalf of the state by individuals fighting for their 
own lives.  The fact that the masses were entertained and kept happy was another 
goal of the state which was pursued on its behalf by the Circus. The output-based 
specification was clear and permanent to the losing party: death.  The duties carried 
out within the circus were only allowed for the duration of the ―entertainment‖ so a 
specified period of time was indicated.  Furthermore, gladiator masters received 
contracts over extended periods of time to provide their specific brand of 
entertainment.  Survival was perhaps the most important benefit for those 
participating in the games, while the gladiator masters stood to gain considerable 
financial benefits.  The gladiator masters had to take on board all the risks associated 
with sourcing the fighters and bringing them to the games in good condition, and had 
to provide training, meals and accommodation.  They could also lose their fighters in 
the Circus.  The state was not exposed to any physical risk.  
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The public sector, in the guise of the Roman leadership, still played a significant role 
in the Circus, attended events and made decisions on the survival or execution of 
participants in the game. 
 
Table 2-3: Checklist to classify a partnership as a PPP: The Roman Circus 
Requirements for partnership classification as PPP: 
THE ROMAN CIRCUS 
Complies: 
Yes  / No 
1 A contractual arrangement is in place Yes 
2 …between a public sector entity and a private sector entity… Yes 
3 …whereby the private sector performs a departmental function…. Yes 
4 …in accordance with an output-based specification…. Yes 
5 …for a specified, significant period of time… Yes 
6 …in return for a benefit, which is normally in the form of financial 
remuneration. 
Yes 
7 There is a substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle risk to the 
private sector. 
Yes 
8 The public sector retains a significant role in the partnership project either 
as the main purchaser of the services provided, or as the main enabler of 
the project. 
Yes 
 
By using the PPP checklist above, it is in fact possible to classify the Roman Circus 
as a PPP according to the SA Treasury PPP definition. 
2.1.7 Olympic Games and other major sporting events 
The first celebration of the Olympic Games occurred in 776 BC and this mix of public 
and private enterprise, individual effort and communal entertainment can be seen as 
an early variation on the PPP.  In modern-day major sporting events such as the 
Olympic Games and Soccer World Cup, this pattern continues as such events 
require carefully integrated public and private efforts from a host nation to ensure a 
successful event.  The successful staging of the 2010 FIFA World Cup™ in South 
Africa required unprecedented cooperation between the public and private sectors, 
while the 2008 Athens Olympics required significant investments from the private and 
public sector in Greece. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 43 
2.1.8 Constructing public buildings in ancient Greek and Roman times 
The construction of public buildings in the city-states of ancient Greece and the far-
flung colonies and settlements of the Roman empires also bear comparison with 
partnerships between public and private entities.  In ancient democracies proposals 
were placed before the popular assembly and voted on; buildings might then be put 
up from the resources of the state, but these resources were frequently exiguous in a 
society that avoided direct taxation as far as possible, and even in the democracies 
the wealth of individuals still contributed much to building. This represents a 
partnership between the state and its private citizens. In the Hellenistic kingdoms, 
state financial reserves were considerable (a legacy from the Persian system), and 
under the control of the kings, so that royal state financing was possible.  Much of 
Alexandria must have been constructed from central, royal funds even though a 
distinct city administration seems to have existed, at least at first.   
 
Elsewhere, in what could be typified as partnerships between satellite states and the 
king, independent cities relied essentially on their own resources, but were avid to 
acquire subsidies from the kings, playing them (and their desire for support) off 
against one another.  The result was that, in favoured localities, small towns and 
cities could achieve an architectural solidity that was obviously beyond their own 
means.  Places which could not get royal support, naturally continued in the old-
fashioned style (Tomlinson, 1992:15).  In frontier provinces, the army provided what 
amounts to a free building service.  For most of the Empire though, local funding was 
employed.  Thanks to the Roman peace, this could be extensive, and a matter of 
obligation imposed on local aristocrats (Tomlinson, 1992:15).  Design of buildings 
and layout of streets were at times an organized responsibility subject to political 
control and carried out by professionals (Tomlinson, 1992:15).  Most Greek cities, 
whether governed by the mass of their citizens or a more exclusive elite, entrusted 
political business to a council, whose size varied  from place to place but often had 
500 members, as in Athens, (Tomlinson, 1992:23).  As much as a quarter of the total 
area of a city was devoted to public buildings.  In the Greek city-state prior to the 12th 
century BC, the palace was equated with the administration (Tomlinson, 1992:38). 
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2.1.9 The provision of water after Roman decline 
―With the decline of Roman municipal administration the task of providing a public 
water supply was often taken up by the church‖ writes Porter (1999:29) about 
Medieval Europe.  ―The Franciscan friary, for example, supplied Southampton with 
water from 1290‖.  Although no public sector is involved here, due to the decline and 
loss of power, a partnership arrangement is still observable. 
2.1.10 Bubonic plague response 
The emphasis on controlling the movements and lodging of healthy and sick 
individuals during episodes of plague during the Middle Ages reflected a clear belief 
in the spread of plague through direct contact, and lead to a public health partnership 
arrangement between state and church.  The rulers of European inland city-states 
had sufficient power to impose (assumedly necessary) strict policing upon their 
citizens and enforce it through armed militia.  The rulers then used the religious 
authorities to provide surveillance and intelligence.  This collaboration equates to a 
partnership between state and church to protect public health.  Numerous Italian city-
states began providing lzarettos (sick houses) to house plague victims in the late 
fifteenth century and, like Florence, created semi-permanent public health officials 
serving on health boards to institute new plague regulations. In smaller towns, ‗local 
gentlemen‘ were appointed as public health officers in times of epidemics.  While 
physicians were consulted for their advice, the health boards were entirely political 
bodies administered by the local nobility or their patrician delegates. It has been 
argued that the plague founded public health as a function of the modern state, 
aimed at the management of the relationship between disease and social disorder 
(Porter, 1999:35–37, 42).  
2.1.11 Early public enterprises 
Farazmand argues that recognisable public enterprises existed as long ago as the 
Persian Empire, in the fourth and fifth centuries BC, and these were established 
partly for national prestige purposes (1996:2–3). 
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2.1.12 Recent international trends 
Commentators have indicated that, for whatever reason, the enthusiasm for the 
private sector playing a greater role worldwide in the policy sector has been 
overwhelming over the last decades (Barker, 1996; Linder & Vaillancourt Rosenau, 
2000:4; Schultze, 1977).  According to these commentators, the drive to the 
privatization of public services has been apparent at every level of government.  They 
argue that this course of action involves deregulation, policy decentralization, 
downsizing of government, outsourcing of public services, and privatization of sectors 
previously assumed to be what economists called natural monopolies including gas, 
electricity and telephones (Linder & Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:4). 
 
Incidentally, in remarking on these trends Linder and Vaillancourt Rosenau also show 
the propensity for many commentators to equate public-private partnership with 
privatization.  Whether PPPs are in fact equal to privatization will be discussed in 
more detail later.   According to these writers, there has been extensive debate on 
which civic responsibilities the public and private sectors respectively are best suited 
to deliver.  They point out that the debate has included public safety, national 
defence, health care, housing and urban development, social services, education and 
recreation (Linder & Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:3; Machan, 1995; Savas, 1987:223).  
Linder and Vaillancourt Rosenau (2002:2) state that the norm has been a relatively 
clear separation of the private and public sectors, but cautions that this does not 
mean that the definition of what is private and what is public has been stable over 
time: ―Some of what we consider public functions, today, were private in the past.‖ 
 
Examples of the flux between what is public and what is private include the 
privatization of jury trials in California (Linder & Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:5; 
Jacobs, 1997) and a global trend towards the privatization of utilities (electricity, 
water, gas, transportation) (Linder & Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:5; Moffett,1998).  
Other cited examples relate to local level outsourcing in the US, increasing to include 
close to 600 cities by 1992 (Daley, 1996; Linder & Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:2).  At 
the opposite side of the scale, nationalization of companies would create conditions 
with a large public or government sector.  
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In 2000, McQuaid wrote that partnership approaches have received widespread 
support from across the political spectrum, including policy makers, officials and local 
communities.  He professed that they would likely remain high on the policy agenda 
at all levels.  Nine years later, in 2009, these words were supported by the efforts of 
President Barack Obama of the United States to assist private industrial and financial 
entities to survive the global economic meltdown.  In South Africa, in 2009, the 
Department of Provincial and Local Government was renamed the Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, confirming the primacy of the 
cooperation and partnership idea within government.  The figure below illustrates the 
growing sophistication of public management and its concurrent movement between 
the seemingly naturally opposing extremes of big government and privatization.  The 
figure‘s construction is based on a discussion with Burger (2006).  The move from 
traditional bureaucracy to new public management includes an embracing of 
alternative service delivery and a bigger role for the private sector in the delivery of 
public services.  The subsequent move towards good governance has seen a 
redefined, smaller role for the private sector. 
 
 
 
In the early 1980s there were wide-ranging attacks on the size and capability of the 
public sector.  Almost two decades of enthusiastic privatization followed, with 
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Figure 2.9: The increased sophistication of public management 
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alternatives for the provision of service by public bureaucracies actively pursued.  
This drive towards small government was visible in the USA under Reagan, the UK 
under Thatcher, and in the contraction of the size and budget of the public sector in 
countries with traditionally large public sectors such as Spain, Italy, Germany and 
Sweden.  Economic problems in the 1980s lead to governments reassessing their 
bureaucracies and demanding changes.  As Caiden (1991:74) noted: ―All blamed the 
dead hand of bureaucracy, especially the poor performance of public bureaucracies 
and the daily annoyances of irksome restrictions, cumbrous red tape, unpleasant 
officials, poor service and corrupt practices.‖ 
 
By the beginning of the 1990s, a new model of public sector management had 
emerged in most advanced countries and many developing ones.  Initially, the new 
model had several names, including: managerialism; new public management; 
market-based public administration; the post-bureaucratic paradigm and 
entrepreneurial government.  The underlying theories of the traditional model of 
public administration, based on bureaucracy, one-best-way, the public interest and a 
separation of politics from administration, all had their problems.  The public 
management reforms have been driven by totally different underlying theories: that 
economic motivation can be assumed for all players in government; that private 
management flexibility provides lessons for government; and that there can be no 
separation of politics from administration.  Above all else, the change of theory is 
from administration to management, the former being about following instructions and 
the latter meaning to achieve results and to take personal responsibility for doing so 
(Hughes, 2003:5–6).   
 
The ideological fervour of attacks on the role of government, and efforts to reduce its 
size, faded somewhat in the late 1990s.  There was a greater appreciation of the 
positive role of government (Hughes, 2003).  In 2003 Hughes (5–6) wrote:  
The traditional model of public administration, which predominated for most of 
the twentieth century, has changed since the mid-1980s to a flexible, market-
based form of public management.  This is not simply a matter of reform or a 
minor change in management style, but a change in the role of government in 
society and the relationship between government and citizenry.  Traditional 
public administration has been discredited theoretically and practically, and the 
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adoption of new forms of public management means the emergence of a new 
paradigm in the public sector. 
 
This revolt against the traditional model of public administration resulted in the 
competing paradigms of public administration and public management.  The reform 
of public sector management has been a reaction to the perceived excesses of the 
welfare state, both in the macro sense, as reflected in the growing size of 
government and associated fiscal deficits, and in the micro sense, in the perceived 
recognition of limits to government‘s ability to solve all problems for its citizens 
(Holmes & Shand, 1995:552).  Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000:90) noted how possible 
bureaucratic solutions to problems were being disregarded: 
Suggesting…that an existing or new activity would be better placed within an 
enlarged central ministry or as a direct, state-provided service, becomes an 
uphill struggle – it is ‗beyond the pale‘, not the done thing…Likewise the 
proposition that working partnerships with a range of private and ‗third sector‘ 
bodies to deliver a service may be simply time-consuming, wasteful and a 
threat to clear public accountability: uttering such a sacrilegious thought can 
be instantly to brand oneself as a ‗reactionary‘.  Within this managerialist 
thought-world there is only limited consciousness of the flimsiness of many of 
the current ‗principles‘ of good public management. 
 
By 2003, Hughes was discussing the criticism against both the traditional public 
administration model and the more recent New Public Management model and 
wondering what, if anything, would replace New Public Management.  The answer to 
his question was already contained in his own book, although he did not recognize it 
as such at the time.  He says that good governance tries to do more than ―mere 
efficient management of economic and financial resources, or particular public 
services; it is also a broad reform strategy to strengthen the institutions of civil 
society, and make government more open, responsive, accountable and democratic.‖ 
(Hughes, 2003:77)  The best way of managing a particular policy issue may be to 
work in partnership with the private sector, or to privatize a function or through the 
use of regulation.  Direct provision by government and the bureaucracy is not 
precluded, it rather depends on the circumstances in which the best form of 
governance might be found (Hughes, 2003:77). 
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It is now opportune to return to the earlier remarks on the propensity of writers to 
equate PPPs with privatization.  While PPPs were originally treated as a derivative of 
the privatization movement, there is growing consensus today that PPPs do not 
simply mean the introduction of market mechanisms or the privatization of public 
services.  PPPs rather imply a mode of collaboration to pursue common goals, while 
utilizing joint resources and capitalising on the respective competences and strengths 
of the public and private partners (Jamali, 2004:4–5; Jamali, 2004, citing Nijkamp, 
Van der Burch & Vidigni, 2002, Pongsiri, 2002 and Widdus, 2001).  PPPs are seen 
by some as a tool of coercion:  It has been suggested that the ―promise‖ (read 
―threat‖) to privatize be employed as a ―stick‖ to improve public-sector performance 
even if there is no real plan to carry through such a proposal (Korosec & Mead, 1996; 
Linder & Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:2; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). 
 
At the supra-national level the European Union (EU) promotes partnerships as it 
operates with and through member states and more local agencies to achieve its 
policy aims, taking account of national rules and practices (CEC, 1996; McQuaid, 
2000:11). Strong support for the concept of partnerships is also evident from 
international organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UN/ISDR).  During the 1990s and early 2000s, a number of agencies – the World 
Bank in particular – have provided direct assistance in the formulation of 
partnerships, and have made their own funding conditional upon private sector 
involvement.  This direct action has been supported by extensive policy formulation 
and analysis, and research into the key financial and economic aspects of existing 
transactions.  A number of service sectors, including energy, water, sanitation and 
solid waste, have produced toolkits to provide guidance on basic partnership issues 
and processes (OECD, 2010; Plummer, 2002:109).  At national level in many 
countries, including the UK, there has been government pressure to move away from 
public provision of services towards joint private-public partnerships or greater private 
provision (McQuaid, 2000:11; Newman & Clarke, 2009). 
 
The UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 
called for an equitable world partnership based on the creation of new forms of 
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cooperation between states and social organizations (UN-CSD, 2002).  Since then, 
this vision of shared responsibility for development has gained importance throughout 
the development cooperation community.  The idea of partnerships as agents of 
sustainable development and poverty eradication was strongly promoted at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002. The United 
Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UN-CSD) was mandated to serve 
as the focal point for discussion on partnerships for sustainable development (Creech 
& Paas, 2008:10).  The UN-CSD defines such partnerships as ―voluntary, multi-
stakeholder initiatives aimed at implementing sustainable development goals of 
Agenda 21, Rio+5, and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation‖. The UN 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) carries the concept even further, targeting the 
creation of a global partnership for development as part of the blueprint to meet the 
needs of the world‘s poor. The aspirational partnership of the MDGs brings together 
north and south, private and public, and recognizes the role of youth (Creech & Paas, 
2008:10).  In fact, one can say that partnerships have become part of the language 
and practice of development.  As stated by the US based Global Development 
Alliance (GDA), ―[p]artnerships are certainly not new in development practice. But 
never has there been a sharper focus on gathering all actors facing the same set of 
problems to jointly design, plan, and implement solutions‖ (Creech & Paas, 2008:10). 
2.1.13 South African history of PPPs 
According to the SA Treasury Department (Republic of South Africa, 2001:B7), 
"[d]elivering public services through PPPs is relatively new in South Africa".  Whether 
this assessment is correct is debatable, because permanent European settlement in 
South Africa in 1652 was a result of a concession held by a company in a relationship 
that could easily be categorized as a public-private partnership.  The Dutch East 
India Company was granted a license or concession by the government of the 
Netherlands to operate trade routes to and from the East, and the refreshment station 
at the Cape of Good Hope was established purely to support the commercial 
activities of the Company – with no initial government involvement at all.  Despite all 
the negative aspects of colonization, the Company did establish and maintain various 
public services in the Cape Colony. 
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In the late 1500s several Dutch trading companies were operating internationally and 
over time a large degree of concurrence developed among these companies so that 
a consolidation of the different companies became an urgent necessity (Ferreira, 
2007:38). The Dutch had a strong statesman in Johan van Oldenbarneveldt (1547-
1619) who, with the help of the Prince of Orange, Maurits van Nassau (1567-1625), 
could take the lead and could orchestrate the unification of all the concurrent Dutch 
companies on 20 March 1602 into one large ―Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie 
(VOC)‖ or United Dutch East-India Company. The VOC thus came into being through 
a partnership between the state and private business. The VOC consisted of six 
chambers, formed out of the earlier companies with their headquarters in 
Amsterdam, Zeeland, Delft, Rotterdam, Enkhuizen and Hoorn. The central body of 
authority within the VOC was the ―Here XVII‖ or Lords XVII. The VOC would have a 
state-endorsed monopoly on all trade east of the Cape of Good Hope, and extensive 
trade, military and political powers were awarded to the VOC by the States-General.  
The charter of the VOC determined that the power, the prestige and the riches of the 
Portuguese had to be challenged in Asia (Ferreira, 2007:150).  The mission of the 
VOC and its means of operation, which included armed forces, was clearly a public 
function which was given to a private operator.  The state would benefit from the 
successful operations of the VOC through increased foreign influence and revenue, 
while the VOC itself could benefit financially.  Clearly, the mandate and operations of 
the VOC constituted the minimum requirements of a PPP. 
 
The building of capital-intensive infrastructure like the Orange River Irrigation 
Scheme in the Northern Cape with manual labour during the Great Depression 
provides an early 20th-century example of the use of partnerships to address major 
societal problems in South Africa.  Many years later in 1994, the new democratice 
South Africa came into being. The new government inherited the national public 
service and those of a variety of former provinces and all homelands that had to be 
amalgamated to form a national unified public service. Although this task was 
accomplished rapidly, the resulting public service was very large, and exhibited many 
features of traditional bureaucracy, including hierarchical structures, limited 
automation and information technology applications, low levels of training, a poor 
work culture, language and cultural barriers, and an overall orientation towards inputs 
and processes rather than service delivery and results.   
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Within the first three years of the new order, substantial effort was devoted to 
reforming the bureaucracy. New public service legislation and regulations were 
introduced, new and powerful central personnel agencies were created, English 
became the language of administration, and substantial authority was devolved to 
departments and provinces. Despite these reforms, progress in improving results in 
terms of service delivery, especially to previously disadvantaged communities, was 
mixed. Towards the end of the 1990s, increased attention was paid to means of 
improving service delivery. Three important initiatives in this regard were Batho Pele 
(1997), the adoption of eight nationwide principles for better service delivery; a 
public-private partnerships initiative (2000) and the promotion of alternative service 
delivery.  While alternative service delivery initiatives are largely at a pilot stage, they 
offer a promising alternative both to traditional bureaucracy (with its cost and poor 
service delivery focus) and to a narrow version of privatization (which could involve 
heavy social costs, job losses, and regressive redistribution of wealth) (Russel & 
Bvuma, 2001). 
 
In April 1997, the SA Cabinet approved the establishment of an interdepartmental 
task team (IDTT), chaired by the Department of Finance, to explore how PPPs could 
improve infrastructure and service delivery efficiency.  The IDTT was mandated to 
develop a national public-private partnership programme, the objectives of which 
were to identify the major constraints to the successful implementation of PPPs and 
to develop a package of cross-sectoral and intergovernmental policy, and legislative 
and regulatory reform (Republic of South Africa, 2001:B5).  In 2001 the SA National 
Treasury published a manual on public-private partnerships (Republic of South 
Africa, 2001).  The simplest forms of PPPs have been part of South Africa's 
procurement landscape for some time.  More complex arrangements, in particular 
long-duration contracts that entail private finance, represent new ground, according 
to an SA Treasury opinion (Republic of South Africa, 2001:B6). This opinion could be 
contested based on the 24 October 1894 decision of the Cape Town City Council to 
grant the right to a local businessman, Henry Butters, to build and operate the first 
electric tramway company through the city (City of Cape Town, 2009). So perhaps 
the type of long-duration contracts referred to by Treasury is not so new after all.  In 
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the same Treasury document it is argued that limited experience with more complex 
PPPs to date has produced mixed results (Republic of South Africa, 2001:B6).2 
 
The SA National Treasury established a dedicated PPP Unit whose role is to enforce 
compliance with Treasury Regulations and to assist departments in preparing, 
procuring and implementing PPPs.  According to a Treasury publication, the Unit is 
able to provide technical and financial advice throughout the PPP project cycle 
(Republic of South Africa, 2001:A3).  This assistance is available to national and 
provincial departments whose affairs are governed by the Public Finance 
Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999) (Republic of South Africa, 2001:A3).  In 2005 
the South African Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, called on the private sector to 
partner the government in funding infrastructure projects and fast-tracking the 
delivery of key services to the poor.  He indicated that the partnerships involve 
locking in long-term collaboration between parties to share the cost, rewards and 
risks of projects (Phasiwe, 2005). 
 
In order to promote PPPs, the Treasury also issued a PPP Manual and Standardized 
PPP Provisions as Treasury PPP practice notes in terms of the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA), Act 1 of 1999 (Republic of South Africa, 1999), which 
governs the financial management of the national and provincial spheres of the South 
African government. The manual and provisions are applicable to national and 
provincial departments and the public entities to which Treasury Regulation 16 of the 
PFMA applies. At a local government level in South Africa, municipal financial 
management is governed by the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) which 
became law in 2003.  Municipal PPP regulations were being finalized in 2005, and 
the PPP Unit was at that stage working on special guidelines for Municipal PPPs. 
There is substantial policy consistency between the PFMA and MFMA PPP 
regulations, so while the institutional systems and decision-making processes differ, 
                                            
 
 
2
 Whether this statement is as accurate as the previous one pertaining to the recency of longer-term 
partnerships would bear further investigation of two aspects, the first being the complexity and the 
second the mixed results claim. An investigation into degrees of complexity of previous partnerships 
would not add value to the current discussion and will therefore not be pursued.  The mixed results 
claim will be further investigated in the chapter on case studies. 
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the principal approaches to PPP affordability, risk transfer and value-for-money are 
consistent (PPP Unit of the SA Treasury, 2004). 
 
Figure 2.10: The SA Treasury PPP life cycle 
 
Section 120 of the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), 2003 (Act 56 of 
2003) establishes conditions and processes for public-private partnerships.  
According to the Act, a municipality may enter into a public-private partnership 
agreement, but only if the municipality can demonstrate that the agreement will: 
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provide value for money to the municipality; be affordable for the municipality; and 
transfer appropriate technical, operational and financial risk to the private party.  The 
MFMA thus establishes value for money, affordability and risk transfer as 
prerequisites for PPPs at the municipal level.  According to Section 75(1)(j) of the 
Act, the accounting officer of the municipality must place the agreements for the 
PPPs in which it is involved on the website of the municipality.  
 
In Section 75 it is also stated that a public-private partnership agreement must 
comply with any prescribed regulatory framework for public-private partnerships.  If 
the public-private partnership involves the provision of a municipal service, Chapter 8 
of the Municipal Systems Act must also be complied with, and before a public-private 
partnership is concluded, the municipality must conduct a feasibility study that 
explains the strategic and operational benefits of the public-private partnership for the 
municipality in terms of its objectives; and describes in specific terms- the nature of 
the private party‘s role in the public-private partnership;  the extent to which this role, 
both legally and by nature, can be performed by a private party; and how the 
proposed agreement will- provide value for money to the municipality; be affordable 
for the municipality; transfer appropriate technical, operational and financial risk to 
the private party; and impact on the municipality‘s revenue flows and its current and 
future budgets; takes into account all relevant information; and explains the capacity 
of the municipality to effectively monitor, manage and enforce the agreement. 
 
The national government may assist municipalities in carrying out and assessing 
feasibility studies.  When a feasibility study has been completed, the accounting 
officer of the municipality must submit the report on the feasibility study together with 
all other relevant documents to the council for a decision, in principle, on whether the 
municipality should continue with the proposed public-private partnership; at least 60 
days prior to the meeting of the council at which the matter is to be considered, in 
accordance with section 21A of the Municipal Systems Act, 
 make public particulars of the proposed public-private partnership, including 
the report on the feasibility study; and 
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 invite the local community and other interested persons to submit to the 
municipality comments or representations in respect of the proposed public-
private partnership; and 
solicit the views and recommendations of  
 the National Treasury; 
 the national department responsible for local government; 
 if the public-private partnership involves the provision of water, sanitation, 
electricity or any other service as may be prescribed, the  
 responsible national department; and  
 any other national or provincial organ of state as may be prescribed. 
 
Part one of the same chapter applies to the procurement of public-private partnership 
agreements. Section 33 also applies if the agreement will have multi-year budgetary 
implications for the municipality within the meaning of that section. 
 
Section 168(1)(d) of the Municipal Finance Management Act (2003) (MFMA) provides 
that the Minister of Finance may, with the concurrence of the Minister for Provincial 
and Local Government, issue regulations and guidelines regulating the financial 
commitments of municipalities and municipal entities in terms of public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). Section 86A of the Municipal Systems Act (2000) (MSA), read 
together with section 120 (1) and (2) of that act, provide that the Minister for 
Provincial and Local Government may issue guidelines for municipalities when 
assessing options for the provision of a municipal service, the different categories of 
municipal services and the different categories of service providers.  These National 
Treasury/Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) Municipal Service 
Delivery and PPP Guidelines of 2007 are jointly issued by the Minister of Finance 
and the Minister for Provincial and Local Government, and apply to the municipalities 
described in section 2 of the MSA.  
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 57 
 
Figure 2.11: The Municipal PPP Project Cycle of the SA Treasury 
 
 
(Republic of South Africa, 2007) 
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The SA Treasury Life Cycle for a municipal partnership thus consists of four stages, 
being: 
 Inception; 
 Feasibility study; 
 Procurement; and  
 PPP Contract Management (Republic of South Africa, 2007). 
 
This four-stage model of life cycle stages will be discussed again in section 3.8 from 
page 200.  This concludes the historic overview of partnerships.  In the following 
sections the defining elements of partnerships and an additional partnership 
vocabulary will be explored.  
2.2 THE DEFINING ELEMENTS OF A PPP 
The characterization of some of the above partnerships as PPPs may be questioned.  
It is important that there is clarity on what qualifies as a PPP and what does not.  The 
checklist based on the SA Treasury definition of a PPP can be helpful in this regard 
but will not be applied to all the examples above due to space constraints.   
 
In summary, the defining elements of partnerships that can be derived from the 
definitions in this section are: 
– A contractual arrangement must exist (this could be written or verbal); 
– There must be pursuit of a common goal and mutual benefit (includes 
individual benefit to each participating partner); 
– At least two entities should be involved – and the arrangement should be 
between at least one public entity and at least one private entity; 
– A fee or exchange of value should take place; 
– A specified time should apply to the arrangement; 
– A public entity function (as practiced or defined in the specific jusridisction) is 
delivered by a private entity; 
– Clear risk allocation and/or risk transfer should be achieved. 
 
As already illustrated earlier, one would be able to use the above defining elements 
to decide whether a specific arrangement or agreement could be defined as a public-
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private partnership.  In the next section the similarities between partnerships and 
symbiosis will be explored and the vocabulary with which to describe partnerships will 
be expanded. 
2.3 SYMBIOSIS IN NATURE AS METAPHOR FOR PARTNERSHIP 
In this section symbiotic relationships in nature are explored as a metaphor for public-
private partnerships, with the aim of adding more vocabulary to the discussion on 
partnerships that will follow.  Comparable relationships from nature are just too 
obvious to ignore and will be discussed here to aid the later characterization of the 
possible relationship structures within public-private partnerships.   
 
In an African context, one of the most well-known mutually beneficial symbiotic 
relationships is that between humans and the honey bird.  The Greater Honeyguide 
feeds primarily on the contents of bee colonies or "hives", bee eggs, larvae and 
pupae, wax worms and beeswax. Most remarkably, it also guides people to hives 
using specific movements or manoeuvres and sounds to guide humans to an 
occupied hive.  After the humans have disabled the bees with smoke and taken the 
honey, the Honeyguide eats whatever is left. The traditions of the Bushmen and most 
other Southern African tribes say that the Honeyguide must be thanked with a gift of 
honey; if not, it may lead its follower to a lion, bull elephant or venomous snake as 
punishment.   The type of mutually beneficial symbiosis illustrated by the honey bird 
and humans is called mutualism.  On the opposite end of the symbiosis continuum 
lies parasitism.  
 
A parasitic relationship is one in which one member of the association benefits while 
the other is harmed.  Parasitism is a type of symbiotic relationship between two 
different organisms where one organism, the parasite, takes from the host, 
sometimes for a prolonged time.  Symbiotic relationships may be either obligate, i.e., 
necessary for the survival of at least one of the organisms involved, or facultative, 
where the relationship is beneficial but not essential to survival of the organisms.  Yet 
another type of symbiotic relationship has been described as commensal in nature. 
Commensalism describes a relationship between two living organisms where one 
benefits and the other is not significantly harmed or helped.  
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Figure 2.12: A continuum of symbiotic relationships 
 
The term "mutualism" describes any relationship between individuals of different 
species where both individuals derive a fitness benefit. Generally, only lifelong 
interactions involving close physical and biochemical contact can properly be 
considered symbiotic. Mutualistic relationships may be either obligate for both 
species, obligate for one but facultative for the other, or facultative for both. Many 
biologists restrict the definition of symbiosis to close mutualist relationships 
(Bronstein, 2009:233).  Some further examples: A large percentage of herbivores 
have mutualistic gut fauna that help them digest plant matter, which is more difficult 
to digest than animal prey. Coral reefs are the result of mutualisms between coral 
organisms and various types of algae that live inside them. Another example of 
mutual symbiosis is the relationship between the Ocellaris clownfish that dwell 
among the tentacles of Ritteri sea anemones. The territorial fish protects the 
anemone from anemone-eating fish, and in turn the stinging tentacles of the 
anemone protect the clownfish from its predators. Special mucus on the clownfish 
protects it from the stinging tentacles. There are also many types of tropical and sub-
tropical ants that have evolved very complex relationships with certain tree species. 
 
It is easy to draw parallels between these natural symbiotic relationships and the 
types of partnership being discussed.  The terminology that emerges will be used in 
later sections.  Such an ecological approach is not new, as confirmed by Müller 
(2008:6) when describing the application of ecological principles in describing the 
emergence of self-organizing structures in the context of organizational innovation in 
collaborative environmental management (Kiel, 1989:544–547; Mecier & McGowan, 
1996:447). Müller (2008:13) refers to relationships of trust, reciprocity and mutuality 
Parisitism 
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Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 61 
in collaborative environmental governance networks. Returning to use of the 
symbiosis metaphor, one can already characterize the SA Treasury definition of a 
PPP as commensal, while the definition of PPPs coming from business seems 
distinctly parasitic.  The goal of a PPP should be to create true symbiosis: mutualism.   
 
The related concept of Symbiogenesis also holds value for a discussion on 
partnerships.  The biologist Lynn Margulis, famous for her work on endosymbiosis, 
contends that symbiosis is a major driving force behind evolution. She considers 
Darwin's notion of evolution, driven by competition, as incomplete and claims that 
evolution is strongly based on co-operation, interaction, and mutual dependence 
among organisms. According to Margulis and Dorion Sagan, "[l]ife did not take over 
the globe by combat, but by networking."  This opinion, when related to partnerships, 
could mean that partnership may encourage and enhance evolution, rapid adaptation 
and innovation in problem-solving. 
2.4 DEFINITIONS RELATING TO PARTNERSHIPS 
There are several concepts that need to be described and defined when one 
discusses definitions of public service delivery partnerships.  The first group of 
concepts to be described will be the contributing concepts in the name ―Public-
Private Partnerships‖.  These concepts are ―public‖, ―private‖ and ―partnerships‖.  
2.4.1 Definitions of “Public” 
Traditionally, from a European nation-state perspective, the public in PPP refers to 
the public sector.  The idea of what comprises a ―public‖ entity has been revisited by 
writers such as Newman and Clarke (2009), who dissect ideas of public and 
publicness and expose intriguing discourses on the alleged contraction of the public 
sector but also increased plurality of the concept of ―public‖.  Although this relatively 
new development is noted, the ―traditional‖ concept of public sector will be used as 
the main reference of what ―public‖ in PPP refers to.  The public sector includes 
government departments and other state agencies.  In different countries, depending 
on government system and ideology, the private sector can differ in terms of size and 
service delivery scope.  One would expect a socialist government to favour a larger 
public sector responsible for the delivery of an extensive array of services, while a 
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conservative capitalist government would favour a smaller public sector with fewer 
service delivery commitments. 
 
Fox and Meyer (1996:107) define the public sector as ―that portion of an economy 
whose activities (economic and non-economic) are under the control and direction of 
the state.  The state owns all resources in this sector and uses them to achieve 
whatever goals it may have – e.g., to promote the economic welfare of the ruling elite 
or to maximize the well-being of society as a whole‖.  In the UK the term ‗public 
sector body‘ is used to refer to central government departments and agencies. It also 
refers to most public corporations, including National Health Service (NHS) Trusts 
and other NHS bodies, agencies and trading funds, but not to local authorities (HM 
Treasury, 2001:5).  The extent of the public sector differs from country to country and 
even more so between political-economic systems such as capitalism and socialism.  
Different political parties, depending on the political theory or dogma on which they 
have based their policies, would pursue smaller or larger government structures and 
differing mandates for government involvement. 
2.4.2 Definitions of “Private” 
The ―private‖ in PPP refers to the private sector.  The private sector is generally 
regarded as commercial and industrial concerns owned by private individuals or 
private companies.  The private sector is generally agreed to have a profit motive and 
to exclude civil society and not-for-profit concerns such as non-governmental 
organizations.  This study will not exclude partnerships with civil organizations or 
non-profit or non-governmental organizations merely on the basis of them not being 
part of the traditional private sector. Again note the blurring of what is ―public‖ and 
―private‖ as noted by Newman and Clarke (2009). The third sector, not public and not 
private, which includes NGOs and several other entities, also has an important role to 
play in partnerships.  This point will be elaborated in later sections. 
 
A United Nations conference on partnership excluded the UN itself from what is 
―private‖, but in contrast, a UN-OCHA (United Nations – Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs) contracted employee interviewed in 2007 (David Mwaniki) 
assumed that NGOs are part of the private sector while another UN-OCHA 
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employee, upon being asked about partnerships said that he had had no experience 
of public-private partnerships.  The conclusion from these differing opinions is that 
within the UN system there are differing opinions on whether the UN itself is a 
private, public or third sector entity.  Fox and Meyer (1996:101) define the private 
sector as ―that part of an economy whose activities are under the control and 
direction of non-governmental economic units such as households or firms.  Each 
economic unit owns its own resources and uses them mainly to maximize its own 
well-being.‖  They add that ―traditionally it is that sector of the economy which 
conducts business for profit; specifically the business and industrial communities‖.   
The arena of PPPs is complex. Central to this complexity, according to Plummer 
(2002:39), is the untidy way in which vastly different organizations are collectively 
referred to as ‗private sector‘.  Plummer however believes that these complications 
reflect the real nature of service delivery in developing cities. 
 
The term ―private sector‖, in relation to municipal service delivery, therefore covers a 
vast range of profit-making organizations – large and small, formal and informal, in a 
range of sectors.  For example, in the water and sanitation provision line of business 
which has a considerable worldwide PPP population, one end of the private sector 
spectrum is represented by large international water companies such as Ondeo-
Lyonnaise des Eaux, Vivendi and Thames Water.  The other end is represented by 
the water-vendor with a cart, selling water by the container.  In the solid waste sector, 
the national operators with compactors and large-scale landfill and recycling facilities 
are contrasted with the small-scale rag-picking cooperatives or itinerant waste-
buyers, whose self-employed recycling activities are the basis of their livelihoods 
(Plummer, 2002:75).  After defining ―public‖ and ―private‖, and before moving on to 
defiing other components of the PPP concept, it would be appropriate to explore a 
third sector of society that could also influence and become involved in PPPs. 
2.4.3 The Third Sector 
Defining the third sector, by definition that part of society that is not public and not 
private, basically the ―remainder‖, is not as straight-forward as may be imagined. The 
third sector includes the civil society and not-for-profit entities excluded from the 
definition of the private sector that precedes this subsection.  It is not possible to call 
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this sector ―civil society‖ or the ―voluntary sector‖, simply because the sector is wider 
than those entities that would comfortably fit into the definitions of civil society and 
voluntarism.   It should be noted that there is no intention to portray the third sector 
as less important than the other two sectors by calling it the ―third‖ sector. The name, 
as it is used here, denotes no hierarchy or priority.  The three sectors of society are 
illustrated in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 2.13: The three sectors of society 
 
The above figure illustrates the sectors as having equal size, but of course the size of 
the sectors within each society will be defined by factors such as government policy 
and the dominant political ideology in a specific society.   There are many definitions 
and refinements of the terms ―third sector‖ and ―voluntary sector‖.  One issue in 
defining the sector is that although many feel voluntary organizations are distinctly 
different from private and public ones, the boundaries are actually unclear. Some 
commentators believe that the differentiation between public, private and the third 
sector (which includes the voluntary sector) is more of a continuum than a set of 
discrete boxes (VolResource, 2010). 
 
One definition states that a voluntary organization is: non-profit distributing, non-
statutory, autonomous, and may be charitable (VolResource, 2010).  This definition 
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adds the following descriptors to the third sector: non-profit; non-statutory; 
autonomous and possibly charitable.  Other descriptors used for the sector include: 
community sector; voluntary and community organization (VolResource, 2010).  The 
term ―third sector‖ is sometimes used specifically in relation to co-operatives or social 
enterprises.  The abbreviation TSO (for Third Sector Organization) has been used in 
UK National Audit Office reports. With the establishment of the UK 
government's Office of the Third Sector in May 2006, the term was said to describe 
"non-governmental organizations which are value-driven and which principally 
reinvest their surpluses to further social, environmental or cultural objectives. It 
includes voluntary and community organizations, charities, faith groups, social 
enterprises, cooperatives and mutuals.‖ (VolResource, 2010) 
 
When one looks beyond Europe, the delineation of the third sector becomes more 
complex. In Japan, since the 1980s, the third sector (Daisan sector) refers to 
joint corporations invested both by the public sector and private sector (Jenei & Kuti, 
2008:12).  This sounds very much like PPPs.  In India the voluntary sector is 
commonly called the "joint sector", and includes the industries run in partnership by 
the state and private sector for more than four decades (Erdman, 1973:25–55; Sinha, 
2005:125).  The Indian approach also sounds very much like a PPP.  It does seem as 
if there are considerable problems with terminology. Although the voluntary, 
community and not-for-personal profit sectors are frequently taken to comprise the 
"Third Sector", each of these sectors or sub-sectors has quite different 
characteristics. The community sector is assumed to comprise volunteers (unpaid), 
whilst the voluntary sector are considered (confusingly) to employ staff working for a 
social or community purpose. In addition however, the not-for-personal-profit sector is 
also considered to include social firms (such as cooperatives and mutuals) and more 
recently, governmental institutions (such as Housing Associations) that have 
been spun off from government, although still operating fundamentally as public 
service delivery organizations. These other types of institutions may be considered to 
be quasi-private or quasi-public sector rather than stemming from direct community 
benefit motivations (Lyons, 2001:5-8; Voluntary sector, 2010). 
 
Lyons (2005:5) defines the third sector as consisting of private organizations that are 
formed and sustained by groups of people (members) acting voluntarily and without 
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seeking personal profit to provide benefits for themselves or for others, that are 
democratically controlled, and where any material benefit gained by a member is 
proportionate to their use of the organization.  Lyons also indicates that the third 
sector encompasses all those organizations that are not part of the public or business 
sectors (Anheier & Seibel, 1990; Hasan, Lyons & Onyx, 2008; Werther & Berman, 
2001:3–4). 
2.4.4 Definitions of “Partnership” 
The term ―partnership‖, as it relates to PPPs, will be discussed in this section.  In the 
term ―Public-Private Partnerships‖ the core concept is obviously ―Partnership‖, which 
is being qualified by ―Public-Private‖.  It is therefore clear that the Public-Private 
Partnership is but one type of partnership, and one can expect that the definition of 
partnership could accommodate various types of partnership.  At a basic level, it is 
clear that partnership involves cooperation and working together (McQuaid, 2000:11).  
The Chambers Concise Dictionary defines partnership as the state of being a 
partner: a contract between persons engaged in any business (Davidson, Seaton & 
Simpson, 1989:710).  According to McQuaid (2000:10–11), the term ―partnership‖ 
covers greatly differing concepts and practices and is used to describe a wide variety 
of types of relationship in a myriad of circumstances and locations.  He suggests that 
there is an infinite range of partnership activities as the ‗methods for carrying out 
such (private-public) partnerships are limited only by the imagination…‘ McQuaid 
(2000:34) also notes that there is a danger of the term ―partnership‖ losing much 
meaning beyond that of being a vague, though benign, platitude.  Similar lack of 
clarity in the use of the term can be seen in other areas.   
 
The US Department of Agriculture Forest Service (2005) defines ―partnership‖ 
(specifically within the PPP context) as a voluntary, mutually beneficial arrangement 
entered into for the purpose of accomplishing mutually agreed upon objective(s). It 
further states that specific legislative authority must exist to form partnerships where 
the parties anticipate exchanging funds, property, or other items having value. Three 
pertinent points can be made about this definition.  Firstly, the reference to a 
voluntary arrangement in the above definition may be questioned because it could be 
possible that a partnership is the result of a ―shot-gun wedding‖ or ―arranged 
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marriage‖ where parties are legally or otherwise forced to work in partnership, for 
example municipal and provincial housing departments and their agents or 
contractors.  The fact that two or more parties are forced to form a partnership 
probably creates more opportunity for conflict than harmony, but does not exclude 
the possibility of a successful partnership.  Secondly, the expectation of mutual 
benefit from the formation of partnerships may not always be realized or even 
possible (refer to the discussion on the types of symbiosis above). Mutual benefit will 
be discussed in more detail later.  Thirdly, mutually agreed upon objectives is not a 
prerequisite for partnership, but it is a contributing factor to the success of 
partnerships.  This will also be discussed in more detail at a later stage. 
 
One example of a partnership as a forced marriage can be seen in the required joint 
response by the Western Cape Provincial Government and the City of Cape Town to 
social violence and the displacement of foreign individuals within the Western Cape 
Province of South Africa in 2008.  The City of Cape Town is the biggest city in the 
Western Cape Province of South Africa and its citizenry comprises more than 60% of 
the total population of the Western Cape.  In 2008 the City was under the control of a 
coalition of parties led by the Democratic Alliance (DA), while the Western Cape 
Provincial Government was being controlled by the African National Congress (ANC).  
The ANC and DA are political opponents and have conflicting ideas on many issues.  
While a joint and integrated response to the emergency facing the provincial and 
local government was required, political differences between the leadership of the 
two spheres of government complicated and constrained cooperation.  Partnership 
was required but the partners were not enthusiastic about such close collaboration.  
Some examples from this period of time can best illustrate this point: 
 
o The displacement of thousands of individuals from their communities 
necessitated the provision of shelter and mass care centres.  The City did not 
want to open its community halls as shelters because these facilities were 
required for other purposes such as distribution and pay points for pensions 
and grants.  The City has also had extensive experience in the complications 
that can arise when displaced communities decide that they do not want to 
leave the shelter made available to them.  In the past the City has had to 
resort to court orders and forced evictions from such emergency shelters 
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several months after the emergency which necessitated the provision of 
shelter had passed.  The City argued that Provincial facilities should be used 
before community halls under control of the City are used.  The Provincial 
government responded by getting a court order forcing the City to open its 
community halls as shelters.  In turn, the City sought a court order to halt this 
process.  The legal battle was ended when the judge involved told both parties 
that they needed to work together and made each pay their own costs.  The 
willingness of both parties to use litigation was ended by a forced partnership 
– an ―arranged marriage‖. 
 
o As part of the joint response to the social conflict and violence against foreign 
nationals, the Provincial Joint Operations Centre was mobilized for several 
months by the Provincial Disaster Management Centre to deal with the 
emergency.  The Joint Operations Centre was staffed by representatives from 
national, provincial and municipal departments, NGOs and the United Nations.  
This partnership was formalized through regular senior-level meetings and 
facilitated by the Provincial Disaster Management Centre staff through the 
provision of infrastructure and facilities.  Interesting nuances in the 
relationships between departments in this complicated and extended multi-
partner partnership came to light. Firstly the staff of the Provincial Disaster 
Management Centre relied on information they received via e-mail from the 
City‘s Disaster Risk Management Centre and preferred this information above 
that which they could get directly from the Department of Social Services 
sitting next to them in the Centre.  This might have been because they were 
used to working closely with the City‘s Disaster Risk Management Centre in 
responding to humanitarian emergencies, but it also illustrates that even 
though a partnership was formed, the parties involved in the partnership were 
not necessarily playing according to the rules of the partnership and were 
defining their own roles on an ongoing basis. 
 
o One of the coordination problems that surfaced during the period was the 
different spelling of names of care centres by different stakeholders.  This 
caused confusion and duplication of relief efforts, and points to the importance 
of optimal communication and standardized terms and language to be used in 
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order to make a partnership more effective.  Communication between partners 
also happened on a sporadic basis at strategic meetings, while persons sitting 
close to each other in the JOC would not communicate directly on an ongoing 
basis.  
 
Further examples of partnerships in Disaster Management are discussed in section 
2.6.1 from page 123. 
 
Some commentators believe that the usual understanding of partnership (again 
within the PPP context) is that it represents a clearly defined legal contract that spells 
out the risks, financial obligations and quantified outputs to be attained. Managerial 
responsibility for operations is normally allocated to one of the partners. These 
commentators argue that this is a narrow understanding of a partnership which lacks 
reference to the dynamic action, cooperation, and mutual learning that is required for 
the partnership to be strategically effective. It is their opinion that most of the current 
efforts are spent on setting up the partnership with little or no effort allocated to the 
open-ended growth and development of the partnership (EWET, 2008).  From this 
argument one can deduce that there is strong opinion favouring the view that a 
partnership should be considered a new entity which can develop and grow 
organically.  The World Bank sees partnership as a sustained collaborative effort.  
This effort is the basis of the third "P" of the PPP, entailing a joint alliance between 
the public and private sectors beyond the traditional contractual relationship that 
brings the best of each partner‘s competences to optimize the achievement of the 
common objective. Given the mid- or long-term nature of that objective and the 
transformation generated by the shift in roles, the joint alliance needs to be sustained 
over a long period of time.  
 
The longer the nature of the objective, the larger are the uncertainties 
associated with the project and the more critical and relevant becomes the 
third "P" of a PPP (World Bank, 2008). 
 
There is an argument that operational definitions of the word ―partnership‖ as it 
relates to socio-economic development should cater for a high level of uncertainty 
and ambiguity.  The manner in which the partnership attains socio-economic 
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development objectives, and the way in which partners capture it, cannot be 
determined beforehand.  The opinion holds that the partner relationship will evolve in 
ways that are hard to predict. Managing the partnership over time will usually be 
more important than crafting the initial formal design.  Success has less to do with 
initial agreements than with adaptability to change (EWET, 2008). 
 
One aspect that is clear from the definitions of partnership listed above is that 
partnerships are seen in a decidedly positive light, and that the goals of partnerships 
are often seen as positive and beneficial to the partners as well as society.  One 
could therefore distinguish a (positive) partnership from a (negative) collusion where, 
for example, costs may be deliberately imposed on third parties.  One would not refer 
to a price-fixing cartel as a partnership.  A relationship therefore qualifies as a 
partnership if it involves the joint definition of specific goals, and a clear assignment 
of responsibilities and areas of competence between the partners in the pursuit of a 
common endeavour (Jamali, 2004).  Most supposed PPPs in third world development 
do not meet this criterion.  Donor agencies often promote privatization and 
government subsidies to private entrepreneurs in the name of building PPPs.  
However privatization and subsidies should not be confused with PPPs (Jamali, 
2004).  Partnership can cover a wide range of possible relations. According to one 
source, the different levels of partnership with a voluntary organization can be 
described as (increasing in involvement): Supporter, Agent, Adviser, Junior 
Membership, Joint Ownership and the highest level: Community Ownership 
(VolResource, 2010).  The word ―partnership‖ stems from the word ―partner‖, and it 
would also be worthwhile to consider definitions of the word ―partner‖. 
2.4.5 Definitions of “Partner” 
In a quite focused definition, the US Department of Agriculture Forest Service (2005) 
defines ―partner‖ (or co-operator) as an individual or entity that voluntarily cooperates 
with the Forest Service on a project and is willing to formalize the relationship by 
entering into an agreement. Other definitions are more encompassing: 
 
A partner as a sharer: an associate: one engaged with another in business: 
one who plays on the same side with another in a game: one who dances or 
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goes into dinner with another: a husband or wife: an associate in 
commensalisms or symbiosis (Davidson et al., 1989:710). 
 
In the following subsections, definitions of partnership and PPPs from various 
authorities and role-players will be discussed. 
2.4.6 Definitions of “Public-Private Partnership” 
In this subsection definitions of PPPs from various authorities and role-players will be 
discussed. 
2.4.6.1 South African Treasury definition 
The official definition of a PPP by the South African Treasury was presented in the 
previous chapter.  The Treasury (Republic of South Africa, 2001:A3) describes a PPP 
as "[a] contractual arrangement between a public sector entity and a private sector 
entity whereby the private sector performs a departmental function in accordance 
with an output-based specification for a specified, significant period of time in return 
for a benefit, which is normally in the form of financial remuneration.  It furthermore 
involves a substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle risk to the private 
sector.  The public sector retains a significant role in the partnership project either as 
the main purchaser of the services provided, or as the main enabler of the project."   
 
The components that are included in this definition will each be discussed in further 
detail at a later stage.  Certain aspects of the Treasury definition can be contested 
and the discussion of the correctness of the Treasury definition is part of the original 
contribution of this dissertation to the body of knowledge regarding public service 
delivery partnerships (see page 78). 
2.4.6.2 Other PPP and partnership definitions 
Various definitions of partnerships from literature firstly reveal context-specific as well 
as general elements and secondly betray their study-area origins within the 
definitions.  A public policy partnership can be defined as cooperation between 
people or organizations in the public or private sector for mutual benefit (Holland, 
1984).  Harding (1990:110) sets out a similar general definition of private-public 
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partnership with a slant towards economic development when describing private-
public partnerships as any action which relies on the agreement of actors in the 
public and private sectors and which also contributes in some way to improving the 
urban economy and the quality of life. Bailey (1994:293) provides a working definition 
of private-public partnerships in urban regeneration as ―the mobilization of a coalition 
of interests drawn from more than one sector in order to prepare and oversee an 
agreed strategy for regeneration of a defined area‖. 
 
Also taking an economic development perspective, Sellgren (1990), cited by 
McQuaid (2000:11), defines partnership as a scheme with involvement or funding 
from more than one agency. This definition raises the question of whether a party can 
really be called a partner if its sole contribution to the partnership is involvement or 
funding, not both.  Does a partnership indeed exist if the partner is a ―silent partner‖, 
providing only funding and not getting involved in the partnership itself?  If such a 
―silent partner‖ does qualify as a partner, what positive or negative influence does the 
existence of a ―silent partner‖ have on the success of a partnership?   Bennett and 
Krebs (1994) similarly stress the joint objectives of the bodies and define partnership 
as cooperation between actors where they agree to work together towards a 
specified economic-development objective (their discussion focuses economic 
development objectives). They draw a key distinction between generalized policy 
communities that develop a broad local vision for the area or local economy and the 
specific networks (or partnerships) that are necessary to support individual 
projects (McQuaid, 2000:11). 
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The above definition focuses on the project execution aspect of partnerships as a 
defining mechanism, equates partnerships with networks, and sees partnerships as 
something more specific than a community with shared beliefs and vision.  The 
project linkage to partnerships in this definition could imply that, like projects, 
partnerships need to exist for a specified finite period of time with a specific start and 
finish. The equation of partnerships with networks as suggested above warrants 
further analysis later in this section.  A number of definitions of partnership take a 
policy perspective.  One that shows the wide scope of partnerships and the 
contributions of partners is from the Commonwealth (State) of Massachusetts which 
says ―[a] partnership is a collaboration among business, non-profit organizations, and 
government in which risks, resources and skills are shared in projects that benefit 
each partner as well as the community‖  (Stratton 1989).  Although the definition is 
useful, it is necessary to note that the ―benefit‖ can only be a goal, not a part of the 
definition of partnership.  Established mutual benefit would be an indication of 
success – a partnership without benefit is still a partnership, while a partnership that 
delivers mutual and community benefit is a successful partnership. Benefit is a goal 
and if it is achieved it shows success.  One could rather argue that a partnership is 
an attempt to create benefit for the partners and the community.  It is clear that these 
Society 
Policy Community 
Partnership / 
Network 
Figure 2.14: Partnership levels: A distinction between policy 
communities and partnerships 
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definitions are context-specific.  Other policy definitions may try to define more 
closely the range of actors involved, the geographical areas covered and any power 
that is devolved (McQuaid, 2000:11). 
 
Within the context of urban development in areas of multiple deprivation, the UK 
Government has defined the partnership approach as involving the voluntary 
commitment by the wide range of bodies with a contribution to make to urban 
development or regeneration (including local communities, the local authorities, 
Government departments and agencies and the private sector) to an agreed 
comprehensive long-term regeneration strategy for their areas‖ (McQuaid, 2000:11; 
The Scottish Office, 1993:6;).  This definition will be analysed to indicate and critique 
characteristics of partnerships identified in the definition.  While the definition may be 
specific to urban development, those characteristics that can be generalized across 
differently intended partnerships will be isolated for discussion.  The Scottish Office 
definition and approach incorporates a number of issues which will be discussed 
individually in the following paragraphs.  The issues identified in the definition are: 
 the voluntary nature of relationship; 
 a wide range of participants, ranging from community to private sector, local 
government, national government departments and quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organizations with a contribution to make; 
 the need for an agreed strategy (or at least an agreed goal); 
 a long time-scale; and 
 agreed contributions of resources to the process (McQuaid, 2000:11–12). 
 
The voluntary nature of the partnership relationship has already been questioned.  It 
is held that the relationship does not necessarily have to be voluntary, and 
furthermore that the participation in the partnership, or compliance with the 
requirements of the partnership, can be either voluntary or forced.  A partner forced 
into the partnership through some or other punitive measure could then proceed to 
comply with the requirements of the partnership but does so in a manner which either 
delays or makes impossible the creation of mutual benefit.  It is therefore not possible 
to say that all partnerships are voluntary and a voluntary relationship cannot be seen 
as a standard characteristic of partnership.  Here the earlier discussion of synergism 
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in nature becomes an important aid to understanding.  Delving deeper into this issue, 
it is possible to argue that, if forced into a partnership, the partner that is under 
duress can choose to either positively support or negatively sabotage the 
partnership.  A further option for such a partner could be non-participation without 
actively supporting or detracting from the partnership.  One could argue that it would 
be possible for a partnership that includes non-voluntary partners to still be 
successful if the partner(s) forced into the partnership were to choose to make a 
positive contribution.  The conclusion drawn from this line of thought is that positive 
participation in a partnership would be a critical success factor, even if voluntary 
participation did not occur. 
 
When McQuaid refers to a ―wide range of participants … with a contribution to make 
(see bulleted list above), the implication is that partnerships are comprised only of 
partners that are able to make meaningful contributions.  It follows that if you cannot 
make a contribution, then there is no reason for you to be in the partnership and 
furthermore that there is never a situation where all partners are not making 
meaningful contributions to partnerships.  This argument does not hold water 
because a partnership model does create opportunities for ―free-riders‖ who can 
benefit from the partnership without making real contributions.  One should rather 
argue that the ideal is that all partners are able to make meaningful contributions and 
actively do so throughout the lifetime of the partnership.  The potential for and the 
delivery of continuous meaningful contributions should be seen as an indicator of 
success rather than as a general characteristic of partnership. 
 
The opinion that partnership implies a need for an agreed strategy (or at least a goal) 
cannot be contested.  Such a need definitely exists and the absence of such an 
agreed strategy would potentially cloud any prospects of a successful partnership.  
However, it is not an absolute truth that all partnerships do possess such agreed 
strategies. It is worthwhile to ask whether a goal is not implicit, unspoken and not the 
subject of any formal written or formal agreement.  It is quite possible for a 
partnership to come into being without any conscious establishment of a joint 
strategy.  An agreed strategy can thus be seen as a recommendation for successful 
partnership, but not a characteristic of all partnerships. It would also be interesting to 
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investigate possible cases where partnerships delivered meaningful mutual benefit 
without any overt statement or determination of agreed strategy. 
 
The Scottish Office definition‘s mention of a long time-scale for partnership may be 
applicable to urban development but is perhaps less applicable to partnerships in 
general.  While it can be accepted that any partnership formed around the 
establishment of large scale capital investment would necessarily be structured over 
several years, it should also be possible for partnerships to have medium- or even 
short-term goals and similarly brief existences.  Examples of long-term partnerships 
include 25-year contracts for the building and operation of prisons in South Africa 
(Essop, 2009:2) while examples of short-term partnerships include the fleeting 
partnerships that are built between multiple disciplines working on the scene of a 
major road or other incident.  Other short-term partnerships include collaboration 
between a private financial institution and a public law enforcement agency to 
pinpoint and compile evidence against fraudsters, or between property and business 
owners and a municipal film commission to make a film shoot possible in a specific 
public road.   
 
It is not clear whether the length of a partnership has any direct relevance to or 
impact upon the success of a partnership.  Obviously it will take a required minimum 
amount of time where infrastructure needs to be established.  A partnership with a 
planned lifetime which is shorter than the expected time it would take to establish the 
infrastructure on which the revenue stream of the partnership would rely, is clearly 
doomed to failure.  Excluding such cases of criminally bad planning where time 
allocated is less than time needed, it is still not clear whether any specific timeframe 
would be more appropriate for partnerships than any other timeframe.  Committing to 
a specific timeframe as a general characteristic of partnership can therefore not be 
supported, and one cannot say that a long time-scale is a requirement for successful 
partnership.  It is also not possible to use a long time-scale as a qualifying 
requirement for partnership.  One recommendation from this discussion can be that 
the lifetime of a partnership should be suited to the type of product or service it will 
deliver, and should be appropriate to ensure opportunity for the benefits of the 
partnership to accrue to the partners. 
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The issue of agreed contributions of resources to the process is also listed by 
McQuaid as an issue flowing from the Scottish Office definition of partnerships in 
urban development.  It is questionable whether this can be considered as a defining 
element of partnerships.  Certainly some sort of agreement would be advisable.  Just 
as certainly it must be possible that partnerships are formed based only on what 
should be achieved.  Such partnerships could be formed with some vague 
assumptions about partner contributions and little initial attention paid to detailed 
agreements on the required contributions from each individual partner. Even if there 
is agreement on resource contributions it may not cover all required contributions.  
The agreement on resource contributions could cover all resources to be contributed, 
or could only be applicable to the list of resources that was thought of and considered 
necessary by the persons negotiating the partnership at the time of its creation.  
While the Scottish Office is not clear on whether the agreement needs to be written, 
one could assume that an oral agreement would also be sufficient for some more 
informal partnerships. Another question is whether the agreement needs to be in 
place before the partnership commences or whether it can be put in place and 
reviewed after the commencement of the partnership.  The conclusion is that an 
agreement on resource contributions by partners is recommended but cannot be said 
to be a default characteristic or defining element of partnership. 
 
The term PPP is used in various ways in various contexts.  Frequently it implies 
some form of private investment and transfer of risk to the private sector; but in other 
countries the focus is on the concept of partnership and not on the contract or the 
investment.  Plummer (2002:6) adopts a broad usage to describe some form of 
partnership endeavour involving both the public and private sectors (but not 
excluding the involvement of the third sector, civil society). 
 
A pre-occupation with risk transfer is a recurring theme in many definitions of PPPs.  
One conspicuous absence from the issues covered in the Scottish Office definition of 
the partnership approach is the sharing of risk, which is a central part of the SA 
Treasury definition of public-private partnerships.  This raises the question whether 
the SA Treasury‘s definition focuses too heavily on risk shedding as opposed to 
service delivery.  Following this train of thought, the next question would be whether, 
in spite of the SA Treasury definition, it is not perhaps possible to have improved 
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service delivery through a partnership without any conscious effort at risk transfer.  
The South African Treasury have adopted a simple PPP definition based on three 
essential elements: 
 A contractual arrangement 
 Substantial risk transfer 
 Outcome-based financial rewards (Republic of South Africa, 2001:A3) 
 
According to the SA Treasury definition already discussed in Chapter 1, a PPP is a 
contractual arrangement whereby a private party performs part of a department's 
service delivery or administrative functions and assumes the associated risks.  In 
return (as is illustrated below), the private party receives a fee according to 
predefined performance criteria, which may be: 
 Entirely from service tariffs or user charges 
 Entirely from a departmental or other budget 
 A combination of the above (Republic of South Africa, 2001:B5) 
 
 
 
 
There is a certain irony in the PPP proponents‘ argument that private sector expertise 
is required for public projects, considering the SMME (Small to medium enterprises) 
and economic development agenda of many governments where they have 
departments advising business on doing business and provide seed funding for 
businesses.  An example of this practice is the Stellenbosch Municipality which 
provides start-up grants for small businesses and advice and support to 
entrepreneurs (Van der Westhuizen, 2009). 
The essential aspects of a PPP arrangement, as distinct from the direct delivery of a 
public service by a department are: 
 A focus on the services to be provided, not the assets to be employed; 
Service tariff /  
charge 
Departmental 
 / other  
budget 
Both / 
Combination 
Figure 2.15: Source of fees for private party in PPP 
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 A shift of the risks and responsibilities to a private provider for the activities 
associated with the provision of services (Republic of South Africa, 2001:B5). 
 
A PPP is a contract between a public sector entity and a private sector entity where 
the latter performs a public entity function according to outcomes-based 
specifications, for a fee, and for a specific period of time.  It involves substantial risk 
transfer to the private sector, and the public sector retains a significant role as either 
purchaser or enabler of the services being provided (Aiello, 2001). 
 
PPP is certainly a viable instrument but I cannot comment on its popularity. 
Here at the PPP Unit we certainly have plenty of work to do.  The unions, 
SAMWU and IMATU, have made a religious vow to oppose PPPs, which is a 
travesty of justice because the vehicle has so much to offer.  The two 
remaining full-service water sector PPP contracts in the country are at Ilembe 
(previously Dolphin Cost) in KwaZulu-Natal, and at Nelspruit.  Both are highly 
successful PPPs and they have achieved Blue drop and Green drop status in 
a recent water quality survey. I have just completed a 15-year review of the 
Nelspruit PPP for the World Bank and it is certainly successful.  (Aiello, 2010) 
 
The European Union has the following definition of ―institutionalized PPPs‖: PPPs are 
forms of cooperation between public authorities and businesses, with the aim of 
carrying out infrastructure projects or providing service for the public.  These 
arrangements, which typically involve complex legal and financial arrangements, 
have been developed in several areas of the public sector and are widely used within 
the EU, in particular in the areas of transport, public health, public safety, waste 
management and water distribution‖ (European Union, 2004).  Most definitions 
recognise that a public-private partnership is a contractual agreement between a 
public agency (federal, state or local) and a private sector entity. Through this 
agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private) are shared in 
delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. In addition to the 
sharing of resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the 
delivery of the service and/or facility (NCPPP, 2006).  This definition from the US 
body responsible for promoting PPPs can be seen to favour private investors when it 
refers to the sharing of risk instead of the ―transfer‖ of risk.  The issue of risk in PPPs 
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is also addressed by the World Bank (2008) when it argues that PPPs should 
promote the individual interests of each partner: generally, a return on the investment 
for the private partner, and a net benefit to the society and the economy as a whole 
for the public entity (through the achievement of specific goals, such as the 
improvement of accessibility or the reduction of costs). These interests are 
channelled through the definition of risks. The World Bank (2008) argues for the clear 
assignment of risks as a precondition of the implementation of a PPP initiative. 
 
At European Union level, one of the European Commission‘s three main principles in 
its guidelines for its structural policy was ―to implement a partnership with all the 
parties involved in structural policy, especially the regional authorities‖ (CEC, 1987).  
It went on to define the term partnership in its framework Regulation for Reforming 
the Community‘s Structural Funds as ―close consultation between the Commission, 
the Member States concerned and the competent authorities designated by the latter 
at national, regional, local or other level, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit 
of a common goal‖ (CEC,1989:15; CEC 1996). This type of partnership implies both 
consultation and action at a local level (McQuaid, 2000:12).  The important defining 
element for partnerships that flow from this definition is the pursuit of a common goal.  
The World Bank (2008) supports this element when it refers to assumptions 
regarding PPPs and specifically the need for a common objective, the provision to 
users of facilities and services that meet clearly defined physical and performance 
standards, encompassing interventions that range from the construction and 
operation of new infrastructure to the simpler maintenance of existing infrastructure. 
2.4.7 Collaboration 
Collaboration is defined as two or more entities working together to create mutual 
value.  To make it more tangible, collaboration involves two or more companies, 
departments, customers, regulatory agencies, or whomever that combine their 
competencies to create new shared value while, at the same time, managing their 
respective costs and risks.  The entities can combine in any one of several different 
business relationships and for very different periods of time – ranging from some 
duration needed to exploit a particular innovation or business opportunity, to a much 
longer-term ongoing relationship.  Collaboration consists of creating value 
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(differentiated value bundles) and creating relationships that allow people to work 
together to create that value (Welborn & Kasten, 2003:32). 
2.4.8 Private sector participation 
Private sector participation (PSP) refers to the involvement of the private sector in 
some form, at some stage in the delivery of services.  It is a general term that is used 
to cover a wide range of private sector involvement including large and small scale, 
international and local, and the formal and informal sectors (Plummer, 2002:6). 
2.4.9 Privatization 
Privatization can be defined as the transfer of ownership to the private sector of 
certain previously public-owned resources and the private delivery of services 
previously delivered by public bodies.  As mentioned in several places in this 
dissertation, partnerships and specifically PPPs have been seen as equal to 
privatization both by supporters and critics of the PPP idea.  Both those who think 
privatization is good and those who think it is bad, have called PPP formation 
privatization.  An opposing view could be that government is actually expanding its 
area of influence through PPPs by tying the private sector into its delivery 
mechanisms.  Partnerships, including PPPs, could be seen as efforts from 
government to increase its influence in the private sector or to exercise an influence 
in areas where it previously did not operate.  Partial nationalization may come very 
close to the structure of a PPP and may be a way for a government to gain or regain 
control or market share in an area of private service delivery.  A government which 
believes that it or its predecessor has gone too far down the road of privatization may 
use PPPs as an instrument to restore the ―balance‖ towards more government 
control and involvement in the delivery of public services.   
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While the main reason for labour resistance against the PPP concept is that it is seen 
as privatization, the other side of the argument is seldom heard: that a PPP could be 
a move towards nationalization.  The fact is that PPP can be an instrument for both 
privatization and nationalization.  According to the UNDP (United Nations 
Development Programme) a distinction must be made between PPPs and 
privatization. It has been argued that while the word ―privatization‖ is frequently used 
to obtain private sector capabilities for provision of a project or service, it is a 
significant difference from a PPP. In privatization, the ownership of the asset is 
transferred to the private sector, with minimal (if any) public sector control retained. 
Under a PPP, the public sector retains a significant level of control to ensure that the 
best interests of the public are achieved. However, for a partnership to be successful, 
this control must be exercised with an understanding of the limitations and objectives 
of the private sector partners, otherwise the partnership is likely to fail. 
2.4.10 Three-sector hypothesis 
In this chapter the three sectors of society (public, private, third) have been defined.  
In this subsection an additional sectoral division is presented that will assist in later 
analysis of partnership examples. This sectoral division relates to three economic 
sectors. The three-sector hypothesis is an economic theory which divides economies 
into three sectors of activity: extraction of raw materials (primary), manufacturing 
(secondary), and services (tertiary). It was developed by Colin Clark and Jean 
Fourastié (Farlex, 2010b).  According to the theory the main focus of an economy's 
activity shifts from the primary, through the secondary and finally to the tertiary sector 
Towards 
Privatization 
Towards 
Nationalization 
Traditional ―direction‖ implied by PPP, the 
main reason for labour opposition to PPP. 
Figure 2.16: Traditional perception of the PPP as a tool for privatization 
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as it matures. Fourastié saw the process as essentially positive, and in The Great 
Hope of the Twentieth Century he writes of the increase in quality of life, social 
security, blossoming of education and culture, higher level of qualifications, 
humanization of work, and avoidance of unemployment (Farlex, 2010b). 
 
Countries with a low per capita income are in an early state of development; the main 
part of their national income is achieved through production in the primary sector. 
Countries in a more advanced state of development, with a medium national income, 
generate their income mostly in the secondary sector. In highly developed countries 
with a high income, the tertiary sector dominates the total output of the economy 
(Farlex, 2010b).  In later chapters, the economic sectors defined in this subsection 
will be used to differentiate between partnerships.  In this section several key 
partnership concepts were defined and discussed. In the next section, the reasons 
for partnering and partnerships will be explored.  
2.5 REASONS FOR PARTNERING 
In this section the arguments for the usefulness of partnerships, as well as the 
conditions under which partnerships are required will be introduced for discussion in 
subsequent sections. The conditions that will point to a need for a PPP will be 
identified and the question will be asked: ―When or for what projects would it not be a 
good idea to use partnerships?‖  The enthusiasm for partnerships must have 
something to do with the feelings of inclusiveness, consultation, participation and 
collaboration that are somehow associated with the term.  However, partnerships 
bring more complexity and potentially more problems.  This complexity and 
accompanying problems will be discussed in later chapters. Enthusiasm for the 
partnership concept could thus be one reason for partnering.   
 
Putting a partnership together can be done through the formation of another 
partnership, as was the case with the advisors used to advise the Philippine 
government on the terms of reference and appointment of other advisors who would 
eventually pull together two concessions for water and wastewater in Greater Manila.  
These concessions would serve a population of 11 million and require investment of 
US$7 billion over the contract period (Plummer, 2002:158).  In effect a partnership 
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was put together in order to decide on another much bigger partnership and this was 
done due to the lack of expertise of the public sector managers in the area.  A lack of 
expertise within the public sector (an assumption that will be challenged later) is thus 
also a reason for partnering. 
 
There are a number of assumptions underlying definitions of partnership.  One 
assumption is that there is potential for synergy where ‗the sum is greater than the 
parts‘.  The idea of synergy was discussed earlier in this chapter and will be raised 
again in later chapters. The concept of synergy also relates to the discussion of 
symbiotic relationships discussed earlier in this chapter.  It does seem as if the 
potential for synergy must exist before one could say that a partnership will be a good 
idea3 and woud therefore be a possible reason for partnering.  A second assumption 
is that a partnership involves both development and delivery of a strategy or a set of 
projects or operations, although each actor may not be equally involved in all stages. 
The different levels of involvement are discussed in the next paragraph.  A third 
assumption is that in public-private partnerships the public sector is not pursuing 
purely commercial goals.  A criterion for partnership could therefore be the presence 
of social goals among the possibly more prevalent commercial goals being pursued 
through transactions. 
 
Thus far in this section, reasons for partnership that have been identified include 
enthusiasm for the partnership concept, an assumed lack of expertise within the 
public sector, and a potential for synergism / symbiosis.  The figure below gives an 
example of how a partnership could be characterized by identifying the interaction 
between public and private contributions to the partnership.  In this example the need 
for the service is public, the initiative in answering the need is shared between public 
and private with slightly more private input, funding is mostly emanating from the 
public sector, and the development and delivery of the service is driven by the private 
sector.  The resources required to deliver the service is mostly public, the profit of the 
enterprise is shared, and the goals met are public.  A further distinction could be 
made by looking at the level of involvement of different partners at different times 
                                            
 
 
3
 Success Factor (SF): The existence of potential for synergy between partners.   
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over the life of a partnership.  The provision of resources could for example shift 
between partners over time as the project progresses through different stages. 
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Need  
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 Funding  
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 Delivery 
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Goals  
Figure 2.17: An example of public and private contributions to a partnership 
 
The components used above are quite arbitrary and solely for the purpose of 
illustration.  It would be possible to disassemble partnerships into other components 
as well.  It could be argued that if all requirements and inputs were to fall exclusively 
within either the public or the private sphere there would be little room or need for a 
public-private partnership.  On the other hand, when requirements and inputs are 
scattered across the two sectors, partnership makes perfect sense.  One example is 
the response that is required to cyber attacks.  Government alone cannot thwart 
cyber attacks on telephone systems, power grids, financial systems, dams, municipal 
water systems and other critical infrastructure.  This is because in a country such as 
the US, the private sector owns between 85 and 90 percent of the infrastructure.  
Recognising this, the US federal government has formed several multisectoral 
networks to coordinate cyber-security efforts (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004:9). 
 
The conclusion from the previous paragraph and from the spread of various service 
delivery needs and contributions across the public and private sector as depicted in 
Figure 2.17 is thus that where public service delivery requirements and the means 
with which to satisfy those needs are not present within one sector but scattered 
across both the public and private sector, a reason for partnering exists.  In the 
following subsections more reasons for partnering and the creation of PPPs will be 
explored. Reasons from specific sectors as well as sector-independent reasons for 
partnering will be dealt with. 
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2.5.1 Sectoral perspectives 
The differing perspectives of sectors can provide reasons for partnering.  The 
interests, power, goals and other differentiating aspects of sectors can expose 
potential reasons and imperatives for partnering to deliver public services.  The 
primary economic interest of the private sector gives it a reason to try to expand its 
market by ―moving into‖ public service delivery through the PPP vehicle.  The 
legislative powers of the public sector coupled with its primary goal of a stable civil 
society gives it reason to establish vehicles for providing public services by involving 
and stabilising communities while tapping private initiative and finance – PPPs.  Civil 
society, the so-called third sector, represents the interests of communities and 
members and will find reasons for partnering in public service delivery when 
considering its focus on justice and equity. 
 
The potential actors in service partnerships all fit within one of the three 
organizational sectors: the public sector, the private sector and civil society 
(Plummer, 2002:113).  While the traditional approach to PPPs only consider two 
sectors as potential sources of partners for PPPs, the public and private sectors, the 
third sector will also be discussed and considered as potential source of public 
service delivery partners in this dissertation. It would be useful for public managers to 
develop an understanding of the comparative attributes of these potential partners.  
The table below compares sectoral perspectives on partnership issues from the 
perspective of the three sectors, these being the Government (Public), Business 
(Private) and Civil Society sectors. 
 
Table 2-4: Sectoral perspectives on partnership issues 
 Government / Public 
Sector 
Business / Private 
Sector 
Civil Society / Third 
Sector 
Primary interest  Political  Economic  Social 
Primary form of power  Legislation, 
taxation and 
enforcement 
 Money  Traditions and 
values, voting 
power 
Primary goals  Stable civil society  Wealth creation  Establishing rights 
Framework for 
assessment 
 Legality  Profitability  Justice, equity 
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 Government / Public 
Sector 
Business / Private 
Sector 
Civil Society / Third 
Sector 
Primary form of 
organization 
 Governmental  For profit  Non-profit 
Stakeholders 
controlling action 
 Voters / rulers  Owners  Communities and 
members 
Primary basis for 
establishing 
relationships 
 Rules  Transactions  Values 
Framework for 
organization 
 Administering  Managing  Developing 
Primary timeframe  Election cycles  Profit reporting / 
business cycles 
 Sustainability / 
regeneration cycles 
(Waddel, 2000, cited in Plummer, 2002:112) 
 
This comparative table and evidence from service partnerships related by Plummer 
shows that there are still gaps in the traditional public-private package – gaps that 
can be filled by drawing in the competencies of the civil society sector (Plummer, 
2002:113).  The sectoral perspective of civil society thus clearly provides reasons for 
it to become involved in partnerships for public service delivery.  Plummer elaborates 
on the table with another table more specifically looking at municipal partnership and 
here she discriminates between two types of business or private sector partners, 
being international business and small-scale, presumably local providers. 
 
Table 2-5: Sectoral perspectives on municipal partnerships  
 Municipality International 
Business 
Small-scale 
providers 
NGOs 
Primary interest  
(in the partnership) 
 Political 
 Financial 
 Physical / 
Environmental 
 Economic 
 Financial 
 Economic 
 Financial 
 Social 
 Physical / 
Environmental 
Forms of power  
(in the partnership) 
 Regulatory 
control 
 Hierarchy/status 
 Tradition 
 Payment 
 Money  Local 
knowledge 
 Values 
 Reputation 
Primary goals 
(in the partnership) 
 To maintain the 
status quo 
 To improve the 
 To create 
profits 
 To generate 
 To make a 
living 
 To improve the 
quality of life in 
poor 
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 Municipality International 
Business 
Small-scale 
providers 
NGOs 
environment more work 
opportunities 
communities 
Framework for 
assessment 
 Legality 
 Political 
recognition 
 Individual 
profitability 
 Profitability  Profitability  Equity 
Primary form of 
organization 
 Governmental  For profit  For profit  Non-profit 
Stakeholders 
controlling action 
 Voters / rulers  Owners / 
Managers 
 Their clients  Communities 
 NGO leaders 
Primary basis for 
establishing 
relationships 
 Rules  Transactions  Job  Values 
Framework for 
organization 
 Administering  Managing  Operational  Developing 
Primary timeframe  Election cycles  Profit-reporting 
/ business 
cycles 
 Immediate job  Sustainability / 
funding cycle 
 
The table illustrates the difference between the interests of local and international 
business and shows how their perspectives could provide reasons for partnering.  An 
example is that a local provider could have local knowledge but has a need for 
immediate income, while an international firm may want to generate more work 
opportunities and has capital to invest in the short term. Such private-private 
partnerships can constitute part of a larger PPP that also involves the public and/or 
the third sector.  
 
In the third or civil society sector, there is also a differentiation between local and 
international perspectives that can motivate the formation of partnerships.  With its 
international civil society perspective, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) argues that a number of significant benefits may be obtained from properly 
constructed and managed public-private partnership.  These reasons for partnering 
can include: increased availability of capital; improved delivery time of projects; more 
cost effective operations; progress towards the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals; improved environmental sustainability; the development of small 
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businesses; and progress towards the achievement of the UNDP Global Summit 
Goals.  Each of these reasons will now be discussed individually: 
 
 Increased capital available for a project: Available public sector funding (by 
local, national or international financial sources) can be leveraged through 
long-term financing from private sector resources, with an appropriate means 
for recapturing the investment included in the contract. This can often provide 
the critical level of capital for the execution of a project that might not 
otherwise be possible. 
 Improved delivery time: With the enhanced project management skills of the 
private sector and clearly defined and indicated delivery goals incorporated in 
the contract, project or service delivery can be provided in substantially shorter 
timeframes. 
 Cost-effective operations: Through workplace rules, management practices 
and operational efficiencies developed through competition in the marketplace, 
the private sector can provide cost-effective approaches. 
 Relationship to Millennium Development Goals: PPPs provide a methodology 
that can be used to meet a number of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs – see definitions), including improved and more cost-effective service 
systems that aid in the eradication of poverty and hunger, promote universal 
primary education, provide for gender equality, and improve a number of 
health concerns (such as infant mortality, maternal health, and combating 
HIV/Aids). 
 Environmental Sustainability: PPPs may be specifically designed to address 
environmental challenges. Through the application of new technologies 
provided by the private partner and concerns about air and water pollution, 
remediation of hazardous wastes and other environmental concerns can be 
addressed. 
 Small business development: Development of new small businesses at the 
local level can be incorporated into the provisions of a PPP. These may 
include development of skills for a range of service providers and the training 
of a skilled workforce. 
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 UNDP Global Summit Goals: PPPs can provide an environment for the 
implementation of policies and programmes that meet a number of these 
goals. First among these is transparency and accountability in the 
procurement process. PPPs can also provide the vehicles for bilateral or 
multilateral cooperation, increased trade volumes, foreign direct investment, 
technology transfer, and technical and humanitarian assistance. 
 
It is therefore clear that from a third sector perspective various reasons can be found 
for partnering, both from a local and a national perspective.  There are various 
stakeholders within each sector that could consider partnering in their own best 
interest.  The stakeholders involved in a partnership could include any combination of 
public officials, private-sector partners, business, affected employees, portions of the 
public receiving the service provided by the partnership, the media, involved labour 
unions, non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations, gender 
advocacy groups, indigenous / traditional representation, research institutions, 
international agencies, donor organizations and relevant interest groups (Creech & 
Paas, 2008:13; NCPPP, 2006). Each of these groups might have a different 
perspective on the necessity for partnership.  In this subsection various reasons for 
partnering that are sector-specific have been touched upon.  In the next subsections 
sector-independent conditions that create a need for partnering will be isolated and 
described. 
2.5.2 Conditions that point to the need for partnership 
The manifestation of specific conditions can provide reasons to partner and 
cooperate in public service delivery.  McQuaid (2000:26) lists three main reasons for 
cooperation.  He believes that the threat of a central authority can cause parties to 
cooperate, that common objectives might precipitate cooperation, and that other self-
interest could bring cooperation.   There is also an expectation that elements in the 
policy development and even operational planning process of public service delivery 
will make it apparent that partnership is required.  It is interesting to note that, due to 
the fact that the public are in fact co-producers of the services of government, it could 
be argued that partnership is always required in public service delivery.   If there are 
certain conditions that indicate to observers that partnership is required, the opposite 
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should also be true: there must be circumstances that are clearly not conducive to 
partnership.  One could for example say that a partnership will take time to establish 
and bring into operation and would therefore not be a good idea where time is limited.  
The indications are however not very clear and can often be open to interpretation.  
In more than one case in the UK the same project has been used by both the 
detractors and supporters of PPPs to ―prove‖ their point of view.  
 
In his 2003 State of the Nation address, the then president of South Africa, Mr Thabo 
Mbeki, committed the government to continue to work on public-private partnerships 
to increase its capacity to respond to the needs of the people and indicated that 50 
partnerships were already operational in areas such as as health, education, 
transport, housing, information technology, tourism, and government accommodation 
(Mbeki, 2003). One can extract one condition requiring partnership from this 
statement, that is that partnership is required under conditions where a government is 
seeking to rapidly increase its capacity to respond to service delivery requirements.  
The converse would then be true: the need for partnerships will be less obvious 
under conditions where government is seeking to just maintain or even reduce 
service delivery capacity.  While nothing is impossible, such a condition is arguably 
highly unlikely, especially in developing countries such as South Africa. 
 
The possibility of ―government failure‖ as well as ―market failure‖ must be considered 
– according to Roth (1987:7) – when deciding whether a service should be provided 
through public or private means.  Government failure could thus be a condition that 
points to the need for partnership, and similarly market failure could also provide 
fertile ground for partnering.  Market failure exists where the private provision of a 
specific service or commodity collapses due to a lack of supply, otherwise manifested 
as the inability of the private sector to provide a specific service at a place, time and 
cost that is acceptable both to itself and a sufficiently large client base.  Market failure 
will necessarily occur where a service cannot be provided at a rate that is profitable 
for the supplier, as no supplier will then be interested in delivering the service 
concerned.  Market failure will also occur where the possible customer base is not 
willing to purchase a service at the price at which the supplier is able to provide the 
service. 
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The economic literature describes five situations or conditions in which private 
markets cannot necessarily be relied upon to provide the most efficient and 
appropriate pattern of services: 
 Where natural monopolies exist; 
 Where increased production is associated with decreasing costs; 
 Where substantial externalities exist and are not reflected in the accounts 
of private suppliers (positive and negative externalities); 
 Where it is difficult to charge for a service or to exclude those who do not 
pay; 
 Where merit goods are involved (Roth, 1987:7). 
 
Where the above conditions exist, it is expected that the public sector would have to 
step up and deliver the service, provided that it has the capacity.  Where a market 
failure has occurred, where the public service is required, and where the public sector 
does not have the capacity to deliver the service, conditions are ideal for partnering.  
In the following section the influence of policy transfer and policy entrepreneurs as 
reasons for partnering will be discussed. 
2.5.3 Policy transfer and policy entrepreneurs 
Policy transfer is a widespread practice that also provides reasons for partnering.  
For example, Americans borrowed the idea of national income tax from the British 
while Europeans imported the concept of cloverleaf intersections from the United 
States.  The literature on policy transfer has grown substantially in the past decade 
(Hoyt, 2008:113; Mossberger & Wolman, 2003).  Policy transfer is also known as 
lesson drawing, policy borrowing, policy shopping, policy band-wagoning, and 
systematically pinching ideas.  It is a term that describes the voluntary flow of ideas 
between individuals and is regarded as a type of policy learning because it involves 
the acquisition and utilization of knowledge about policies elsewhere.  Put simply, 
policy transfer refers to the way in which policies and practices from one context are 
used to develop policies and practices in other settings.  Individually, policy agents 
represent public, private, or public-private organizations and function as experts or 
―policy transfer entrepreneurs‖ who advocate the spread of certain policies and 
information (Hoyt, 2008:113). 
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It is argued that the widespread adoption of the Business Improvement District (BID) 
model of PPP is mainly the result of policy transfer and policy entrepreneurs who 
have actively marketed the BID model as a solution to urban decay in business 
areas. The BID model is a very parochial instrument which focuses on a small 
microcosm within society. With the power to impose taxes and provide collective 
services, BIDs supplement publicly funded efforts to attract visitors and investors, 
enhance pedestrian experience, and improve a city‘s ability to compete with regional 
office parks, shopping malls, and suburban living (Hoyt, 2008:112).  The issues that 
deserve consideration prior to policy adoption, according to a framework developed 
by Mossberger and Wolman in 2003 for prospective policy evaluation, include: 
adequacy and accuracy of information, similarity of problems and differences in 
setting, policy performance, and policy application (Hoyt, 2008:125–126). 
 
Earlier in this dissertation the problem of finding unbiased information on the success 
or failure of PPPs was noted.  That view is supported by the following perspective on 
the BID as a specific type of PPP which is actively marketed as best practice and for 
which policy transfer is encouraged. 
  
―...with respect to policy transfer, the BID model is problematic because it 
mandates self-promotion.  Said another way, BID organizations with highly 
visible programmes are not necessarily effective in creating delightful, safe 
and clean environments; such a reputation may be, in part, the result of an 
impressive marketing scheme that is merely evidence that a BID manager is 
doing his or her job.  Therefore, importers are rightfully sceptical, and the BID 
entrepreneurs that I interviewed expressed some frustration with the task of 
borrowing ideas from organizations, especially when it was difficult to 
distinguish between objective and subjective accounts of success.‖ (Hoyt, 
2008:126) 
 
It would be plausible to carry this perspective on the promotion of a specific PPP 
model through to other types of partnerships.  Hoyt (2008:126) argues that, despite 
the realization that BIDs do not represent a panacea for urban ills, urban policy 
entrepreneurs advocated the transfer of the BID model for the purpose of building a 
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coalition of support that will justify their beliefs and publicize their activities.   
According to guidelines set forth by Mossberger and Wolman (2003), entrepreneurs 
should systematically evaluate prospective policies in the originating country prior to 
adoption.  Hoyt (2008:127) supports the need for careful consideration before 
adoption: 
Put simply, entrepreneurs should refrain from borrowing ideas unless they 
have proof that they are successful elsewhere. Most are satisfied with 
subjective accounts of success from experts‘ opinion, collections of 
promotional material on BIDs and on-site visits of operational BIDs. 
 
In the past, few entrepreneurs approached the adoption of BID policy methodically.  
Late adopters - such as the property owners and local officials in Cape Town as well 
as England‘s central government – practice what Hoyt (2008:128) has termed as 
―rather creative and cautious techniques‖ for assessment.  According to her the Cape 
Town Partnership methodically assessed and effectively blended revitalization 
models  from a variety of contexts, including the United States (Denver, Seattle, 
Washington DC, and New York), Ireland (Dublin), England (Liverpool, Manchester, 
and Coventry), the Netherlands, Australia (Adelaide), and Brazil (Hoyt, 2008:128).  
Similar conservative adoption of the BID model is seen in England where the BID 
model was launched through a pilot project that involved the institutionalization of 
fewer than two dozen BIDs instead of wholeheartedly embracing the model (Hoyt, 
2008:128). 
 
The BID model is seen as flexible and responsive to the historically, politically, and 
socio-economically divergent contexts that Johannesburg and Cape Town present as 
opposed to other areas where the model was implemented.  Hoyt determined this 
through a survey investigating the involvement of managers of BIDs in the activities 
which BIDs have historically supported in pursuing the three principal aims of BIDs: 
delight, safety, and cleanliness.  The surveyed activities which BIDs could support 
included: consumer marketing, capital improvements, policy advocacy, maintenance, 
security, economic development, transportation, and social services (Hoyt, 
2008:128).  The table below highlights the international status of BID policy transfer 
as determined by Hoyt in 2008. 
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Table 2-6: Stages of Policy Transfer for the BID Model (Hoyt, 2008:117) 
Stage of 
policy 
transfer 
Policy Emergence Transfer Success Resistance 
Description 
of policy 
transfer 
stage 
Before policy enabling legislation has 
been adopted.  Policy entrepreneurs 
are involved in importation-related 
tasks, including the study of policies 
in other places as well as activities 
such as proposing, drafting, and 
lobbying to implement enabling 
legislation 
Enabling legislation 
is approved. 
Policy 
implementation is 
functional 
Ongoing and 
considerable resistance 
to the importation of the 
policy or the adoption of 
enabling legislation 
Countries 
in the 
different 
policy 
transfer 
stages 
relating to 
the BID 
model. 
Japan, Austria, Germany, Lithuania, 
the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Romania 
Canada, United 
States, New 
Zealand, South 
Africa, Serbia, 
Albania, Jamaica, 
United Kingdom 
 
 
It is now opportune to return to other reasons for partnering than policy transfer.  In 
the next section sector-independent reasons for partnering will be discussed. 
2.5.4 Sector-independent reasons / perspective 
It is important to improve the partnership element of PPPs in order to reach a 'win-
win' situation, rather than to allow the traditional adversarial approach between 
private and public sectors to continue (Wakeford & Valentine, 2001). In this 
subsection generic or sector-independent reasons for the use of partnerships will be 
discussed. 
2.5.4.1 Resource sharing 
Collin and Hansson (2000:206) cite the need for resource sharing as a reason for 
embarking on partnerships in Sweden.  Related arguments on sharing resources 
come from Goldsmith and Eggers when they discuss the sharing of knowledge 
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(2004:107), communication and co-location (2004:96) as well as Grant (2005) in his 
discussions on the reasons for vertical integration. 
2.5.4.2 An instrument for transformation 
The need to have an instrument for transforming an organization can bring about a 
move towards partnership (Collin & Hansson, 2000:206).  The goal of ―getting rid‖ of 
an inefficient internal provider that has become a financial burden, as in Colombia, 
South America (Plummer, 2002:156), is also seen as a reason for partnership. 
2.5.4.3 Providing the image of a proper firm  
Observers in Sweden (Collin & Hansson, 2000:206) have commented that the 
formation of a formal partnership in the guise of a new, separate entity could be 
motivated by a need to appease the private partners in an existing informal 
partnership who would be more comfortable dealing with a formally constituted, 
proper firm. 
2.5.4.4 Dealing with complex issues 
Various initiatives, as described below, implicitly recognize the promise of 
partnerships as a viable vehicle for solving complex problems.  Powell (2002) has 
argued that partnerships can be used to combat pervasive crises such as the 
HIV/Aids pandemic.  Dumol (2000) explains how a partnership was used to put 
together a complex large scale and long-term concession.  The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) represent a global partnership for development. The 
deal makes it clear that it is the primary responsibility of poor countries to work 
towards achieving the first seven Goals. They must do their part to ensure greater 
accountability to citizens as well as the efficient use of resources. But for poor 
countries to achieve the first seven Goals, it is said to be critical that rich countries 
deliver on their end of the bargain with more and more effective aid, more sustainable 
debt relief and fairer trade rules, well in advance of the 2015 target. 
 
Trevor Manuel, the then Minister of Finance of South Africa, said the MDGs can 
divert attention too far away from already productive aspects of the economy.  He 
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motivated that a balanced perspective is necessary because social goals are more 
related to rapid economic growth than changes in spending patterns (Leuvennink, 
2007).  It is however still held that partnerships can be the more effective 
interventions to deal with complex social problems; (Rowe, 2006:209) 
2.5.4.5 Providing stability in unstable conditions  
In the midst of political turmoil a special purpose vehicle in the form of a partnership 
was to be created to manage the process of procuring a soccer stadium in Cape 
Town for the 2010 Soccer World Cup (Essop, 2006; Herman & Kassiem, 2006).  
Although the idea did not come to fruition, it points to the confidence with which 
partnerships are regarded as instruments that can deal with uncertainty and unstable 
conditions.  This leaves the question whether PPPs really do require a stable 
environment to be successful.  This question will be discussed in more detail in later 
chapters, but at this point it can be recorded that a stable environment is not 
necessarily seen as a critical success factor for PPP. 
2.5.4.6 Improving services to the poor and excluded 
In the book Focusing Partnerships – A Sourcebook for Municipal Capacity Building in 
Public-Private Partnerships, Plummer presents a strategic framework for municipal 
capacity building ―to understand, formulate and implement PPPs focused on 
improving services to the poor.‖  One should not assume that her focus on improving 
services to the poor means that PPPs cannot be used for other purposes (2002:9). 
Related to improving services, Phasiwe (2005) indicates that partnerships become 
necessary where the delivery of key services to the poor need to be fast-tracked.  
Plummer in turn indicates that private partners can develop innovative and alternative 
service delivery options to low-income communities (2002:22). 
 
Public-private partnership can serve as an institutional means of dealing with 
particular sources of market failure (Pongsiri, 2002).  Rowe extends the capacity of 
partnerships to improve delivery to the poor and excluded further by indicating that 
participation unlocked through partnership can build capacity and ―social capital‖ in 
excluded communities (Rowe, 2006:209). 
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2.5.4.7 Access to superior managerial efficiency 
The efficiency argument for privatization (which if considered in broad terms also 
includes the use of PPPs) claims that private management is inherently superior to 
public management.  One could therefore say that trying to get access to superior 
managerial efficiency could be a reason to pursue PPPs as service delivery 
mechanisms.  The assumption of inferior management within the public sector has 
however not gone uncontested.  Hughes (2003:105) argues that there is simply no 
conclusive proof of the alleged superiority of private management over public 
management.  He states that public and private management environments differ 
considerably and that management in the public sector may be less straightforward.  
Plummer (2002) highlights various perspectives on the reasons for involving the 
private sector in service delivery.  Opinions from a mayor in Kathmandu, Nepal, the 
Operations Manager of Johannesburg Water Management, a representative of the 
Mvula Trust (an NGO), a low-income community from Buenos Aires, the Water and 
Sanitation Programme as well as a donor (DFID – UK Department for International 
Development) and a financier (Aqua International Partners, San Francisco) are 
provided in this section for a comparison of sectoral views on the utility of 
partnership. 
2.5.4.8 Market failure 
It is possible that partnerships, and PPPs specifically, are the result of market failures 
– the failure of a specific sector to deliver a required public good, a public product or 
service for which a demand exists.  Examples from Sweden that will be described 
elsewhere in this dissertation illustrate how the failure of the private sector to 
continue providing rail transport services to a small community prompted the 
development of a PPP.  The failure of the public sector to provide enough water 
again prompted the development of PPPs in other parts of the world, including South 
America.  In the next section, specific attention will be given to reasons for partnering 
from a public sector perspective.  
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2.5.5 Public sector perspective 
The public sector perspective is particularly important in the context of this 
dissertation, which aims to support public sector decision-making on the partnership 
as a service delivery option, and aims to support public sector managers in realizing 
successful partnerships when partnerships are implemented.  Partnerships for 
sustainable development - voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiatives aimed at 
implementing sustainable development - were an important complementary outcome 
of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD).  At its 11th Session in 
May 2003, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) reaffirmed that these 
partnerships contribute to the implementation of intergovernmental commitments, 
recognizing that partnerships are a complement to, not a substitute for, 
intergovernmental commitments.  In an SA Treasury document, it is held that if 
correctly structured and used, partnerships are a useful service delivery option with 
benefits from both an operational and a strategic perspective (Republic of South 
Africa, 2001:B6, A3).  This statement implies that correct structure and use are 
success factors for PPPs, and indicates that the realization of operational and 
strategic benefits can be seen as a performance indicator. 
 
The opinion has been voiced that it would be no surprise if the public sector were 
less efficient than the private sector in the performance of society‘s business of public 
policy.  The concept of the ―neutral civil service‖, the bureaucracy staffed with career 
public servants, is a well-known historical tradition in Europe, but not in the USA.  
The American pay-off system, called the Tammany Hall tradition, employs public-
service jobs as political pay-off.  In many US cities, especially in the eastern United 
States, this has been the equivalent of the Prince‘s mercenary army (Linder & 
Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:4).   The rationale for privatization through partnership 
can be attributed to a wide range of factors ranging from cost reductions to 
ideological preference (Daley, 1996; Starr, 1990).   
2.5.5.1 Cost reduction 
There are arguments for the use of partnerships to realize cost reduction.  In order to 
support an argument for cost reduction it would be necessary to give an accurate 
comparison of the costs involved in delivering a set service on a public or a privatized 
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basis.  Such a clear comparison is however not always possible because establishing 
the costs of privatization may be extremely complex.  According to some 
commentators implementation is often carried out in the absence of cost information 
(Lifsher, 1998; Xiong, 1997) or with estimated data (US General Accounting Office, 
1998).  Therefore, it is no surprise that much research on the topic simply assumes 
that privatization reduces costs (Greene, 1996).  Evidence in support of this 
proposition, generally based on case studies, is mixed and, on balance, evidence is 
simply contradictory (Handler, 1996).  It is therefore clear that there is an assumption, 
but no real proof, of cost reduction. 
2.5.5.2 Managing large projects 
Economists have expressed reservations on the ability of the SA government to 
implement large capital spending, because only 5% of planned infrastructure 
spending of R372 billion over three years from 2006 was to be spent through public-
private partnerships (Clark, 2006). The reason for partnership that can be derived 
from this opinion is that partnerships could be required in cases where large capital 
projects needs to be completed. 
2.5.5.3 Reconnecting public service delivery with clients 
Residents bring a previously untapped perspective to the challenge of resolving 
difficult social problems and exclusion through partnerships.  They might bring a form 
of intelligence and, in a sense, power to a partnership, an understanding of what 
does and does not work, for whom and why.  By not simply criticising local services 
but also by participating in the development of alternative arrangements, the local 
community brings both accountability and legitimacy.  The way in which they are 
engaged in the process of partnership working is central to an understanding of the 
effectiveness of partnership (Rowe, 2006:209).   
 
Rowe‘s description of partnership makes one wonder about the effectiveness of 
democracy, which ideally is supposed to capture exactly the understanding, 
accountability and legitimacy he attributes to partnership.  It seems as if partnership, 
with the direct involvement of communities and a commendable client focus where 
communities participate as co-producers of services, could be displacing traditional 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 101 
approaches to representative democracy and can be seen as an indictment exposing 
the ineffectiveness of democracy as currently practiced.  Rowe indicates that the 
challenge of how to effectively incorporate the diverse range of experiences and 
voices to be found in excluded communities is a central problem for partnerships.  He 
questions whether individuals on boards are sufficiently representative and whether 
such individuals are to be accountable for the views they express.  Rowe asks 
whether consultation is a sufficient substitute for wider participation and, touching on 
the challenge that partnerships might imply for democracy, indicates that for local 
authorities and particularly elected members, the development of other forms of 
democratic expression has sometimes been interpreted as a threat to their role as 
elected representatives (Rowe, 2006:210).  Despite these misgivings, it is clear that 
partnerships can allow the reconnection of public service delivery with clients. 
2.5.5.4 Ideological preference 
The public sector may decide to embark on PPPs purely because of the ideological 
preference of whatever political party is in charge of the machine of government.  If 
the governing party is in favour of smaller government and privatization, or if it has a 
strong belief in involving citizens and other sectors of society in service delivery, it 
could set a pro-PPP agenda.  In the UK the Labour government that came into power 
in 1997 built on the partnership idea implemented by the previous government by 
extending  the scope to encompass the voluntary and community sectors and to 
embrace a much more holistic agenda (Rowe, 2006:209). 
2.5.5.5 Accountability and oversight 
Accountability is defined as the legal obligation to respect the legitimate interests of 
others affected by decisions, programmes, and interventions (Consodine, 2002).  
From a public sector perspective, according to Rowe (2006:209), PPPs can bring 
greater accountability and oversight of public services. 
 
The public-private partnership is significant in creating a perception of equity and 
mutual accountability regarding transactions between public and private 
organizations through cooperative behaviour (Pongsiri, 2002). 
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2.5.5.6 Tempering business sense with social consciousness 
PPPs are said to assist in balancing business and social concerns.  Although 
business could have a bigger hand in public service delivery in a PPP, the business 
sense of the private sector would be tempered by the social concerns of the public, 
voluntary and charity sectors (Rowe, 2006:209). 
2.5.5.7 A vehicle for modernization 
At a conference in Cape Town in 2006, the British Member of Parliament and 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Stephen Timms indicated that the British 
government has used public-private partnerships as vehicles for modernising public 
services and British business alike (Timms, 2006). 
2.5.5.8 Increased efficiency 
The following two examples illustrate how, from a public sector perspective, PPPs 
may be seen as tools with which to increase efficiency.   In Colombia in the early 
1990s, central government was devolving responsibility for essential services, but 
wished to avoid the re-emergence of inefficiency in the provision of services under 
direct municipal control (Plummer, 2002:238), and consequently opted for PPPs.  
The second example involves the UK labour government that, while in power, argued 
that better value should be derived from public spending, particularly at a local level, 
by working across organizational and sectoral boundaries (Rowe, 2006:209). PPPs 
(or the Brtish model of PPPs, PFIs) was seen as the vehicle of choice for this 
purpose. 
 
Better coordination of public services, securing efficiencies both in terms of cash 
savings and improved delivery, can also be achieved through PPPs (Rowe, 
2006:209).  Partnerships also bring administrative benefits to government – 
increased speed and reduced administrative costs by tendering only once for multi-
year engagements (Plummer, 2002:24). 
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2.5.5.9 The promise of operational benefits 
One of the objectives with the establishment of a JV (Joint Venture) PPP for water 
and sanitation in Cartegena, Colombia in 1995, was to ―improve efficiency by 
attracting the necessary technical skills from the private sector‖ (Plummer, 2002:156).  
The SA Treasury professes that operationally, the benefits of PPPs include 
efficiency gains, output focus, economies generated from integrating the design, 
building, financing and operation of assets, innovative use of assets; managerial 
expertise and better project identification. These benefits can result in some 
combination of better and more services for the same price, and savings, which can 
be used for other services or for more investment elsewhere (Republic of South 
Africa, 2001:B6, A3).  As already mentioned in previous sections of this dissertation, 
it is important not to assume the realization of benefits due to partnerships, but rather 
to note that the potential for the realization of benefits is created through partnership.  
Whether a partnership is successful or not – whether the potential is fully exploited or 
not - will determine whether benefit is realized - or not. It would be more appropriate 
to say that successful partnerships are able to use assets innovatively, unlock 
managerial expertise, improve project identification, realize efficiency gains, achieve 
an output focus, and generate economies through integration of design, building, 
financing and operating assets.  
 
Two arguments can be used to contest the claims for efficiency gains made on behalf 
of partnerships. Firstly, a partnership could be a more complicated delivery 
mechanism than straightforward delivery by a public entity, thus possibly reducing 
efficiency by involving more role-players and layers of management.  Secondly, 
creating a partnership structure does not remove the purportedly inefficient public 
sector from the equation – they must still be involved in the partnership if it is to be 
called a partnership.  The argument that partnerships facilitate an output focus can 
also be criticized.  With the creation of a new partnership entity, a significant amount 
of energy and focus can be spent on getting the ―new animal‖ to work, thus 
encouraging an inward focus and weakening the intended output focus. 
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2.5.5.10 The promise of strategic benefits 
The SA Treasury holds that strategically, partnership contracts enhance 
accountability by clarifying responsibilities and focusing on the key deliverables of a 
service.  The Treasury argues that a department's managerial efficiency can benefit 
significantly as existing departmental financial, human and management resources 
can be refocused on strategic functions (Republic of South Africa, 2001:B6, A3).  
This position can be contested, as partnerships can require more time and personal 
investment from management than expected: More meetings, trying to make sure the 
partnership is aimed in the right way, ensuring co-operation and consensus.  When 
the partnership meets, it will want to consult widely, and will in all likelihood require 
representation from all its constituencies when decisions need to be made.   
 
Table 2-7: Partnerships require additional coordination 
Comparison of meetings required  for a single simple project executed by a single agency as opposed to 
the same project executed by a partnership 
Single executing agency Execution though Partnership 
Project meetings: Single executing agency 
Project meetings: Partnership 
Meetings inside each partner to get go-ahead for 
partnership. 
Project initiation Project initiation meeting 
Weekly project management meetings 
Weekly project management meetings 
Weekly feedback to partner organizations by their 
representatives within the partnership 
Monthly progress report meetings with project 
champion 
Monthly progress report meetings with project 
champion 
Monthly progress report meetings with champion within 
each partner organization 
Partnership management and coordination meetings 
Internal management meetings of single executing 
agency 
Internal management meetings of each partner 
organization 
Project close-out meeting 
Meetings to approve project close-out within each 
partner organization 
Project close-out meeting 
 
A partnership will also bring management in contact with more stakeholders and 
open up new channels of information exchange.  In terms of general management 
principles and due diligence this should be good, but in terms of time, it can be 
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argued that partnerships often do not mean more free time for management, and 
rarely frees up significant amounts of resources.  The amount of delegated decision-
making powers the representatives of the different partners in the partnership has4 
could of course have an influence on how much resources are actually freed up or 
consumed by the partnership.  Observers may equate the use of partnerships with 
the use of consultants by government.  The officials may hope that the appointment 
of a consultant will translate into more free time, but normally experiences 
disillusionment when they find out that they need to monitor and work with the 
consultant.  Service delivery will not happen in the absence of the public official.  In 
the same way that a consultant will still need to be managed, a PPP will still need to 
be managed.  In contrast to the supposed need for private expertise that PPPs can 
provide, PPPs rely on administration by highly competent public officials to deal 
adequately with contract administration. 
2.5.5.11 Strategic clarity 
The SA Treasury claims that partnerships hold the potential benefit of strategic clarity 
by focusing departmental resources on strategic management and ensuring that key 
services are delivered effectively (Republic of South Africa, 2001:B6, A3).  This 
assertion echoes the ―steering, not rowing‖ dogma of the reinventing government 
movement of the late 1990s. 
2.5.5.12 The promise of financial benefits 
One of the municipal objectives with the establishment of a water and sanitation JV 
(Joint Venture) PPP in Cartagena, Colombia in 1995 was to rid itself of the fiscal 
burden of an inefficient in-house operation by delegating the management function.  
The municipal-owned operation was in crisis with water losses exceeding 50%.  
Current revenue did not cover operating costs and deepened an existing deficit.  
There was not enough money to pay for chemicals to treat water.  Investment in 
network maintenance and extension was non-existent (Plummer, 2002:156).  The 
unquestioning public official may see PPPs as an easy way to get around 
                                            
 
 
4
 SF: The representatives of the partners in the partnership must have sufficient delegated decision-
making powers. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 106 
deficiencies in budgeting by pulling private capital into public service delivery 
(Anderson & Thompson, 1999). Unfortunately the use of private finance rather than 
public finance does not mean that more expenditure can be afforded as, in the long 
run, the cost of private borrowing is normally higher than conventional government 
borrowing.  Since government can normally borrow more cheaply, the gains from the 
private operator's efficiency must exceed the difference in borrowing cost if a PPP 
project is considered.  The real benefit of PPPs is the value for money derived from 
the operational and strategic benefits mentioned above (Republic of South Africa, 
2001:A4). 
 
The accepted wisdom that the only way to improve the performance of utilities is by 
some form of privatization is being challenged, based on the failure of some private 
sector management contracts in developing countries to deliver expected 
improvement in standards.  There is a realization that in some circumstances, 
technical assistance could be a better option than privatization (Plummer, 2002:186).  
The financial limitations of a management contract became clear once analysis by a 
World Bank team revealed that improvements in the performance of the Lesotho 
Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA), achieved through the provision of technical 
assistance, left insufficient scope for the additional cost savings upon which a 
management contract rely in order to be viable.  In other words, in this particular 
case, the cost of a management contract would be greater than the savings that 
would accrue from the greater efficiencies that such a contract would be expected to 
bring (Plummer, 2002:186, citing Wessex Water International). 
 
The practical limitations are exemplified in the second of the two conclusions reached 
by the World Bank mission: that, in this case, the core problem of WASA cannot be 
remedied by a management contract.  These core problems are identified as staffing, 
tariffs and the collection of government debts.  The reason given is that these issues 
are outside the jurisdiction of a management contract, as they are primarily the result 
of policy decisions of the government.  However, the World Bank mission felt that 
addressing them can be made a condition by the Bank for a Technical Assistance–
supported performance agreement (Plummer, 2002:186).  The performance 
agreement concept has previously been successful in Swaziland, where the Water 
Services Corporation has a performance contract with government (in the form of the 
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Public Enterprise Unit).  This was a condition of a World Bank loan for the urban 
development project, and DFID (UK Department for International Development) 
supported the TA (Technical Assistance) for the corporation.  As long as the 
agreement is well drafted without areas for ambiguity, it provides the performance-
based incentives normally associated with the private sector while leaving 
responsibility for achievement with the organization‘s own staff.  This is more likely to 
contribute to the overall objective of sustainable development than the handing over 
of responsibility to an international company (Plummer, 2002:186). 
 
The split between operating and financing skills implies that, if the municipality has 
the capacity to package the operating and financing skills itself, it may be able to 
arrange a more cost effective partnership by separating the two functions – for 
example, by pairing one or more local operators (including community groups) with a 
combination of local and international sources of investment capital (including public 
and not-for-profit sources) (Plummer, 2002:202).  Borrowing costs represent a large 
component of the financial aspect of public infrastructure creation, and the discussion 
of the possible financial benefits of partnerships should also include a discussion of 
borrowing costs. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.18: In a PPP the expected higher borrowing costs should be offset by lower 
implementation cost or increased service delivery. 
 
The question that begs asking is whether PPPs are in fact good options if borrowing 
is necessary, or whether they are only appropriate if borrowing is not necessary.  It is 
clear that, in order for a PPP to be a viable financial option when borrowing is 
No PPP PPP 
Borrowing 
cost 
Cost 
Service 
Borrowing 
cost 
Cost 
Service 
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necessary, the extra borrowing cost must be outweighed by savings in service 
delivery or benefits through improved service delivery, as illustrated in the figure 
above.  A quantification of the cost of public service delivery will of course be 
required before it is possible to compare costs with proposed delivery-in-partnership 
or clear private provision of a public service. 
 
The South Australian Department of Treasury and Finance, in its Partnerships South 
Australia programme guiding documentation, states that ―[t]he project must be able to 
demonstrate that, on a whole of life basis, the cost to the community of the project 
provided by the private sector is lower than for the equivalent project provided by the 
public sector. To ensure the analysis of the two alternatives is comparable there will 
need to be a proper accounting for quality of services, price, time frame, risk 
apportionment and certainty. Agencies should therefore develop an appropriate 
benchmark, or Public Sector Comparator (PSC), to provide an assessment of the 
project‘s cost effectiveness if wholly delivered by the public sector, against which 
private sector proposals can be compared.  As a benchmark, the PSC should be 
developed ahead of seeking to engage the private sector. In the majority of cases, 
previous project viability studies should provide the basic framework for the 
comparator, which, when finalized, is to be used as a stable reference benchmark. 
The comparator should not be changed or re-specified after engaging with the private 
sector unless there are fundamental changes in the nature of the project (for example 
a change in risk apportionment amongst the parties) after this time‖ (South Australia 
Department of Treasury and Finance, 2007:7).  The demonstration of affordability 
and value for money remain determining factors for approval by the relevant treasury 
in SA (Republic of South Africa, 2001:A4) and there is a priority to leverage better or 
more services for the same price or even to bring about savings (Republic of South 
Africa, 2001:B6). 
2.5.5.13 A need for private sector skills 
The SA Treasury (Republic of South Africa, 2001:A4) lists an operational need for 
private sector skills to deliver a service as one of the conditions on which the benefits 
of partnerships depend. The access to skills is also a reason for partnership 
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mentioned by Anderson and Thompson (1999).  A need for technical assistance has 
also been demonstrated as a reason for partnership in Lesotho (Plummer, 2002:186). 
2.5.5.14 Availability of private sector capacity 
An identifiable market of private sector bidders prepared to compete for the project is 
one of the three conditions the SA Treasury lists as requirement for partnerships to 
be beneficial.  Therefore, the availability of ample private sector capacity could be 
seen as a reason for partnering. 
2.5.5.15 The promise of risk transfer 
Risk transfer remains a central theme in many authors‘ descriptions of reasons for 
using PPPs (Collin & Hansson, 2000:206).  The major investment projects that 
characterize many PPPs carry a range of inherent risks: in construction, for instance, 
in terms of getting the building completed on time and within budget, and in market 
demand, whether forecast customer demand ends up matching reality. Actually 
having the asset available to users when needed is another risk that needs to 
absorbed. In a PPP, such risks can be shared in innovative ways between the public 
and private sector in order to deliver better value for money than would have been 
the case using traditional procurement (Hawkesworth, 2010).  In South Africa, in 
order for PPPs to be approved by the relevant Treasury, they must demonstrate the 
transfer of appropriate financial, technical and operational risk to the private party 
(Republic of South Africa, 2001:A4).  McQuaid (1993) extends this beyond the 
sharing of risks to the creation and sharing of rewards and incentives towards 
creating and participating in partnerships (Anderson & Thompson, 1999). 
2.5.5.16 The promise of improved service delivery, effectiveness and efficiency 
In South Africa, in order for PPPs to be approved by the relevant Treasury, they must 
demonstrate affordability (mentioned in 2.5.5.12 above), value-for-money (mentioned 
in 2.5.5.12 above) and the transfer of appropriate financial, technical and operational 
risk to the private party (mentioned in 2.5.5.15 above).  It is interesting, though 
disconcerting, to note that these three requirements do not mention delivery of 
service, and the sum of the three does not guarantee a successful partnership if 
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success is measured through service delivery.  If only these three requirements are 
taken as guidelines for the approval of PPPs, it means that according to the SA 
Treasury, a PPP can be successful without delivering the right service at the right 
time and place. 
 
The SA Treasury motivates its support of national and provincial government 
departments in using PPPs with the fact that South Africa faces daunting challenges 
in the delivery of public services and infrastructure.  According to the Treasury, the 
SA Government has implemented a range of infrastructure delivery programmes that 
have significantly increased access to services, but large backlogs remain. The 
Treasury argues that addressing the backlogs in essential public services while 
maintaining sound fiscal policies requires greater efficiency in the delivery of public 
services.  Greater efficiency will enhance the scope for increasing access to services 
and for providing services of a higher quality (Republic of South Africa, 2001:B5).  
Once again, one can deliver a service with great efficiency, without that service 
satisfying any real need.  One could be efficiently delivering the wrong service, such 
as efficiently building inappropriate housing. 
 
Although one can only agree with the SA Treasury‘s assertion that "[a]ll options for 
achieving greater efficiency in the delivery of public services need to be explored" 
(Republic of South Africa, 2001:B5), it is the opinion of the researcher that greater 
attention should be paid to ensuring that the correct services are being delivered, and 
then to fine-tune efficiencies.  There is support from various sources for the 
contention that the reasons for the use of PPPs include a need for more effective and 
efficient policy development and implementation (McQuaid, 1993).  Greater efficiency 
in the delivery of public services can in turn enhance the scope for increasing access 
to services and for providing services of a higher quality.  It is felt that PPPs are 
vehicles for addressing backlogs while, in line with the specific priorities of the SA 
National Treasury "maintaining sound fiscal policies" (Republic of South Africa, 
2001:B5).  Plummer supports the argument that PPPs can be used to unlock 
effectiveness and efficiency by highlighting the added value that a private partner can 
bring in motivating and empowering personnel through the implementation of 
comprehensive training programmes and the introduction of performance 
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management systems.  It is also believed that the private partner can align personnel 
to a customer-focused approach (Plummer, 2002:22).  
2.5.5.17 Access to alternative funding 
The need for access to alternative funding can also become a reason for partnering.  
The South African National Road Agency Ltd (Sanral), when discussing its plans to 
expand its responsibility by including more of the roads currently the responsibility of 
provincial authorities, argued that ―[a]gainst this background it is important for Sanral 
to gain access to alternative funding in order not to threaten the fiscus‖ (Sanral, 
2006a:34).  A PPP can contribute to establishing a sustainable utility through the 
implementation of cost-effective processes, and also through the injection of the 
necessary capital investment funding (Plummer, 2002:22).  The capital investment 
injection mentioned above can be made by an international partner that can source 
investment from other economies if investment funds are not locally available.  It 
should of course be mentioned that governments are normally quite able to raise 
foreign loans themselves. Where a government is not regarded as legitimate by the 
international community, such a government may of course have more obstacles in 
the way of procuring foreign investment.  This brings to the fore the very real risk that 
a government can use a PPP to gain foreign investment which it would not otherwise 
have access to. 
 
One of the longer-term objectives of the formation of the JV PPP ―AGUACAR‖ for 
water and sanitation in Cartagena, Colombia in the mid 1990s, was to secure access 
to soft loan finance from international financial institutions in order to upgrade and 
expand the system (Nickson, 2001, as well as Foster, 1998, both cited in Plummer, 
2002:156).  Nickson (2001, cited in Plummer, 2002:238) explains that the Colombian 
government underwent a major policy shift towards the use of PPP in the early 
1990s, promoting a market approach that assigned a key role to private capital and 
technology in the institutional reform process. One of the reasons was a recognition 
that the country could not afford the level of public spending needed for 
infrastructure, and that private resources were needed to fill the gap, leaving public 
funds for social programmes.  In 2010, after the global economic downturn, 
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Hawkesworth (2010) confirms the possibility that PPPs can be seen as a way of 
accessing additional funds when he says:  
When national budgets are on bread-and-water diets, PPPs are like a parcel 
of cheese and sausage under the floorboards. 
 
According to the OECD, the financial crisis had an immediate negative impact on the 
volume of PPP projects in OECD member countries. As credit markets dried up, debt 
capital became next to impossible to secure by SPVs (special purpose vehicles), and 
new projects that had not already been finalized largely came to a standstill. In 
response to these developments, a number of countries made efforts to unclog the 
PPP pipeline by making financing available in various forms. The United Kingdom 
chose to do so by setting up a unit within the Treasury that acts like a private sector 
bank: the Infrastructure Finance Unit. France and Portugal chose to set up a 
guarantee scheme, and other countries such as Korea and Mexico set up special 
PPP initiatives as part of their fiscal stimulus plans (OECD, 2010).  Hawkesworth 
(2010) argues that PPPs have on occasion been used to finance expenditures which 
would not otherwise be approved given the debt and deficit constraints on national 
budgets. He cautions that ceding to that temptation too hastily in the midst of the 
global financial crisis would be ill-advised, but adds that this does not mean that 
governments should stay away from PPPs.  Rather, he believes, they have to focus 
on using PPPs for attaining value for money, not as accounting gimmicks. 
2.5.5.18 Resource availability 
Government and specifically local government can be motivated to embark on 
partnerships to get access to external resources that it cannot afford to establish and 
maintain on its own (McQuaid, 1993).  Such external resources could include 
funding, property, expertise, and links to support schemes. 
2.5.5.19 Resource sharing 
The benefits to be derived include greater sharing of information and resources 
between public agencies, and between the public, charity, voluntary, community and 
business sectors (Rowe, 2006:209). 
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2.5.5.20 Improved service design 
The public sector perspective is also positive about engagement with local 
communities to better plan and design service provision, thus improving take-up and 
outcomes (Rowe, 2006:209).  This would lead to better product design by the public 
sector. 
2.5.5.21 Experimentation and learning 
PPP initiatives should allow for experimentation and for learning from small-scale 
initiatives, mainstreaming the lessons learnt from these initiatives where they have 
proven to be effective (Rowe, 2006:209). 
2.5.5.22 Legitimacy and conflict avoidance  
Partnerships could also be seen as a vehicle to achieve greater legitimacy for policy 
through direct involvement of local community ―rather than through the representative 
democracy of central and local government‖ (McQuaid, 1993).  Partnerships have 
been said to facilitate improvements in local democratic life, both through 
participation in decision-making and in elections (Rowe, 2006:209). 
2.5.5.23 Avoidance of duplication 
It has been argued that the desire to avoid duplication can motivate the use of PPPs 
(McQuaid, 1993).  A counter-argument could be that duplication is the only way to 
encourage competition, or even that the use of PPPs could encourage duplication if, 
for example, two companies are given adjoining concessions in a specific area – as 
was the case in one Philippine case study (Plummer, 2002:158). 
 
One would however have to accept McQuaid‘s argument that partnerships could be 
the vehicle with which to avoid duplication if competing interests could be brought 
together to work off one common infrastructure base. 
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2.5.5.24 Replication of good practice in other joint initiatives 
Public sector reasons for partnering could include an intention to replicate the good 
practices that were employed in other, previous or concurrent initiatives (McQuaid, 
1993).  This reason is related to the policy transfer argument earlier in this section. 
2.5.5.25 Improved decision-making 
A need for improved decision-making can motivate the public sector to pursue 
partnership models.  One could argue that a public-private partnership brings the 
same advantages as those that emerge from joint ventures involving multi-national 
corporations.  Due to a pooling of information by diverse parties, more information is 
available from which to make informed decisions as opposed to decision-making that 
could become groupthink in a homogenous group.  Information pooling is the major 
beneficial effect of management team diversity on the performance of a private 
business entity.  Information pooling refers to the process in which members of 
groups pool their information and knowledge in order to improve the group‘s decision-
making. In the information pooling process, people who are very similar may possess 
less overall information as a group, than those who are very different.  Accordingly, a 
very low level of diversity in the top management team may lead to relatively limited 
information and knowledge pooling, especially in an international business context 
(Jackson, 1992:138–173; Karakowsky & Lam, 2002:844–845).  Plummer (2002:22) 
believes that public organizations recognize the added value that a private partner 
can bring in enabling a decision-making culture based on business principles and not 
on political or bureaucratic considerations. 
2.5.5.26 As response to international pressure 
Growing pressure on central government from international financial institutions to 
open up basic service provision to PPPs is recorded as one of the reasons for a 
policy shift towards PPPs in Colombia in the early 1990s (Plummer, 2002:238; 
Nickson, 2001). 
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2.5.5.27 Failure of the public sector to deliver a necessary public good or service 
The final reason for the public sector to seek partnership with the private sector is 
when the public sector is not able to deliver a service that is generally accepted as 
necessary by the public, basically when the public sector fails to deliver on its 
mandate.  This concludes the investigation of public sector motivations for 
partnership.  In the next subsection, the reasons that the private sector may have to 
be interested in partnering with the public sector will be discussed. 
2.5.6 Private sector perspective 
That private sector interest in participating in partnerships is high, is illustrated in the 
lengths that private sector players go to to become involved in the PPP market, 
including advertising and promotions on the subject of their involvement in PPPs. 
2.5.6.1 Expanded market 
Business will be positive towards public-private partnerships because through such 
partnerships they are given a bigger slice of the cake. Business is given greater 
opportunity for creating profit because they become responsible for a larger part of 
government service delivery.  Instead of just providing services or products that are 
used by government in service delivery, they now become more involved in 
managing service delivery.  PPPs can also imply major capital transactions and 
borrowing with relatively low risk for the lender while it gets access to capital 
transactions that could have happened outside the commercial sector were it not for 
the use of a PPP vehicle.  As an example, the private company Investec formed part 
of the project and infrastructure financing team for the R2.9 billion re-financing of the 
Maputo Corridor N4 Toll Road – according to Investec the first transaction of its kind 
for a public-private partnership (Investec, 2006). 
2.5.6.2 Gaining expertise 
At a conference in Cape Town in 2006, the British Member of Parliament and 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Stephen Timms, indicated that the British 
government has used public-private partnerships as vehicles for modernising public 
services and British business alike.  ―Britain's businesses have gained a great deal of 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 116 
expertise in public-private partnerships and many are finding this is valuable 
expertise when seeking to win business overseas‖ (Timms, 2006). 
2.5.6.3 Image / reputation enhancement 
Businesses use the positive associations with partnership in their advertising, as 
illustrated by the three quotes below:  
 
– ―So whether we are designing new roads or upgrading and rehabilitating 
existing ones, we always work in partnership with our clients so that they get 
exactly what they need for the communities they serve‖ (Jeffares & Green 
Consulting Engineers, 2006:26). 
 
– ―ARCUS GIBB will continue to partner with Government, private sector and the 
wider communities in building a better and brighter South Africa‖ (ARCUS 
GIBB, 2006:28). 
 
– ―Working in partnership to secure African energy from African waste‖ (Enviro-
Fill, 2008:32). 
2.5.6.4 Access to resources, statutory powers and legitimacy 
The local authorities themselves also provide resources, statutory powers and 
democratic legitimacy to such partnerships (McQuaid, 1993). 
2.5.6.5 Financial benefit 
Financial benefit is of course the overarching goal of private business and the profit 
motive cannot be discounted as a reason for private sector interest in participating in 
PPPs (Collin & Hansson, 2000:206).  Financial benefit that a private partner could 
accrue is not only related to profit.  A private partner in partnership with a low-income 
community where it is delivering services could benefit financially by reducing illegal 
use of services by a community that is excluded from such a service, by enabling the 
private provider to project a positive image and gain credence as a responsible 
corporate citizen providing affordable services to poor communities (Plummer, 
2002:25). 
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2.5.7 An Operator’s Perspective 
Although municipalities are generally anxious to ensure and accelerate the changes 
they think are necessary in terms of water and sanitation service delivery, many of 
them acknowledge that they suffer drawbacks which inhibit adequate service 
delivery, including bureaucracy, financial constraints and excessive political 
interference.  These constraints can be overcome with full commitment to a 
partnership between public and private parties.  An experienced and competent 
private partner is able to bring the required added value to the partnership (Plummer, 
2002:22). 
2.5.8 A Civil Society Perspective 
In this subsection the ―third sector‖ mentioned in the definitions section is addressed 
and the reasons for partnering from the perspective of this sector are analysed.  
Some NGOs are motivated to become involved in PPPs because they see the 
involvement of the private sector as a feasible option as a delivery vehicle for water 
and sanitation improvement, and want to play a role in protecting poor stakeholders 
in such projects.  NGOs generally accept that Government gains access to improved 
management capacity through BoTT (build, operate, train and transfer) public-private 
partnerships and that the private partner contribute technical knowledge in the 
planning, designing and monitoring of construction and other activities. 
 
The private sector can provide guarantees and professional indemnity insurance 
required for large and capital-intensive contracts – something an NGO cannot do.  
Charitable organizations can also provide public services.  Where this is done in a 
financially viable manner, Roth (1987:11–12) argues it can be considered private 
provision of public services.  Civil society also sees partnership as an opportunity for 
greater accountability and oversight of public services (Rowe, 2006:209).  From an 
international NGO perspective, the UNDP argues that PPPs can be a valuable tool 
for facilitating efficient and effective provision of infrastructure and services. They 
state that in the early 21st century there is a trend toward increased use of PPPs, in 
both developed and developing/transitional economies. This trend, according to 
them, is observed at the national, regional, and local/municipal level.  It is the opinion 
of the UNDP that governments today face growing demands for infrastructure and 
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public services. However, their ability to meet the needs of their citizens may be 
constrained by a lack of capital, lack of technical, management, or governance 
expertise, or limited civic institutions. This provides a climate in which PPPs should 
be considered as an option for appropriate projects or services. Through PPPs, 
governments may be able to leverage their limited public capital, and improve 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the delivery of public services and infrastructure. 
In many cases, partnerships can also offer a means of providing more current 
technologies for the delivery and operation of projects and services. Finally, PPPs 
can aid in meeting a wide range of social and economic goals. 
2.5.9 Low-income community perspective  
Low-income communities will support partnerships that assist them in gaining access 
to adequate water supply – giving or increasing access to services.  Such 
communities are positive towards partnerships that are adept at resolving or 
manoeuvring around a legal impasse between a contractor and national government 
or achieving multi-sectoral collaboration to solve complex problems and unblock 
deadlocks (Plummer, 2002:25). 
2.5.10 Water and sanitation programme perspective 
Motivations from a water and sanitation programme perspective to support 
partnerships include the ability of partnership to: increase access for poor 
consumers; increase efficiency; increase capital investment; enable better cost 
recovery; and unlock local private potential.  It is however recognized that these 
benefits will be reliant on well-designed transactions, effective regulatory control and 
government willingness to step back from day-to-day service delivery. Problems that 
can be experienced include the fact that poor transaction design can hurt poor 
consumers, that small and local providers can be displaced by careless design, and 
that sloppy tariff design can create disincentives to connect new (poor) users 
(Plummer, 2002:26). 
2.5.11 Donors’ perspective 
International development programmes are created by agencies that are extensions 
of governments, in developmental terms. Notwithstanding the internal agendas of 
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bilateral donors, donor interest in partnership formation may be driven by their 
interest in: 
 Promoting the role of the private sector in economic development and 
reducing the role of the state; 
 Mobilizing private sector investment in the context of decreasing aid flows; 
 Creating a more efficient, predictable and conducive environment of aid 
funding and technical assistance; 
 Promoting institutional change in key sectors; 
 Promoting private sector participation in service delivery to the poor and 
 Promoting efficient, equitable development (Plummer, 2002:109). 
 
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) is a prominent player in 
the international donor organization environment.  From its perspective, the 
advantages of partnerships, and therefore the reasons why it would support 
partnerships, is that partnerships can reduce cost, increase the efficiency and scope 
of urban services, and facilitate new capital investment (Plummer, 2002:28).5  DFID 
also sees that partnerships benefit from the involvement of both the private and the 
public sector, bringing the advantages that are inherent in each of the sectors to bear 
on service delivery problems.  Public-private partnerships benefit from the 
involvement of the private sector by gaining access to innovation, finance, knowledge 
of technologies, managerial efficiency and entrepreneurial spirit.  At the same time 
the partnerships enjoy access to the social responsibility, environmental awareness 
and local knowledge of the public partner (Plummer, 2002:28). 
 
It is DFID‘s opinion that PPPs provide a rich menu of ideas and models for local 
government to choose from (Plummer, 2002:28).  DFID indicates that the private 
provision of services are easiest to apply where consumers can be charged and 
competition is possible and are effective only if independent regulators can protect 
the public from excessive charges (Plummer, 2002:28).  Donors are also positive 
                                            
 
 
5 One could of course question DFID‘s motivation in supporting partnerships and why it would want 
more privatization.  It would be possible to argue that DFID has an underlying, less publicly stated, 
interest in unlocking business opportunities for UK business. 
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towards partnerships because partnerships can improve the allocative efficiency of 
loans, increase productive efficiency, and reduce the risk that may be involved in 
foreign investment (Plummer 2002:156). 
2.5.12 A Mayor’s perspective on the reasons for using PPPs 
Political leadership obviously has a strong influence on the choice of service delivery 
options in government, and even more so at local government level where politicians 
are much closer to service delivery than at provincial or national level.  Depending on 
their ideological background, political leaders may be for or against the use of 
partnerships, as is illustrated in more than one case study referred to in this 
dissertation.  In this subsection the reasons why the Mayor of Kathmandu 
Metropolitan Municipality supported the partnership option in his municipality are 
described.  Keshav Sthapit, Mayor of Kathmandu Metropolitan Municipality, argued 
that the demand for services has ―sky rocketed‖ due to urbanization.  He indicated 
that previously centralized service provision had been decentralized to local level, 
and that service delivery was reactive and in constant crisis - suffering from old and 
inadequate infrastructure.  Budget and staff were not enough to meet the challenge 
and the municipality wanted the rapidly developing private sector to share the burden 
of the services they were demanding (Plummer, 2002:20). 
 
In summary, the motivation for the mayor to support partnership was that supply 
could not meet demand for public services and that increased service delivery 
responsibility due to government restructuring further widened the gap between 
service delivery and demand.  Infrastructure had also become old and inadequate.  
According to the Mayor, the experience has been positive. ―Mutual confidence 
between the public and private sector is growing, and I anticipate that in the future 
more and more services will be managed as PPP ventures.  I believe that the lessons 
learned in Kathmandu can be, and are being applied elsewhere in Nepal, and are 
applicable to other countries in Asia‖ (Plummer, 2002:20).  This concludes the 
discussion on the different perspectives on the utility of partnerships.  The next 
section of this chapter is dedicated to the different applications for which partnerships 
are used. 
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2.6 USES FOR PARTNERSHIP  
Several examples of partnerships and uses for partnerships have been described in 
sections 1.1 and 2.1.  In this section the various purposes for which partnerships are 
being used and have been used in the past will be discussed. As a start, some very 
practical examples from the city discussed in the previous subsection, Kathmandu in 
Nepal, will be mentioned.  In 2002 the Mayor of Kathmandu Metropolitan City offered 
the following examples of PPPs in the municipality which were established in terms of 
a PPP policy of the city approved by its council in 2000: 
 Management of bus terminus and investment in expansion; 
 Landscaping and managing open spaces around the town; 
 Collecting garbage through innovative schemes (often operated by local user 
groups on a self-sustaining basis); 
 Managing parking and collecting fees; 
 Collection of vehicle registration fees; 
 Managing and expanding pedestrian bridges (Plummer, 2002:20). 
  
The mayor indicated that the following PPPs were in negotiation stages at the time: 
 Managing markets; 
 Constructing and operating an abattoir; 
 Constructing and operating a solid waste composting and transfer station; 
 Municipal fleet management (repairs and maintenance); 
 Operating a trolley bus service, as an extension to the existing service; 
 Constructing  and operating an underground car park and shopping centre in 
the CBD; 
 Constructing and operating a cultural centre (Plummer, 2002:20). 
 
These very practical examples of the uses for partnership is further expanded upon 
by the large international company Ondeo (Ondeo-Lyonnaise des Eaux - formerly 
Suez Lyonnaise-des-Eaux) which in 2002 supplied more than 110 million people with 
water and sanitation services.  Municipalities by which Ondeo were contracted for 
services on a partnership basis include: Buenos Aires, Casablanca, Atlanta, Santiago 
and Jakarta (Plummer, 2002:22).  Investors are also seeing PPPs as vehicles with 
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which to roll out clean energy technology development and deployment projects. 
$200m was, for example, made available for clean energy projects (solar energy, 
wind energy, biomass power, and small hydropower projects) in sub-Saharan 
countries by private investors in 2010 (Clean energy projects, 2010).  The uses for 
partnership are to some degree determined by the relationship between the state and 
the market in a specific country.  There could be a fluctuation in the relationship 
between the state (government) and the market (private sector) as buyer and 
producer of public services (Roth, 1987:13).  Exactly how this will manifest in each 
country will depend on the economic and political policies of the country.  The figure 
below illustrates how different uses for partnership were internationally associated 
with the two sectors in 1987.  The Y (vertical) axis of the diagram represents the 
continuum between government and the private sector as buyers of public services.  
The X (horizontal) axis represents the continuum between government and the 
private sector as producers of public services.  It is interesting to note that by 2009 
one and all of the public services listed below as being produced by government and 
bought by the private sector have been produced in some or other form of PPP by a 
private contractor. 
 
 
 
Private sector as buyer 
Private 
sector as 
producer 
Government 
as producer 
Government as buyer 
Railway transport 
Telephone service (outside 
the United States) 
Electricity 
Water supply 
Social marketing 
Housing 
Most consumer goods 
Education 
Taxi rides 
Telephone service (in the 
United States) 
Road haulage 
Housing 
Compulsory education 
Public broadcasting 
Law Courts 
Police and the armed 
forces 
Road construction 
Petroleum exploration 
Schoolbooks 
Professional services 
Figure 2.19: The public service producer and buyer relationships between government and the 
private sector (Roth, 1987) 
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Thus far in this section 14 different uses for partnerships have been mentioned.  
Another recurring theme in the use of partnerships is poverty reduction (Plummer, 
2002).  Corporate social responsibility projects are also often executed in 
partnerships set up for the express purpose of these projects. Other popular uses for 
partnership include telecommunications, transport, ports and eco-tourism (Phasiwe, 
2005).  In his State of the Nation Address, delivered at the opening of the South 
African Parliament on 14 February 2003, President Thabo Mbeki indicated that 50 
PPPs were already operational in South Africa in such areas as health, education, 
transport, housing, information technology, tourism and government accommodation.  
Uses for partnership also emanate from environmental factors, the location of 
problems, the ownership of the resources needed to address the problem, and the 
nature of the ―citizen‖ who needs a public service.  The networked model used in the 
US to combat cyber terrorism demonstrates the extent to which government is 
changing in response to today‘s more complicated problems.  In simpler times, the 
federal government might have employed a command-and-control approach for such 
a critical initiative.  But in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks in the US, a 
centralised approach was neither feasible nor desirable.  As then President George 
W. Bush explained when unveiling his federal cyber-security initiative: 
 
―The cornerstone of America‘s cyberspace security strategy is and will remain 
a public-private partnership….Only by acting together can we build a more 
secure future in cyberspace.‖ (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004:9) 
 
It is already clear that there are multiple purposes for which partnerships can be 
used. In the following subsections, even more examples of the use of partnerships 
will be described, but in more detail.  This will add further understanding to the 
breadth of the partnership concept and will aid later discussions on critical success 
factors. 
2.6.1 Disaster Risk Reduction 
Partnerships in Disaster Risk Reduction are intentionally chosen as the first use of 
partnerships to be highlighted in this section due to the researcher‘s personal 
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experience of more than 10 years in this field.  The problems that accompany 
disaster impact are complex and require response from many different stakeholders, 
some of whom are public and some of whom are private sector role-players.  The 
challenge in longer-term preventive disaster risk reduction may be even more 
complex in terms of multiple role-players, if less urgent.  The disaster risk reduction 
field therefore seems a logical candidate for a partnership approach due to the 
multiple role-players involved.  The formal use of the term PPP in Disaster Risk 
Reduction began in the US in 1989 during the formation of IDAC (International 
Disaster Advisory Committee).  FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 
used the term while under the leadership of James Lee Witt and Harvey Ryland and 
expanded it during the Clinton administration (Davidson, 2008). 
 
During personal observation of activities at the Western Cape Provincial Disaster 
Management Centre, the researcher realized that in the conditions that exist during 
disaster response, partnership is less of an option and more of a necessity.  
Partnership is a must in a landscape where so many different organizations, 
agencies and role-players have contributions to make while trying to manage overlap 
and duplication, or no up-take of responsibilities by certain role-players.  The 
temporary partnerships formed between senior managers of participating agencies 
during a disaster are ideally based on relationships that have been planned for and 
developed over time.  Even less structured are the temporal disaster relief 
organizations referred to in a report on Hurricane Katrina – temporary organizations 
with no history or structure that are created without ceremony and which fulfils 
important requirements – operating successfully alongside more permanent and 
established relief organizations (Farnham, Pedersen & Kirkpatrick, 2006:44).  In 
Disaster Management, it has been said that the most important partnership is with 
the victim (or potential victim) of disaster.  This links to the fact that the client 
participates in the production of a service as opposed to a product. 
 
At an informal breakfast discussion with representatives of UN agencies working in 
South Africa during the xenophobia crisis in 2008, the representatives related the 
difficulties they have faced in dealing with governments in different countries.  The 
discussion then turned to the question of whether it could be easier or less 
complicated for the UN family to intervene in a country of which the government has 
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collapsed.  In such a case there is less complexity caused by interfacing with 
government structures, and the aid agencies can work according to their own 
programme without undue political influence.  The UN staff found this question 
interesting, and responded that although their task could be less complicated without 
interference from several layers of government, they could never say that they would 
prefer to work in a country with a collapsed government.  The message, for 
partnerships, from this interaction is that complexity should be expected and 
responded to with patience.  The discussion also lingered on experience and it was 
agreed that previous partnership experience always helps to produce better 
partnerships.  South Africa at that time had no previous experience of working with 
UN agencies that were providing relief inside the country and this lack of experience 
did influence the efficiency with which international aid was integrated into the relief 
operations in response to the xenophobia crisis (also see Polzer, 2009). 
 
According to Davidson (2008), PPPs in Disaster Management are often and quite 
understandably built to solve a passing problem.  He feels, however, that the larger 
―common business interest‖ has never been researched in enough detail to build a 
sustainable PPP.  He believes that the ―common business interest‖ is employment 
protection (from hazards) and rapid job restoration or creation after an event.  He 
argues that protecting employment against all hazards solidifies a tax base, which is 
the backbone of economic viability (Davidson, 2008).   
 
This subsection has focused on the use of partnerships in Disaster Risk Reduction in 
order to illustrate the wide applicability and use of partnerships.  The above example 
of the use of partnerships shows its use in crises and high-pressure situations.  In 
crisis situations it is probably more acceptable for the government to play a strong 
role, while the proponents of marketising the provision of public services would argue 
that the state has a much smaller role to play in everyday situations.  If the 
partnership model can also be used in more routine low visibility services then it will 
show that partnerships are viable service delivery mechanisms across a wide 
spectrum of public services. An example of such a low-pressure, everyday service is 
waste management and waste recycling. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 126 
2.6.2 Waste Recycling 
In 2008 an average of 80 tons of household recyclables were being collected and 
reprocessed annually instead of going to landfill in certain areas of Cape Town, 
thanks to a kerbside recycling collection programme involving the collaboration of the 
City, communities, a private contractor and informal collectors.  Informal collectors 
were included in the recycling stream. Rather than being considered a nuisance, their 
role was ―formalized‖ and they were paid per weight collected (Tyrell, 2008:25–26).  
Success factors identified by Tyrell in this partnership included an experienced 
recycling contractor, a supportive solid waste management department, a thorough 
media and promotion campaign, closely-linked communities, involvement by local 
councillors and the inclusion of informal collectors.  The above examples further 
exhibits the utility of partnerships in public service delivery and proves that 
partnerships can be necessary and successful in the delivery of services where rapid 
high-pressure and critical decisions must be made, but can be just as necessary and 
successful in services that, although also important, does not require critical high-
pressure and immediate decision-making. 
 
The reference by Tyrell to closely-linked communities bears further discussion.  
Lovrich (1999) argues that there is good reason to attempt to draw on existing stocks 
of social capital in collaborative partnerships directed to community quality of life 
improvements. Such efforts tend to be broadly supported by conservative and liberal 
elements alike, and where social capital is strong, positive effects can be observed in 
a relatively short period of time. It is important to recognize, however, that in settings 
where social capital resources are weak, it will be necessary to make a long-term 
commitment (including patience) to agency-community partnerships.  These 
comments point to a need for either sufficient social capital or sufficient time to build 
sufficient social capital.6   
 
Related to the building of social capital, partnership can be seen as an instrument to 
bring communities and the state or the market and the state together, to build bridges 
                                            
 
 
6
 SF: Sufficient social capital and/or sufficient time to build social capital. 
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and mitigate animosity or belligerence between the private and public sectors.  The 
difference between the market (focusing on supply and demand and the survival of 
the fittest) and public bureaucracy (theoretically or ideally working towards improving 
the human condition and supporting the weak) is pronounced and partnerships can 
bring mutual understanding.  There are of course conditions where the market is 
more visible and other conditions where the state is more visible.  It is possible to say 
that the state is normally more visible in times of crisis, as was evidenced by the 
rescue packages and bail-outs provided to financial, commercial and industrial 
institutions by world governments in the global recession during 2009 and 2010 as 
well as the historically high visibility of the state during times of war or disaster.  In 
times of peace and economic prosperity the market becomes more visible (Refer to 
the discussion on the theoretical shifting of the understanding of the nature and 
extent of the public sector and of ―publicness‖ by Newman and Clarke on page 264).  
The next use for partnership that will be discussed is as an instrument to escape 
financial crisis. 
2.6.3 Escaping financial crisis 
The global financial crisis experienced from 2008 has created a poignant footnote to 
this research project and an opportune discussion with which to conclude this 
discussion of the uses for partnership.  Governments may find public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) especially tempting in the aftermath of a financial crisis, and one 
can rightly ask how hasty decisions by desperate governments can be avoided 
(Hawkesworth, 2010).  As Hawkeswoth (2010) intimates:  
When national budgets are on bread-and-water diets, PPPs are like a parcel 
of cheese and sausage under the floorboards.  
 
In reality though, PPPs are long-term contracts whereby the private sector delivers 
services – such as a bridge or hospital building – used by the public sector. Major 
investment projects carry a range of inherent risks: in construction, for instance, risk 
is inherent in the necessity of getting the building completed on time and within 
budget, and in market demand, whether forecast customer demand ends up 
matching reality. The need to actually have the asset available to users when needed 
is another potentially risk-inducing facet of service delivery. In a PPP, such risks are 
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shared in innovative ways between the public and private sector in order to deliver 
better value for money than would have been the case using traditional procurement. 
Still, they have on occasion been used to finance expenditures which would not 
otherwise be approved given the debt and deficit constraints on national budgets. 
Ceding to that temptation too hastily would be ill-advised. This does not mean that 
governments should stay away from PPPs, but they have to focus on using PPPs for 
attaining value for money, not as accounting gimmicks (Hawkesworth, 2010). 
 
By 2010, the financial crisis ―has been rough‖ on PPPs. The lack and high cost of 
credit stymied plans for new projects and the refinancing of those already underway. 
Moreover, operational PPPs such as transportation projects and airports, which 
depend on drivers paying tolls and airline companies paying landing fees, have 
watched revenue dry up as travellers cut back on spending (Hawkesworth, 2010).  
Despite the historic drop in interest rates, risk premiums soared between 2008 and 
2009, widening the spread of corporate bonds to the highest in recent memory. The 
threat to PPPs was clear, and as part of the large stimulus plans enacted in OECD 
countries, governments adopted various initiatives to keep interest in PPPs alive 
(Hawkesworth, 2010).  The UK, for instance, created the Infrastructure Finance Unit 
to fund PPPs unable to secure loans on the market. Once market conditions become 
more favourable, the loans will be sold off prior to maturity. No ceiling has been set 
on the amount that can be loaned. Likewise, until the end of 2010, the French 
government is guaranteeing up to 80% of the capital needed for PPP investment 
projects – and has set aside €10 billion for the purpose. Portugal has earmarked €7 
billion for a similar programme. Korea is funnelling 15% of its fiscal stimulus 
investments through PPPs. Most of these projects are ―build-transfer-operate‖ 
projects (typically, transportation services such as roads and railways) and ―build-
transfer-lease‖ projects, for example, the construction of schools and dormitories or 
the expansion and improvement of sewerage systems. Most of these initiatives 
involve so-called dedicated PPP units. These are groups of experts brought together 
to assist governments in managing risks associated with PPPs in a bid to ensure 
value for money (Hawkesworth, 2010). 
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2.6.3.1 Dedicated PPP Units 
Seventeen OECD countries today have dedicated PPP units. They provide policy 
guidance and technical support, for which they are sometimes criticized, since they 
might mingle policy formulation and technical support during the assessment of a 
project. There are also fears that the closer a unit is to the relevant political authority, 
the more vulnerable it is to political sway when it comes to choosing projects. Another 
concern is that the creation of a unit implies the approval of PPPs as the policy tool of 
choice, undermining the case for other viable procurement methods. Despite these 
reservations, dedicated PPP units have an important advantage over regular 
procurement methods: they have the skills to focus on attaining value and ensuring 
that budget considerations, both in terms of the benefits and the costs of projects, are 
kept to the fore in project choices and that contingent liabilities are rigorously 
evaluated. They can also mitigate some of the problems stemming from the fact that 
PPPs or traditional procurement methods are, in some countries, not subject to the 
same tests – making the playing field uneven, as recent OECD research reveals 
(Hawkesworth, 2010).  Another strength of PPP units is their potential to reassure 
potential private partners that the government possesses the necessary expertise to 
negotiate PPPs, allaying anxieties over the waste and confusion caused by the 
distribution of management responsibilities among a host of government 
departments. The units consist of experts who advise the various relevant 
government departments, although they may also carry out mandatory reviews. More 
rarely, they approve projects and promote PPPs. Approval is usually still the 
prerogative of the ministry of finance‘s central budget authority. Units may be located 
in the higher ranks of government such as in the ministry of finance, farther down in 
line ministries like transport and power, which are already familiar with PPPs, or 
outside government in an independent government agency working in collaboration 
with one of the ministries (Hawkesworth, 2010). 
 
What the lending initiatives mentioned above all have in common is that they are 
temporary and reversible. This is an important caveat. In trying to re-awaken 
investors‘ appetites for PPPs, governments are assuming considerable risk. This is 
why the OECD recommends that in addition to being temporary and reversible, these 
initiatives be assessed in terms of cost, budget and transparency. There are many 
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examples of support measures carried over into subsequent and more clement 
budget cycles where they are not needed. When the additional cost of entering a 
PPP under the current economic conditions outweighs its efficiency and value for 
money, the project should be postponed until market conditions 
improve.  Fortunately, there are signs that the clouds are lifting. An economic 
recovery is slowly under way, and market conditions for PPPs are brightening again 
(Hawkesworth, 2010).  However, they must not be chosen for the wrong reasons. 
The survival of certain projects will require hard decisions from governments. Such 
decisions will be less onerous if the budget and costs associated with the projects are 
made transparent, with the overriding principle being value for money (Hawkesworth, 
2010).  OECD Countries with dedicated PPP units include Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the UK (Hawkesworth, 2010). 
 
This concludes the discussion of partnerships as a means of escape from financial 
crisis.  In 1999, Domberger and Fernandez were of the opinion that public-private 
partnerships were set to go on expanding at a fast rate.  In 2010 the evidence 
suggested that they were not wrong.  In the next chapter the different forms that 
partnership may take will be investigated. 
2.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided the first instalment of an overview of the PPP 
phenomenon.  The history of partnerships and the defining elements of a PPP were 
explored, and the symbiosis metaphor for partnership was presented.  Definitions of 
concepts that are critical elements of the discussion in this dissertation were also 
provided.  These definitions included the key concepts of ―public‖, ―private‖, and 
―partnership‖ as well as PPP itself.  Reasons for partnering were subsequently 
highlighted, and the usefulness of partnerships was explained.  A number of success 
factors for partnerships have been identified in this chapter and will be dealt with in 
the next chapter, where a consolidated list of identified factors for chapters two and 
three will be compiled.  The next chapter will allow further exploration of the PPP 
concept by providing an overview of the types of partnerships, the management of 
partnerships and the life cycle of partnerships. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 131 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
PARTNERSHIP MECHANICS AND MANAGEMENT 
 
 
Chapter 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2: 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: AN OVERVIEW 
Chapter 3: 
PARTNERSHIP MECHANICS AND MANAGEMENT 
Chapter 4: 
CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
Perspective 1: Collecting opinions and evidence from literature 
Chapter 5: 
EVALUATING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Perspective 2: Interrogating definitions and opinions of success to 
establish success measurement instruments 
Chapter 6: 
EXAMPLES AND THEIR SUCCESS OR FAILURE 
Perspective 3: Analysing case studies using measurement 
instruments from the previous chapter 
Chapter 7: 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE: SEARCHING FOR A PATTERN 
Comparing the evidence from different perspectives 
Chapter 8: 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: KEY ASPECTS OF 
SUCCESSFUL PARTNERSHIPS 
Synthesis: Evaluating the evidence 
9.: 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
10.: 
REFERENCE LIST 
11. Annexure A: 
PPP ENABLERS PER COUNTRY 
12. Annexure B: 
QUESTIONNAIRE TABLES 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 132 
3 PARTNERSHIP MECHANICS AND MANAGEMENT 
In this chapter the more technical aspects of partnership management will be 
explored, building upon the introduction to PPPs provided in Chapter 1 and the first 
instalment of a detailed PPP overview which was provided in Chapter 2.  The 
discussion in this chapter will commence with an exploration of partnership forms and 
contract types.  The structures and management of partnerships will be investigated 
and certain barriers to partnership will be highlighted.  Negative aspects of 
partnerships will be illuminated, after which selection criteria for partners will be 
presented.  Finally the context in which partnerships exist as well as the life cycle of 
partnerships will be discussed before a summary of the chapter will be provided.  
Success factors for PPPs will be identified in this chapter, as in the previous chapter, 
through the use of footnotes.  The identified success factors from this and the 
previous chapter will be listed and then consolidated in the chapter summary.  A first 
attempt at developing an evaluation instrument for partnerships will also be made in 
the chapter summary.  Chapter 2 has provided an overview of the PPP concept and 
in the next secton the different forms that PPPs can take will be explored. 
3.1 FORMS OF PARTNERSHIP 
In this section the variety of partnership forms that can be found are described in 
order to highlight the many different options available, to show what has been done in 
terms of partnerships internationally, and also to further expand the vocabulary and 
understanding of partnerships for use in later discussions.  Importantly, more forms of 
partnership than the traditionally defined PPP will be described here.  Generally 
accepted versions of the PPP will be supplemented with a wide variety of additional 
partnership types, some with strong links to PPPs and some that differ considerably 
from the generally accepted pattern of PPPs.  PPPs offer a large range of solutions, 
from semi-public companies devoted to operations to long-term investment schemes 
enabling the alleviation of the financial debts of the authorities in charge of public 
service delivery (Buisson, 2006).   
 
According to the SA Treasury (Republic of South Africa, 2001:B5) the simplest form 
of a PPP is a service contract.  In such contracts, a department typically awards a 
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private party the right and obligation to perform a specific service, within well-defined 
specifications for a period of perhaps one to three years.  The government retains 
ownership and control of all facilities and capital assets and properties.  A key feature 
of more complex PPP arrangements, such as concessions (compare the Privateers 
discussed at the start of this chapter) and build-operate-transfer (BOT) schemes, is 
the mobilization of private finance on a limited resource basis.  In the former, the 
concessionaire's responsibilities are expected to include maintenance, rehabilitation, 
upgrading and enhancement of the facility, all of which may involve substantial 
capital investment.  In the latter, the private party undertakes the financing and 
construction of a given infrastructure facility, as well as its operation and 
maintenance, for a specified period of time.  Given the often substantial capital 
investment by the private sector under such arrangements, the contracts tend to be 
of long duration (around 25 years).  
 
The SA Treasury has a very specific view on the difference between 'outsourcing' 
'privatization' and 'PPP'.  The Treasury contends that unlike outsourcing (such as 
hiring a security or cleaning company to do a job), a PPP entails the private party 
taking very substantial risk for financing a project's capital and operating costs, 
designing and building a facility, and managing its operations to specified standards, 
normally over a significant period of time.  Furthermore, Treasury indicates that in a 
PPP, the land typically belongs to the public institution, not to the private party, and 
the fixed assets developed in terms of the PPP are thus state property. Treasury‘s 
view on privatization entails the sale/disposal of state property and functions - 
including all the assets and liabilities associated with that property and functions 
(PPP Unit of the SA Treasury, 2004).  The most important fact from the above 
discussion on differences between outsourcing, PPPs and privatization are the 
characteristics of PPPs ascribed to PPPs by the SA Treasury – which indicates a 
very limiting and parochial view of PPPs.  The merits if this view will be further 
discussed elsewhere in this dissertation. 
 
Another variation on the theme of partnership, with a connection to the question of 
whether a ―silent partner‖ can be part of a real partnership, is the possible distinction 
between a ―paper‖ or ―virtual‖ partnership and a ―real‖ partnership.  The issue here is 
whether a partnership that exists on paper is at all meaningful if the paper 
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arrangement is not mirrored or carried out in real life.  One could argue that having a 
partnership formally established on paper or even forced through legislation is no 
guarantee that the partnership will actually start up and operate as intended.  A 
counter-argument could be that well-documented founding arrangements will at least 
provide a better starting point for a partnership than undocumented good intentions.  
The remarks above point to the alleged necessity for a documented contractual 
arrangement to formalize a partnership.  The US Department of Agriculture Forest 
Service (2005) refers to partnership types linked to a Memorandum of Understanding 
or other forms of agreement such as Challenge Cost Share, Collection, Interagency, 
Participating, Research Joint Venture, Cooperative Research and Development, or 
Research Cost-Reimbursable Agreements‖.  The benefits of private sector 
participation vary substantially with different types of contracts, depending on the 
financial resources that they bring to some projects (Mvula Trust, 2002, cited in 
Plummer, 2002:24).  In the following subsections various types or models of 
partnership will be discussed individually.  The first nine types of partnership 
contracts or arrangements in the following list are recognized by the SA Treasury. 
3.1.1 Service contract   
The service contract is seen as the simplest form of PPP.  In such contracts, a 
department typically awards a private party the right and obligation to perform a 
specific service, within well-defined specifications for a period of perhaps one to three 
years.  The government retains ownership and control of all facilities and capital 
assets and properties.  The public entity pays a fee to a private organization to 
provide specific operational services such as meter reading, bill collection or garbage 
collection.  The typical duration of a service contract is 1 to 3 years (Plummer, 2002; 
Republic of South Africa, 2001).  The service contract may also be a supply contract, 
a civil works contract or a technical assistance contract (Plummer, 2002:187).  
Service contracts may, for example, be found in cities without sewerage, when the 
upkeep of a fleet of special-purpose vehicles for septic tank cleaning is contracted on 
a fixed term to local entrepreneurs (Plummer, 2002:187). 
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3.1.2 Management contract   
The management contract moves beyond the delegation of discrete service functions 
to the delegation of a range of delivery, operation and maintenance functions.  The 
municipality retains ownership of assets and – like the service contract – is 
responsible for capital expenditures, working capital and the commercial risk 
associated with collecting service fees from users (Plummer, 2002:189).  A private 
sector organization assumes overall responsibility for the operation and maintenance 
of a service delivery system, with the freedom to make day-to-day management 
decisions.  The typical duration of a management contract is five years (Republic of 
South Africa, 2001) or 3-8 years (Plummer, 2002).  Johannesburg Water and 
Sanitation is an example of a management contract.  The management contract can 
address efficiency objectives, although not the structural problems associated with 
under-investment (Plummer, 2002:191). 
3.1.3 Outsourcing   
Outsourcing is a type of management contract whereby the private sector manages 
and operates a particular activity and in addition may be tasked to provide capital 
investment, in exchange for a fee by which it is compensated for its management 
efficiencies and by which it recoups its financial investment.  The duration of 
outsourcing varies, but a minimum of 5 years normally apply.  Examples include IT 
and Vehicle Fleet outsourcing (Republic of South Africa, 2001). 
3.1.4 Lease contract 
This type of PPP entails that a private sector organization leases facilities from a 
public sector entity and assumes responsibility for operation and maintenance. The 
lessee is responsible for working capital and replacement of capital components.   
The typical duration of a lease contract is 10 years (Republic of South Africa, 2001) 
or 8-15 years (Plummer, 2002:195).  Examples of lease contracts include the joint 
use of facilities/hospitals by public and private entities.  The lease contract aims to 
provide an arrangement through which a municipality (or utility) can lease 
infrastructure and facilities to a private firm, which then operates and maintains the 
service for a fixed period of time.  There is no transfer of ownership of existing assets 
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and the municipality is responsible for the capital investment required to upgrade 
existing assets or extend infrastructure to new areas (Republic of South Africa, 
2001).  ―Affermage‖, a term which originated in France and was brought into the 
market by the large French water operators, is similar to a lease, in that the operator 
bears the cost of running the business (or service network) and typically bears the 
commercial risk by having the responsibility for revenue collection (Plummer, 
2002:195). 
3.1.5 Corporatization  
Corporatization involves a department of a public entity becoming a ring-fenced 
company, under the Companies Act.  The public entity is the sole shareholder of the 
company and the corporate status of the company enhances borrowing capacity.  
There is no fixed minimum or maximum duration for such a contract.  Examples of 
corporatization include the NHFC (National Housing Finance Corporation) and 
Joburg Water (Republic of South Africa, 2001).  The NHFC was set up by the 
Department of Housing in 1996 with a mandate to ensure that every South African  
with a regular source of income is able to gain access to finance, to acquire and 
improve a home of his or her own.  One of South Africa‘s eight Development Finance 
Institutions, the Corporation acts as a wholesale funder and risk-manager, facilitating 
access to housing finance for low and moderate income communities (NHFC, 2010). 
 
Other Development Finance Institutions in South Africa include the following: 
 DBSA (Development Bank of Southern Africa) 
 IDC (Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd) 
 Khula Enterprise Finance Ltd 
 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa 
 National Empowerment Fund 
 Umsobomvu Youth Fund 
 
Each of these institutions is an example of corporatization. 
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3.1.6 Concession   
In a concession a private organization handles operations and maintenance and 
finances fixed asset investments.  Such projects are designed to generate sufficient 
revenues to allow investment recoupment and operating costs.  The duration of a 
concession is normally 15 or more years.  Examples of concessions include Nelspruit 
and Dolphin Coast water provision (Republic of South Africa, 2001).  In a concession 
contract, the municipality turns over full responsibility for the delivery of services in a 
specified area to the partnership concessionaire, including all related construction, 
operation, maintenance, collection and management activities.  The concessionaire 
is responsible for any capital investment required to build, upgrade or expand the 
system and for financing those investments.  The public sector is responsible for 
establishing performance standards and ensuring that the concessionaire meets 
them.  The additional responsibility to fund capital investments distinguishes it from a 
lease (Plummer, 2002:197). 
 
A senior manager of Johannesburg Water Management in 2002 expressed the 
opinion that the concession remains the most efficient of the various models of PPP: 
 
The operator can optimize the total cost by deciding daily how to 
arbitrate between operating and capital investment costs.  The result is 
that through its optimization of the service operation, the private 
operator enables the financial resources to be made more productive, 
thus increasing the achievable capital investment programme.  
(Plummer, 2002:22) 
 
He cites the example of Aguas Argentinas, the Buenos Aires water utility operator 
managed by Ondeo, which is investing around US$200 million annually, which 
represents 40% of the company revenue (Plummer, 2002:22).  Among the strengths 
of concessions is their ability to bring private money into the construction of new 
service systems or the substantial renovation of existing systems.  Among their 
weaknesses is the fact that large-scale concessions can be politically controversial 
and difficult and/or expensive to organize. 
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3.1.7 Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT) and Design, Build, Operate (DBO) 
In this PPP model, a private sector organization finances, builds, and operates a 
facility providing a public service.  The relevant public entity pays a fee, usually on a 
per-unit-of-service basis (e.g. mega-litres of water treated).  The duration of BOT and 
DBO PPPs is normally around 15+ years. Examples include Durban Wastewater 
Treatment (Republic of South Africa, 2001).  BOT and DBO projects are generally 
designed to bring private capital into the construction of new infrastructure.  The 
operations period is long enough to allow the private company to pay off the 
construction costs and realize a profit – typically 10 to 20 years. The government 
retains ownership of the infrastructure facilities and becomes both the customer and 
the regulator of the service. The private sector provides the capital to build the new 
facilities and in return the government agrees to purchase a minimum level of output 
over time, regardless of the demand from the ultimate consumers. Having the 
government bear the commercial risk is what distinguishes BOTs from concessions 
(Plummer, 2002:201). 
3.1.8 Build, Operate, Train and Transfer (BOTT)  
In terms of a BOTT the private sector organization finances, builds, and operates a 
facility providing a public service.  The public entity pays a fee, usually on a per-unit-
of-service basis.  The private sector organization also trains human resources that 
will remain with the project after transfer.  The duration of BOTT projects are normally 
15+ years (Republic of South Africa, 2001).  According to the Mvula Trust, an NGO 
involved in PPPs with private sector organizations and government in South Africa, 
the complex nature of a BOTT concession requires the private organization 
responsible to have strong skills in contract administration, programme and project 
development, coordination and quality control (Plummer, 2002:24).  In South Africa 
the BOTT contract is the primary vehicle adopted by the government to rapidly 
improve water and sanitation services in underserviced rural and peri-urban areas of 
the country (Plummer, 2002:201).  The strength of the BOTT model is its ability to 
bring private money into the construction of new facilities or the substantial 
renovation of existing ones.  Weaknesses include that it generally involves just one 
facility or a limited number of facilities, and thus restricts the partnership‘s ability to 
help optimize system-wide resources or efficiencies (Plummer, 2002:201–202). 
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3.1.9 Full Privatization   
This involves the public entity selling off the facility to the private sector to continue 
operating as it sees fit – or even to discontinue the operation.  The duration of the 
partnership is not applicable here because privatization puts public resources in 
private hands for an indefinite period. Full privatization examples include Rand 
Airport, Metro Gas, and the sale by the SA Government of its partial interest in ACSA 
(The Airports Company of South Africa) (Aiello, 2001; Republic of South Africa, 
2001).  When ―full privatization‖ is described as one variety of PPP by the Republic of 
South Africa, there is a possibly unintended but inherent inference that PPPs are 
instruments of privatization.  This is also the contention of labour movements.  For 
those supporting PPPs and trying to garner labour support for PPPs, this 
―confession‖ could be counter-productive.  A senior official of Johannesburg Water 
Management PPP in 2002 expressed a negative opinion of the privatization option.  
He believes that the privatization model implies that the operator has to buy the 
existing assets or pay a license fee, as in the UK, Chile or for some US and Central 
European companies.  ―In this case, the operator has to bill the customers for the 
cost of past investments, which doesn‘t [sic] contribute to an improvement in current 
and future service‖ (Plummer, 2002:22). 
3.1.10 Joint Venture (JV) 
The Joint Venture, as described here, is a variation on the ―Corporatization‖ type of 
PPP described by the SA Treasury in section 3.1.5 above, with the main difference 
being that the public entity does not become the sole shareholder in the new venture.  
The joint venture (empresa mixta) emerged as the institutional arrangement preferred 
by the Colombian central government to fulfil the twin objectives of strengthening 
local government and encouraging private sector participation (PSP) in public service 
delivery.  The arguments put forward in favour of the joint venture were economic 
and political.  The economic argument emphasized that the municipality retained 
ownership of the assets, as under the more conventional concession contract 
arrangement, but with the added advantage that, as a major shareholder in the joint 
venture, the municipality had a financial interest in promoting efficiency in service 
delivery.  The political argument emphasized that, as a major shareholder, the 
municipality was better positioned to monitor and control the activities of its private 
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sector partner.  This was contrasted with the conventional concession contract, under 
which the public sector effectively handed over control of the day-to-day operations to 
the concessionaire.  Consequently (and despite conflict of interest) the traditional 
criticism from public sector unions that the municipality had ―sold out‖ to the private 
sector was muted by the joint venture arrangement (Nickson, 2001; Plummer, 
2002:238). 
 
According to the UK Treasury, a joint venture company with public and private sector 
shareholders is a distinct form of PPP. A joint venture constitutes the creation of a 
new company, which will be a separate legal entity with its own name. This new 
company will be the vehicle by which the common enterprise of the joint venture is 
carried out. It is important to distinguish the formation of a joint venture company from 
purely contractual arrangements, such as for the provision of goods or services. The 
setting up of a joint venture company requires legal documents to be agreed between 
the founders. These documents will define: the way the new company is to be run 
and disputes resolved; exit strategies; how often directors and shareholders meet; 
and the nature of the business and constraints. The activities of the JV will usually be 
governed by a business plan, which will lay out the future direction and activities for 
the JV (HM Treasury, 2001:7).  Joint venture companies and other types of public-
private partnerships are usually established because the parties have complementary 
objectives: each has a contribution to make to the delivery of a successful business 
or venture, which they would be unable to achieve independently at lower cost or 
risk. Generally joint venture companies are appropriate when a business is being 
created that needs investment and flexibility to maximize its potential. There will, 
however, be many occasions when the desired results can be achieved more easily 
through a contractual relationship or other types of partnership. Some of the key 
features of joint venture companies are set out below. 
 
Key features of a joint venture company from the public sector point of view include 
the following: 
 It will have its own legal capacity, separate from its founders. Consequently, 
the new company can own and deal in assets, employ people, enter into 
contracts in its own right, and if it is classified as private will be subject to 
private sector accounting and tax considerations. It will succeed or fail by its 
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own efforts. These features need to be balanced against issues such as 
directors‘ liabilities, insolvency legislation and wider implications for the public 
sector body such as public accountability, ministerial responsibilities and audit 
requirements. 
 Using a company structure can improve access to the skills and other 
resources of the private sector partner(s), such as finance and manufacturing 
technology. 
 The company structure provides a mechanism for capturing longer term value, 
as the public sector will hold an equity stake in the company. 
 Joint venture companies provide flexibility. For example, they can be set up so 
that they will not pay any dividends in the early years, and any capital growth 
in terms of share price will only be realized by selling some or all of the shares. 
Alternatively, other mechanisms with differing value/risk profiles may be 
employed, such as licensing the public sector assets to the joint venture 
company in return for a defined sum, or taking a royalty on any sales. 
 Staff can be given a greater incentive to succeed, through the prospects of 
higher salaries and rewards such as bonuses or share options. 
 A skilled independent management team can be put in place in the new 
company. 
 A company structure encourages greater focus on the business plan and 
achieving goals. The new company, as a single entity, can also help in 
branding/marketing a product or service and dealing with customer enquiries. 
 A joint venture company can allow better management of risks and can be 
used to limit liabilities to the public sector. 
 Where necessary, it is still possible for public policy objectives to be preserved 
by securing the desired level of control in the decision making of the new 
company as a shareholder or on the board, or by including provisions in the 
governing legal documents. 
 
There are a number of issues that need careful consideration in order to ensure that 
the potential benefits of a joint venture company are properly captured. For example, 
joint venture companies can be difficult (and unsuccessful) when the partners have 
profound differences in culture, or different underlying commercial objectives (HM 
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Treasury, 2001:9).   The public sector body will need to manage its exposure to risk. 
After time, the new entity can alter its strategic direction from that originally desired 
by the founders, if effective joint control mechanisms are not put in place. Also, 
creating a joint venture company could create conflicts of interest between public 
sector staff acting in the role of company directors and their roles as public 
employees.  There will be many occasions when a joint venture company is not the 
best option and the desired results can be more easily or better achieved by other 
means. Any consideration of the merits of a joint venture company must include an 
assessment of the benefits and disadvantages of other options. A number of different 
sorts of contract could be an alternative to establishing a joint venture company, 
including: 
 Service / supply contracts; 
 licensing agreements; 
 distribution agreements (including royalties); and 
 research and development / co-operation contracts. 
(HM Treasury, 2001:10) 
 
Joint venture examples include those created through the UK Government‘s Initiative 
―Selling Government Services to Wider Markets‖ (the Wider Markets Initiative).  
There are a number of UK Government policy initiatives relating to PPPs between the 
public and private sectors. These initiatives include the Wider Markets Initiative, 
outlined in Selling Government Services to Wider Markets: Policy and Guidance 
Note, which encourages the greater exploitation of irreducible spare capacity in 
public assets and goods derived from them, and the Government‘s response to the 
Baker Report which encourages the exploitation of the outputs of publicly funded 
research.  The Wider Markets Initiative in the UK introduced a number of policy 
revisions, including the automatic right to retain the benefit of receipts generated by 
sales to wider markets.  The Initiative encourages the commercial exploitation of both 
physical assets (spare capacity of equipment, land, buildings) and intangible assets 
(software, databases, skills, intellectual property) (HM Treasury, 2001:6). 
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3.1.11 Spin-out Company 
A spin-out company is yet another variation on the SA Treasury‘s ―corporatization‖ 
category of PPP, and is especially useful where major capital funding is required.  As 
an example, RiboTargets Ltd was established in July 1997 as a spin-out company 
from the UK Medical Research Council‘s (MRC) Laboratory of Molecular Biology 
(LMB) in Cambridge. The company raised £7m from four investors (Apax Partners, 
Advent International, 3i, and Kargoe). In return for the MRC‘s intellectual property, 
know-how and limited use of specified facilities at LMB, the MRC took a 10% 
shareholding in RiboTargets and a seat on the Board of Directors (HM Treasury, 
2001:60).   
 
This discussion of PPP types have now included all those recognised by the SA 
Treasury and included some types rceognised in the UK,  Some additional 
collaboration types have been identified by Creech (2005) from the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development in a paper entitled ―A typology of relationships: 
knowledge networks, partnerships and other types of collaboration‖.  Many of the 
types described have overlaps with the partnership concept and the types of 
partnerships already described in this section. 
3.1.12 Internal knowledge management networks 
These networks evolve through the thematic mapping of expertise within an 
organization, combined with the creation of appropriate environments for knowledge 
sharing. Their primary purpose is to maximize the application of individual knowledge 
to meet organizational objectives.  These networks are largely internal, although they 
may cross national boundaries through the inclusion of country offices of an 
organization.  Although the networks are sometimes called ―communities of practice‖, 
the principal distinction lies in the level of ―voluntary‖ participation. In some 
institutions (UNDP and World Bank, for example), participation in at least one 
network or practice is in fact mandatory (Creech, 2005). 
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3.1.13 Communities of practice  
Two or more individuals can create a community of practice for conversation and 
information exchange, possibly even leading to the development of new ideas and 
processes. Participation is purely voluntary and will wax and wane with the level of 
interest of the participants. Communities of practice primarily build capacity. They 
attract individuals who are willing to share their expertise in exchange for gaining 
expertise from others. The principal driver is the desire to strengthen their own skills 
for their own objectives, more than a desire to work together on common objectives. 
Communities of practice can exist within an organization, or be independent of any 
organization. They can be ―in person‖ or virtual / online (Creech, 2005). 
3.1.14 Open source development communities 
These partnerships are purpose driven in the development and testing of new ideas. 
They are open in the sense that anyone wishing to contribute to the purpose can join, 
and structured in the expectation that members will contribute actively to the purpose, 
with dedicated monitoring and reviewing of those contributions by the originators of 
the community.  The partnership is hierarchical in that the endorsement and adoption 
of new ideas is through the inner circle of the original creators of the community. This 
model of partnership is prone to regular branching off of new communities when 
ideas are not endorsed or adopted (Creech, 2005). 
3.1.15 Communities of interest 
These are more loosely knit communities built around common characteristics or 
shared interests (youth activism, hobbies, personal views). Participation is purely 
voluntary and will wax and wane with the level of interest of the participants (Creech, 
2005). 
3.1.16 Membership networks 
Membership networks are in some respects, like a community of practice – but 
involving organizational members rather than individuals. These partnerships have 
formal structures for governance and operations, usually with a central secretariat 
(Creech, 2005). 
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3.1.17 Information networks and portals 
These networks primarily provide access to information supplied by network 
members, occasionally with overlays of interpretative materials that organize content 
thematically. However, they are fundamentally passive in nature. Users must come to 
the network — physically or electronically — to benefit from the work of the network 
(Creech, 2005). 
3.1.18 Strategic alliances 
In the private sector, these alliances are ―long-term purposeful arrangements among 
distinct but related organizations that allow those firms to gain or sustain competitive 
advantage vis-à-vis their competitors outside the network.‖  A true adoption of the 
private sector model by civil society organizations would involve real value 
appropriation (money, time and influence) among the partners in the network 
(Creech, 2005). 
3.1.19 Networks of experts 
These networks bring together individuals rather than organizations; the invitation to 
join is based on expertise in a particular area. Their purpose can be either advisory or 
focused on research and problem solving (Creech, 2005). 
3.1.20 Knowledge networks 
Knowledge networks focus on strengthening the sharing of knowledge and the 
generation of new knowledge to have greater influence on policies and practices 
outside the network. The knowledge is for use beyond the network; the network is 
purpose driven, to create knowledge for application; and often time bound, in setting 
and achieving goals and objectives.  ―Formal‖ knowledge networks have a greater 
degree of structure, bringing together expert institutions for more specific research 
tasks, but retaining the focus on promoting the findings for use beyond the network 
(Creech, 2005).  The idea of networks as a form of collaboration and partnership is 
also supported by other sources.  The South African Cities Network (SACN) is a 
network that focuses on knowledge management, sharing and learning networks. 
Networking occurs through communities of practice, partnerships and conferences. 
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SACN‘s knowledge sharing partnerships are both vertical and horizontal. 
Intergovernmental knowledge sharing is vertical and multi-sectoral while horizontal 
information and knowledge sharing takes place on a city to city basis (SACN, 2003).  
The Horizontal Learning Programme for Local Government (Hologram) is managed 
by a consortium-partnership (Nolwazi) which also works in a very `networked‘ way, 
and there is a belief that much has been achieved through this networked approach 
(SACN, 2003).   In 2003 SALGA (South African Local Government Association) and 
DPLG‘s (the then Department of Provincial and Local Government) Knowledge 
Sharing Programme (KSP) was in the process of being implemented and aimed to 
encourage horizontal and vertical learning within the local government community. 
The KSP was being driven by a technical committee at that stage and funds were still 
being raised. Discussions were underway with a number of partners (SACN, 2003).  
3.1.21 Multi-stakeholder partnerships 
These are partnerships involving several sectors of society, usually including 
representation from private, public and civil society institutions. Such partnerships are 
considered to be a key mechanism for translating political commitments into action. 
The partnerships may be long-term relationships or may be focused on specific 
project implementation (Creech, 2005). 
3.1.22 Public Entrepreneurship Networks 
Public entrepreneurship networks are community-based consortia of public, private 
and citizen interests that come together to introduce, test and use new ―greener‖ 
technologies (Creech, 2005; Laws, Susskind, Abrams, Anderson, Chapman, 
Rubenstein and Vadgama, 2001). 
3.1.23 Global Public Policy Networks 
Global policy networks are coalitions of institutions that work at the public/private 
interface in the development and implementation of public policy on a global level 
(Creech, 2005). 
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3.1.24 Global Action Networks 
These are action oriented networks, involving multiple partners, led by strong 
advocates for change, as new mechanisms for accelerating societal change (Creech, 
2005). 
3.1.25 Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) 
Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) present yet another type of PPP. The BID 
model is highly popular across the world with a large community of practice, but the 
model is ignored by writers such as Plummer (2002) who have rather focused on 
engineering-related water, sanitation and solid waste management PPPs.   
 
According to Hoyt (2008:118) the Business Improvement District (BID) model of 
partnership originated in Toronto, Canada.  By the mid-1960s the impact of rapid 
suburbanization began to negatively affect retail sales and commercial growth rates 
throughout the city of Toronto.  From the early 1920s through to the mid-1960s, 
streetcars delivered visitors to the thriving commercial area now known as West 
Bloor Village, but the opening of several regional malls, including the Yorkdale Mall, 
along with the completion of the Bloor-Danforth subway line in 1967, detrimentally 
impacted on this small commercial area located in the western corner of Toronto.  
Malls offered shoppers a climate-controlled environment with free parking and other 
amenities, and the shoppers that once rode streetcars on Bloor Avenue were 
directed underground.  In 1963, Neil McLellan, a jewellery store owner and chairman 
of the ―Bloor-Jane-Runnymede Business Men‘s Association‘s Parking Committee‖, 
invited members of the city‘s planning board to discuss the possibility of a business 
district.  For several years, the Business Men‘s Association‘s Parking Committee 
relied on voluntary contributions; however, as participation waned, disagreement 
among business owners intensified and the association‘s coffers diminished 
significantly.  This development started a long dialogue between local representatives 
and businessmen, and spawned the formation of a committee.  The committee 
included the representatives of the Business Men‘s Association, City of Toronto 
Planning Board, City Council, Department of Public Works, Parking Authority, City 
Surveyors Department, City Real Estate Department, City Legal Department, 
Department of Streets, Metro Roads and Traffic Department, Department of Parks 
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and Recreation, Development Department, Toronto Transit Commission, Toronto 
Hydro Electric Commission, and Ontario Hydro.7  The committee explored the 
feasibility of forming a business district with a self-imposed tax on local property 
owners as a means to circumvent the free-rider problem and to make collective 
improvements that would protect their various individual investments.   
 
After considerable research into the subject, the committee discovered that the 
formation of such a district required enabling legislation8.  With cooperation from the 
Department of the City Solicitor, the committee drafted the necessary legislation, 
which passed in the legislature on December 17, 1969 (Hoyt, 2008:118).  Six months 
after the province of Ontario passed section 379g of the Municipal Act, the Council of 
the Corporation of the City of Toronto passed bylaw 170-70 and the world‘s first BID, 
Bloor West Village (then known as the Bloor-Jane-Runnymede Improvement Area), 
became a legal reality (Hoyt, 2008:118–119) .  With a modest budget, the voluntary 
management board designed the first BID programme.  The agenda focused on 
streetscape improvements and special events.  In the first year they supervised the 
installation of more than 100 large planters, new benches, trash receptacles, 
banners, lighting, newspaper dispensers, and holiday decorations.  They also worked 
with Ontario Hydro and Toronto Hydro Electric Systems to remove utility poles from 
the street and move services below grade (pavement level). 
―According to Alex Ling, businessman, property owner, and BID director 
for more than 30 years, these basic streetscape elements dramatically 
improved the pedestrian experience and attracted customers to the 
area‖ (Hoyt, 2008:119). 
 
The BID model transferred to other areas because with the power to tax members, 
the BID model of Toronto represents a persistent, competitive, and flexible strategy to 
confront local dilemmas through the provision of additional public services. Hundreds 
of governments throughout the province of Ontario have since allowed the 
authorization of BID organizations.  The BID model remains popular in Canada.  One 
                                            
 
 
7
 SF: Wide consultation and stakeholder involvement. 
8
 SF: Enabling Legislation 
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reason why the model transferred so rapidly throughout Canada is that Canadian 
governments encouraged the establishment of BIDs.  In the 1970s the province of 
Ontario made infrastructure grants only to BID organizations (Hoyt, 2008:119).  The 
BID model is relatively new to South Africa and was imported directly from the United 
States by a small group of actors in Johannesburg. The first BID enabling legislation 
passed in South Africa in 1999 (Hoyt, 2008:121).  The National Main Street Trust in 
New Zealand is a related example of an urban upliftment partnership.  The mall 
developments in New Zealand began in the 1960s, and its towns and cities – like 
their counterparts in Canada and America – were negatively impacted by 
suburbanization. In the early 1990s, council planners throughout the country imported 
the Main Street model from the United States, and at least 30 of the more than 150 
Main Streets have implemented a separate rate, or self-funding mechanism, which 
qualifies them as BIDs (Hoyt, 2008:120–121).  The New Orleans Downtown 
Development District, established in 1975, was the United States‘ first BID (Hoyt, 
2008:119). 
 
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, Philadelphia‘s population grew at an 
impressive rate.  However, suburban shopping malls appeared in the 1950s, and the 
exodus of both central-city businesses and the white middle class to the urban 
periphery started a decline in population that continues today.  Interested in making 
Philadelphia‘s central business district more competitive, the Central Philadelphia 
Development Corporation (CPDC), a not-for-profit membership organization 
supported by Philadelphia‘s business leaders that was formed in 1956, deliberately 
imported the BID model (Hoyt, 2008:119–120).  Efforts began in 1985 and by 1990 
the enabling legislation was in place and the ―Center City District‖ (CCD) was 
operational (Hoyt, 2008:120).  The CCD served as a model for subsequently formed 
BIDs in Philadelphia because its programmes were visible, it possessed considerable 
resources (―wherewithal‖), and it was managed by a group of highly dedicated, 
creative, and charismatic professionals (Hoyt, 2008:120).9 
 
                                            
 
 
9
 SF: High-profile proponents / champions of the model 
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With the inception of the Municipal Property Rates Act, the City of Cape Town has 
started to move from the CID (City Improvement District) concept to the Special 
Rating Area (SRA) as per Section 22 of the Act (Rossouw, 2010).10  According to 
Rossouw, the success of the CIDs/SRAs depend to a large degree on the ability of 
the manager of the Section 21 company that comes into place with the establishment 
of the CID/SRA. The mandate of these bodies are limited to the competencies of 
local government as described in schedule 4 and 5 of the SA Constitution, but within 
that mandate the competency of the manager is a determining factor in the success 
of the entity. 
3.1.26 Tri-sector Partnerships 
A tri-sector partnership is a PPP that also involves communities as an equal partner 
in the partnership.  An international group called Business Partners for Development 
(BPD) has argued that strategic partnerships involving business, government and 
civil society11 (part of the Third Sector defined earlier in this chapter) represent a 
successful ―new model‖ for the development of communities around the world 
(Plummer, 2002:108).  BPD seeks to demonstrate that partnerships among these 
three sectors can achieve more at the local level than any of the groups acting 
individually.  There is a realization that among the three groups, perspectives and 
motivations vary widely and that reaching consensus would often prove difficult.  
Different work processes, methods of communication and approaches to decision-
making are common obstacles.  
 
―But when tri-sector partnerships succeed, communities benefit, 
governments serve more effectively, and private enterprise profits.  The 
result is a win-win-win situation‖ (BPD, 2002, cited in Plummer, 
2002:108). 
 
                                            
 
 
10
 SF: Competent, motivated management 
11
 Civil society here is seen as a separate entity from the public (state) and private (market) sectors.  
The UN includes international NGOs, institutions, foundations, associations and Indigenous People‘s 
Organizations in its collective term ―Civil Society Organizations‖ (UN, 2009).  Civil society can also 
include churches and trade unions (Baker, 2002:6) and voluntary and charity organizations (Rowe, 
2006:209). 
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By pooling their unique assets and experience these tri-sector partnerships have the 
potential to provide mutual gains for all.  Government can ensure the health of their 
citizens with safe water and effective sanitation, while apportioning the financial and 
technical burdens.  Corporations can showcase good works while ensuring financial 
sustainability over the long term and communities can gain a real voice in their 
development (BPD, 2002, cited in Plummer, 2002:108).  Focus projects listed by 
BPD are shown in the table below: 
 
Table 3-1: Focus Projects – Business Partners for Development 
Project description Project location 
Drinking water supply and sewer system El Pozon quarter, Cartagena, Colombia 
Water supply improvements Marunda District, Jakarta, Indonesia 
Restructuring public water service in shanty 
towns 
Port-au-Prince, Haiti 
Developing water supply and sanitation 
services for marginal urban populations 
La Paz and El Alto, Bolivia 
Innovative water solutions for 
underprivileged areas 
Eastern Cape and Northern Province, South 
Africa 
Management of water services Durban and Pietermaritzburg, South Africa 
Upgrade and expansion of local water 
networks 
Dakar, Senegal 
 
3.1.27 Franchise 
Under franchise contracts, the public entity, normally a municipality, grants a private 
firm an exclusive right to provide a specific type of service within a specific area.  
Often used in solid waste, the franchise is similar to the lease but instead of leasing 
facilities and infrastructure, the operator is only given the right to deliver a service.  
This is often confined to a specified zone and constitutes a zonal monopoly for a 
fixed period of time (Plummer, 2002:184). 
3.1.28 Public Sector Partnership 
Public sector partnerships involve a partnering arrangement between public sector 
entities which could include city-city partnerships and twinning arrangements.  One 
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example of a public sector partnership is a community safety partnership that existed 
between the then Durban Metro Council (South Africa) and Leeds City Council (UK). 
The project was funded through the Commonwealth Local Government Good 
Practice Scheme and was entitled 'Building effective community safety partnerships'.  
A similar partnership existed between the OR Tambo District Municipality in the 
Eastern Cape Province and the City of Cape Town. 
3.1.29 Policy partnerships 
A public-private policy partnership can be seen as a formation of cooperative 
relationships between government, profit-making firms, and non-profit private 
organizations12 to fulfil a policy function.  Working together, they seek to meet the 
objectives of each while, hopefully, performing better than either one acting alone 
(Linder & Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:5–6).  Among its advocates, partnerships 
represent the second generation of efforts to bring competitive market discipline to 
bear on government provision of goods and services.  As distinct from the first 
generation of privatizing efforts, policy partnering involves a sharing of both 
responsibility and financial risk (Linder & Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:5–6; United 
Nations Development Programme, 1998).  Rather than shrinking government in 
favour of private-sector activity through devolution of public responsibility, or other 
forms of load-shedding, in the best of situations, partnering institutionalizes 
collaborative arrangements where the differences between the sectors become 
blurred.  Linder and Vaillancourt Rosenau (2000:6) however cautions against taking 
the policy partnership too far and turning a policymaking responsibility over to the 
private sector entirely.  They argue, for example, that private prisons playing a role in 
policy-making on the discretionary use of force in the US may constitute too much of 
a delegation of the policymaking power that is usually reserved for government (Di 
Iulio, 1988; Starr, 1990).13   
 
                                            
 
 
12
 The use of the term non-profit private organization is interesting in this context as it implies that the 
organizations traditionally referred to as NGOs are actually part of the private sector and does not 
constitute a separate third sector – civil society.  Also see the discussion on civil society in Chapter 2 
and the discussion on the changing perceptions of ―public‖ and ―private‖ in the section on public 
governance in Chapter 3. 
13
 SF: Policy-making powers should be delegated with care, if at all. 
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Partnerships are complex organizations, and they may include for-profit companies, 
private non-profit organizations (in a competitive environment or a monopoly 
situation), as well as public-sector non-profit organizations (government). 
Government contracting with private non-profit organizations is a form of partnership 
with advantages and disadvantages (Lovrich, 2000; Smith & Lipsky, 1992). Each 
involves different levels and types of conflict of interest and different ethical 
responsibilities.  Ironically, there is a risk that these types of partnership involving 
private-non-profit relationships use so much social capital that it (social capital) will 
be exhausted14 (Lovrich, 2000).  Partnerships between the government and the non-
profit sector may be less susceptible to some forms of conflicts of interest than the 
alternative of partnership between the for-profit private sector and government, but 
they still present problems (Linder & Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:6; Smith & Lipsky, 
1992).  Partnerships between government and for-profit enterprises have advantages 
and disadvantages.  The private sector can often provide a service at less cost, but 
short-term savings can lead to increased costs in the long-run.  For example, 
employees may not have pension plans when public institutions contract with private 
companies to provide services.  This cost shifts back to the public sector years later if 
these employees end up on welfare when they are too old to work.  The complexity of 
private-public policy partnerships is likely to be greater when the long-term view is 
taken into account (Linder & Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:6).  The clear lesson is that 
the cost and benefit analysis of partnerships need to consider longer-term costs 
along with immediate costs.  
 
Terminology is a significant problem when considering public-private policy 
partnerships. For some, partnering with for-profit organizations is just short of 
privatizing (Handler, 1996:11).  For others, it means a shared commitment to agreed-
upon goals that take shape in projects requiring financial investment and human 
capital of both partners.  Such projects share risk, authority, responsibilities, and 
accountability between public and private partners (United Nations Development 
Programme, 1998).  They involve the public and the private sector planning together 
                                            
 
 
14
 SF: Sufficient social capital within society to accommodate the social capital requirements of the 
partnership. 
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for mutual advantage (Linder & Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:6).  Little agreement 
exists as to what ―planning‖ means.  For some, it may be implicit, informal, or even 
unintentional and accidental.  For example James Dunn (2000) points out that 
partnerships, defined broadly, might even include the public development of roads 
through long-term investment, with the private partners being prudent motorists, 
truckers, and so forth.  For others, partnerships require close, explicit, and formal 
cooperation between the public and private sectors involving more than using public 
money for private goods and services.  In addition, there may be many different types 
of public-private policy partnerships in the same policy sector, even in the same 
institutions – for example, in the prison system one can pay private companies for 
incarcerating prisoners, and one can also partner in the sense of having other private 
firms set up production plants in a prison, where prisoners provide the labour (Linder 
& Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:6–7). 
 
The distinctions between partnerships, public or private provision of services, and 
privatization can be understood in several different ways.  A case can be made, for 
example, for generalizing the partnership notion to include almost any combination of 
public funding and private provision of services for public purposes.  From this 
perspective, partnerships come in many forms and shapes, with new forms 
proliferating under governmental auspices (Muschell, 1995).  The trend here is 
toward the inclusion of for-profit providers as contractual ―partners‖ in the provision of 
human and non-defence public services, tasks once the exclusive preserve of 
government and non-profit providers.  A number of authors prefer ―partnership‖ to 
―privatization‖ since the latter is understood to exclude most forms of joint funding 
and provision and still retains an ideological connotation of being anti-government 
(Linder & Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:7).  This could be seen as sugar-coating an 
indigestible truth, and many anti-privatisers in fact see very little difference between 
PPPs and privatization. 
3.1.30 Technical assistance performance agreement 
The performance agreement concept has previously been successful in Swaziland, 
where the Water Services Corporation has a performance contract with government 
(in the form of the Public Enterprise Unit).  This was a condition of a World Bank loan 
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for an urban development project, and DFID supported the TA (Technical Assistance) 
for the corporation.  As long as the agreement is well drafted without areas for 
ambiguity, it provides the performance-based incentives normally associated with the 
private sector while leaving responsibility for achievement with the organization‘s own 
staff.  This is more likely to contribute to the overall objective of sustainable 
development than the handing over of responsibility to an international company 
(Plummer, 2002:186). 
3.1.31 Quangos 
Yet another variation on the public-private partnerships theme with a very specific 
and even notorious name is the ―Quango‖ or ―Quasi- autonomous Non-Governmental 
organization‖.  These organizations function in a kind of no-man‘s land between the 
public-, private- and civil sectors.  Quangos have been the focus of much protest and 
ridicule, as illustrated in the following quote from the Sunday Times (UK) of 3 
September 2006: 
 
Pay £180bn: you've been quangoed 
When the autumn term starts this week the British Potato Council — annual 
budget: £6m — will be sending teams into schools to encourage children to 
sample crisps and eat chips. The BPC even has a dance troupe called the 
Chippie Dales. 
To counter it, the Food Standards Agency — cost: £143m a year — will be 
campaigning to lower cholesterol and fight obesity which costs the country an 
estimated £7 billion a year. The organizations have conflicting agendas but 
both are quangos (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations) paid 
for in part by the taxpayer. 
(Chittenden & Bessaoud, 2006) 
 
The Quango, at least in name, is indigenous to the UK.  Similar agencies and bodies, 
called different names such as commissions, councils and boards exist in large 
numbers in many societies, including South Africa.  A considerable number of these 
would qualify as PPPs as they perform some governmental function without truly 
being part of government, and are remunerated through a variety of levies, taxes and 
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government subsidies.  South African examples include the Youth Commission, the 
Film and Publications Board, the Road Accident Fund and several others.  This 
completes the detailed description of several partnership models.  In the next section 
a comparison of certain contract types will be presented and the advisability of 
enforcing specific models of PPP will be discussed. 
3.2 PARTNERSHIP CONTRACT TYPES 
The table below describes some of the roles commonly prescribed to private 
business and municipalities in relation to service, management, lease, concession 
and BOT contracts.  Plummer suggests that ―Northern‖ advocates of PPPs specify 
particular requirements (or characteristics) for each contract type, but that analysis of 
existing contracts and arrangements in developing countries suggests that, in 
practice, these requirements are often relaxed.  Arrangements are often hybrids of 
more than one contract type and the definition of contract type may vary (Plummer, 
2002:184).  In the South, where flexibility is paramount, it is more common to find that 
the definitions are indistinct and contract terminology varies, often within the same 
operating context (Plummer, 2002:184). 
 
Table 3-2: Partnership contract types with partner rights and duties 
 
Service Contracts 
Management 
contracts 
Affermage / 
leases 
BOT variants Concessions 
Asset ownership 
Municipal Municipal Municipal 
Private to 
municipal 
Municipal 
Capital investment 
finance 
Municipal Municipal Municipal Private Private 
Operating 
maintenance 
finance 
Municipal Municipal Private Private Private 
Tariff collection 
Municipal 
Municipal (or 
private) 
Private Municipal Private 
System operation Municipal / and 
private 
Private Private Private Private 
 
Some pertinent observations from the table: 
 Investment by the private sector increases to the right; 
 Risk allocated to the private sector increases to the right; 
 The duration of the contract increases to the right‘ 
 Tariff collection increasingly shifts to the private sector to the right of the table; 
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 Operation and management tasks increasingly shift to the private sector to the 
right of the table (Plummer, 2002:184). 
 
Looking at this illustration brings the realization that it should not be surprising when 
many observers equate a move towards PPP as privatization.  In the current PPP 
environment, an important question is whether or not predetermined contract forms 
are appropriate and whether the strong focus on the categories of contracts 
undermines the ability to craft partnership arrangements that meet local needs and 
constraints.  Cases examined in South Africa illustrate the types of variations that are 
created in response to perceived requirements and contextual limitations: 
 The Nelspruit concession, as it was envisaged, intended to draw on capital 
investments from the private sector, but by 2002 all finance had come from the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa. 
 The Queenstown Concession did not include customer management.  Tariff 
collection was carried out by the municipality as a part of a composite service 
tariff.  The private operator and the municipality still called it a ―concession‖, 
but could it really be a performance-based management contract with a 
sizeable capital investment programme for a private firm? 
 The Stutterheim Affermage – as it has been called – also did not include tariff 
collection.  The municipality set and collected the tariff, but the operator 
funded all operation and maintenance costs.  In this case the operator referred 
to the contract as an ―affermage‖, but Plummer questions whether it was not 
simply a management contract (Plummer, 2002:184; McDonald & Pape, 
2002). 
 
The clear message is that there is a wide variety of possible partnership models, and 
that it would not be productive to spend much energy on trying to containerize any 
specific partnership within any specific partnership type.  The situation should rather 
dictate which partnership model or which combination of models should be used, if 
any at all.  In the next section partnership structures and management will be 
analysed. 
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3.3 PARTNERSHIP STRUCTURES AND MANAGEMENT 
PPPs entail a significant change in roles for public and private entities.  This has 
considerable governance implications.  According to the World Bank (2008), a PPP 
requires a shift in the roles and attitudes of both the public and private partnering 
entities, moving away from the usual client-contractor approach and towards focusing 
on the core functions of supervision and regulation (for the public authorities), and 
assuming greater responsibilities and risks in execution, operation and the 
mobilization of resources (for the private sector). This change requires a 
transformation of the partners as some capacities of the public sector are transferred 
away to the private sector (World Bank, 2008).  In this section the structures and 
management arrangements for partnerships will be described. 
3.3.1 Management arrangements in partnerships 
It should be recognized that there are both formal and informal management 
arrangements in most partnerships.  In a survey of 10 partnerships by Creech and 
Paas for the IISD which was reported on in 2008, it was clear that there were informal 
aspects to most of the 10 partnerships (Creech & Paas, 2008:25, 31).    It is therefore 
clear that not everything regarding the governance of partnerships is as well-
documented as expected by the bodies that advocate PPPs.  In the remainder of this 
section, management arrangements pertaining to risk management will be explored. 
3.3.1.1 Risk management  
It has already been stated that there seems to be a pre-occupation, at least on the 
side of the SA Treasury, with risk transfer from the public to the private sector in 
PPPs.  It is therefore clear that risk management will be a central aspect of the 
management arrangements in many partnerships.  Risk management is concerned 
with the assessment and quantification of risk and subsequent processes put in place 
to either avoid or reduce risk and to mitigate the effects of those risks which cannot 
be avoided or reduced.  One of the options to reduce risk is to transfer it, and it is this 
risk transfer which is so important to the South African Treasury.  Other risk 
management options include tolerance (if the risk is low enough), treatment (active 
measures to reduce risk – this is often the most significant element of risk 
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management), or termination (totally avoiding the risk by not continuing with the 
activity that creates the risk – this option is not always available in the delivery of 
public services). 
 
Buisson (2006), focusing mainly on transport-related PPPs, is of the opinion that 
PPPs promote risk management by giving cities and authorities a clear vision of their 
future finances, as investment through PPP is spread over a long time through fixed 
annual contributions.  Buisson (2006) also subscribes to the opinion of the many 
parties that believe that risk transfer is an important requirement of PPPs when he 
indicates that PPP means a risks transfer from the authority to the investor, who has 
to include it in its margin calculation.  He argues that risk sharing (he does not refer to 
―transfer‖) is probably the major issue of any PPP.  While he believes that 
construction costs (for example on a surface-only light rail transport project) or 
maintenance costs should not be too contentious, he questions how risk will be 
shared, over a lengthy period, regarding passenger revenue, labour issues and run 
time achievement.  He also indicates that operations issues are not to be 
underestimated, and insists that in order to secure a smooth execution of the contract 
during the concession period, it is most suitable to have a strong, professional 
operator playing a key role within a PPP consortium.  The above points indicate that 
there are different types of risk that needs to be managed within PPPs and that some 
could be easier to first identify and then manage than others.  Several sources 
indicate that a simple wholesale transfer of risk to the private sector is not the optimal 
solution because public sector players may be better suited to manage certain types 
of risk than are private sector players.  Risk should reside where it can be best 
managed.  Risk management will again be addressed in later chapters. 
3.3.2 Roles in partnerships 
In this subsection certain specific roles in partnerships will be explored.  The roles 
that are present in partnerships are not limited to a public sector partner and a private 
sector partner.  The management of a PPP not only requires several roles within 
each partner, but also roles played by other stakeholders.  
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3.3.2.1 Lead consultant / Transactional advisor 
A transaction advisor is a person or group of persons (firm or company or 
consortium) that either possesses or has access to professional expertise in financial 
analysis, economic analysis, legal analysis, environmental analysis, contract 
preparation, tender processing, as well as the relevant technical, cost estimating and 
communication skills.  The transaction advisor assists in bringing a PPP project from 
the concept stage through public bidding and award to actual execution. Critics of the 
transactional adviser model could argue that the position creates yet another cost 
associated with establishing PPPs and therefore further reduces the possible 
profitability of PPPs while increasing their complexity.  When the Greater 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Council adopted its IGOLI 2002 plan for restructuring 
municipal functions and determined that a private operator would be procured to 
manage and operate the new utility, the council recognized the importance of 
consultants and undertook an international procurement initiative to find suitable 
international experts to act as lead consultants for the water and sanitation 
restructuring process.  The contract was won by a joint venture led by the Halcrow 
Group of the UK, with VKE Consulting Engineers and Malani Padayachi and 
Associates of South Africa.  HKC Investments (financial analysts) and the Palmer 
Development Group (operations modelling) joined the lead consultancy team at a 
later stage. 
 
The lead consultants‘ role included: 
 Preparing the transition programme; 
 Defining the role and terms of reference for other consultants;  
 Assistance with procuring and managing consultants; 
 Advising the transition manager on strategic issues; 
 Designing the management contract; 
 Managing the procurement process for the private operator; 
 Preparing the bid data room; 
 Preparing the pre-qualification shortlist and evaluating the bids; 
 Operational and financial modelling, and feasibility analysis; and 
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 Preparing the initial business plan (Ricketson, 2002, cited in Plummer, 
2002:110). 
 
According to Ricketson (2002, cited in Plummer, 2002:110), positive lessons that can 
be taken from this example include the importance of leadership and a flexible 
approach from the council and the transition manager. Other positives include the 
fact that the lead consultant could act as a true advisor to the transition manager. The 
ongoing interaction between the lead consultant and the transition manager resulted 
in much greater ownership of the solutions by the council. The flexible terms of 
reference that recognized that the scope and extent of services was difficult to define 
at the start was a positive aspect which enabled flexible and efficient responses to 
events.  Flexibility is required in putting together a team of experts.  The full 
involvement of a project manager from the public sector is vital. A traditional 
consultancy approach, where the client organization must accept the team 
assembled by the winning consultant, was not followed (Ricketson, 2002, cited in 
Plummer, 2002:110).   
 
The long duration of some partnership arrangements, such as concessions, suggest 
that it is pointless and overly ambitious to expect municipalities to develop in-house 
expertise in defining a partnership arrangement – especially if this process happens 
only every 20-30 years.  Buying this expertise at key points in the process is more 
cost efficient, and allows municipalities to focus on developing in-house skills for 
other functions (Plummer, 2002:111).  The presence of an independent consultant 
advising on the establishment of the partnership brings balance in expertise between 
the public sector and the private sector.  The role of the consultant can be important 
to build the confidence of a council and task force to carry out their tasks and make 
decisions.  The presence of an independent, donor-funded specialist has in the past 
been seen as an important mechanism for promoting transparency and assuring the 
public that the process did not involve corrupt practices (Plummer, 2002:111).  The 
potential roles of advisors in the development of partnership arrangements will 
depend on the primary objectives established by the public sector organization.  
Some may, from the outset, appoint advisors to assist in the overall planning and 
development process. In addition, others may be appointed to advise on: 
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 Social issues (the capacity of poor consumers, impacts on workers, social 
impacts); 
 Economic and regulatory issues (market structuring, promotion of competition, 
tariff design, regulatory mechanisms, monitoring, economic instruments); 
 Legal issues (legislation and regulations, bidding documents, the drafting of 
contracts); 
 Technical issues (assessments, specifications and contract requirements); 
 Environmental issues; 
 Financial issues (projections, bankability, documentation and sales 
promotion); 
 The contract negotiation process (Plummer, 2002:113). 
3.3.2.2 The public sector representative 
The inclusion of consultants in the process does not eliminate the fact that 
municipalities must develop a general level of awareness and understanding of 
partnerships and their implementation.  Nor does the hiring of consultants remove the 
burden of management from municipal staff.  The use of external expertise must be 
carefully planned, effectively coordinated and meaningfully absorbed into the 
decision-making process (Plummer, 2002:111).  It is important that government 
structures build the capacity to effectively appoint and work with advisors.  They must 
take responsibility for the selection by understanding which skills and experience they 
need (Plummer, 2002:113). 
3.3.2.3 The potential roles of a municipality 
Municipal partners are in a unique position in partnership arrangements for service 
delivery.  On the one hand they are very dependent on the private sector for 
investment, cost efficiencies and/or know-how, and on the community for its 
willingness to play the game, pay its tariffs and participate in operations and 
maintenance.  On the other hand, as the initiators of potential partnerships, 
municipalities have enormous power.  At the outset they are able to determine and 
direct strategy.  They determine, for instance, the extent, nature and scope of the 
partnership, the actors involved, and the requirements for consultation and 
community participation.  They determine how much of the service mandate to 
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delegate, for how long, in what manner and to whom.  While the private sector 
inevitably builds a stronger presence, at the later stages the municipality oversees 
the implementation process.  The municipality determines the requirements for 
expansion and service standards, and sets the initial agenda (Plummer, 2002:71).  
Municipalities behave very differently with different kinds of partners and thus 
assume very different roles in different service sectors.  They exhibit much more self-
assurance in working with private enterprise in low-technology activities such as solid 
waste handling or septic-tank cleaning than in network service arrangements such as 
water supply, where they often lack the confidence and skill needed to perform 
allocated roles (Plummer, 2002:71). 
 
Roles that the public sector agency may need to play include: 
 Strategic planning; 
 Management and monitoring; 
 Financing; 
 Regulation; 
 Coordination; 
 Consultation and participation; 
 Social guardian; 
 Capacity building; 
 Integration with public agency activities (Plummer, 2002:71–71). 
3.3.2.4 Donors in poverty-reduction focused partnerships  
Donors can provide funds for technical assistance.  They can also perform gap-filling, 
where the competencies of the actors do not correspond with project objectives.  
Donors can provide general guidance on options, particularly in relation to poor areas 
and can assist with the definition and dissemination of best practice.  Finally, donors 
can also facilitate new initiatives as a part of broader sectoral reform (Plummer, 
2002:109). 
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3.3.2.5 Operator 
The technical and managerial skills needed to provide urban services in terms of a 
PPP contract are not always found in the same firms that provide large amounts of 
investment capital, although many governments seek them in a package.  This split 
between financing and operating skills introduces yet another party into the 
partnership arrangement – one whose needs also have to be met (Plummer, 
2002:202). 
3.3.2.6 Investor 
Donors are related to but often not the same as international investors.  International 
investment organizations can invest significant funds into major capital programmes 
and hope to profit from such investments or the loans that finance the investments.  
The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) is one possible investor, but sees 
itself as having triple roles of lender, advisor, and partner.  
3.3.2.7 International Companies 
Large international companies that become involved in PPPs may also be known as 
multinationals, transnationals and international corporations (Plummer, 2002:75).  
International private companies are usually engaged in municipal service provision 
because they can provide three types of resources: 
 Professional management expertise in improving service efficiency and 
quality; 
 Technical expertise, developed through international research and 
development, that a municipality (particularly a small municipality) cannot 
sustain; and 
 Capital for investment in equipment and infrastructure costs (Plummer, 
2002:75). 
 
The table below further unpacks the components of the private sector (Plummer, 
2002:74) and makes a distinction between large international companies and 
localized small to medium enterprises that also may become involved in PPPs. 
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Table 3-3: Components of the private sector as they relate to formality and scale 
 Formal / large scale  Informal / Small scale 
International companies National companies Micro-enterprises 
Small-scale independent providers 
Informal providers 
Competencies  Technical expertise 
 Financial resources 
 Management expertise 
 Technical expertise 
 Management expertise 
 National knowledge 
 Local legitimacy 
 Local knowledge 
 Innovation with local 
resources 
Benefits  Inflow of finances, skills and 
technologies 
 Managerial experience 
 Innovation 
 Building national capacity 
and expertise 
 Local networks 
 Government links 
 Generating local socio-
economic development 
impact 
 Creating community 
ownership 
 Powerful development impact 
if properly engaged 
Market 
interests 
 Large-scale projects 
 Market entry 
 Limited risk 
 Medium-scale projects 
 Secondary cities 
 Working in consortia 
 Filling gaps in service supply 
 Flexible commercial 
opportunities requiring limited 
investment 
 Relatively high risk, but small 
size 
 Poor households 
 Inaccessible, marginal areas 
 Peri-urban areas 
Service focus  Water supply  Solid waste 
 Water supply in consortia 
 Tertiary level: water supply, 
sanitation services, and solid 
waste collection 
Political 
issues 
 (Generally) outside the web 
of local politics: might be less 
corruptible 
 Generally very dependent 
upon local politics and 
individuals 
 Outside the political system 
and therefore less valued 
and less influential 
Other issues  Driven simply by contracts 
 Profits taken out of country 
 Inevitably promote an 
international culture 
 Driven by national pride 
 Profits more likely to stay in 
country 
 Culturally more likely to 
support national values 
 Driven by needs for personal 
income 
 Profits usually retained in 
community 
 More likely to meet very 
poor‘s requirements 
 
The objectives of water and sanitation multinationals show that international company 
mandates focus on business. Their main focus areas are consumer satisfaction, 
efficiency and environmental sustainability.  The inclusion of environmental 
sustainability in their missions, according to Plummer (2002:77), is a reflection of their 
Northern roots.  Plummer‘s contention in the table above that informal or small scale 
providers are outside the political system and is therefore less valued and is less 
must be questioned in the South African context.  The researcher has personally 
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observed how informal traders that wanted to trade on the premises of the Cape 
Town Station during the 2010 FIFA World Cup™ exercised considerable political 
power.  Queries from the traders through political channels resulted in a presidential 
query about the lack of facilities on the station for informal traders which in turned 
prompted the management of the station to embark on an emergency procurement 
project, rapidly establishing temporary trading areas at considerable cost. While this 
one example does not prove that strong political influence is a general characteristic 
of informal traders and small-scale providers, it does serve as an indication that 
considerable political power may be in the possession of small traders in the South 
African context. 
3.3.2.8 National business 
National business refers to bigger corporations operating at a national scale in a 
country.  Involvement in non-exploitative partnerships clearly benefits national 
business. Not only are such partnerships lucrative (and present risks that are 
acceptable to international businesses), but the transfer of management know-how 
and environmental technology can be invaluable in preparing the national business 
for independent activities elsewhere.  Governments often seize these advantages, 
and actively promote consortia that involve national companies as a strategy to build 
the capacity of their national business sectors (Plummer, 2002:83). 
3.3.2.9 Non-Governmental Organizations 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are recognized as important partners in 
partnerships that require community involvement and participation.  Plummer 
provides different options for the involvement of NGOs within PPPs, from no 
contractual agreement to a separate contract, a sub-contractor model, an NGO-
community arrangement and a consortium model to a community-client model 
(Plummer, 2002:205–211).  In each of these options the NGO plays a progressively 
more important role in the partnership. 
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3.3.2.10 The Public 
PPPs are aimed at public service delivery and therefore the recipient or client or 
customer of the PPP should also be recognized as a role-player within a PPP.  
Plummer makes an interesting distinction regarding the role of the public in different 
types of service delivery models.  Where government is the service provider, 
members of the public are the beneficiaries, while they become customers when 
the service delivery is done through a traditional PPP, and becomes participants 
where service delivery happens through a poverty-focused partnership (Plummer, 
2002:114).  It is however also true that clients or customers are participants and co-
producers in the delivery of services. 
3.3.2.11 Network Government roles within the public sector 
The realization that moving the delivery of public services to private providers adds 
coordination complexity has prompted the growth of the idea of network 
governance.  In their book Governing by Network, Goldsmith and Eggers (2004), 
describe what they believe is the new shape of the public sector.  Their ideas and 
specifically the public sector skills required for this type of governance are discussed 
in further detail in Chapter 3 of this dissertation (see Section 4.2.3 on page 250).  The 
contribution of Network Government as a concept closely related to partnership in 
this phase of the argument presented in this dissertation, is that at least five 
additional roles are identified which should be brought into consideration in designing 
the institutional arrangements for partnerships.  These roles are those of Chief 
Relations Officer, the Network Manager, the Procurement Officer, ―normal‖ public 
employees and government top management. 
 
The Chief Relationship Officer seems to be a manager of a portfolio of 
partnerships, networks and similar contractual or non-contractual arrangements 
where third parties are involved in public service delivery.  Exactly what this position 
should be called and where exactly in a public sector organization it should be 
placed, is perhaps less important than the functions it should fulfil – overseeing 
relationships, serving as a reality check on internal departments and agencies 
managing contracts, seeking opportunities to realize economies of scale and 
continually looking for opportunities to improve the performance of possibly many 
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contracts, partnerships and networks.  A chief relationship officer could conduct 
performance and risk assessments to determine the adequacy of resources, 
personnel, procedures, monitoring systems and performance measures (Goldsmith & 
Eggers, 2004:162–164). 
 
The Network Manager supervises day-to-day network (or partnership) activities and 
should ideally come from the department most intimately involved with the applicable 
mission – not a procurement division.  This is because in a networked environment, 
contract and relationship management often amount to programme management, 
something which is not separate enough to offload to a different department.  
Officials should decide where contract management should be located based on the 
centrality of the work to the department or agency‘s mission, not whether contractors 
or government employees do the actual work.  The network manager must manage 
partnership relationships, formulate feedback loops to get results, and monitor 
performance across both the public and private sectors – all at the same time.  This 
is why Goldsmith and Eggers is of the opinion that the numerous potential minefields 
involved mean that even the best recruits might not excel at this job for several years 
(2004:164–166). 
 
The Procurement Officer is the other prominent role-player from a network 
government perspective.  Advocates of the network government paradigm argue that 
the most important requirement for a procurement officer traditionally was to know all 
the rules and follow them without deviation.  Now, according to the network 
government movement, a strong knowledge of rules and processes no longer suffice 
and acquisition officers must be more than mere purchasers or process managers.  
As a US Defence Acquisition University director puts it in Goldsmith and Eggers 
(2004:167): 
 
Acquisition is no longer about managing supplies, it‘s about managing 
suppliers. 
 
Procurement officers operating within the network government milieu need to 
approach their work as a search for the right mix of components, harvesting ideas 
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from key players inside and outside government and making judgement calls every 
day in a constant effort to improve the situation (Goldsmith & Eggers; 2004:167). 
 
The Chief Relations Officer, Network Manager and Procurement Officer occupy the 
space between top level public employees and the direct service provision staff at 
operational level.  Network government also has implications for these two categories 
of role-player.  The New Governance Public Employee, as Goldsmith and Eggers 
(2004:168) describe the ―average public employee‖, will, if their predictions come 
true, become endangered at the lowest operational level and will have to start 
steering instead of rowing – managing vendors instead of doing line-level work - at all 
higher levels.  They are also not extremely positive about the future of public 
employees who cannot find their inner contract manager: 
 
Even with the best training, however, some [public] employees will be unable 
or unwilling to make the transition from doing the work themselves to ensuring 
that it gets done.  In the long run, it is hard to see much of a role for such 
individuals in the new environment. 
 
As much as the public sector has often pessimistically been seen as a safe haven for 
inept individuals, this threat of cleaning the decks of the networking-impaired, seems 
a bit harsh from a Southern / Developing World perspective.  Surely the extent to 
which a society has adopted the private provision of public services would dictate the 
extent to which network governance is required.  While the predictions of Goldsmith 
and Eggers may apply to countries such as the US and UK that are further down the 
road that meanders toward extensive privatization and wholesale network 
governance, there may still be room for the type of employee that Goldsmith and 
Eggers would encourage to walk the plank – the not-so-new-governance public 
employee.  The main concern with the argument that direct service delivery public 
employees will vanish in a puff of third party service delivery is the question of who 
will be left to do the work if everyone becomes a manager – who will row if everyone 
is steering?  The immediate answer, from the network governance enthusiasts, would 
be private contractors, but it can be argued that even in the purportedly highly 
evolved public sectors of countries such as the UK and US, there will necessarily still 
be public work that cannot be done by a contractor.  What exactly will remain in the 
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public domain of delivery in a specific country will certainly depend on the policies of 
the government of the day and could fluctuate over time. 
 
This long-winded criticism of the assumptions (however informed) of the proponents 
of network governance should not be seen as criticism of the idea that public workers 
could benefit from networking practice.  The purpose of the criticism is rather to bring 
balance to an argument made from the perspective of a developed country with the 
confident predictions of writers whose experience and ideas are perhaps not as 
globally applicable as their tone (even if unintentionally) suggests.  Writing from an 
African and South African perspective, the researcher would encourage the adoption 
of the principles of network governance, but would caution against the uncritical 
transfer of the predictions of the degree to which third party provision of public 
services will expand.  More time is spent on the skills required from public employees 
in network governance in Chapter 4 (see page 248).  The decision on if and how the 
private sector will be involved in public service delivery, as well as the decision on 
who in the private sector would be acceptable as public service provider, will largely 
fall within the responsibility of the last network governance role-player that will be 
discussed in this section – government top management. 
 
Government CEO is the name that Goldsmith and Eggers (2004:159) gives to 
government departments‘ top management.  Possible variations on this title include 
cabinet secretary, agency director, chief operating officer, municipal manager and 
head of department.  It is the incumbents of these positions that will have the 
responsibility, authority and accountability to make decisions on the manner in which 
those public services, for which the applicable organ of state is responsible, will be 
delivered.  From the vantage point afforded to strategic management, top-level 
officials can assess the public value and, if it is sensible, look outside the public 
sector to identify other mechanisms or organizations they can involve in enhancing 
public value.   Leaders must keep the agency‘s outcome-focused goals foremost and 
focus on the ―product‖ rather than the ―process.  They must fulfil the agency‘s mission 
through the best means possible.  Talented leaders must understand not only how to 
address the make-or-buy decision, but how to bring others with needed capabilities 
and resources into the supply chain (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004:160). 
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Most elected public leaders, in contrast with their managers, already spend most of 
their time looking outside the organization.  They can leverage these external duties 
to expand both their knowledge of what others are doing in similar areas and of the 
interest of other groups in partnering with government (Goldsmith & Eggers, 
2004:161).  Executive attention in government still typically focuses on providing 
political or stakeholder support for existing governmental structures and putting out 
related fires.  Precious little time is spent supervising and fostering partnership 
arrangements.  Contract management has been pushed down the organization and 
does not get the attention it deserves (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004:162).  This 
concludes the discussion on the roles involved in network governance in this 
subsection as well as the roles involved in partnerships in general in this section.  
The next section of this chapter will be committed to the barriers that exist to 
partnership. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Welborn and Kasten’s Zones of the Collaborative Landscape 
 
3.4 BARRIERS TO PARTNERSHIP  
While partnerships and more specifically PPPs have a large support base, there are 
still certain barriers that keep organizations from going down the partnership route, 
even if they see the option as attractive.  These barriers, identified by McQuaid 
(2000:22–25), include organizational, legal / technical and political barriers. Hodges 
(2003) mentions political opposition, the inability or lack of interest of the private 
companies in providing services at affordable prices and the insufficiency of local 
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private sector management skills to provide services effectively and efficiently as 
factors in a strong opposition that exists to the increased use of the private sector to 
provide public services. 
 
Organizational barriers include differing missions, different professional orientations, 
different structures and adherence to different processes.  A partnership, depending 
on its configuration and governance arrangements, could require varying degrees of 
interaction between the partnering organizations.  Even the least interactive 
arrangement will however still require considerable inter-organizational contact and 
such contact will suffer if there are fundamental differences between the partnering 
organizations.  Differing missions will leave little common ground on which to base a 
partnership and could mean that there is little or no room for mutually beneficial 
cooperation.  A highly formalized hierarchical organization with a professional 
orientation focused on production might experience difficulty in collaborating with an 
unstructured and informal organization focused on individual identity and creativity.  
An organization structured on the basis of geographical regions and product units 
might not know at which level or in what area to interact with its partner organization 
which is structured according to client sectors and operates over different geographic 
regions.  Differences in management levels and designations or titles can complicate 
matters further.  The processes used in manufacturing a tangible product might be 
difficult to reconcile with the processes involved in producing an intangible service, 
and highly regulated processes in one organization could conflict with unwritten 
processes in its partner organization. 
 
Legislation might reduce the opportunity for partnership or even discourage it, either 
through making the formation of partnerships technically challenging, or by limiting 
the scope for partnership.  Legal and technical barriers such as statutes or 
regulations set down by higher authority could restrict partnership options. Technical 
barriers could include situations where staff from an organization with low levels of 
technological sophistication may feel uncomfortable working with highly specialized 
technicians and scientists, and vice versa.  Even the technical systems in use within 
partnering organizations could make it difficult for them to collaborate if the systems 
are incompatible.  This is illustrated by the frustration experienced when two 
organizations using different office software packages try to share electronic 
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documents, or even more practically and mundane, when fire services from different 
jurisdictions try to work together but their hose couplings are not compatible. 15 
 
Political barriers can also reduce the availability or appeal of the partnership option 
(Hodges, 2003). According to McQuaid (2000:22–25) both the external political 
environment and internal bureaucracy politics can hamper partnership efforts.  The 
external political environment could include barriers such as the deep distrust in the 
private sector that can exist in socialist countries or affiliations between a government 
and certain financial centres of power that exclude non-affiliated private 
entrepreneurs from any relationship with the public sector.  The political-economic 
philosophy and policies to which a government subscribes will determine whether 
such a government would support the notion of PPP (see discussion on fascism from 
page 34).  Internal bureaucratic politics which could hamper partnership relates to the 
discussions on power in the next section on the negative aspects of partnerships.  In 
short, power struggles inside an organization could prompt persons to block attempts 
to form partnerships due to a myriad of possible personal reasons. 16  The inability or 
lack of interest of the private sector to deliver services at the lower prices that can be 
demanded by either government or users, can pose an additional barrier to 
partnership (Hodges, 2003). The possible inability of the private sector could be 
related to the fact that a private company would want to make some kind of profit 
from delivering a service, while the prices that can be charged for a specific service 
may not provide for a sufficient profit margin above production costs to make it 
worthwhile for the private company.  Private companies could have a lack of interest 
in getting involved in partnerships due to the low or non-existent profit margin. 17 
 
Insufficiency of local private sector management skills will pose a further barrier to 
partnership (Hodges, 2003).  The PPP model relies on a private sector that is able to 
make a meaningful contribution and deliver services effectively and efficiently – 
preferably more so than the public sector can.  There is a built-in assumption in the 
                                            
 
 
15
 SF:  Supportive legal environment.  Compatible procedures and systems and levels of technical 
expertise. 
16
 SF:  Favourable internal and external political environment; Common ground in terms of political 
doctrine; Absence of obstructive gatekeepers and allegiances. 
17
 SF: Price flexibility from private partner, profit potential for private sector. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 174 
PPP model that management skills in the private sector are superior to management 
skills in the public sector (see section 2.5, page 83, on the reasons for partnering). 
This assumption is slightly insulting to all public managers and cannot be accepted 
as a rule of thumb because it is possible that the skills set and education in the 
private sector in a given area may be inferior to that of the public sector in the same 
area.  If universities and their related research bodies are seen as part of the public 
sector, as they are in South Africa, a university town may be an example of a 
situation where the private sector may have insufficient skills to make a pivotal, 
irreplaceable and meaningful contribution to a partnership. This could also be the 
case where government has invested heavily in creating specialized skill sets.   
 
This barrier to partnership has another side to it, because if the private sector has 
fewer skills in a specific area than the private sector, the private entity might be 
especially interested in partnering with the public sector and thus achieve skills 
transfer through a parasitic relationship.18  Property and business owners are 
sometimes unable to establish BIDs in cities, even though the enabling legislation 
exists, for the following reasons: they find themselves without the leadership 
necessary to formulate a collective vision for the area; they lack the financial 
wherewithal necessary to operate a BID; or they face opposition from a significant 
proportion of the local property and business owners.  Sudden shifts in political 
leadership may also prevent policy implementation (Hoyt, 2008:124).  The barriers to 
partnership mentioned in this section should be kept in mind when deciding on a 
service delivery mechanism where partnership is an option, which is why critical 
success factors for PPPs could be derived from some of the barriers. 19    A public 
sector entity‘s capacity to participate in partnerships is determined by individual, 
municipal, partnership and external constraints which include: 
 Overly bureaucratic procedures, inappropriate to partnerships; 
 Inadequate skills and managerial capacity; 
 Inappropriate political interference; 
 Resistance to change; 
                                            
 
 
18
 SF: Skills transfer possible from public to private sector. 
19
 SF: Leadership, financial capacity, support of stakeholders, stable political leadership. 
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 Inter-departmental competition; 
 Inappropriate incentive structures; and 
 Mistrust and scepticism over private sector incentives and NGO approaches 
(Plummer, 2002:73)20 
 
Language can also be a stumbling block in the way of a smoothly functioning 
partnership.  Language barriers became apparent during the Gautrain project.  There 
are many nationalities involved in the Gautrain project and the personnel responsible 
for emergency planning found language a real barrier when speaking to French 
engineers (Deiner, 2008).21  Another possible expression of negativity towards 
partnership, as evidenced in the UK, is a silent resistance against partnerships, 
despite the maintenance of a façade of partnership. In such a situation the language 
used by those who resist the partnership has changed, but beneath the façade, there 
is much that has remained the same (Rowe, 2006:210).  Reasons for this will be 
illuminated in the next paragraph.  
 
First, there was ―a genuine confusion‖ about the idea of governance at a local level in 
the UK, particularly with respect to how the numerous elements of the Local 
Government Modernization Agenda fit in with elements of the Neighbourhood 
Renewal Strategy.  Rowe alleges that it is not clear whether the connections were 
elucidated at national level and that at times guidance seemed to conflict.  As an 
example, he reflects on the possible ill fit between ―strong local leadership‖ and 
―empowerment and partnership‖.22  He describes how this resulted in uncoordinated 
and unconnected strands of governance at local level (Rowe, 2006:210).  Secondly, 
public agencies often lack an understanding of and capacity to engage in dialogue 
with their own frontline staff as well as audiences beyond the public sector – 
particularly excluded communities but also the voluntary and small business sector.23  
Nor is there an understanding that the culture of public agencies needs to change in 
                                            
 
 
20
 SF: Streamlined, appropriate procedures; adequate skills and managerial capacity; appropriate 
levels of political involvement; effective change management; inter-departmental cooperation; 
appropriate incentive structures; public sector understanding of private sector incentives and NGO 
approaches. 
21
 SF: Effective communication across barriers such as language. 
22
 SF: Enabling and coordinated legislative and policy environment. 
23
 SF: Understanding of and capacity for engagement with external and internal stakeholders. 
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order to effectively engage in working partnerships24 (Rowe, 2006:210).  For many 
local authorities, consultation elicits the usual list of complaints, so they begin to 
question the value of consultation.  For others, community forums are dominated by 
the ―usual suspects‖, each with a particular axe to grind. This is certainly the case in 
one South African community forum which the researcher has personal experience of 
- the Koeberg Public Safety Information Forum, a body whose existence is a 
condition of the nuclear power reactor operating license granted to Eskom by the 
National Nuclear Regulator.  Over a period of several years the forum, which includes 
the operator, the local authority, the regulator as well as the residents living within 
16km of the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, seemed to go through a cycle of re-
addressing the same issues raised by the same individuals.  In this context, it is 
―unsurprising‖, according to Rowe, to find public authorities avoiding and ignoring 
consultation or, in some cases, manipulating it (Rowe, 2006:210).25  Thirdly, even 
where there is evidence that public agencies understand the policy, there may be 
significant reluctance to genuinely engage with it.  For many agencies at a local level, 
partnerships are not about the sharing of power. Instead, they are more concerned 
with the presentation of change in order to secure additional funding.  ―Shopfront 
partnerships‖, dominated by one of the main public agencies, often the local 
authority, present all the trappings of engaging excluded voices while relinquishing 
little power (Rowe, 2006:210).26 
 
In recent years increasing dependencies between public and private organizations 
have lead to a growing need for public-private partnerships. However, cultural and 
institutional differences27 between the public and private domain and, in addition, the 
difficulties of bringing the two together, constitute a serious threat to successful 
public-private partnership. The formation of these partnerships is further hindered by 
confusion of the concept of public-private partnership.28 The predominant model of 
contracting out restricts rather than enhances public-private interaction (Van Ham  & 
                                            
 
 
24
 SF: Organizational culture must be receptive for partnership. 
25
 SF: Honest, positive, transparent and constructive consultation with stakeholders 
26
 SF: Genuine engagement with policies promoting partnership; Equality within partnership; Real 
engagement of excluded voices; Power sharing 
27
 SF: Overcoming cultural and institutional differences; Bringing partners ―together‖ 
28
 SF: A common understanding of the concept of public-private partnership. 
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Koppenjan, 2001).29  In the next section some of the possible negative aspects of the 
partnership model and PPPs will be discussed. 
3.5 NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF PARTNERSHIP 
One could easily accept that the records that have been built up on partnerships 
could have different points of departure.  Firstly, parties positively involved in 
partnerships or hopeful to become involved in partnerships would be oriented 
towards success.  They would not easily discuss and analyse partnerships that have 
failed in any detail and would not readily point out the possible negative aspects of 
partnerships.  Secondly, those who have philosophical or principle or political 
objections to partnerships would seek confirmation for their attitudes and /or opinions 
by actively looking for failed partnerships.  Their analyses of such failed partnerships 
would not be with the aim of improving future partnerships but rather with the goal of 
discrediting a particular partnership or partnerships as a concept.  The results of their 
analyses could thus be subjective and would not be very useful in trying to get a 
balanced view on factors that affect the success of partnerships.  It would however 
be irresponsible to ignore negative commentary on partnerships and in this section 
such aspects will be presented and evaluated with a view to extracting salient points 
on aspects that could affect the viability of PPPs. 
3.5.1 Partnership is not always the best solution 
One of the first negative aspects of partnerships to consider is that a partnership is 
not always a better solution than the public provision of services. In the opinion of 
Linder and Vaillancourt Rosenau, reflecting on partnerships as a form of privatization 
in 2000:  
An unequivocal commitment to privatization in all circumstances may be too 
great a reaction to poor performance of the public sector and too naïve a trust 
in the private sector.  The private sector brings attributes that mollify some, but 
not all, of the public sector‘s weaknesses.  There are policy areas where 
                                            
 
 
29
 SF: Supportive models of public-private interaction. 
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weaknesses are simply structural and contextual, inherent in the act of 
providing a public service (Linder and Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000:5). 
 
They argue that in these cases it makes little difference whether the public sector or 
private sector provides the service, whether alone or in a partnership.  They state that 
the private sector has incentives to increase services and expand the need for its 
product just as public sector government bureaucracy does.  Citing Schneider (2000), 
they state that: 
 
It should be no surprise, then, if private prisons don‘t have effective 
rehabilitation programmes, or if they lobby for increasingly long prison terms.  
It is human nature, in both the private and public sector, to seek to increase 
demand for whatever one is providing (Linder and Vaillancourt Rosenau 
2000:6). 
 
The opinion that partnership is not always the best solution for public service delivery 
makes sense.  In the opinion of the researcher, partnership can never be the magic 
recipe that solves all service delivery problems.  It is quite obvious that there will be 
circumstances under which partnerships will simply not work or could never hope to 
be more efficient than the provision of public services by other means.  It is the intent 
of this dissertation to give some advice on when a PPP would be an appropriate 
service delivery mechanism, and to identify some critical success factors that would 
make a partnership more viable.  The warning issued by Linder and Vaillancourt 
Rosenau above confirms that partnerships should not be embarked on without due 
regard being paid to the questions of whether a partnership would be an appropriate 
delivery mechanism for the public service concerned.   The first point of learning in 
this section, then, which can also be seen as a critical success factor for PPPs, is 
that the appropriateness of a partnership as service delivery mechanism for the 
public service concerned should be investigated before commencement of the 
partnership.30  The basic question that would need to be asked is: Can this service 
be delivered more efficiently and effectively by any other means?  If the answer to 
                                            
 
 
30
 SF: The service involved is appropriate for delivery through partnership 
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this question is positive, partnership should not be considered as service delivery 
mechanism, except if some other very important social benefit will be leveraged 
through the partnership. 31 
3.5.2 Unclear goals 
Unclear goals and a lack of specifics in strategies and plans may constrict a 
partnership (McQuaid, 2000:22–25), but unclear goals and non-specific strategies 
cannot said to be particular to PPPs.  Commentators may feel that partnerships are 
more prone to this affliction, possibly due to either potential conflict between the 
goals of the parties constituting the partnership or communication problems due to 
increased complexity.  Unclear goals can be seen as something to avoid in 
constructing a partnership rather than a consistently negative aspect of all 
partnerships. 32 
3.5.3 High resource costs  
Partnerships have been criticized for high resource cost, partly because of the 
possible duplication or overlap between partners. The added complexity of a 
partnership may also contribute to extra costs due to the need for additional 
coordination activities and the additional time required to make decisions.  These 
factors will however be highly dependent on the specific structure and governance 
arrangements of the partnership. If resource costs are in fact higher for a partnership, 
it may still create more benefits than the partners could create independently.  The 
full social costs of the partnership, McQuaid (2000:22–25) argues, need to be 
aggregated and compared with the full social benefits of the partnership, rather than 
each partner focusing upon its own costs and benefits.  Although resource costs and 
keeping such costs low will remain a challenge for all types of organizations, high 
resource cost is a potential stumbling block that has specific relevance to 
partnerships and will need to be targeted actively to increase the viability of a 
                                            
 
 
31
 SF: Improved effectiveness and efficiency or achievement of an important social benefit. 
32
 SF: Clear, agreed goals 
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partnership.  It is worth noting that more expensive resources could also be more 
productive in creating value. 33 
3.5.4 Unequal power  
The potentially unequal power distribution between partners in a partnership has 
been indicated as a negative aspect of partnership. McQuaid (2000:22–25) points out 
that representatives of a partner organization doing on-the-ground project 
implementation could suffer from a lack of voice and choice compared to well-
resourced individuals working at a strategic level in a more powerful partner 
organization. McQuaid is quick to add that he does not believe that an equal 
distribution of power would necessarily be a better solution.  Such a position may 
slow down decision-making and make it difficult to arrive at a clear resolution of 
power for decision-making within a partnership.  Without digressing into a lengthy 
discussion of decision-making and problem-solving theory, it can be accepted that 
there is merit in applying lessons from these fields to improve the governance of 
partnerships.  A few salient points on power and decision-making, supported by 
McQuaid, can be made at this stage.  Decision-making in a partnership should be 
consensual.34  Other models of decision-making in partnerships, such as majority 
voting or a system of votes being assigned asymmetrically to partners, can only 
create conflict.  Slow decision-making can be avoided through prior agreement and 
assignment of specific decision-making powers.35  Unequal power distribution occurs 
naturally inside most organizations and is not considered as a serious problem in 
most types of organizations.  A concern with balancing power is therefore more 
specific to partnership governance than to normal organizational management and 
will need to be addressed if a partnership is to be successful.36  Rowe (2006:210) 
illustrates how the ―Accountable Body‖, responsible in UK local regeneration 
partnerships for ensuring financial probity, has been misused by public managers to 
control partnerships through its financing.  The Accounting Body can influence and 
veto spending decisions, and can strangle initiative with rules while awarding 
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resources to agencies able to meet their stringent requirements, thus distorting the 
practice of partnerships.  A related if not perfectly similar example is the control of 
expenditure by the Ukuvuka campaign which was controlled by a board dominated by 
some partners while other partners were weakly represented. The Ukuvuka 
campaign is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
3.5.5 Significant investments in time and energy 
Even where there is genuine commitment to the idea of partnership, it requires a 
significant investment of energy and time, often for relatively meagre returns in terms 
of financial resources.  At the first sign of difficulty, it is easier to argue for an end to 
genuine partnership than it is to struggle to make it work with all the investment, on 
the part of all sectors and individuals concerned, that that entails (Rowe, 2006:211).37 
3.5.6 Cliques usurping power 
If decision-making is not well-defined beforehand, if communication is not optimal 
and if power is not properly balanced, McQuaid (2000:22–25) argues, it would be 
possible for a particular grouping within a partnership to push the partnership into a 
specific direction out of self-interest or due to group-think or other precursors of sub-
optimal decision-making.  Such a grouping could usurp power, hijack the partnership 
and steer it away from its original goals.  It would be difficult to objectively identify 
cases of clique-based versus normal decision-making.  One could however assume 
that the usurping of power by a clique would coincide with a drop in consensual 
decision-making and increasing dissatisfaction, among certain partners, with 
decisions made.  Strategies to avoid the usurping of power would have to include 
formalising decision-making to ensure that it is inclusive and consensual, and efforts 
to balance power and representivity.  In as far as clique-forming could shipwreck a 
partnership, the measures already mentioned in section 3.5.4 could mitigate its effect 
and make a partnership more viable.38 
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3.5.7 Misuse of partnerships to avoid organizational change 
Partnering can be used as an alternative to far-reaching organizational change, 
resulting in a change in the way business is done without a corresponding internal 
change in a partnering organization.  The unchanged structure can then be 
circumvented and may become irrelevant and lose purpose even if it is not 
dismantled.  Duplication could then occur as both an internal and an external 
structure exists to deliver a service, with the internal structure being ignored in favour 
of the external structure (McQuaid, 2000:22–25).  A public sector organization could 
employ such a strategy to avoid or delay clashes with labour regarding restructuring. 
Under such circumstances, if the purpose of the partnership in the first place is purely 
to circumvent then at least the partnership achieved its purpose, whether that 
purpose is commendable or not.  On a more positive note, a partnership could be 
formed not as a means to avoid organizational change but rather as a precursor or 
even trial for organizational change and as an instrument for cutting through 
inefficient bureaucracy.  The motive behind partnership could therefore be noble or 
nefarious.  The use of an instrument for a negative purpose does of course not mean 
that the same instrument cannot be used for positive purposes, and this dissertation 
is focused on ways of creating successful partnerships with positive outcomes.  The 
instrument itself cannot be blamed for its negative use.  It is the opinion of the writer 
that a well-run partnership with negative objectives and outcomes should not be 
considered to be a successful PPP because any PPP should have positive social 
impact or public good as a basic non-negotiable principle.  Consider for one moment 
the implications of calling a criminal and unethical partnership between a corrupt 
government, a crime syndicate and a multinational corporation that manufactures and 
distributes narcotics, a successful partnership.  The requirement for positive purpose 
will be one of the critical success factors that can now already be defined. 39 
3.5.8 Diversion of resources 
A partnership can have an impact on other services when it is used to divert 
resources from existing departments where it is not needed or where funds are not 
                                            
 
 
39
 SF: A focus on positive goals, positive social impact and public good. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 183 
efficiently utilized (McQuaid,2000:22–25). This diversion of resources could be with 
good intent and the use of the partnership positive, or the diversion of resources 
could harm the public good and make the use of partnership negative.  On the one 
hand the ability of partnerships to channel resources is a tribute to the flexibility that 
partnerships can provide; on the other hand the flexibility could be misused for 
criminal or harmful motive.  The diversion of resources through partnership into non-
productive activities should be limited while the diversion of resources away from 
non-productive activities should be encouraged.  What measures can be instituted to 
ensure that if resources are diverted it is done to improve service delivery? The test 
would be whether the resources are being used more productively after the diversion 
than before the diversion. 40  Related to the issue of the diversion of resources is the 
accusation against one specific type of partnership – business improvement districts 
(BIDs) – that private agendas can be pursued with public funds. Because BIDs use 
property taxes generated within a specified district for infrastructure and services 
there, they are arguably a more efficient means of taxing and spending than the 
normal budgeting process.  However, in some cases these districts also operate as 
quasi-governmental taxing bodies, or ―micropoli,‖ without the traditional means of 
public oversight.  Although BID decision makers in some countries, like the US, are 
political appointees, taxpayers and local governments often have little control over 
how BIDs spend mandated tax revenues.  Some commentators are therefore 
suspicious about the lack of accountability in BIDs (Caruso & Weber, 2008:325). 
 
Performance measures are one of the few mechanisms available to ensure that 
these semi-autonomous enclaves create actual public benefits, benefits that are 
generally accessible and distributed among a wider public, benefiting more than the 
few merchants based in the BID‘s geographical area.  Performance measures can be 
seen as a way of reigning in the power of these quasi-private structures while also 
permitting a continued reliance on this more privatized provision of public goods 
(Caruso & Weber, 2008:325).41  One could understand that a private sector entity 
paying more tax on a voluntary basis would want to see some return on investment 
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and may frown upon local government agonising about how to control the spending 
of tax money it was not going to receive anyway.  Concern about the possible 
diversion of resources remains a valid concern. 
3.5.9 Difference in philosophy among partners 
A possible negative aspect of partnership identified by McQuaid (2000:22–25) is that 
partners may have divergent philosophies which would then presumably reduce the 
viability of such a partnership.  The Mvula trust, an NGO involved in partnerships with 
private companies, expressed a sympathetic opinion in 2002 when it remarked that 
the results-driven approach of private partners working on improvements in poor 
areas is frequently at odds with the work of NGOs in mobilizing and strengthening 
communities to take on operational and maintenance roles.  ―We often find that we 
are aiming for effectiveness while the hard-nosed private representatives (to varying 
degrees) are striving for efficiency‖ (Plummer, 2002:24).  In this specific example, the 
private partners unfamiliar with poverty-related service improvements were accused 
of not always grasping the need for social development inputs, or the need to build 
trust and commitment with communities through participatory processes.  The NGO 
partner had no such difficulty and also argued that many private partners did not 
display the flexibility and technical knowledge for service options that benefit poor 
customers.  The Mvula Trust opined that private partners would still like to see a 
supply-led approach adopted, despite the terms of reference which as read by the 
NGO, had different objectives (Plummer, 2002:24).  The questions to ask in terms of 
the aim of this dissertation, which is to determine critical success factors for public-
private partnerships, is whether a difference in philosophy among partners would 
negatively impact on the viability of a partnership.  The fact that the term ―Public-
Private Partnership‖ already contains reference to two different philosophies – public 
service versus private entrepreneurship - brings one to realize that in partnerships a 
difference in philosophy between partners may be the rule more than the exception.  
A difference in philosophy will be part of the landscape most partnerships will need to 
navigate and can therefore not be seen as a critical determining factor in the success 
or failure of a partnership. While aligned philosophies may be beneficial, differing 
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philosophies is not seen as overly negative or crippling.  The test would be whether 
the partners can work together despite differences in philosophy.42 
3.5.10 Access to information 
While there is a need (in democratic states) for public openness about public sector 
projects, the private sector may be less than eager to share information about their 
operations, especially where intellectual property and trade secrets are concerned.  
The need of private institutions to protect themselves brings a negative aspect of 
partnerships to the fore because the competitive nature of the private sector might 
work against the publication of quality commentaries on the success of public/private 
partnerships.  This can make it difficult to make objective comparisons between 
partnerships – as is required for the aim of this dissertation, for example. Adding to 
the complexity of the access to information problem is that, with the many role-
players involved in partnerships and the high level of communication required, many 
possibilities exist for misinformation or confusion.  Although the awarding of contracts 
and the formation of a partnership might be transparent and open to the normal 
scrutiny afforded to public accounts, the operation of the partnership might be less 
transparent as private partners will tend to protect their interests.  This translates into 
limited information on best practice as well as mistakes made, which may not affect 
the success of the partnership itself but may have a bearing on the success of future 
partnerships which could have benefited from the experience gained in earlier 
partnerships. 43  Where organizations do research on how well the PPPs they are 
involved in are doing, they do so out of self-interest and may not share the results 
because they see such intelligence as their own competitive advantage. 
3.5.11 Additional challenges 
In this subsection some additional challenges for partnerships are discussed in brief.  
According to a study by the South African Institute of International Affairs issued in 
2005, about 600 million people in sub-Saharan Africa lacked access to electricity, 
about 300 million had no access to safe water, and there were just eight telephones - 
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either cell phone or fixed-line - per 100 inhabitants.  The report acknowledged 
successes achieved by PPPs in sectors such as telecommunications, transport, ports 
and eco-tourism, but said that much still needed to be done to hone an effective 
partnership model in water and electricity provision (Phasiwe, 2005).  The author of 
the report, Peter Farlam, said that governments chose public-private partnerships as 
an alternative to full privatization, which had politically contentious aspects.  He 
warned, however, that these partnerships were complex, and that governments 
should not expect them to be a "magic bullet".  "The private sector is not always more 
efficient, and the service provision is often more expensive to the consumer," said 
Farlam (Phasiwe, 2005).  It has been said that insufficient attention to the challenges 
of highly integrated public / private-sector infrastructure partnerships has led to 
uncritical enthusiasm for them, and that the efficiency gains from private-sector 
infrastructure development can be offset by faulty selection processes or contractual 
arrangements.44  It is also believed that severe contracting problems are posed by 
government being a party to the infrastructure arrangement (Daniels & Trebilcock, 
2000:94).45  Labour organizations traditionally object to privatization and most see 
PPPs as veiled privatization.  The Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), 
which describes public-private partnerships as "a form of privatization", have opined 
that private sector participation should not replace government, but should 
complement government capacity.  Cosatu economist Neva Makgetla has said that 
private-sector contractors often lied about their capacity to deliver, especially to poor 
areas.  Makgetla said private delivery "is fine where it will not compromise 
development aims" (Phasiwe, 2005).    Whether the support of labour organizations 
is required to make successful partnership possible would depend on the labour-
intensiveness of the proposed project, the strength of labour organizations in the 
specific context, and the labour legislation governing the specific project.  It is 
conceivable that in some situations a project could go ahead and be successful 
despite labour organization opposition, while, in different circumstances, such a 
project would never be approved.  The rule of thumb would be to seek support from 
labour organizations, but as indicated previously most labour organizations are 
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opposed to privatizations in principle, and sees partnership as a vehicle for 
privatization.  The influence of the partnership on job creation and security would be 
an important determining factor for labour organization support of partnerships, and 
should therefore be well-articulated when seeking labour support for a project.  The 
potential losses or gains in membership numbers could also influence the decision-
making of labour organizations on supporting or opposing a specific project.46 
 
In the South African context, partnerships are confronted with the additional 
complication of having to contribute to black economic empowerment.  Kogan Pillay, 
of the national treasury's public-private partnership unit, has indicated that black 
economic empowerment was a prerequisite for all companies bidding for government 
tenders (Phasiwe, 2005).47  In 2004, the then South African Finance Minister Trevor 
Manuel called on the private sector to partner government to fund infrastructure 
projects and fast-track the delivery of key services to the poor. The partnerships 
would involve locking in long-term collaboration between parties to share the cost, 
rewards and risks of projects. Manuel said government's policy was to use "diverse 
sources of funding" to meet SA's infrastructure and service delivery needs.  Some of 
the big projects which would require private sector participation included the 
proposed R7bn Gautrain Rapid Rail Link project, the R2.5bn Dube Trade Port which 
incorporates the King Shaka International Airport in Durban, and the building of 
schools and hospitals across the country (Phasiwe, 2005). Such a call illustrates a 
government commitment to partnership which signifies a supporting environment for 
partnerships.  It is interesting to note that in 2010 the new airport opened in Durban, 
and the Gautrain project‘s first phase was completed with trains now regularly 
running between OR Tambo International Airport and Sandton.48  Complexity 
embodies another challenge for partnerships.  Experience has shown that the 
complexity of managing a large consortium can become a distraction to an operator.  
For this reason an RfQ (Request for Qualification) document issued for a PPP in 
Johannesburg limited the number of partners in any consortium to a maximum of 
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three (Plummer, 2002:214).49  The importance of correct partner selection has 
already been alluded to on page 186.  The next section will focus in more detail on 
selection criteria for partners that will participate in partnerships. 
3.6 SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PARTNERS 
It seems self-evident that good partners would make good partnerships.  What 
exactly a ―good‖ partner would be, will be discussed in this section.  Importantly, the 
partner selection criteria used in evaluating possible partners for public-private joint 
ventures could give an indication of the characteristics of a ―good‖ partner.  The table 
below illustrates UK Treasury selection criteria to be used by public sector entities 
when considering private sector partners for a joint venture.  The table indicates 
characteristic or asset classes against which possible partners could be measured.  
These classes of characteristics or assets are relationship management, 
organizational strengths, financial strengths and technical capability.  
 
Table 3-4: Characteristics/Assets: Possible questions/selection criteria 
Relationship 
Management  
 
Vision: why they want to get involved 
Objectives: what they want to get out of the partnership 
Stated policy on partnering 
Transparency in dealings 
Organizational 
strengths 
Company background 
Principal activities 
Management capacity 
Ownership structure: parent and subsidiaries 
Core business 
Stability of market place in which company operates 
Diversity of operations 
Performance and reliability within market place 
Financial strengths Statement of turnover in respect of proposed joint venture company 
Key ratios: profitability, liquidity, gearing, debtor delays, stock 
Turnover 
Technical 
capability  
Questions/criteria will depend on the specifics of the project 
(HM Treasury, 2001:31) 
 
In the UK Treasury methodology, partner selection is thus focused on relationship 
management, organizational strengths, financial strengths and technical capability.  It 
could be argued that some of the classes of characteristics or assets would be less 
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appropriate selection criteria for a non-profit or government partner than for a private 
sector partner and therefore provide a guide only for the public sector in selecting a 
private partner.  Ownership structure in a public entity, for example, is not a factor 
that would distinguish it from any other public entity because, except in monarchies, 
ownership of the organs of state theoretically belongs to all citizens and practically is 
controlled through a combination of political, legislative, judicial and executive powers 
seated in different positions within the state structures.  Turnover and profitability are 
also not appropriate measurement instruments with which to evaluate a public 
entity‘s desirability as a partner.  A question that arises is whether a private entity 
really has any choice about its public partner in any specific project.  A private entity 
might only be able to avoid partnering with a specific public entity by avoiding all 
projects in which that public entity is involved.  Therefore, there seems to be room for 
developing a guideline which could be used by private or non-governmental 
organizations to assess the characteristics and assets of possible public partners.  
While such an investigation is outside the scope of this dissertation, it is 
recommended as possible further research on the topic of PPPs. 
 
In returning to the discussion of the assessment of private partners, it is noteworthy 
that operators in the water sector believe that the private partner needs to be 
experienced and competent to bring added value (Plummer, 2002:22).50 Experience 
can only be linked indirectly with the evaluation classes mentioned in Table 3-4 on 
page 188, but has obvious merit as an indicator of suitability as partner.  The 
following statement by Jean Pierre Mas, Operations Executive at Johannesburg 
Water Management, supports the idea that experience is important in the make-up of 
a potential private sector partner, even if the statement is somewhat self-promotional:  
 
The change to customer-focused and business-orientated services is greatly 
facilitated when private utilities such as Ondeo can add expertise and 
experience from their various contracts around the world.  As such, Ondeo has 
considerable expertise through a network of specialists in terms of water 
service provision to low-income communities.  Inexperienced private 
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companies would certainly experience enormous difficulties in bringing 
affordable and adequate services to such communities, which represent a 
large proportion of the various metropolis populations. (Plummer, 2002:22) 
 
Partners can also be selected through competition, and in one specific type of 
partnership, the JV, as practiced in the UK, there are broadly two methods of 
selecting a JV partner competitively.  The first option is running an open competition 
and the second is using a targeted approach.  The UK Treasury argues that the 
choice of approach will depend on the particulars of the case. The overall aim, 
whatever process is followed, is to select the partner best able to deliver the sought 
after outcomes. Both processes have much in common, and should involve: 
 identifying and investigating the market (considering type, geography, size, 
players, strategy); 
 identifying and investigating the main players (considering philosophy, track 
record, geography, strategy, market share, marketing skills, competitors); 
 developing evaluation criteria based on the desired competencies, attributes 
and the desired strategic outcome; 
 short listing; and 
 identifying and negotiating with a preferred partner (HM Treasury, 2001:28).51 
 
Where the possibility exists to select a partner, these processes will surely add value 
and increase the likelihood of successful partnership.  This concludes the discussion 
of selection criteria for partners.  In the next section the context or environment of 
partnerships and how this affects partnership success will be discussed. 
3.7 THE CONTEXT OF PPPS 
The environment in which partnerships operate and inside which PPPs are conceived 
and prosper or die should have some bearing on the success or failure of a PPP.  In 
this section, that context will be explored in more detail.  PPPs exist within an 
environment which can be supportive, indifferent or destructive. When considering 
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the impact of the environment on PPPs, one needs to consider both the general and 
specific environments, as well as the public-to-private continuum in the environment.  
An analysis of the environment indicates that it can be divided into: Political, 
Economic, Social, Cultural and Technological sectors, or into Political, Economic, 
Societal, Technological, Ecological and Legal sectors. A closer look at what 
constitutes an enabling environment will be taken in Chapter 3.  The risks and 
potential benefits of PPPs tend to increase from one end of the PPP continuum to the 
other, i.e. from simple service and management contracts through to concessions 
and BOTs.  As the more complex arrangements become more widespread, the 
creation of a suitable enabling environment becomes increasingly relevant. 
3.7.1 Definitions, structures and governance issues related to PPPs 
internationally  
What is public and what is private is often dependent on the governmental system 
and ideology, and therefore, so is the definition of public-private partnerships.  The 
PPP definitions and structures that are in place in selected countries as well as 
international organizations warrant discussion and comparison within the ambit of this 
dissertation.  Research for this dissertation has shown that there is a supportive 
international context for partnerships.  The supportive network for one type of PPP, 
the Business Improvement District, provides ample illustration of this.  Internationally 
focused entities such as the International Downtown Association, the Association of 
Town Centre Management, and the United States Agency for International 
Development foster information exchange on the Business Improvement District 
(BID) model, by providing centralised forums for parties with similar interests, thus 
allowing participants to form alliances and reduce transaction cost.  A wide range of 
policy entrepreneurs, including property owners, business owners, local 
governments, public agencies, nongovernmental organizations, elected officials, 
private consultancy firms, international organizations, and researchers, are 
responsible for the intra- and international transfer of the BID model.  Within this 
system and through a variety of communicative mechanisms, BID policy 
entrepreneurs deliberately and effectively maintain a network for sharing information, 
ideas, and resources within and beyond their national boundaries.  They are 
motivated to share information because they recognize the advantages of urban 
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policy transfer, especially the benefits associated with membership in a policy 
network such as the opportunity to benefit from the exchange of information (Hoyt, 
2008:125). 
3.7.2 National, Provincial, and Local 
Public sector partners can be provincial or national government departments, organs 
of state, parastatals and municipal departments and entities.  There seems to be 
some misgivings regarding the use of PPPs within the SA public sector if the 
following quote is considered:  
 
While there are no general impediments to the use of PPPs, various 
uncertainties, inconsistencies and ambiguities create unnecessary risks for the 
government and private service providers (Republic of South Africa, 2001:B7). 
 
In South Africa, the National Treasury's package of integrated reforms to strengthen 
the enabling environment in support of PPPs includes: 
 Establishing a clearer policy framework to ensure that PPPs are a coherent 
option for departments (using the word clearer must be a reference to 
insufficient clarity in the previous policy framework); 
 Refining legislation through a targeted programme to remove unnecessary 
obstacles to cost-effective PPP arrangements; 
 Enhancing the capacity of departments to use PPPs in sound and effective 
projects; 
 Providing a simple yet effective institutional framework to ensure that PPPs 
achieve value for money and facilitate capacity enhancement activities 
(Republic of South Africa, 2001:B6). 
 
Treasury's role in relation to PPPs is to ensure that PPP projects reflect a prudent 
use of state resources (i.e. that they are affordable and provide value for money).  
The regulations and the guidelines facilitate departments and Treasury playing their 
respective roles throughout the PPP project cycle (Republic of South Africa, 
2001:A3).  In the municipal sphere, the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit 
(MIIU) provides technical assistance and support to municipal councils involved in 
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PPPs.  It promotes PPPs and fosters capacity enhancement through its work with 
municipalities (Republic of South Africa, 2001:B9).  Functional capacity for engaging 
in partnerships has been strengthened at the local government level.  The 
Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) and it successor named the 
Department of Co-operative Governance (DCOG) coordinates several technical 
assistance projects to provide appropriate training and related capacity enhancement 
activities for local government officials.  The DPLG also issued various best practice 
guidelines on key aspects of the partnership project life cycle and assisting councils 
in promoting the partnership concept among municipal residents (Republic of South 
Africa, 2001:B9). 
 
Since 1994, the SA government has placed significant emphasis on the elimination of 
service backlogs from the apartheid era.  The Municipal Infrastructure Investment 
Framework, published in 1995, was the first attempt to quantify the investment 
needed.  It demonstrated that this challenge could not be met by the public sector 
alone: it needed partnerships with private investors and operators.  Thus, subsequent 
government policies on urban development and local government have recognized 
the need for partnerships.  Some municipalities began to explore options involving 
the private sector, adding to the pressure for clearer government guidance on 
approaching partnerships.  In 1997 the then Department of Constitutional 
Development published a first set of guidelines for PPPs at the municipal level.  
Government departments and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) 
introduced municipalities to the partnership concept, but soon the need for a more 
consolidated initiative became apparent (Plummer, 2002:236).  In 1997, the 
Departments of Finance and Constitutional Development and the DBSA joined forces 
to establish a support unit to act as a catalyst for PPPs.  The Municipal Infrastructure 
Investment Unit (MIIU) was given the explicit objectives of encouraging private sector 
investment in municipal services, and building sustainable capacity in the municipal, 
private and consultancy sectors.  Located at the DBSA, the MIIU was conceived as a 
five-year project.  Members of staff were either seconded from the DBSA or were 
international experts supported with funding from USAID (Plummer, 2002:236). 
 
In practical terms, the MIIU provides technical assistance to municipalities that are 
preparing service projects for private sector investment.  It provides funding support, 
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on a cost-sharing basis, for municipalities to appoint the specialist consultants 
needed for project preparation, and also provides direct technical assistance to 
municipalities regarding the process of structuring PPPs.  Typically, this includes 
guidance on the conceptualization and design of PPP initiatives; the selection, 
supervision and evaluation of local consultants charged with preparing feasibility 
studies and bid document packages; the negotiation of PPP contracts; and 
appropriate means and methods of interacting with national-level stakeholders such 
as labour unions and relevant ministries (Hlahla, 1999).  It then provides limited 
support for municipalities when they move forward into the initial stages of 
implementation (Plummer, 2002:236).  By 2002, the MIIU was addressing 
approximately 40 municipal projects in water, electricity and solid waste as well as 
other non-basic municipal services.  The unit had received over 40 applications from 
other interested municipalities.  Deals concluded by 2002 included the two most 
prominent water concessions in the country, in Nelspruit and Dolphin Coast.  Its 
support is demand-led.  Municipalities must request assistance and meet rigorous 
procedures to qualify for technical and financial assistance.  Given the aim of creating 
PPP ―success stories‖ within the country, it is likely that those municipalities receiving 
support from the MIIU and launching PPP initiatives already have a significant degree 
of financial capacity and technical skills.  Basic municipal management skills were 
being developed through broader initiatives, led by the DPLG and its successor 
DCOG, the DBSA and donors (Plummer, 2002:236). 
 
The process adopted by the MIIU in the development of PPPs also aims to build a 
national consultancy sector with the ability to underpin future municipal initiatives. 
This is envisaged as a key tool in the creation of a sustainable market for PPPs in 
South Africa.  To this end, local consultants have worked beside international 
consultants on the projects, building skills as core team members while accompanied 
by colleagues with more expertise and experience.  The unit places a high degree of 
importance on learning from international experience and the inputs of the World 
Bank and bilateral donors (Plummer, 2002:236).  In the light of its experience with 
municipal PPPs, the MIIU has been able to contribute significantly to the 
government‘s development of policy and legislation.  South African government 
policy on partnerships was contained in a Draft White Paper on Municipal Service 
Partnerships published in April 2000.  Partnerships are also specifically described, 
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and their procurement regulated, in the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 (Plummer, 
2002:236).  While South Africa has a pro-PPP stance in terms of national legislation, 
other countries have used legislation to escape PPP contracts.  In Canada, the 
government made legislation mid-way through a contract to enable them to get out of 
the contract (Daniels & Trebilcock, 2000:103). 
3.7.3 Local Government 
The scope for partnerships at local level can be limited by the scope of local 
government mandate.  It is possible that municipalities in different government 
systems would have differing service delivery portfolios.  In a centralized command 
system, a local government would probably have less say in major infrastructure 
development than in other countries where local authorities can, for example, choose 
to build international airports.  At local government level, PPPs are implemented 
according to legislation and guidelines developed by the Department of Provincial 
and Local Government.  These are covered in the Municipal Services Partnerships 
Policy.  The National Treasury's PPP unit, guidelines and regulations did not cover 
local government PPPs in 2001, although the principles are the same, and projects 
may be similar in practice (Republic of South Africa, 2001:A3).  By 2010 additional 
guidelines specifically for local government had been issued.  The constitutional 
recognition of local government as a sphere of government has enhanced the status 
of local government as a whole and of municipalities in particular, and has given 
them a new dynamic role as instruments of delivery. The relationship between the 
three spheres of government is outlined in Chapter Three of the Constitution, which, 
among other things, requires Parliament to establish structures and institutions to 
promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations.  
 
According to the Constitution and the Organized Local Government Act, 1997 (Act 52 
of 1997), (which formally recognizes the South African Local Government Association 
(SALGA) and the nine provincial local government associations), organized local 
government may designate up to 10 part-time representatives to represent the 
different categories of municipalities and participate in proceedings of the NCOP.   
The South African Constitution provides for three categories of municipalities. As 
directed by the Constitution, the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998, 
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contains criteria for determining when an area must have a Category A municipality 
(metropolitan municipalities) and when its municipalities fall into categories B (local 
municipalities) or C (district areas or municipalities). It also determines that Category 
A municipalities can only be established in metropolitan areas. The Municipal 
Demarcation Board determined that Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town, Pretoria, 
East Rand and Port Elizabeth be declared metropolitan areas.   Metropolitan councils 
have a single metropolitan budget, common property rating and service tariff 
systems, and a single employer body. South Africa has six metropolitan 
municipalities, namely Tshwane, Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, EThekwini, Cape Town 
and Nelson Mandela. It also has 231 local municipalities and 47 district 
municipalities. Metropolitan councils may decentralize powers and functions. 
However, all original municipal, legislative and executive powers are vested in the 
metropolitan councils.  In metropolitan areas there is a choice between two types of 
executive systems: the mayoral executive system where legislative and executive 
authority is vested in the mayor, and the collective executive committee where these 
powers are vested in the executive committee.  
 
According to Jeanne Pierre Mas, Operations Executive of Johannesburg Water 
Management in 2002, the establishment of partnerships with experienced private 
companies requires sound regulatory frameworks (Plummer, 2002:22).  In November 
2000, the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000), was 
published to establish a framework for planning, performance-management systems, 
effective use of resources, and organizational change in a business context.  The Act 
also established a system for local councils to report on their performance, and gives 
an opportunity for residents to compare this performance with others (Burger, 2002).  
Public-private partnerships are also regulated by the Act. It allows municipalities 
significant powers to corporatize their services, establish utilities for service delivery, 
or enter into partnerships with other service-providers. The Act provides for the 
adoption of a credit-control policy by municipalities that will provide for the termination 
of services in the event of non-payment. Municipalities will have the power to pass 
bylaws to implement the policy.  The rationalization of old-order legislation has 
received significant attention (Burger, 2002). 
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3.7.4 Legislative environment 
The most pertinent legislation in terms of PPPs in South Africa include the Public 
Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999) and the Municipal Finance 
Management Act, 2003 (Act 56 of 2003).  Regulation maintains competitive market 
discipline in the execution of public-private partnership contracts (Pongsiri, 2002).  
Kogan Pillay of the national treasury's public-private partnership unit have indicated 
that black economic empowerment was a prerequisite for all companies bidding for 
government tenders (Phasiwe, 2005).  Although the motivation for this policy cannot 
be contested, it does add an extra level of complexity to the use of partnerships.  
Important policy documents include the Municipal Service Partnerships Policy 
(Republic of South Africa, 2001:B5). 
3.7.5 Why have partnerships at local level? 
At the local level, continued or greater involvement in partnership approaches is likely 
between public bodies and/or private bodies and non-governmental organizations 
because of pragmatic factors such as resource constraints, as well as more 
ideological factors.  These factors include a belief in the overall advantages of a 
partnership approach; the move towards enabling local government (where publicly 
funded services are implemented by private or not-for-profit bodies rather than by the 
public sector); a recognition that any one local actor often does not have all the 
competencies or resources to deal with the interconnected issues raised in many 
policy areas; and greater agreement that urban regeneration should include the 
genuine participation of the local community  (McQuaid, 2000:11).  Some degree of 
resource constraints must be experienced for partnerships to be necessary.  The 
theoretical and empirical validity of these views do however need further analysis.  
Indeed, in order to fully understand the behaviour and policies of organizations 
involved in economic development and regeneration it is necessary to consider the 
nature of their networks and relationships with other actors, including the flows of 
resources, power, and information within these networks (McQuaid, 2000:9–10). 
 
Each partnership is a function of a particular set of historical, economic, social and 
political contexts. Even so, there are many common trends. McQuaid argues that the 
natures of partnerships, particularly private-public partnerships but also partnerships 
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between quasi-public and/or public agencies, are in a state of flux because of 
changing global economic patterns, government funding and changing economic 
structures in both the US and UK.  He indicates that one broad context for the growth 
of partnerships is the transformation of central-local government and changing state-
private sector relationships, in which partnerships may be the result of, but in other 
cases the cause of, such changing relationships.  According to McQuaid, these 
changing relationships have given rise to a paradox concerning the fragmentation of 
publicly funded agencies and the multifaceted nature of issues that government must 
deal with.  This apparent paradox is that there has been a move in recent decades 
for many government functions to be delivered through ―quangos‖52 or other agencies 
with a narrow range of objectives so as to increase focus, accountability and 
effectiveness.  Yet, as a result of the multi-faceted nature of the issues and problems 
being dealt with, these agencies must generally work in various forms of partnership 
to effectively tackle the issues.  However, these partnerships cloud accountability, 
reduce focus and influence overall efficiency and effectiveness unless the 
partnerships are carefully designed and operated.  A ―form and function paradox‖ 
exists ―whereby the multi-functional nature of policies needed to deal with complex 
issues conflicts with the single or limited-function nature of the organizations, 
resulting in new partnership forms of strategy development and delivery which may 
then reduce some of the apparent benefits of having individual organizations‖  
(McQuaid, 2000:11, 34). 
 
The decision on whether or not to embark on partnership should be based on some 
sort of cost-of-delivery calculation.  Ideally, the provision of the specific public service 
through the partnership should be less expensive than delivering the same through 
the normal public channel.  If a partnership cannot deliver a service at a cheaper rate, 
there seems to be little reason for using the partnership option, except if the public 
value, public benefit or public ―profit‖ generated through delivering the public service 
in partnership exceeds what would be generated through direct public provision.  This 
idea of profit is illustrated in the figure below.  While it is accepted that government 
                                            
 
 
52
 Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations to which government functions are devolved, 
also referred to as non-departmental public bodies in the UK. 
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would not normally operate a service with a profit motive, government may seek to 
recover more than its costs on a specific service in order to subsidize another.  If, 
through partnership, such an over-recovery could be maximized, government would 
have even more revenue with which to deliver other services.  The private sector has 
an undeniable profit focus and would have an interest in maximising that profit as 
much as possible.  There may however be difficulty in determining the exact cost of 
service delivery, both on the public and the private side.  The dilemma for the public 
manager is that the real cost of delivery by the public sectors is already not easy to 
calculate. In Australia, such a calculation is called a Public Sector Comparitor (see 
previous discussion under the reasons for partnership on page 105 (sub-subsection 
2.5.5.12 The promise of financial benefits).  Then there is the possible uncertainty of 
how much delivery would cost in a partnership, which is exacerbated by the closed 
nature of private sector delivery cost calculations.  The private sector has an interest 
in maximising profit and would presumably not want to disclose its cost of service 
delivery and thereby give an indication of profit level. 
 
Public  PPP  Private 
    
? 
  
? 
    
Profit 
    
    
    
  
Profit 
 
 Loans 
repayment 
  
Profit 
Operational   
Capital   
Staff  Staff  Staff 
 
Figure 3.2: A comparison of costs and profit / benefit within the public and private sector as 
well as in a PPP 
 
Some critics, including unions, may see PPPs as a way of avoiding unionized labour.  
The South African government has actively encouraged public service provision 
since 1996, but Plummer (2002:234) argues that trade union resistance continues to 
test the government‘s commitment to PPP.  The South African government signalled 
continued commitment to partnerships with the private sector when, in March 2009, 
the Waste Management Act was gazetted.  While the Constition of South Africa 
assigns the responsibility of waste management to local authorities, one of the 
objectives of the Waste Management Act is ―to encourage greater private sector 
participation in waste management‖ (Beningfield, 2009:22). 
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3.8 THE LIFE CYCLE OF A PPP 
In this section, the life cycle of a PPP will be described in order to provide further 
insight into the PPP concept.  The evaluation of partnerships, with due regard to life 
cycle stages of partnerships, will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5 from page 
317.  It is however now opportune to formulate a standard life cycle typology that can 
be used as part of an evaluation tool.  Such a typology will determine a specific set of 
life cycle stages that will be used in the rest of this dissertation.  Irrespective of the 
life cycle stages one decides to apply to partnerships, such a life cycle analysis can 
have significant influence on the evaluation of partnerships.  It would for example not 
be useful to attempt a direct comparison between the performances of two 
partnerships that are in widely disparate life stages, such as comparing a partnership 
which is in pre-contract negotiation phase with another partnership which is in its 25th 
year of a 30 year concession. It is quite clear that it would be important to know 
where a partnership is in its life cycle when it is evaluated.  
Like any organization, contract or agreement, a partnership exhibits a lifespan from 
its start to its conclusion.  One could attribute biological life stages to partnerships 
such as conception, birth, childhood, adulthood and death, or one could apply human 
relationship constructs such as courtship, engagement, marriage, separation and 
divorce.  The well-known theory with the group development stages of forming, 
storming, norming and performing could also be applied to partnerships.  Another 
possible life-stage analysis of partnerships could use standard project life cycle 
stages.  The project life cycle generally includes the four basic stages of concept and 
initiation, design and development, implementation or construction and 
commissioning and handover (Burke, 2007).  A very simplistic but still realistic 
partnership life cycle characterization would be to divide the life cycle of a partnership 
into only three primary components, being to (1) Set an objective / milestone, (2) 
Achieve and (3) Disassemble or maintain the partnership (with transfer of learning 
and responsibility).  A more informal characterization found in literature includes four 
steps: Trawling for a partner; Sizing up; Structuring the partnership; and Rolling.  In 
2001 Aiello identified the following phases in the life of a PPP: 
 Conceptualization; 
 Internal ringfencing exercise (ensuring budget availability); 
 Feasibility study under Treasury rules; 
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 Request for qualifications (RFQ); 
 Request for proposals (RFP); 
 Adjudication, negotiation, contract signing; 
 Implementation. 
 
It is interesting to note that while the procurement stage is described with six phases, 
the implementation part of the project is only described with one phase.  It is quite 
clear that the focus is mostly on the procurement aspect of the partnership with only 
cursory consideration of the arguably most important delivery part of the project.  
While it may be argued that the procurement stage is critical in any PPP project, a 
counter-argument could be that the proof of success can only really be in delivery.  
An example might help to clarify this argument: while the procurement of a fire engine 
can be a complicated process of specification, tendering, evaluation and delivery and 
payment, the business-end of the project for the local fire chief will be the operational 
use of the fire engine.  The importance of correct procurement can not be contested, 
but there is a case for prioritising appropriate implementation above procurement.  
Returning to the (possibly appropriate) obsessive focus on PPP procurement in the 
PPP project life cycle by the SA Treasury, it is held that the non-financial public 
manager should be more interested in how the service delivery vehicle will work and 
what involvement will be required than in the initial procurement process.  The PPP 
phases described above can be interpreted as being specific to the PPP environment 
within South Africa because Aiello was involved in framing the PPP guidelines 
published by the SA Treasury and influenced the process at the time through thought 
leadership and the publication of papers (Aiello, 2010) .  The phases could serve as a 
basis from which to discuss the life cycle of a PPP.  There are however key 
omissions in Aiello‘s life cycle phases which should also be considered to attain a 
comprehensive view of the life cycle of a partnership.  It can for example be argued 
that Aiello‘s characterization of phases is influenced by a focus on PPPs concerning 
procurement, infrastructure creation and handover, and therefore says too little about 
what happens with a partnership after delivery of the infrastructure.  Specifically the 
life of a partnership after implementation, from maintenance to possible 
demobilization should also be considered, while Aiello merely mentions 
implementation.  The number of phases in the life cycle of a partnership, such as 
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those identified by Aiello, will of course also be dependent on the type of PPP (see 
description of partnership forms in section 3 from page 132). A design-and-build 
partnership would necessarily have a shorter lifespan and therefore possibly fewer 
life cycle phases than a partnership which includes design, build, ownership, 
operation and ultimately transfer of assets to the public sector. 
 
An alternative life cycle with more comprehensive cradle-to-grave phases is 
proposed as the core of an evaluation tool.  These phases, based on Burke‘s 
combination of project and operation life cycle into one ―product life cycle‖, includes 
the following life cycle phases (2007:52): 
 
 Pre-project; 
 Concept; 
 Design; 
 Implementation; 
 Handover; 
 Operation; 
 Disposal. 
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The life cycle stages identified by Aiello fits comfortably inside this proposed life cycle model, although Aiello elaborates 
considerably on procurement-related matters within the life cycle.  It is reaffirmed that this dissertation in not necessarily aimed at 
guiding procurement officers on the process of procuring a service through PPPs, but rather at public managers in general to 
enable them to deal appropriately with partnerships when they come across them. 
 
Table 3-5: A comparison of life cycle conceptions for partnerships 
Partnership life 
cycle 
Aiello’s PPP life 
cycle 
Group dynamics 
theory life cycle 
Biological life 
cycle 
Relationship life 
cycle 
Simplified life 
cycle 
Informal life cycle 
Pre-project  Conceptuali
zation 
 
Forming Conception Courtship Set an objective Trawling for a 
partner 
Concept and 
initiation 
 Conceptuali
zation 
 Internal 
ringfencing 
exercise 
Forming Conception Courtship Set an objective Sizing up 
Design and 
development 
 Internal 
ringfencing 
exercise 
 Feasibility 
study under 
Treasury 
rules 
 Request for 
qualification
Storming 
Norming 
Birth Engagement Achieve Structuring the 
partnership 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 204 
Partnership life 
cycle 
Aiello’s PPP life 
cycle 
Group dynamics 
theory life cycle 
Biological life 
cycle 
Relationship life 
cycle 
Simplified life 
cycle 
Informal life cycle 
s (RFQ) 
 Request for 
proposals 
(RFP) 
 Adjudicatio
n, 
negotiation, 
contract 
signing 
Implementation / 
Construction 
Implementation Performing Childhood Marriage Achieve Rolling 
Handover / 
Commissioning 
Implementation Performing Adulthood Marriage Achieve Rolling 
Operation Implementation Performing Adulthood Marriage Achieve Rolling 
Disposal Implementation Performing Demise Divorce / 
Separation 
Disassemble Rolling 
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In the conceptualization phase the driving forces include a need for capital, the 
desire to shed costly activities that could dominate or weigh down budgets, and the 
desire to access private sector efficiencies and capital (Aiello, 2001).  The 
conceptualization phase is equal to the conception phase.  The internal ring fencing 
exercise concerns an effort at determining internal cost for the provision of the 
service.  In South Africa the feasibility study for a PPP may be approached in 
different ways, depending on the sphere of government involved in the partnership.  
For national and provincial government agencies the Treasury format for feasibility 
studies must be used, which will include an options analysis and feasibility study 
focusing on affordability, followed by a request for quotation or a request for 
proposals where value for money must be the deciding factor.  The final element of 
the Treasury-format feasibility study for national and provincial government agencies 
will be the financial closure which must achieve and formalize risk transfer.  For PPPs 
in the municipal format, there will be a Phase I and a Phase II Feasibility Study 
followed by an RFQ, an RFP, procurement, and implementation. 
 
There are three major elements to the option analysis: affordability, value for money 
and risk transfer. In looking at affordability it is important to determine what the actual 
costs are so that a comparator can be constructed, and so that the private sector will 
know what is expected.  The challenges faced in determining affordability include the 
fact that many public entities do not know the costs involved in performing a 
particular service because budget allocation may not reflect actual annual cost.  
Value for money, in turn, is a comparison between the NPV of what it costs or will 
cost the public entity to perform the service, and the NPV of what it will cost the 
private sector to perform the same service. The other elements of affordability and 
risk transfer are also considered in determining value for money.  The risk transfer 
element of option analysis involves making sure that each party should bear the risk 
it is best suited to control.  According to Aiello, this typically means that the private 
sector must bear most of the project risks while the public sector risk would usually 
focus on payment.  The likely response of organized labour to the option, as well as 
the question of private sector interest also bears consideration in an options analysis 
(Aiello, 2001). 
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It can be said that the useful life of a partnership is limited to the period from its 
creation to the achievement of its milestones and/or objectives, except if there is a 
renegotiation of the objective or if the objective requires ongoing effort such as a 
condition or service objective instead of an infrastructure objective.  A condition or 
service objective is dynamic and it would be an objective to create and maintain a 
specific condition or service, while the more concrete infrastructure objective will 
relate only to the creation of infrastructure.  The aim of this dissertation is to identify 
critical success factors for PPPs, and in order to determine whether case study PPPs 
can be classified as successful, one would need to be able to somehow measure the 
performance of these PPPs.  The concept of the PPP life cycle adds another 
dimension of complexity to the evaluation of PPPs because one would need to 
consider the stage within the life cycle of a specific partnership when evaluating its 
performance.  This point will be elaborated in the chapter on evaluation.  If one 
considers that PPPs are normally managed as projects, then the normal categories 
of project risks that form part of the project management landscape will also apply to 
PPPs. Project management risks and related success factors for PPP projects are 
further discussed in section 4.6.4 on page 289. 
3.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this and the previous chapter an overview of public-private partnerships was 
presented.  In Chapter 2 historic aspects of PPPs were described to show that the 
PPP is not such a recent invention as many commentators believe.  Partnerships and 
symbiotic relationships that occur in nature were discussed and descriptions that are 
used to categorize types of symbiotic relationships were introduced in order to 
expand the vocabulary with which to describe PPPs. Definitions related to 
partnerships followed, whereafter reasons for partnering and uses for partnership 
were presented.  In this chapter various partnership forms, the structure and the 
management of partnerships were analysed. The barriers to partnership were 
considered and some negative aspects of partnerships were raised before selection 
criteria for partners were discussed.  The context in which PPPs exist was described 
and finally the life cycle of a PPP was analysed in an effort to provide a full 
understanding of PPPs. 
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People and organizations involved in public-private partnerships mostly have very 
little motivation to broadcast the fact that "their" public-private partnership has failed, 
if indeed it has.  Such ―failed‖ partnerships as well as successful ones, could however 
contain valuable lessons for governments, NGOs and the private sector in terms of 
their future involvement in partnerships.  The question is: how many prospective 
―partners‖ are considering these lessons before embarking on new partnerships?  It 
seems that at the most basic level, the success of a partnership will be signalled by 
the value of the whole being greater than the sum of the parts (Adamo, 2008).  In the 
following two subsections the success factors identified in this chapter will be 
summarized, and the development of a partnership evaluation framework will be 
commenced based on what was learnt in this chapter. 
3.9.1 Success factors identified in this and the previous chapter 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the success factors identified in each chapter will be 
summarized at the end of each chapter from this chapter onwards.  The success 
factors that were identified in the footnotes within this and the previous chapter have 
been copied to this section.  In cases where the footnote contained more than one 
distinct success factor, the content of the footnote has been broken down into the 
separate factors apparent in the footnote.  A total of 67 success factors were 
identified in this and the previous chapter and are listed below without further 
processing or interpretation, in the same order that they were identified. The list does 
contain some duplications and similarities. In the latter part of this section, the 
duplications and similarities will be removed to create a summarized list of unique 
success factors which can be used for comparison with factors identified in later 
chapters.  The following success factors were identified in this and the previous 
chapter:  
 
1) The existence of potential for synergy between partners; 
2) The representatives of the partners in the partnership have sufficient 
delegated decision-making powers; 
3) Partners‘ procedures, systems and equipment are compatible; 
4) Sufficient social capital and/or sufficient time to build social capital; 
5) Wide consultation and stakeholder involvement; 
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6) Enabling legislation; 
7) High-profile proponents / champions of the model; 
8) Competent, motivated management; 
9) Policy-making powers are delegated with care, if at all; 
10) Sufficient social capital within society to accommodate the social capital 
requirements of the partnership; 
11) Supportive legal environment; 
12) Compatible procedures and systems and levels of technical expertise; 
13) Favourable internal and external political environment;  
14) Common ground in terms of political doctrine;  
15) Absence of gatekeepers and allegiances; 
16) Price flexibility from private partner; 
17) Profit potential for private sector; 
18) Skills transfer possible from public to private sector; 
19) Leadership; 
20) Financial capacity; 
21) Support of stakeholders; 
22) Stable political leadership; 
23) Streamlined, appropriate procedures;  
24) Adequate skills and managerial capacity;  
25) Appropriate levels of political involvement;  
26) Effective change management;  
27) Inter-departmental cooperation;  
28) Appropriate incentive structures;  
29) Public sector understanding of private sector incentives and NGO 
approaches; 
30) Effective communication across barriers such as language; 
31) Enabling and coordinated legislative and policy environment; 
32) Understanding of and capacity for engagement with external and internal 
stakeholders; 
33) Organizational culture must be receptive for partnership; 
34) Honest, positive, transparent and constructive consultation with stakeholders; 
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35) Genuine engagement with policies promoting partnership;  
36) Equality within partnership;  
37) Real engagement of excluded voices;  
38) Power sharing; 
39) Overcoming cultural and institutional differences;  
40) Bringing partners ―together‖; 
41) A common understanding of the concept of public-private partnership; 
42) Supportive models of public-private interaction; 
43) The service involved is appropriate for delivery through partnership; 
44) Improved effectiveness and efficiency; 
45) Achievement of an important social benefit; 
46) Clear, agreed goals; 
47) Reasonable resource costs; 
48) Comprehensive all-stakeholder calculation of total benefit; 
49) Consensual decision-making; 
50) Clear assignment of specific decision-making powers; 
51) Balancing of power; 
52) Willingness to invest time and effort; 
53) Balanced power and representivity; 
54) Formalized, inclusive and consensual decision-making; 
55) A focus on positive goals, positive social impact and public good; 
56) Increased effectiveness in use of resources; 
57) Effective performance management; 
58) Overcoming potential conflict caused by differences in philosophy; 
59) Access to learning experiences from other partnerships; 
60) Effective partner selection processes and contractual arrangements; 
61) Possible contracting problems emanating from government being a party to 
infrastructure arrangements are addressed; 
62) Seeking labour support and having due consideration for labour organization 
concerns and priorities; 
63) Achieving context-specific requirements, such as black economic 
empowerment in South Africa; 
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64) Public sector commitment; 
65) Supporting environment; 
66) Reducing and managing complexity; 
67) Comprehensive partner-selection process. 
 
The above list is quite difficult to digest in its current format and needs to be made 
more meaningful. The success factors listed above will be processed or distilled to a 
list that is as brief as possible without losing detail, and will be presented in Annexure 
C in the interest of conciseness and continuity in this part of the dissertation. 
3.9.2 Consolidated list of success factors 
The consolidated list of success factors identified in this chapter is provided in 
Annexure C.  The list shown in Annexure C was compiled after deleting duplications, 
combining similar ideas and grouping related success factors with each other.  It is 
now a considerably shorter list of success factors grouped into themes that were 
established by looking at recurring ideas within identified success factors. The 
bulleted format of the list may seem overly structured at this stage, but will be kept in 
this format for easier comparison with lists of success factors identified in later 
chapters.  As already indicated, this list of success factors will, in the next chapter, be 
compared with the success factors identified in that chapter in a similar process as 
followed above. 
3.9.3 Towards a framework for partnership evaluation 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the success or failure of partnerships should be measurable 
if one wants to identify success and be able to draw lessons from it.  The 
determination of the success or failure of a partnership is a critical step in distilling 
success factors form PPP examples.  In this subsection the first steps will be taken 
towards the development of an evaluation framework for partnerships.  It seems 
logical that the first step in such an evaluation will be to determine whether the entity 
being evaluated does in fact qualify as a PPP.  The defining elements of a PPP, as 
discussed in Section 2.2 on page 58, and the eight-point checklist to pre-qualify an 
entity as a PPP as illustrated in Table 1-1 on page 16, can be used in this regard.  
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As a second step in the evaluation of partnerships, one can try to identify key 
performance areas in which the partnership can be evaluated.  The list of potential 
success factors identified in the previous subsection could form the basis for key 
performance areas from which key performance indicators can then be developed.  
Due to the untested status of the above success factors, it would not be productive to 
already use them in the development of an evaluation instrument.  It would be more 
appropriate to await the further development of these success factors within this 
dissertation.  While it is perhaps too early to use the success factors identified in this 
chapter in a proposed evaluation tool, it is at this stage possible to propose a 
framework for the use of success factors to identify key performance areas and 
indicators.  The table below illustrates a proposed framework for evaluation. In the 
table, the column headings describe what information can be entered into the cells 
below them.  The second row in the table below describes what the rows after the 
heading row should contain once it is implemented as an evaluation tool. 
 
Table 3-6: Basic evaluation framework for PPPs 
PPP Name PPP 
Prequalification 
Success 
factors 
Key 
performance 
areas and 
indicators 
Performance 
evaluation 
Contains: 
Name of 
PPP 
Contains: Result 
from eight-point 
checklist to pre-
qualify the entity 
as a PPP. 
Contains: List 
of success 
factors 
identified  
Contains: Key 
performance 
areas (KPAs) 
derived from the 
success factors 
Contains: 
Indication of the 
performance of 
the PPP within 
the KPAs. 
 
In summary, it can be said that a framework for the evaluation of PPPs will include at 
least some confirmation that the entity being evaluated is in fact a PPP, and will also 
include key performance areas that can be derived from the categories of success 
factors identified within this dissertation.  It would be helpful to reduce the large 
number of KPAs identified in this chapter to five or six, and possibilities in this regard 
will be explored, starting in the next chapter.  The discussion on the development of a 
framework for the evaluation of partnerships will be continued at the end of the next 
chapter. 
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3.9.4 Summary 
This concludes Chapter 3.  In this and the previous chapter a comprehensive 
overview of the PPP concept was provided and success factors for partnerships were 
identified while a performance measurement instrument was framed.  In the next 
chapter, critical success factors for PPPs found in literature will be investigated. 
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4 CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is aimed at identifying critical success factors for public-private 
partnerships and providing supportive information for public policy-makers and 
managers on when to consider using partnerships as delivery mechanisms and how 
to best ensure the success of such partnerships.  Chapter 1 introduced the research 
question, indicated how the dissertation would be constructed and described some 
initial concepts related to partnerships.  Chapters 2 and 3 provided a comprehensive 
overview of public-private partnerships which included some historical notes on 
partnerships, a comparison between partnerships and synergism in nature, 
definitions relating to partnership, reasons for partnering, uses for partnership, forms 
of partnerships and contract types. Partnership structures and management was 
described, and barriers to partnership and negative aspects of partnership were 
analysed, after which the context and life cycle of PPPs were presented.  Now that a 
good initial understanding of partnerships has been developed it is possible in this 
chapter to consult literature to locate any critical success factors that are mentioned 
or implied by various authors and researchers regarding partnerships and which can 
in later chapters be considered alongside success factors identified through other 
methods.  Those success factors that are confirmed by subsequent levels of inquiry 
will eventually form part of the final collection of success factors. 
 
In the previous chapter an overview of public-private partnerships was presented and 
certain self-apparent success factors were listed as they came up in the discussion.  
These factors are listed at the end of this chapter and further support for them will be 
found in the search for critical success factors pertinently identified in literature.  The 
search for critical success factors for partnerships in general and more specifically for 
PPPs begins in the traditional public management and PPP literature.  However, as 
explained in Chapter 1, the literature on PPPs pay limited attention to identifying the 
critical success factors for PPPs and the initial search was frequently frustrated by a 
lack of material.  Other fields of study which could contribute to identifying critical 
success factors were then considered and explored, with slightly better results.  This 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
7 
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chapter therefore also contains success factors ―borrowed‖ from various other 
applicable fields of enquiry such as the private sector collaboration literature and 
entrepreneurial studies. 
 
After summarizing the success factors identified in the previous chapter, an analysis 
of the wider partnership literature, which includes works on both PPP and other types 
of partnership, will be conducted and success factors will be lifted out.  The second 
body of literature that will be analysed is that concerned with Public Governance or 
Public Management in all its different guises, taking into consideration recent shifts, 
reforms and redefinitions in this field.  Success factors for partnerships flowing from 
this field of study will be identified.  The focus then moves to other disciplines and 
fields of study that could also contribute to the understanding of partnerships and in 
which further success factors may be identified.  Success factors will be extracted 
from the private inter-business collaboration literature as well as entrepreneurial 
studies because both of these fields have very strong, although mostly ignored links 
with partnerships.  An additional section in this chapter is dedicated to short forays 
into several other fields of study or perspectives, still in search of success factors.  
These success factors will also be sought in stakeholder perspectives, operator 
perspectives, the project management field, enterprise risk management and in the 
private provision of public services. The chapter summary will include a listing of the 
success factors identified in this chapter and then a comparison of these factors with 
success factors identified in previous chapters.  Success factors from the previous 
chapter that are supported by success factors identified in this chapter will be 
transferred to later chapters for additional filtering and discussion.  The obvious first 
place to look for critical success factors for public-private partnerships would be the 
literature on PPPs.  In the next section success factors identified in partnership 
literature will be highlighted. 
4.2 SUCCESS FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN PARTNERSHIP LITERATURE 
In this section success factors identified in general partnership literature (including 
but not limited specifically to PPP literature) will be presented.  The idea here is to 
find specific references in partnership literature that point to critical success factors 
for partnerships. 
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As can be expected, there is quite a wide range of literature on partnerships in 
general, and within this general field there are several more tightly focused areas 
concentrating on specific types of partnerships.  One such focused area concerns 
itself with partnerships in the international sustainable development field and is 
dominated by international development agencies, international NGOs such as the 
United Nations and its many agencies and allied organizations, aid agencies of every 
ilk, and academic and research institutions operating in this field.  A second focus 
area within the wider partnership literature has strong linkages with public 
management and is particularly concerned with PPPs, with a predominant focus on 
large scale infrastructure projects.  A third focus area involves very localised 
partnerships such as business improvement districts (BIDs).  A fourth focus area 
concerns itself with the concept of network governance which is closely linked to the 
partnership idea and looks at networked governance partnerships from a public 
management perspective – describing network governance as a new direction of 
development for public management.  The various uses and contract types for 
partnerships are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  The figure below is an attempt at 
illustrating the relationship between the focus areas inside the more general 
partnership literature. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Relationships in literature on partnerships 
 
In the rest of this section, success factors emanating from the different focused areas 
mentioned above will be discussed.  The first focus area is that of partnerships in the 
international sustainable development field, and this will be discussed in the first 
subsection. 
Public 
Management 
Literature 
Partnership Literature 
Sustainable 
Development 
Partnerships 
Literature 
PPP 
Literature 
BID 
Literature 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 217 
4.2.1 Focus area 1: International sustainable development partnership 
literature: SEED Partnerships and the success factor transplant 
The IISD (International Institute of Sustainable Development) operates out of Canada 
and is one of the organizations operating in the field of sustainable development and 
partnerships contributing to sustainable development.  In August 2007, the IISD was 
mandated to pursue a research agenda with one of its primary research goals being 
to analyse different types of development partnerships and their success factors. The 
objectives of the research included to provide guidance for partnerships, to share 
demonstrated success factors and, by understanding what makes these partnerships 
successful, helping other sustainable development partnerships and entrepreneurs, 
policy- and decision-makers, donors and other investors who want to support new 
ventures to identify those worthy of investment and support (Creech & Paas, 
2008:11).  This research performed by the IISD has obvious parallels with the aim 
and methodology of this dissertation and is therefore covered in some detail in this 
subsection.  The research would focus on SEED winners. The SEED Initiative 
(Supporting Entrepreneurs for Sustainable Development) runs an international award 
scheme which selects promising partnerships for sustainable development. The 
SEED initiative was founded at the World Summit for Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) in 2002, and launched its first award round in 2004. SEED Partners include 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP); the World Conservation Union (IUCN); as well as 
the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.  The SEED award is a partnership building and 
capacity development award, through which expertise, advice, and contacts are 
made available to award winners through its partners and its support programme 
(Creech & Paas, 2008:11). 
 
After preliminary steps in the research programme, it became evident to the research 
team that the SEED initiative was encountering several issues which they believed 
are commonly found in the practice of promoting partnerships for sustainable 
development. These include: 
 The continuing ambiguity of the meaning of ―partnerships‖; 
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 The plethora of types of collaboration making it very challenging to categorize 
―partnerships‖ and to then identify which types of partnership for sustainable 
development are working; and  
 With that amount of variation, making it difficult to pull out common but specific 
indicators for good performance and success (Creech & Paas, 2008:12). 
 
According to Creech and Paas (2008:12) this ambiguity in understanding the different 
types of partnerships has been a contributing factor to the wide variety of SEED 
winners being selected, in both 2005 and 2007. This variety of winners presented a 
challenge for the SEED Research and Learning Programme in attempting to analyse 
from the winners‘ experience any common factors for success, other than the most 
generic of observations (such as the need for a champion or driver for the enterprise, 
and community support) – all of which, according to their opinion, have been 
documented at the meta-level fairly regularly in the literature.  These ―most generic of 
observations‖, which are almost discarded by Creech and Paas, remain important 
and will be useful for the public manager who becomes involved in PPPs.  These 
observations will be discussed in later sections of this chapter.  IISD‘s frustration with 
ambiguity and variation prompted it to begin forming a hypothesis that there might be 
an alternative lens through which to view the SEED winners, besides that of the 
WSSD multistakeholder partnerships. The idea of partnerships as agents of 
sustainable development and poverty eradication was strongly promoted at the 
WSSD in Johannesburg in 2002. IISD considered the view that the common 
characteristic for SEED winners is that they are forming, or helping to form, for-profit 
enterprises based on social or environmental objectives and values.  The IISD then 
asserted that partnerships is not the central, defining objective of these enterprises; 
rather, the enterprises and entrepreneurs are using a variety of partnerships and 
other relationships to achieve their goals (Creech & Paas, 2008:12).   
 
The line of argument used here gives the impression that the IISD was moving away 
from the concept of partnerships because of an inability to isolate meaningful critical 
success factors for partnerships that would apply to the SEED winners and provide 
meaningful support to the winners.  Later in this subsection, it will be shown that the 
IISD in fact had to return to the partnership concept as a core element of what the 
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winners had to try to get right in order to survive and grow.  The argument used by 
the IISD that it had to look elsewhere than partnership literature and practice to give 
the winners meaningful critical success factors is however still fundamentally 
important.  The assertion that entrepreneurial studies could provide lessons that 
could be used to increase the chances of success of sustainable development 
partnerships is a key departure from conventional thought on partnerships.  It brings 
the realization that many other disciplines or areas of enquiry could also perhaps 
contribute to a better understanding of what makes partnerships work or fail.  It 
supports the reasoning used in this dissertation, where critical success factors for 
PPPs are being sought not only in literature on sustainable development partnerships 
and other generalized types of partnership, but also in other fields with apparently 
tenuous connections to PPPs.  It is this transfer of ideas from other fields of study 
that is alluded to in the title of this subsection.  Strong local ownership is seen as a 
key success factor for partnerships.  ―Strong local ownership has crucial positive 
effects: it increases compliance with policies and norms; it ensures that development 
initiatives fit local circumstances; and it empowers the local stakeholder groups 
involved.‖ (Creech & Paas, 2008:18)  It should however be noted that some 
commentators see ―ownership‖ and ―partnership‖ as contradictory terms, because the 
concept of ownership implies that one party takes charge, while the concept of 
partnership implies equality (Steets, 2006:95). 
 
Through critical reading and interpretation, the following success factors can be 
identified in this subsection: 
 Strong local ownership; 
 Strong champion or driver; 
 Community support; 
 See partnerships formation as the formation of new for-profit enterprises 
based on social or environmental objectives and values – use lessons from 
private enterprise; 
 Observe the ―generic observations‖ on partnership success. 
 
The second literature focus area on partnerships identified at the start of this section 
is the literature focused on the formal PPP field.  In the following subsections a 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 220 
framework for PPP improvement will be synthesized from several different sources 
including Plummer (2002), Rowe (2006) and the NCPPP (2006). 
4.2.2 Focus area 2: PPP Literature 
More than 20 years ago, in 1987, the World Bank‘s Economic Development Institute 
(EDI) published a series of books called the EDI Series in Economic Development, of 
which one book was called ―The private provision of public services in developing 
countries‖.  This can be considered as early PPP literature because even if the name 
PPP is not used, the author, Roth, indicated that the purpose of the book was to 
refute the conventional wisdom that only the public sector can supply public services 
in developing countries.  He saw the private provision of public services as a way to 
reduce deficits and at the same time enhance quality of services, particularly for low-
income people.  A particularly illuminating point he makes is that it is often the well-
to-do that benefit from public services while the poor have to make do with private 
services.  This may sound counter-intuitive to someone who sees the state as the 
final support system that everyone can depend on, but the example is a clear 
confirmation of Roth‘s opinion: at the time of his research drinking water in Karachi, 
Pakistan, had to be bought in bottles by the poor, while it was piped to the better off 
(Roth, 1987:xiv).  Twenty-one years later, in 2008, the Oscar-winning film ―Slum Dog 
Millionaire‖, also clearly illustrated how the opportunity to use sanitation services 
(such as informally erected toilets) were privately sold by children within the slums of 
Mumbai, India. 
 
These and other examples as discussed in Chapter 1 and 2 show the breadth and 
age of the inquiry into PPPs and suggests that there will be ample information within 
PPP literature that would indicate critical success factors applicable to PPPs.  
Unfortunately, as discussed in previous chapters, there is scant independent 
evaluative information on partnerships as most references to partnership case 
studies and the theory around partnering are either unquestioningly positive or 
parochially negative.  Even so, many success factors could already be derived from 
the overview of partnerships in the previous chapter, and in this section a further 
exploration of PPP literature will be undertaken to identify as many success factors 
as possible directly from the available body of knowledge. 
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4.2.2.1 Frameworks and principles for PPP improvement 
In 2002 a comprehensive sourcebook ―for Municipal Capacity Building in Public-
Private Partnerships‖ was published as part of a municipal capacity building series by 
Earthscan Publications.  The sourcebook was prepared with funding from the 
Department for International Development (DFID), UK, through its Knowledge and 
Research Programme.  It was the result of a two-year project entitled ―Building 
Municipal Capacity for Private Sector Participation‖ carried out by GHK International 
in collaboration with the University of Birmingham and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban 
Environment (PPPUE) facility.  While the book is comprehensive, it is rather one-
dimensional in terms of the partnership types covered, with a strong focus on 
formalized water, sanitation and solid waste partnerships only.  Other types of 
partnerships that occur at municipal level, such as business improvement districts 
(BIDs), are not mentioned. While no book can cover every aspect and type of 
partnership, and while the book is aimed specifically at poverty reduction, the 
parochial focus of the book does present a problem to the reader from the public 
sector who is looking for advice on a wider variety of types of partnership with the 
purpose of finding solutions to the challenges faced by the public sector. The 
municipal manager, for example, does not have the luxury of only looking at one 
sector at a time, and should be empowered to consider the use of PPPs in the much 
broader range of services that municipalities must deliver – all of which could have 
bearing on poverty reduction. 
 
At the end of the DFID publication discussed here, the various elements of municipal 
capacity building for PPPs discussed in the book are summarized and placed in a 
broad framework for action. Plummer (2002) indicates some discomfort with the 
framework by stating:  
 
The complex arena of PPPs makes such an outline a matter of debate.  This 
particular framework stresses urban management, poverty reduction and a 
broad perspective of PPPs.  
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Actually the perspective is not that broad – many types of PPPs and fields in which 
PPPs exist are not addressed, one glaring example being the many urban 
regeneration partnerships operating across the world. 
 
It aims to provide a structured way of considering PPPs in their municipal 
context and supplements programmes and technical toolkits presented 
elsewhere.  This complexity is accentuated further by integrating poverty 
responses into PPP and not separating them as optional extras. 
 
Central to this complexity is the untidy way in which vastly different 
organizations are simultaneously referred to as ―private sector‖.  Yet this 
compilation reflects the real nature of service delivery in developing cities.  
The private sector participation process is not a matter of shifting from purely 
public operation to purely large-scale private operation.  It is a matter of 
shifting from a mixed composition of providers to a hopefully more integrated 
structure. (Plummer, 2002:309) 
 
While it is agreed that the definition of ―private sector‖ is not at all as clear-cut as 
generally believed, one has to question the idea that PPP is the tool with which to 
shift from mixed service provision to integrated service provision.  Firstly, PPPs can 
actually bring more complexity and, secondly, depending on contract design 
decisions, PPPs could further fragment the delivery of service by making several 
separate private agents responsible, in competition for a service previously delivered 
by a single municipal department.  There is however support for Plummer‘s assertion 
on integration from the strategic management field where Grant (2005) describes the 
vertical integration of steps in product development and argues that the integration of 
vertically related activities into one organizational structure can reduce transaction 
costs.  The organizational design of such a partnership will then have considerable 
bearing on its ability to realize transaction cost savings.  This aspect is discussed in 
subsection 4.6.7.  Plummer‘s framework is thus focused on local government and 
poverty reduction, mostly in the provision of bulk water and sanitation services.  
There are also other frameworks and lists of recommendations for successful PPPs 
with other perspectives, one example being from the United Nations Development 
Programme‘s Special Unit for South-South Cooperation. 
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A decidedly private-sector inspired ―recipe for success‖ comes from the NCPPP 
(National Council for Public-Private Partnerships, United States), who states that 
there are six critical components of any successful PPP. The NCPPP notes that, 
while there is not a set formula or an absolute foolproof technique in crafting a 
successful PPP, each of their identified keys is involved in varying degrees.  Yet 
another checklist or recommendations come from Nelson and Zadek who set out 10 
key ―pathways‖ for successful partnerships, broken down into issues of context, 
purpose, participants, organization and outcomes.  According to Twigg (2002) they 
illustrate the complexity that is inherent in such initiatives.  McQuaid in turn organises 
the factors he believes success will depend upon into leadership, legitimacy, 
resources, governance and evaluation (McQuaid, 2000:30).  The key principles of 
partnership suggested by Plummer also inform the formation of a set 
recommendation to promote partnership success. These suggested principles 
include: Transparency and accountability; Competition and contestability; Legitimacy 
and legality; Specificity; Stakeholder participation; Equity; Clarity and predictability; 
Risk Management; and Economic, financial and environmental sustainability.  In the 
remainder of this section, the recommendations from Plummer, the NCPPP, Nelson 
and Zadeck, McQuaid and Rowe will be combined into one comprehensive list of 
recommendations from the PPP literature on ensuring the success of PPPs. 
4.2.2.2 Focused Purpose 
Achieving a focused purpose will entail clarity and openness about individual 
expectations and agendas, with mutual agreement on a common purpose and 
agenda for the partnership – i.e. synergy between desired benefits to participants and 
benefits to society.  It is necessary to keep a partnership focused on outcome instead 
of inputs.  There should be mutual agreement on the scope and complexity of the 
partnerships‘s intended locations and levels of action, variety of functions, range of 
desired outcomes and time-scales (Nelson & Zaldek, 2000; Plummer, 2002:309–
313).  Part of having a focused purpose would be to ensure the identifying and 
meeting of objectives with due regard for the organizational and governance 
objectives, functions and obligations inside which the partnership operates.  A 
focused purpose not only entails knowing the purpose of the partnership, but also the 
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target audience, beneficiaries or clients of the partnership – the public to whom the 
public service will be delivered.  Plummer (2002:309–313) focuses specifically on 
additional poverty reduction–specific activities, but such a focus can be translated 
into focusing on the intended beneficiaries of the partnership and investing extra 
effort in identifying their needs and objectives, incorporating previous knowledge of 
interaction with the problem at hand and the target audience, identifying and 
responding to the key concerns of the target audience and identifying existing actors, 
assets and mechanisms involved in service delivery to the target audience. 
 
Rowe believes that government policies in the UK privileged the needs of business 
over the general interests of the wider community (Rowe, 2006:208).  In the UK, 
local–level partnerships are a result of distrust in the ability of local government.  One 
could ask why the the local municipality would participate if a partnership were a 
product of distrust.  Based on the understanding emerging from the preceding 
paragraphs, the following success factors can be identified in this subsection: 
 Clarity and openness about individual and collective agendas and purpose; 
 Synergy between individual and collective agendas; 
 Synergy between individual, collective and societal benefits. 
 
4.2.2.3 Implementation Support 
What is unambiguous and straightforward, according to Plummer (2002:309), is the 
need for greater support, at least at the municipal level, to focus PPPs and to 
integrate them into urban governance strategies.  A single success factor can be 
identified in this subsection: 
 Ensure support in the implementation of partnerships. 
4.2.2.4 Beware power relationships 
A plethora of material suggests that partnerships, while a good idea on paper, are 
particularly problematic in practice. There are expected tensions and dilemmas 
inherent in a policy that seeks to engage people from across sectors in decision-
making and which seeks to challenge and change mainstream services.  The idea of 
partnership is hard to put into practice and problems are aggravated by the way 
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some seek to adapt to and undermine the policy (Rowe, 2006:207).  It is telling that 
Rowe felt it necessary to remove all references to specific partnerships from his 
paper on ―Abusive Partnerships‖. He stated, ―[i]t is in the nature of the narrative 
presented here that they are not acknowledged openly, and certainly not to outsiders‖ 
(Rowe, 2006:208).  Rowe‘s assessment that information would normally not be 
shared supports earlier arguments in this dissertation where it was stated that 
―honest‖ information on partnerships is rare.  Rowe‘s narratives point to issues of 
power and inequality within partnerships of real significance to those concerned with 
the themes of regeneration and inclusion.  These issues, while not universal, are 
common.  Rowe argues that much of the practitioner literature fails to seriously 
address questions of power.  He indicates that the PPP authorities only recently 
started to take questions of governance particularly seriously.  On the other hand, 
academic literature suggests that questions of power represent almost 
insurmountable barriers to the practice of partnerships (Rowe, 2006:208).  The 
following insights into success factors can be identified in this subsection: 
 Understand and adjust for the influence of power relationships upon 
partnership governance; 
 Pay attention to governance issues in partnerships. 
4.2.2.5 Transparent procurement processes 
It is argued that partnership success will depend upon building legitimacy, 
accountability and public confidence through transparency in procurement processes 
(McQuaid, 2000:30; Nelson & Zaldek, 2000; Plummer, 2002:220).  To improve 
accountability, cost reporting must be made transparent - all stakeholders become 
nervous when financial reporting is not open (Plummer, 2002:304).  One concern 
regarding process transparency is that a transaction which seems transparent and 
fair to a highly trained chartered accountant might not be seen in the same light by a 
member of the community with little or no financial training.  The lesson is that 
stakeholders should be empowered to understand that which is supposed to be 
transparent.  A fully transparent procurement system must allow for open competition 
in the selection of the partners for each project (UNDP, 2008).  Steps towards 
transparency could include some of the following prescriptions: 
 Bidders have access to the same information about a project 
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 Proposals must comply with some minimum requirements 
 Prospective operators are prohibited from soliciting support from anyone 
involved in awarding the contract 
 Collusion with other bidders are prohibited 
 Amendments after the award of the contract are prohibited (unless essential 
due to unforeseen changes in the operating environment); and 
 Public reporting of amendments, and general reporting throughout the project 
cycle, should be as open as possible (Plummer, 2002:215). 
 
The appointment of external consultants to work with the municipality on the 
evaluation of bids is often a helpful step because they create confidence in the quality 
and independence of the process (Plummer, 2002:215).  Procedural disincentives for 
corruption can be devised and the permanent or temporary blacklisting of contractors 
who make themselves guilty of corrupt behaviour can be considered (Plummer, 
2002:215).  An analysis of the preceding paragraphs indicates that the following 
success factors can be identified in this subsection: 
 Transparent procurement processes 
 Stakeholders should be empowered to understand that which is supposed to 
be transparent 
 Consider appointment of external consultants to work with the government 
agency on the evaluation of bids 
 Procedural disincentives for corruption 
 Blacklisting of corrupt contractors 
 
4.2.2.6 Involve civil society 
NGOs offer a useful instrument to help with the monitoring of procurement, tariff-
setting and implementation processes. Municipalities could make use of this capacity 
to assist them in ensuring the ongoing public scrutiny of partnerships (Plummer, 
2002:215).  Plummer (2002:205) indicates that NGOs may become involved in 
partnerships without any contract.  The relationship may have no formal contractual 
status and involve no financial remuneration for the NGO.  It is often of an indefinite 
duration, an ongoing commitment at the discretion of the NGO.  There are no formal 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 227 
obligations on the private firm to listen to the advice of an NGO, and it can easily be 
by-passed. However, while the relationship may be informal, an important role is still 
performed and the NGO remains independent.  It is able to act on its own and the 
community‘s behalf, and is not compromized or placed in conflicting roles.  The 
following success factors are apparent from this subsection: 
 Civil society can assist with performance measurement; 
 The role of civil society to act on behalf of the community should be 
recognized by partnerships; 
4.2.2.7 Reduce transaction cost  
Transaction costs include those costs incurred through planning and preparation of 
the partnership project until financial and contractual closure (Plummer, 2002:202).  
As one of the motivations for using partnerships is precisely the potential of 
partnerships to reduce the costs of public service provision, it will be important and 
pivotal to the success of a partnership to reduce transactional costs as much as 
possible.  Among the major transaction costs are those incurred for: 
 Feasibility studies (financial models and options, appropriate levels of services 
and service options and consumer profiles); 
 Hiring of legal advisors (many complex issues can only be dealt with by 
specialist legal advisors); 
 Consultants to assist with procurement and contracting procedures and to 
support the municipality in its liaison with the private sector and other 
stakeholders. 
 
Options available to municipalities and other government actors to reduce costs 
could include reducing the bureaucracy of the process by simplifying decision-making 
and granting negotiators authority and clear lines of accountability.  Other options 
include: bundling activities together so that costs are shared; simplifying specification 
by stating expected outputs (quality and performance standards); ensuring that 
invitations to tender do not require too much additional (detailed or extraneous) 
information.  This can be done by making sure that information requirements are well 
thought out beforehand, and by providing a format that makes it easy to compare the 
information received from different bidders.  Cost reduction can also be achieved by 
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inducing awareness of cost management among staff of the public sector party; 
expediting access for new suppliers to staff and premises; and ensuring that 
contracts are flexible to reduce time spent on discussing contract variations. Finally, 
limiting complexity by rationalising the number of partners in a partnership and 
ensuring fair contract enforcement mechanisms in the partnership arrangement can 
also reduce costs (Plummer, 2002:203, 214).  The sheer cost of establishing a PPP 
could be a key concern for government agencies and especially municipalities, and 
finding the funding to facilitate this process should be an early task for a designated 
team or individual within the public sector entity aiming to establish a partnership 
(Plummer, 2002:203). 
 
Quite a number of success factors can be derived from the discussions in this 
subsection: 
 Limit transaction costs; 
 Simplify decision-making; 
 Devolve authority for decisions to the lowest possible level; 
 Clear lines of accountability; 
 Integration of activities to enable cost sharing; 
 Simplify specifications by focusing on outputs and outcomes; 
 Ensure tender invitations are complete with all necessary information; 
 Standardized forms and methodology for bid adjudication; 
 Increase awareness of cost management among public staff; 
 Expedite access for new suppliers to staff and premises; 
 Flexible contracts with simple, robust contract variation procedures; 
 Rationalize the number of partners; 
 Fair contract enforcement mechanisms; 
 Early appointment of a designated team or individual to identify finance 
sources. 
4.2.2.8 Stakeholder participation, communication and support 
This area of recommendations for success involves actively determining the 
concerns and interests of stakeholders and systematically addressing these 
(Plummer, 2002:222).  It has been indicated that any partnership initiative will 
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flounder if stakeholder involvement is superficially consultative, with the stakeholders 
feeling that they have no real impact on outcomes.  All stakeholders should be 
consulted with due sensitivity to their particular interests (Plummer, 2002:223).  
Different stakeholders will be important at different times and government must be 
responsive to public (Plummer, 2002:220) and other stakeholder demands.  More 
people will be affected by a partnership than just the public officials and the private-
sector partner. Affected employees, the portions of the public receiving the service, 
the press, appropriate labour unions and relevant interest groups will all have 
opinions and, frequently significant misconceptions about a partnership and its value 
to the public. It would be in the interest of the prospective partnership to 
communicate openly and candidly with these stakeholders to minimize potential 
resistance to establishing a partnership (NCPPP, 2006). 
 
The table below gives an indication of the many stakeholders that may become 
involved in a partnership.  The biggest part of the table was used to record 
stakeholder concerns and interests as well as project responses to these 
stakeholders in a municipal water supply project in Gweru, Zimbabwe.  Some 
additional stakeholders were added from a case study description in Plummer (2002). 
 
Table 4-1: Partnership stakeholder concerns and interests 
Stakeholder category Concerns / interests Project Response 
Consumers Will have to pay for the services, 
have interest in the standards 
and costs involved 
Effective communication on 
project goals and timelines, and 
how this will affect consumers. 
Residents directly affected by 
construction 
People living next door to a new 
reservoir or landfill site 
Should be treated as interested 
and affected parties. 
Poor households and 
communities 
Often lack the means to 
participate effectively in public 
policy and project processes.  
Their involvement is critical to 
partnership design, 
implementation and monitoring 
because it helps to incorporate 
the perspectives of people who 
experience delivery problems 
first hand 
Pro-poor public participation 
process 
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Stakeholder category Concerns / interests Project Response 
Municipal employees Often fear the implications of 
private sector participation for 
their employment conditions, if 
not for their jobs.  It is critical to 
engage with them from the 
outset, to ensure that they 
understand the need for 
transformation, and that they 
are able to make an impact on 
the decisions that are eventually 
made about partnerships 
Effective communication of 
project impact on municipal 
employees and their careers. 
Existing informal service 
providers 
Stand to lose their source of 
income if their interests are 
ignored 
Engagement with local 
economic development 
authorities. 
Consumer groups To protect consumer rights Tariff control 
Performance standards to 
ensure quality of service 
Community-based 
Organizations (CBOs) 
To ensure transparency in the 
PPP process 
To protect consumer interests 
and protect reliable and 
affordable service 
Public tender, public meetings 
Chamber of commerce / 
chamber of industry 
To ensure efficiency and 
reliability of service 
To ensure commercial tariffs are 
kept to a minimum 
Zimbabwe: no response 
required because commerce 
was positive towards PPP 
Trade unions federation Employees would lose jobs 
Conditions same or better than 
existing 
Ensure handover of all staff to 
operator 
Terms and conditions to be 
same or better 
Future conditions pegged 
against Council terms and 
conditions 
Skills development (local and 
international) would be provided 
by operator to meet 
requirements 
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Stakeholder category Concerns / interests Project Response 
Municipal workers union As above 
Pension scheme carried over to 
new jobs 
Assurance that current scheme 
would be maintained – operator 
pays into same fund 
Seeking an amendment to local 
authorities pensions act to 
enable trasbferred employees to 
return fund membership 
(Zimbabwe) Electricity Supply 
Authority 
To ensure that PPP does not 
disrupt existing operations 
Ensure notification of all 
stakeholder meetings and 
decision-making forum 
Enable operators access to 
ZESA in preliminary survey 
Ministry of Local Government 
and National Housing 
To monitor process to ensure 
government policy on PPP is 
met 
To promote the first water and 
sanitation PPP in Zimbabwe 
Disseminate experience to other 
local authorities 
Ensure notification of all 
stakeholder meetings and 
decision-making forum 
Provided access to the 
development of all 
documentation 
National Economic Planning 
Commission 
To understand and promote 
their role in capital financing 
Ensure notification of all 
stakeholder meetings and 
decision-making forum 
 
Ministry of Water Resources 
and Development (Provincial 
Water Engineer) 
To continue to supply bulk water 
to Gweru 
To ensure that existing bulk 
water charges are met by the 
private operator 
Ensure notification of all 
stakeholder meetings and 
decision-making forum 
 
Enable operator access to 
Ministry 
Operator  Efficient operations, keeping 
costs low 
Project management 
Investors Return on investment Transparency in financial 
reporting, meaningful 
performance indicators. 
 
Success in getting a trade union on board in a water and sanitation project in Gweru, 
Zimbabwe, was attributed to previous experience in similar projects. 
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The municipality and the unions had undergone a massive learning curve by 
cutting their teeth on the contracting-out of the theatre and security services, 
and commercialising the distillery (Plummer, 2002:220). 
 
Stakeholders may also have unwritten and subtle motivations or even hidden 
agendas.  A possible example is that a trade union would not want to lose 
membership through the transfer of existing union members from a government 
department to a private entity where the union has no power or mandate.  In such a 
case, it can be expected that the union would fight the project vociferously.  The 
Zimbabwean example discussed here possibly received approval from the union 
because they were not going to lose membership and power.  As has been illustrated 
by partnerships that have failed, it is critical to keep the public and all stakeholders in 
a project fully and accurately informed about the intent, purpose and means for 
implementation of a given project. This communication should be made early in the 
development process and repeated as often as appropriate and necessary. The 
messages should be open and candid, giving the facts about the project and all the 
partners, in order to counter misperceptions and myths. The message format should 
be one provided in the appropriate context and format for each given audience 
(UNDP, 2008).  The responsibility for these communications can be equally shared 
by the political leadership and the administrative leadership (i.e. the dedicated unit). 
The audiences that should be addressed should include all constituencies that will be 
impacted by the project and its implementation. This could include the press, public 
sector employees, the private sector (both those competing for the project and those 
with interests but not suited), local unions, the end users of the service or projects, 
and any competing interests (McQuaid, 2000:30; UNDP, 2008). 
 
Some final recommendations related to stakeholder participation include allowing 
participation of the public in the choice of a provider (Plummer, 2002:220) as this will 
improve local ownership of a project.  The understanding prompted by the discussion 
in this subsection gives rise to the identification of the following success factors: 
 Previous experience of partners in partnerships will add to prospects for 
success; 
 Clear identification of all stakeholders; 
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 Open and candid communication with all stakeholders, taking into regard the 
concerns and priorities of each stakeholder; 
 Conscious stakeholder relationship management; 
 Keep all stakeholders informed of all aspects of project, with specific focus on 
the intent, purpose, and means of implementation of the project; 
 Counter misperceptions and myths through audience-appropriate, candid and 
factual information; 
 Clearly identify all stakeholders and ensure appropriate communication with 
each; 
 Communication responsibility should be shared among partners, and 
communication should come from the most appropriate partner for the specific 
communication. 
4.2.2.9 Effective collaboration 
The emphasis of implementing PPPs is often placed on legal mechanisms, but 
increasingly the focus of sustainable partnerships lie in the development of a 
collaborative process – a process with which Plummer (2002:293) believes public 
actors will be unfamiliar and for which they will have few established or appropriate 
procedures to draw upon.  Even with the recent focus on cooperative governance in 
South Africa and the constant calls for partnership, it can be argued that the regular 
public official has limited incentive to expend much energy in collaboration.  
Procedures for collaboration should be developed in the earlier stages of partnership 
and need to be upheld throughout the implementation stage.  Keeping the doors of 
the partnership open, ensuring flexibility and dialogue through joint capacity building 
sessions, regular reviews and reconsideration are all essential mechanisms for 
ensuring partnership sustainablility.  Unlike the legal work involved in a partnership, 
collaboration requires experimentation and flexibility, as well as a piloting and testing 
approach within the bounds of a loose legal framework such as a memorandum of 
understanding (Plummer, 2002:293). 
 
There is little concrete advice on how to make collaboration effective, possibly 
because there are so many interpersonal issues which could influence the 
effectiveness of collaboration.  It is certainly not possible to achieve good 
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collaboration solely through the design and implementation of rules and procedures, 
simply because human beings have the capacity to disagree and be uncooperative 
despite every effort to make them collaborate.  The only way to address the 
interpersonal aspects of collaboration is to ensure good interpersonal skills in the 
partnership staff.  Based on the discussions in this subsection, the following success 
factors can be identified: 
 Develop a collaborative process; 
 Provide incentives for effective collaboration; 
 Joint capacity building session; 
 Regular partnership review and reconsideration; 
 Experiment with collaboration options; 
 Build interpersonal skills for collaboration. 
4.2.2.10 Context 
The context of a partnership needs to be fully understood by all participants.  
Acknowledgement by all the participants as to what drivers and triggers have brought 
individuals and organizations to the table, and an ability to understand and 
reappraise on an ongoing basis the shifting context and its influence on the 
partnerships (Nelson & Zaldek, 2000) will have bearing on the success of the 
partnership.  Any partnership needs to be designed according to the specific 
problems and circumstances it is supposed to address.  A good partnership 
arrangement is one that builds on the assets of local conditions, and that is planned 
and implemented in a thorough and credible manner to address the specific issues 
within that local context (Plummer, 2002:229).  Plummer‘s description of her 
framework for partnership makes valid points about the influence of context on 
partnerships: 
 
―Like any such framework, this is only a guide and must be adapted to suit the 
context, and the highly specific and general aspirations of the municipality. 
Local conditions will spell out what is possible and what is not.  They will 
provide key areas of concern, whether political or regulatory.  While action at 
the policy level is largely outside the scope of this book, it is a vital aspect of 
the potential of municipal capacity.  Existing stakeholders and their respective 
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capacities will further affect the key areas of action.  The existence of a fleet of 
water tankers and reservoirs provides an asset for water delivery that cannot 
be overlooked in more ambitious network planning.  Competent NGOs working 
with the poor in sanitation and hygiene promotion play a key role in linking the 
benefits of services to poverty reduction.  The willingness of the international 
private sector will also clearly influence a municipality‘s approach to achieving 
its objectives.  The balance of these is particular to each context.‖ (Plummer, 
2002:309) 
 
Buisson (2006) argues that each type of partnership with a local authority has to be 
tailored to local conditions, national legislation and sectoral authority requirements.  It 
is safe to assume that the same caveat of appropriate tailoring will apply to 
partnerships involving other spheres of government.  The following success factors 
are indicated in this subsection: 
 Understanding of the original partnering motivations and conditions; 
 Sensitivity to the environment and its influence on the partnership; 
 Ability to adapt to environmental changes. 
4.2.2.11 Enabling Political and Statutory Environment 
Before the first step is taken to form a PPP, the political and statutory environment 
must be in place. Critical parts of this include visible leadership and a fully 
transparent procurement system that allows for open competition in the selection of 
the partners for each project. There must be statutory and regulatory authorization for 
the specific use of PPPs (NCPPP, 2006; UNDP, 2008). 
 
These political and statutory environmental factors must be incorporated in national 
codes that must include provisions for the ―sanctity of contracts.‖ Provisions in a 
contract must be adhered to by all parties, unless it is mutually agreed that a revision 
is appropriate and needed. Failure to comply with the terms of a contract must also 
invoke clearly prescribed penalties for both the public and the private sector partners.  
Fair, unbiased judicial systems, which provide equal access to judicial relief to all 
parties, domestic and foreign, and provide consistent, reasonably predictable rulings, 
are also essential (McQuaid, 2000:30; UNDP, 2008). 
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A number of success factors can be derived from the discussion in this subsection: 
 Visible political leadership; 
 Policy statement to all stakeholders; 
 Change necessary parts of procurement system to support the partnership 
approach; 
 Fully transparent procurement system; 
 Open competition in the selection of partners; 
 Confirm / ensure statutory and regulatory authorization; 
 Public officials must identify and remove legislative, regulatory and 
administrative impediments; 
 Rally public, political and administrative support; 
 Strong leadership to overcome institutional inertia / resistance to change; 
 Recognize the importance of perceptions among leadership; 
 Contract management to ensure adherence and punish non-compliance; 
 Access to fair and unbiased judicial relief; 
 A statutory foundation (enabling legal environment). 
4.2.2.12 Public and private leadership 
According to the NCPPP (2006), a successful partnership can result only if there is 
commitment from "the top". The most senior public officials must be willing to be 
actively involved in supporting the concept of PPPs and taking a leadership role in 
the development of each given partnership. A well-informed political leader can play 
a critical role in minimizing misperceptions about the value to the public of an 
effectively developed partnership (NCPPP, 2006).  Visible and effective political 
leadership is required in support of the PPP. Senior officials, both elected and 
administrative, must take a public posture in support of the partnership approach, 
through a strong policy statement to all stakeholders and a clear will to ensure that 
the necessary parts of their procurement system can support a PPP (Frisch, 2002; 
UNDP, 2008).  Equally important, public officials must take the leadership role in 
removing any impediments, legislative, regulatory or administrative, to the 
implementation of PPPs. Through their political leadership, they should endeavour to 
rally public, political and administrative support for the partnership approach to 
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addressing public needs. This may be particularly challenging for the mid-level 
management in agencies that have not had experience with PPPs - there can be 
significant resistance to a new approach, and strong leadership may be required to 
overcome this ―institutional inertia.‖ The perception of leadership in this area is as 
important as the actual implementation, because this closely relates to other key 
elements in the development of PPPs (McQuaid, 2000:30; UNDP, 2008). 
 
It is possible to see too that partnerships that appear to be failing often lacked the 
direct contact (or understanding) of a councillor familiar with the nature, scope and 
problems of partnerships.  As councillors are usually elected for a relatively short 
period (three to five years), a primary issue for long-term partnership arrangements is 
the capacity and frequent turnover of municipal decision-makers.  In many respects, 
the capacity of the private sector to become involved in the delivery of services to the 
poor is dependent on individual champions from the private firms involved, and the 
difficulties seem due to the inflexibility of the private organizations with regard to new 
circumstances, as well as the over-riding profit motive, which arises from time to time 
(Plummer, 2002:24).  This inflexibility is a somewhat surprising accusation when 
considered against the background that many proponents of the involvement of the 
private sector in service delivery uses the supposed flexibility of the private sector as 
an argument for involvement.  The mention of individual champions, reflect the 
recurring theme of the importance of individuals in determining the success or failure 
of a PPP.  This discussion of public and private leadership gives rise to the 
identification of the following success factors: 
 Strong individual champions in the private partner; 
 Flexibiliy to adapt to changing circumstances; 
 Commitment of and leadership from top management in the public partner; 
 Well-informed political leadership involvement from public partner. 
4.2.2.13 Sustained public sector involvement 
Once a partnership has been established, the public-sector must remain actively 
involved in the project or programme. On-going monitoring of the performance of the 
partnership is important in assuring its success. This monitoring should be done on a 
daily, weekly, monthly or quarterly basis for different aspects of each partnership.  
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The frequency can be defined in the business plan and/or contract (NCPPP, 2006). 
Two success factors can be identified from this subsection: 
 Continued active involvement of public partner; 
 Ongoing performance management. 
4.2.2.14 Contract: A well thought-out plan 
The prospective partners must know what they expect from the partnership 
beforehand. A carefully developed plan (which could be compiled with the assistance 
of an outside expert in this field) will substantially increase the probability of success 
of the partnership. This plan most often will take the form of an extensive, detailed 
contract, clearly describing the responsibilities of both the public and private partners. 
In addition to attempting to foresee areas of respective responsibilities, a good plan 
or contract will include a clearly defined method of dispute resolution because not all 
contingencies can be foreseen (McQuaid, 2000:30; NCPPP, 2006).  The specifics for 
the implementation of a project should be included in a detailed contract that 
incorporates a business plan for implementation. It is the opinion of the UNDP that 
there is no appropriate template for these contracts because each partnership has 
unique requirements that must be reflected in the contract. The contract can be best 
structured to include performance oriented goals, instead of specific design 
requirements - this will allow for the private sector to utilize its best engineering and 
technology skills in the implementation of the project. The contract should also be 
based on ―best value‖ instead of ―lowest price‖ taking into consideration the life-cycle 
costs of operation including long-term maintenance and replacement of infrastructure 
components, even after the conclusion of the private sector role in the project 
(UNDP, 2008). 
 
The contract should include clearly delineated metrics for performance and reporting 
of milestones. Depending on the nature of the metrics, reporting should be on shorter 
time-frames, while others can be quarterly or even annually. Implementation of this 
process is directly related to the skill levels of the dedicated PPP unit that the UNDP 
recommends should be established to deal with PPPs (UNDP, 2008).  The contract 
should include the most appropriate allocation of risks, a dispute resolution process 
that is satisfactory to all parties of the partnership, and provision for the specific 
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programme to be implemented for development of the workforce that will be 
employed for the development and operation of the project (UNDP, 2008).  The 
following success factors derive from the discussion in this subsection: 
 Clear description of the responsibilities of each partner; 
 Clearly defined method of dispute resolution; 
 Contract design should reflect conditions; 
 Performance oriented goals; 
 Clearly delineated metrics for performance and reporting; 
 Clear risk allocation; 
 Workforce development plan. 
4.2.2.15 Commitment 
Partnerships will only be successful if there is adequate commitment from all involved 
parties. 
While there are sound policy reasons for engaging in the game of 
partnerships, there are dangers in understanding the capacity of public 
agencies to adopt and adapt the language of partnership, without genuinely 
engaging in the intent behind the policy (Rowe, 2006:207). 
 
What Rowe is alluding to is that public sector role-players could be going through the 
motions of partnership without really committing to this type of service delivery.   A 
public sector willingness to operate in a true partnership environment with the private 
sector will be critical for the success of a partnership (UNDP, 2008).  One success 
factor is identified in this subsection: 
 Commitment to the partnership process by all partners. 
4.2.2.16 Organizing 
It is recognized that organizational change may accompany the decision to embark 
upon PPPs.  Municipal leadership and management, procedures and systems, 
structures, finances and attitudes may be influenced.  Success will depend upon 
leadership and governance (McQuaid, 2000:30).  In a framework for action intended 
to focus partnerships, Plummer puts emphasis on organizing the partnership 
(Plummer, 2002:309–313), but perhaps too much emphasis.  Plummer may be at risk 
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of over-simplifying the partnership landscape. The question that begs asking is if 
there is not a richer source of success factors than just a process checklist.  
Organizing will require the establishment of an organizational and legal structure 
which must be approved by all partners to meet the common objectives of the 
partnership (Nelson & Zaldek, 2000).   
 
From a UNDP perspective, a dedicated unit must be set up within the public 
administration with the skills necessary for management of all the phases in the 
development and implementation of PPP projects. This agency should be relatively 
independent of political pressure related to the initial selection of a project, as well as 
its development and administration throughout the life of the partnership (UNDP, 
2008).  Plummer echoes the idea of a specialized mechanism, indicating that one of 
the key steps to be taken by municipal managers is to establish a vehicle for 
investigation, decision-making and implementation within partnerships.  To this end, it 
is argued, municipalities frequently establish a special committee, task force or unit 
tasked with defining and carrying out the steps necessary to bring about a service 
partnership.  Ideally, an integrated team of senior and middle managers will be 
formed and exposed to alternative options for service delivery, and this team will 
have some basic training or experience of PPPs.  The members of the mechanism 
should have some training in working together to optimize its outputs (Plummer, 
2002:300).  Such a dedicated unit must have the appropriate administrative skills for 
the development and administration of a PPP. This expertise will be critical for the 
development of political independence of the agency and for assuring accountability 
of the private sector portion of a partnership. Among these skills must be a clear 
understanding of financing tools and the concept of full life-cycle cost recovery. 
Equally, this unit should have a clear understanding of the motives of and 
methodologies to be used by the private sector, and illustrate a willingness to operate 
in a true partnership environment with the private sector (UNDP, 2008). 
 
Acquiring all of these skills may require specific training of personnel in this unit, and 
if these skills are not incumbent, the retaining of truly qualified outside counsels or 
consultants to be managed by the unit to assure the appropriate levels of skills 
(UNDP, 2008).  The dedicated unit must be effective in communications with all 
project stakeholders. Included in this, is an open procurement process, providing 
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accountability and transparency throughout the entire process, from development of 
the concept of the project, through competitive partner selection and into final 
management of the project. However, there must simultaneously be sensitivity to the 
intellectual property rights of the private sector during the competitive bidding 
process. This balance will ensure the best level of competition and ultimately the best 
partner for the PPP (UNDP, 2008).  Communication strategies and systems which 
facilitate clarity of language, ensure regular dialogue and feedback, provide forums 
for problem-solving and conflict resolution, generate a shared vision and celebrate 
success, will need to be established (Nelson & Zaldek, 2000). 
 
According to Plummer‘s framework, the development of partnerships will consist of: 
Building on the assets of potential partners; Focusing the scope and content of 
partnership arrangements; Establishing appropriate organizational and contractual 
arrangements; and Establishing sound partnership principles (Plummer, 2002:309–
313).  Building on the assets of potential partners would involve exploring the 
attributes and roles of actors in the partnership, identifying potential roles and 
contributions of external actors, developing appreciation of the different 
characteristics that partners bring to the partnership and designing mechanisms for 
partnering, i.e. for promoting effective interaction.  Focusing the scope and content of 
partnership arrangements will include considering the scope and content of the 
partnership framework in terms of municipal objectives and then addressing physical 
objectives, political objectives, financial and economic as well as institutional 
objectives. 
 
Establishing appropriate organizational and contractual arrangements pertains to 
considering factors affecting the way the partnership should be structured, identifying 
the key factors affecting the procurement of large-scale operators, developing 
knowledge of the various models of contracting a large-scale private sector partner, 
their limitations and opportunities in relation to agreed objectives, and developing an 
understanding of the key issues involved in working with small-scale providers as 
well as the key parameters concerning the role and position of NGOs.  Under the 
topic of organizing which was elaborated upon in this subsection, the following 
success factors can be identified: 
 Appropriate skills within the public sector partner; 
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 Reduction in potential for political interference; 
 Effective communication with all stakeholders; 
 Open procurement process; 
 Build on the assets of potential partners; 
 Focus the scope and content of the partnership arrangement; 
 Establish appropriate organizational and contractual arrangements; 
 Establish sound partnership principles. 
4.2.2.17 Capacity 
Capacity is perhaps the single most important element contributing to partnership 
success.  Success will depend upon leadership capacity, resource capacity, 
governance capacity and evaluation capacity (McQuaid, 2000:30).  The partnership 
approach – ‗deciding together‘ and ‗acting together‘ – is a key to sustainable 
development (Plummer, 2002:dust cover).  The term partnership has become 
overused, misused and abused.  Too often, analysis is concerned with the financial 
and technical contributions and very little is said about the capacity needed to 
achieve partnerships.  Making municipalities better partners is a critical component to 
making partnerships more effective (Plummer, 2002:dust cover).  In Ankara, Turkey, 
structural capacity building for partnerships included retraining and equipping 
personnel with specific skills needed for project design, bidding and tendering, 
contract management, monitoring and auditing (Goymen, 2000; Plummer, 2002:298).  
Plummer (2002) makes a considerable contribution to partnership literature with a 
detailed analysis of capacity needs for partnership.  She subdivides capacity into 
capacity to implement partnerships, capacity to analyse needs and develop a 
strategic response, capacity to implement the strategy and establish a transaction, 
capacity to maintain effective partnerships, and capacity to engage with stakeholders. 
 
Enhancing capacity to implement partnerships, according to Plummer‘s analysis, 
consists of understanding the operating context and supporting organizational 
development.  An understanding of the context can be gained by investigating the 
operating environment of the applicable agency and the impact of this environment 
on PPPs and on the regulatory environment for PPPs.  This understanding can be 
further supported by developing and implementing a skills development strategy 
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which enhances skills for developing, implementing and sustaining PPPs.  
Organizational development can be supported by developing an organizational 
development strategy to respond to partnership strategies and addressing 
management capacities, procedural constraints, impacts of and on municipal 
structures, financial capacities to ensure strong financial base and reliable partner, 
and municipal attitudes (Plummer, 2002:309–313).  Capacity to analyse needs and 
develop a strategic response: This refers to the ability to understand the context and 
define appropriate objectives and also to understand the concept and practice of 
strategic planning (Plummer, 2002:265).  Capacity to implement the strategy and 
establish a transaction depends on the ability to collaborate, to implement 
transparent tendering and evaluation procedures, to conduct contract negotiation and 
to understand the legal and contractual aspects of PPPs.  One of the most 
overlooked aspects of partnerships is the ability of all partners to behave as partners, 
and carry out their tasks in a collaborative manner.  While clarity of function and 
contract is important, the process of partnering is ultimately more critical. 
Municipalities often lack key skills such as listening and learning. Managers are 
accustomed to always having to know the answers, and have created dictatorial 
rather than flexible learning organizations.  Implementing a partnership strategy that 
unifies a range of actors requires the municipality to facilitate a collaborative spirit.  
This is of paramount importance to the sustainability of the partnership, irrespective 
of what the contract says (Plummer, 2002:266–267). 
 
It is interesting to note that Plummer does not refer to personality types that may be 
better or worse at partnering.  A short look at personality types is included in the 
discussion on entrepreneurial studies.  Capacity to maintain effective partnerships 
requires understanding of technical scope and the ability to engage with the private 
operator about technical problems and solutions, contract management and 
supervision, the capacity to develop monitoring, evaluation and feedback 
mechanisms and the ability to participate in renegotiations, as well as financial 
management and planning  (Plummer, 2002:267–268).  Capacity to engage with 
stakeholders (a consultative and inclusive process) relies on the ability to plan and 
carry out effective stakeholder consultations, on having an understanding of and 
ability to engage with the private operator, with independent service providers, NGOs 
(while promoting their involvement) and consumers, and the ability to engage with all 
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these stakeholders.  An understanding of and ability to undertake consultation with 
trade unions is also required (Plummer, 2002:269–271).  An understanding of 
capacity building needs, and the ability to improve capacity is another requirement.  
This includes an understanding of and ability to develop and implement a capacity 
building strategy and an understanding of the potential roles of specialists (Plummer, 
2002:271).  The understanding brought by the discussion in this subsection provides 
the following identified success factors: 
 Strong local ownership; 
 Commitment; 
 Partners contribute according to their capacity; 
 Contract management; 
 Contract negotiations; 
 Financial analysis and planning; 
 Understanding the business at hand, for example water and sanitation. 
4.2.2.18 Clear revenue stream 
When private capital or other resources are incorporated into a PPP, there must be a 
clearly defined method for the private sector to recapture these expenditures and 
make an appropriate return on that investment. This revenue stream can be 
generated through user fees, government provided ―availability payments,‖ or other 
innovative financing tools. To ensure that the public interests are fully protected, 
there should be a full cost accounting for the project. Accordingly, this may lead to a 
need for some flexibility in these revenue sources (within the bounds of the best 
interest of the public) as unforeseen aspects of a project may emerge (UNDP, 2008).  
Effective financial management: Cost recovery – The introduction and 
implementation of cost recovery principles are central to the creation of sustainable 
service delivery. To ensure that they will be compensated for the service they 
provide, private operators will want to see that cost recovery has been addressed 
before they enter into partnerships (Plummer, 2002:303). Roth argues that the private 
provision of public services do not automatically translate to cost recovery.  He skirts 
the issue of whether public agencies should charge for their services and whether, if 
they do, they should try to recover the full cost of providing the service (Roth, 
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1987:12).  Innovative methods for the development of these revenue streams have 
been used in many PPPs. Some examples are: 
 Tax Increment Financing (TIF), which captures a portion of the increased real 
estate value of properties impacted by the successful partnership (this can be 
particularly the case with transportation and water projects); 
 Dedicated Tax Districts, which impose a specific tax (often on commercial 
activity) in the area served by the new project; 
 Long-term Maintenance Agreements, where the private sector can capture a 
portion of savings in maintenance performed for a project (as a means of 
either recapturing the initial investment or generating the appropriate return on 
investment); 
 Underutilized Assets, where publicly held assets (often real estate) can be 
used by the private sector as an income generator to provide some, if not all, 
of the capital for a project; and 
 User Fees, which are fees for service, through periodic billing or tolls, may 
also be used. These fees may be subsidized, in whole or in part, to enable 
marginalized communities access to vital public services (UNDP, 2008). 
 
While the private partner may provide the initial funding for capital improvements, 
there must be a means of repayment of this investment over the long term of the 
partnership. The income stream can be generated by a variety and combination of 
sources (fees, tolls, shadow tolls, tax increment financing, or a wide range of 
additional options), but must be assured for the length of the partnership (NCPPP, 
2006).  One success factor is identified in this subsection: 
 An assured income stream for the duration of the partnership 
4.2.2.19 Careful Selection of Partner 
The selection of a partner is certainly one of the most important steps in creating a 
PPP.  Some commentators believe that the process of selecting a private sector 
partner is best handled by a special body such as a Source Selection Board, made 
up of senior administration people and independent third party advisors. The decision 
process should be open and transparent, aiding in building the credibility of the 
project and of the partners with the full range of stakeholders (Frisch, 2002; UNDP, 
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2008).  Identification of the private portion of a PPP requires objectivity throughout an 
open and truly competitive selection process. Selection of the company should be 
made on the basis of the best value offered, which may not be the lowest price (when 
the full life-cycle costs of the project are considered). Equally important is to verify the 
technical and financial qualifications of all the candidates through communication with 
other clients of the company and other reliable sources. Of major importance is the 
philosophical match of the company with the public sector, particularly with the unit 
dedicated to manage this long-term relationship) (UNDP, 2008).  It must be kept in 
mind that this selection process should be executed in a timely and effective manner 
– protracted delays in awarding a contract can be extremely costly to the private 
sector, when it is remembered that the costs for preparing the appropriate bids may 
require an expenditure equal to as much as one or two percent of the total project 
costs. Companies are willing to invest this ―risk capital‖ if there is an expectation of a 
timely and fair decision process (UNDP, 2008). 
 
In the selection of a partner, the award of a contract should recognize that the private 
sector is entitled to a reasonable return on their investment. Without this, it is 
impossible for a private company to participate in a PPP (UNDP, 2008).  It is argued, 
especially by the potential private partners in PPPs, that the "lowest bid" is not 
always the best choice for selecting a partner. The NCPPP (National Council on 
Public-Private Partnerships – United States) is of the opinion that the "best value" in 
a partner is more critical than ―lowest bid‖ in the long-term relationship that is central 
to a successful partnership. A candidate's experience in the specific area of 
partnership being considered is an important factor in identifying the right partner. 
The listing of NCPPP members (provided under Council Members on the NCPPP 
website), it believes, provides a logical starting point for the identification of potential 
partners or services that might be required in the development of a partnership 
(NCPPP, 2006). The NCCCP obviously has a mandate to promote its members as 
potential PPP partners and could be accused of advertising in its statements, but the 
opinion that experience and value for money may be more important than the lowest 
price in partnership selection holds water. 
 
Nelson and Zadek (2000) argues that individuals or institutions capable of playing a 
leadership role, acting as inspirer, mediator and/or facilitator between the partnership 
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participants and in many cases between the partnership and its ultimate 
beneficiaries, will be required for successful partnership.  The partner selection 
process should therefore consider these values.  Another quality that a partner 
should exhibit is an understanding of the resources, skills and capacities that are 
needed to meet the partnership‘s objectives, and how to optimize both the quality and 
quantity of resources, skills and capacities that each partner brings to the initiative 
(Nelson & Zaldek, 2000).  The discussion of partnership selection prompts the 
identification of the following success factors in this subsection: 
 Selecting a partner that can contribute the most value to the partnership; 
 Selecting partners with experience in the applicable field; 
 Philosophical match between the private and public partners. 
4.2.2.20 Managing risk 
The apparent preoccupation with the transfer of all PPP project risk from the public to 
the private sector, as advocated by, for example, the SA Treasury, would dictate that 
all risk management in a partnership should be performed by the private partner.  It is 
however argued that the public sector may be better equipped to manage certain 
specific types of risk than the private sector is (UNDP, 2008).  It therefore seems that 
the success of a partnership can be enhanced by ensuring that the different types of 
risk to which the partnership is exposed are assigned to the partner most able to 
manage it.  The table below illustrates how different categories of risk can most 
appropriately be shared between the public and private sectors. 
 
Table 4-2: Risk Management 
Risk Category Municipality Private  
Political risk X  
Design risk  X 
Construction risk  X 
Operating and maintenance risk Should give accurate info Operating costs 
Demand Risk Should give accurate info X 
Tariff risk X X 
Tariff collection risk  X 
Credit risk  X 
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The table indicates that the public partner has a role to play in risk management by 
the private partner and therefore that the wholesale transfer of risk is seldom 
possible.  Completion risk, for example, may be considered the risk of the 
construction contractor, but in reality it has many sub-components, including 
environmental clearances and the securing of the appropriate building and operating 
permits from local authorities (Plummer, 2002:226, 227).  The partnership contract 
should include the most appropriate allocation of risks, to take into consideration that 
some risks are better managed by the public sector and some by the private sector. 
Allocating too many risks to the private sector can have a negative impact on the 
costs and even the success of the project (UNDP, 2008). 
4.2.2.21 Competition and monopoly 
When a private organization is given a monopoly – for example, to provide electricity 
or a telephone service – regulation by the government is generally necessary to 
prevent abuse.  Typically, this regulation covers the prices that may be charged and 
the standards of service that have to be met.  Regulation is also necessary when 
services (such as road maintenance) are contracted out.  Here, detailed 
specifications must be prepared and a thorough system of inspection must be in 
place to ensure that the works are completed in accordance with the specifications.  
Thus, regulating and supervising private suppliers can give rise to substantial 
administrative problems (Roth, 1987:xiv).  The insights from the discussion bear the 
following success factors: 
 Regulation to prevent abuse; 
 Detailed specifications; 
 Evaluation system (which could include inspection). 
4.2.2.22 The skills set required 
Municipal efforts to encourage partnership initiatives will be affected by the human 
resource capacity of the municipality. 
 
Unsurprisingly, evidence from case studies in various parts of the world 
strongly suggests that the greater the capacity, the more likely a municipality is 
to succeed in developing and sustaining effective partnerships.  The paradox 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 249 
is that those without capacity – those most in need of support from the private 
sector – are likely to find partnership furthest from their reach. (Plummer, 
2002:259) 
 
The skills required for partnering, as identified by Plummer (2002) include a strategic 
and practical understanding of the problem and context as well as a strategic 
understanding of solutions.  The strategic and practical understanding of the problem 
and context will be supported by a basic understanding of the operating context for 
service partnerships (macro-economic, political, policy, administrative) and an 
understanding of poverty and the perceptions of the poor, the limitations of existing 
service delivery mechanisms and the limitations of the regulatory framework 
(Plummer, 2002:262–263). 
 
A strategic understanding of solutions will require a strategic understanding of 
partnerships in urban governance, a basic knowledge of financial arrangements and 
a strategic understanding of risk management as well as an understanding of the 
nature, capacity and potential of all actors.  Perhaps the primary skill lacking in the 
―traditional‖ municipal organization is a strategic understanding of partnerships, their 
benefits and the opportunities they create.  That is not to say there is not an 
awareness of the issues, but evidence does suggest that misinformation and 
preconception play key roles in forming councillors‘ and administrators‘ views, and 
attitudinal change is necessary to remove scepticism where it is not warranted. 
Conversely, there are some municipal managers who see partnerships with the 
private sector as the panacea to all municipal illnesses, and are unable to critically 
evaluate the pros and cons of private sector involvement in a particular context.  
There is little doubt that training in PPPs would assist municipal officials to make 
informed decisions that are more consistent with broader urban management goals. 
This will include, for example, the ability to select options – to identify appropriate 
alternative options for a diverse range of municipal functions, to evaluate private 
sector participation (PSP) options and to compare them with other forms of delivery 
(Plummer, 2002:263–265).  The following success factors emerge from the 
discussion in this subsection: 
 Strategic and financial skills within the public sector partner; 
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 Strategic understanding of partnerships within the public sector partner. 
4.2.2.23 Evaluating Outcomes 
Partnership success will depend significantly on the implementation of methodologies 
for the measurement and evaluation of partnership processes and outcomes against 
common and individual agendas.  Flexibility and a willingness to allow adaptation of 
the partnership‘s purpose, participants or process in response to evaluation or 
changes in the external context will also be a contributor to partnership success 
(Nelson & Zaldek, 2000).  Success factors identified in this subsection: 
 Confirm each partner‘s individual goals; 
 Confirm the collective goal of the partnership; 
 Measure performance against the partners‘ individual and combined goals; 
 Flexibility in terms of renegotiating outcomes based on changing conditions. 
 
In the next section the fourth focus area of partnership literature will be investigated 
in the search for success factors. 
4.2.3 Focus area 4: Success factors related to Network Governance 
The concept of network governance and the characteristics of PPPs are so closely 
aligned that one could almost ask whether it is necessary to have separate names for 
these approaches to government.  In their book ―Governing by Network‖, Goldsmith 
and Eggers (2004) repeatedly refer to networks as partnerships and vice versa.  In 
his foreword to their book, Kettl describes the growing reliance of government on 
service delivery systems that may get mandates from government but is performed 
outside government.   
 
‖…if government has become ever more reliant on its network-base 
partnerships (author‘s emphasis), we certainly have not figured out how best 
to make them work: how to make them administratively effective and how to 
hold them politically accountable.‖ (ix) 
 
Based on these and other comments it is justifiable to say that the need for network 
governance is a result of the increasing delivery of public services by private entities 
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(through, amongst other vehicles, partnerships) and the related management and 
coordination challenges this brought.  It would be possible to say that network 
governance is a type of partnership but also an aid to partnerships, and that the 
public official involved in partnerships would need to be proficient at network 
governance to increase the prospects for success of the partnership.  If one was to 
hold a conservative and perhaps even cynical opinion on network governance, one 
could say that through the shrinking of government brought about by new public 
management and its focus on the privatization of public services, government has 
now lost so much of its previous capacity that it needs emergency measures such as 
network governance just to fend off the imminent implosion of the private/public 
service delivery complex.  It could also be argued that partnerships were ―advertised‖ 
to give government access to private sector skills which were said to be inherently 
better than public sector skills, but now that many partnerships have been formed 
and government stripped of its capacity, there is a call for another partnership type to 
solve the problems caused by partnerships.  The repeated emphasis by Goldsmith 
and Eggers on the need for highly skilled (and highly paid) personnel in the public 
sector to manage the networks can also be seen from a cynical perspective to be 
counter to the original promise of PPPs to provide access to expertise and 
simultaneous savings. 
 
In answering such allegations some critical success factors for partnerships will 
become part of the discussion and will be captured for further use in this dissertation.  
The first point will have to be that in public management the problem at hand has to 
be solved and it adds no value to agonize about shifts in policy and dogma.  The fact 
is that the landscape of public service provision has changed drastically (irreversibly, 
according to Goldsmith and Eggers [2004]), that there is a risk of overwhelming 
complexity, and that measures should be put in place which can absorb this 
complexity.  From a partnership perspective, these measures would have to be 
―better partnership management‖ by the public sector and Goldsmith and Eggers see 
Network Governance as the solution.  A second point is that any argument that 
public-private partnerships would work well without considerable skill being resident 
within the public sector, is based on misconception and fairytales.  The public partner 
in a partnership must have advanced skills and knowledge to ensure partnership 
success.  The need for high quality human capital is therefore not a new requirement 
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from Network Governance – it was already a requirement for normal public-private 
partnerships as illustrated in the previous section.  The private sector skills to be 
accessed would be around service delivery, while the public sector skills would have 
to address service design and provider management.  Thirdly, savings are still 
possible through partnerships even if the possibility of savings may diminish if public 
sector participants in the partnership receive pay increases.  The realization of 
savings depends on many more factors than the pay level of the public sector official 
involved in the partnership.  Goldsmith and Eggers (2004:180–188) posited some 
broad principles ―for public innovators to keep in mind as they embark down the path 
of governing by network.‖  These principles are also applicable to partnerships and 
can be viewed as success factors for partnerships: 
 
 Focus less on programmes and more on public value.  This means that the 
first concern should be what public outcome must be produced, and only then 
to address how best to solve it. 
 Don‘t get lost in the fine print.  Networks need to be managed around key 
values and performance objectives, not simply by the fine print of the contract. 
 Money is a tool, not the tool, for forming networks.  Besides money, public 
leaders have an entire tool kit of assets that they can draw on to bring together 
partners. 
 The perfect is the enemy of the good.  The goal is not to build a perfect system 
– failures are to be expected – the goal is to make meaningful enhancements 
to the status quo. 
 Develop a new set of core competencies.  As more and more agencies forge 
partnerships with third parties, agency performance will largely depend on how 
well the partnerships are maintained.  To achieve high performance in this 
environment, governments will need to develop core capabilities in a host of 
areas where today thay have scant expertise.  Three of the most important of 
these capabilities relate to conceptualising the network, integrating it, and 
developing effective knowledge-sharing practices across the network. 
 Downsize and upsize simultaneously.  Government will need fewer people 
overall – particularly at the lower and middle levels – but more highly skilled 
individuals at the top.  Goldsmith and Eggers warns that as governments shift 
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over from producing public services to managing providers, it will have to 
invest in the best and brightest and not the cheapest skills to avoid enduring 
―the continued project failures and billions of dollars‘ worth of wasted tax 
dollars that go along with poorly structured public-private partnerships‖. 
 
These points will all be summarized at the end of this section under critical success 
factors identified.  In the remainder of this section additional factors that could 
contribute to partnership success and that were identified in literature on network 
governance will be indicated.  Public sector skills will first be discussed.  This will be 
followed by a discussion of the flexibility / transparency / accountability nexus. 
 
Public sector skills required for partnership and network government.  Proponents of 
network governance profess that government reforms over the last 50 years have 
worked assiduously to ―professionalize‖ or specialize work and tightly manage 
information.  These proponents believe that effective network governance requires 
something other than specialization: it requires more public employees with a broad 
knowledge of processes and organizations and a deep appreciation of the 
importance of open information to a continuously learning organization.  It is the 
opinion of Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) that these skills, the skills required to 
succeed in a networked economy and government, are quite sophisticated.  This 
opinion is supported by others, as indicated in the quote below. 
 
The kinds of skills involved in orchestrating a high degree of collaboration 
between the public and private sectors are very high-level skills.  They‘re 
similar to those needed to be an investment banker, a venture capitalist, or 
senior-level consultant.  They don‘t come cheap.  (Donahue, 2004, cited in 
Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004:171–172). 
 
Goldsmith and Eggers relate how a senior official appointed to the US Department of 
Interior in 2001 as Assistant Secretary found a dearth of capacity in the areas of 
contract and network management, business and transactions (Goldsmith & Eggers, 
2004:172). 
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When we‘d sit down at the negotiations table with the concessionaires and 
contractors, there wasn‘t equal knowledge.  We had to bring in a consulting 
firm to just help us even the playing field.  Most of our staff was scientists, 
ecologists – people with knowledge of the lands and water. (Goldsmith & 
Eggers, 2004:172) 
 
With the Department of Interior increasingly reliant on partnerships to run its 
operations and meet its policy goals, it was felt that the capacity gap could result in 
failed partnerships.  Measures that were implemented to rectify the situation included 
a strategic human capital plan aimed at recruiting people with skills in conservation 
and communication and collaboration and cooperation.  An internship programme 
was also set up to bring in business skills (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004:173).  The 
opinion in the network government field is therefore that government needs people 
with new network skills, and it is believed that these collaborative skills are currently 
neither highly sought nor valued by government.  There is a belief that as 
government (apparently inevitably) moves more and more to a networked model, 
effective governance will depend on attracting individuals that are supposedly 
different from those currently employed in the public sector.  According to Goldsmith 
and Eggers (2004:178), building such a capacity requires not only far-reaching 
training and recruitment strategies, but a full-blown cultural transformation: it requires 
changing the very definition of ―public employee‖.  A few of the characteristics that 
these new networking-proficient public employees should have as part of their make-
up includes: 
 Good network management skills:  Very organized, strong oral communication 
skills, think creatively, highly adept at resolving problems, know how to create 
win-win situations; 
 Private sector experience: Government needs more, not fewer, people who 
have worked for the private sector. It is harder for people who have never 
been in the private sector to understand fully the needs and motivations of 
their network partners.  Government needs more employment opportunities, 
and more career paths, that allow managers to move more easily between the 
public, private, and nonprofit sectors and to take on projects for well-defined 
projects; 
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 The ability of public managers to act as connectors between stakeholders in 
partnerships; 
 Experience of team-based project oriented environments; 
 Good listeners; 
 Leading by example; 
 Understanding the big picture; 
 Working with indirect and negotiated control; 
 Bridge-building and boundary-spanning; and 
 Deal with continuous change (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004:165–175). 
 
While governing by network demands more skilled people at the higher levels of 
government, the gap between the opportunities outside government and inside 
government for these kinds of individuals have been argued to grow daily (Goldsmith 
& Eggers, 2004:178).  Recognising the skills shortage, PartnershipsUK was created 
by the British central government to improve government‘s capacity to conduct 
public-private partnerships, while the Dutch government created a PPP centre within 
its Ministry of Finance with a similar purpose (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004:173–174). 
 
The flexibility / transparency / accountability nexus.   
 
Flexibility is seen as both a requirement for and a characteristic of network 
governance.  A network that blindly enforces original contract stipulations despite 
shifting circumstances can restrict the potential of a network (Goldsmith & Eggers, 
2004:148), but suggestions to ignore or skirt contract requirements will (hopefully) 
cause some discomfort and nervousness among most public officials.  Where 
changes in contract details are required in order to adapt to changing circumstances 
a dynamic but fair process occurs more frequently when the original contract pays 
sufficient attention to the underlying values and provides clarity about broad goals 
(Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004:149).  The adaptation to environmental factors relates to 
adaptive management.  Adaptive management furnishes a useful tactic for managing 
the tension between flexibility and accountability.  First adopted in the environmental 
sector, adaptive management provides partners with flexibility in the goals and the 
methods they select to achieve them.  In this model, progress is measured by 
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continuous feedback and evaluation during the programme, instead of by a checklist 
of performance targets at the programme‘s conclusion.  The US state of Hawaii‘s 
Executive Office on Ageing used adaptive management as its accountability tool 
when it formed a network of public, private, and non-profit providers to improve end-
of-life care for Hawaii‘s terminally ill and low-income elderly.  The initiative, Kokua 
Mau, enabled elder care and end-of-life providers to share resources for the benefit 
of clients and their families.  The Office of Ageing‘s management model gave network 
members ―permission to change the objectives when the wrong questions have been 
asked.‖  By routinely re-evaluating performance measures, partners could ask 
programme managers to adjust outcomes to meet more realistic goals and permit 
individual providers to use money where it is most needed rather than funding efforts 
in ineffective programming areas (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004:150). 
 
The Office of Ageing maintains focus on a consistent vision and mission but 
manages vendors as true partners, constantly massaging the metrics.  Information 
gleaned from regular measurement and evaluation of performance indicators and 
action can either result in programme management changes or reinforce existing 
positive outcomes.  For example, programme managers noticed that after several 
months of speeches by members of the hospice speakers‘ bureau, Kokua Mau had 
raised awareness of hospice programmes and increased the referral rate of clients by 
40 percent.  Thanks to Kokua Mau‘s adaptive management model, providers used 
their discretion to channel more resources into the speakers‘ bureau because it 
produced better outcomes than some originally funded activities intended to increase 
client referrals (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004:151).  Adaptive management might be 
seen as a practice with a high risk of falling prey to corrupt practices.  It could be 
argued that too much flexibility could erode accountability and that it would be in the 
interest of all parties to carefully balance flexibility and accountability.  If such a 
balance cannot be found and accountability is overemphasized, the network will lose 
one of its most useful hallmarks: its flexibility. 
 
Network managers should bear in mind that networks may include government 
partners – often from different agencies – and since networks often depend on 
market mechanisms to manage resource flows, network rules should apply equally to 
both internal and external partners.  Specifically, internal government service costing 
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should be transparent, and quality and performance standards should apply.  Further, 
participation in the network should be construed in terms of partnership, not 
bureaucracy.  
 
We do a fine job of monitoring contractors. We make sure that they have the 
number of employees thay say they have, that their pencils are sharpened, 
and that their forms are filled out correctly, what we don‘t do a good job of is 
evaluating the contractors‘ performance. (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004:147) 
 
Commentators believe that this problem of contractor or partner performance 
evaluation is not wholly insurmountable. Customer satisfaction data could, for 
example, be used to monitor performance (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004:147).  Any 
successful partnership requires an investment in time and resources, and the return 
on that investment should be a factor in the decision to enter into a partnership.  In 
investment terms the expected return required to make the investment is sometimes 
too low in the public sector.  By the same token, exit strategies are not exercised 
enough.  Too often government accepts mediocre performance in the belief that 
replacing a partner creates too much disruption.  The exploration of the network 
governance focus area has provided various insights into critical success factors 
which will be listed below. 
 
It is now opportune to further expand upon the discussion of the character 
dimensions of partnerships started in Chapter 2.  From the discussion of network 
governance presented in this section, one could identify an additional two character 
dimensions of partnership, being the level of public-private collaboration and the level 
of network management capabilities.  These two dimensions are illustrated as a 
continuum with two axes in the figure below, and four categories of government are 
identified by Goldsmith and Eggers (2004).  
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Figure 4.2: Models of government (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004: 20) 
 
The collaboration dimension can be equated with the cooperation dimension already 
identified in Chapter 2, but network management capabilities, is a new dimension.  
The four government typologies identified above exhibit varying degrees of network 
management and collaboration.  Hierarchical governance can be likened with the 
traditional public management approach that keeps the private sector at arms length 
and is more comfortable in a departmental silo than in a network where boundaries 
have been broken down.  Joined-up government could, in the South African context, 
be seen as cooperative governance where extensive networking happens inside the 
public sector while excluding the private sector, but could also be equated with the 
well-known manifestation of ―old boys‘ clubs‖ where public servants collude and 
manipulate for their common benefit.  Outsourced government would be 
characterized by extensive use of the private provision of public services to the extent 
that government could be seen as abdicating its role of protector of the public good.  
Finally, networked governance can be seen as a governance model where 
networking crosses the border between public and private sectors and partnership is 
the default mode of service delivery. 
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In the figure below the additional character dimension is added to those already 
identified in earlier chapters. A fictional ―Partnership X‖ is used as an example to 
illustrate how a partnership could be characterized by assigning values to its 
character pertaining to each character dimension. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: PPP Character dimensions (Updated)  
 
In this subsection the network governance focus area was explored to identify critical 
success factors for PPPs.  The success factors identified in this section include: 
 Public sector human capital in the fields of contract and network management; 
 Capacity should be balanced in a partnership; 
 People with a collaborative mindset; 
 Strategic human capital plan to acquire the correct skills; 
 Acquire new governance skills set; 
 Establish support mechanisms / partnership enablers; 
 The public sector needs private sector experience; 
 Focus on the required public outcome; 
 Manage flexibly around key values and performance objectives; 
 Use all available resources, not only monetary, to bring partnerships together; 
 Aim to make meaningful enhancements to the status quo; 
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 Develop core competencies (including conceptualising the network, integrating 
it, and developing effective knowledge-sharing practices across the network); 
 Invest in skills and competencies; 
 Structure partnerships for success. 
 
The success factors mentioned above are reflective of a public sector perspective on 
network governance, in other words it says what the public manager should be 
focusing on and is therefore particularly useful for the aim of this dissertation.  This 
dissertation is focused on the public sector and the public manager that needs to 
decide when to use partnerships as a tool for service delivery.  There is also an 
intention to make some suggestions on what factors would most contribute to the 
possible success of a partnership. It is therefore opportune to search for critical 
success factors identified in public governance literature; as will be done in the next 
section. 
4.3 SUCCESS FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 
LITERATURE 
As the constant role-player in PPPs, the public sector as representative of the 
―public‖ should have some clear ideas about what would make a PPP successful and 
which factors would overcome the potential organizational, legal/technical and 
political barriers to partnership. One would thus surmise that the broad body of 
knowledge encompassing current understanding of what has over time been known 
as bureaucracy, public administration, public management, new public management 
and more recently, public governance, should have a considerable body of valuable 
perspectives on success factors for public-private partnerships.  In this section 
various strands of argumentation from recent thinking in public management will be 
discussed, starting with the public management reform debate. 
4.3.1 Succes factors and the Public Management Reform Debate 
The components of the public management reform paradigm include: a commitment 
to providing high quality services that citizens value; giving public sector managers 
increased autonomy to acquire and manage resources; rewarding them for meeting 
demanding operating targets; providing the resources, human and technological, that 
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they need to meet those targets; and, ―a receptiveness to competition and an open 
minded attitude about which activities should be performed by the public sector as 
opposed to the private sector‖ (Borins, 1997, cited in Jones & Thompson, 2007:11). 
4.3.2 Reform 
Organizational transformation through reform typically begins with what is referred to 
as restructuring.  Restructuring is seen as the first step in the process of public 
management reform.  To restructure an organization initially entails defining all of the 
skill areas and work processes where an organization has special or unique skills 
and knowledge, that is, its core competence relative to the capability of other 
organizations.  Secondly, restructuring requires an assessment of those core 
competence areas that fit within its overall mission and objectives.  Thirdly, under 
restructuring the organization contracts out noncore competence work that needs to 
be done to fulfil its mission to other organizations, including those in the private 
sector that have comparative advantage in the specific competence and can make 
the competence its core competence.  The comparative advantage of contractors 
may lie in the superior quality of their products or services, or may be the result of an 
ability to produce products or services at lower costs with no loss of quality (Jones & 
Thompson, 2007:97).  Finally, restructuring meets its goal only where the 
organization then eliminates everything else that does not contribute value to the 
services and products delivered to the citizens and stakeholders served by the 
organization. 
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Figure 4.4: An understanding of public sector restructuring, based on Jones and Thompson 
(2007) 
 
At the beginning, restructuring requires a careful assessment (typically a 
reassessment) of the mission and objectives of the organization, an evaluation of the 
organization‘s strategy relative to its target markets for products or services, the 
definition of criteria for determining core competencies, and value engineering to 
define what work materially contributes to mission and goal achievement, and the 
extent of this contribution.  Restructuring demands a comparison between the costs 
and performance of work performed by the organization and that of potential 
alternative service suppliers.  This step is essential to decide whether to contract out, 
or whether a service or product should be supplied by the organization at all.  And, 
because restructuring requires cost and performance comparison, activity based-cost 
analysis, or what is termed responsibility accounting in the public sector must be 
employed to permit such comparisons to be made.  Responsibility accounting, 
budgeting, and management control are techniques or methods that enable the 
organization to define its core competence and costs of product and service 
Contract 
out 
Core competencies, within mission 
Non-core competencies, within mission 
Non-core competencies, outside mission 
Government  
Department “A” 
Eliminate 
 
Restructured Government  
Department “A” 
Core competency,  
Organization “B” 
Core competency, 
Organization “C” 
Restructure 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 263 
production.  Restructuring may result in significant ―delayering‖ or flattening of 
organizational structure and considerable delegation of authority, responsibility and 
decision making on day to day operations to levels of the organization closer to its 
constituency.  (Jones & Thompson, 2007:98) 
 
It could be argued that such delayering may remove any vertical integration benefits 
that might have been reducing transaction costs before restructuring.  Vertical 
integration refers to a firm‘s ownership of vertically related activities.  The greater the 
firm‘s ownership and control over successive stages of the value chain for its product, 
the greater its degree of vertical integration (Grant, 2005:392).  Where a vertical 
relationship between companies requires one or both companies to make 
investments that are specific to the needs of the other party, a market contract will 
tend to be inefficient in coordinating the activities of the two parties.  These 
inefficiencies arise from the negotiation and enforcement of contracts, including 
bargaining, monitoring, investing in activities whose only purpose is to improve 
bargaining power, and dispute resolution.  These are key sources of transaction 
costs.  The basic case for vertical integration is that by bringing both sides of the 
transaction into a single administrative structure, transaction costs may be avoided 
(Grant, 2005:395).  
 
Jones and Thompson (2007:94) conclude that there can be no single theory or set of 
managerial prescriptions to guide the strengthening of performance in the public 
sector, whether positive or normative, that is sufficient  for all times or circumstances.  
Any institutional arrangement has the potential to improve upon another.  
Conclusions about the utility of new organizational and institutional governance 
arrangements depend essentially upon a comparison of information costs under each 
of the alternatives.  The information revolution has dramatically transformed 
information costs and, thereby, the relative efficacy of various institutional 
arrangements to deal with crises, threats and changes in markets.  Many of the 
consequences of these changes can be lumped together under the rubric of 
performance and results based management.  Inevitably, these changes will 
refashion the institutions of government and public management and, perhaps, even 
the nature of the state itself.  Jones and Thompson (2007:93) argue that the public 
management reform debate has framed new questions. ―What role should the nation-
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state play as but one player in a new architecture of governance where networks of 
organizations comprise more effective problem solving entities than single 
governments?  New organizational forms such as hyperarchies, flatter and more 
decentralised entities with greater delegated authority and responsibility and faster 
learning-adaptation-action cycles appear likely to be more effective than traditional 
bureaucratic organizations to manage networked programmes (Jones & Thompson, 
2007:93).  This can be seen as an argument for PPPs to meet new challenges. 
 
Recent debate has seen a considerable theoretical shifting in the understanding of 
the nature and extent of the public sector and of ―publicness‖ with opposing 
arguments suggesting either a contraction or an expansion of the responsibility of the 
public sector (Newman & Clarke, 2009).    The global economic collapse experienced 
in 2008 and 2009 has prompted some commentators to see it as a confirmation of 
the failure of the market and a confirmation of the need for more state intervention in 
the market. This flies in the face of the New Public Management movement which 
has very actively advocated smaller government with less involvement in the 
economy and more private sector involvement in the delivery of public sector 
services.  It does seem as if it will not be possible to move away from the need for the 
state, for bureaucracy, for the public sector, and for practicing good governance at 
that.  During periods of instability, the costs of administration within large, complex 
firms tend to rise as the need for flexibility and speed of response overwhelms 
traditional management systems (Grant, 2005:391). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 265 
 
 
Where do different partnership types fit on this matrix?  PPPs can possibly be seen 
as leaning towards the Network quadrant, while contracting out is more managerial 
and social partnerships lean more towards the self-governance quadrant. 
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Figure 4.5: A control and legitimacy matrix indicating governance types 
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The relevance of the matrix to the topic of this dissertation is that it can provide clues 
as to the skills set required to ensure the best possible chance of success for a 
partnership.  One could for example locate needs for contract management in the 
managerial governance quadrant and community participation facilitation skills in the 
self-governance quadrant.  In the following figure, the quadrants are linked to the 
question of who determines public value. 
 
 
 
 
With the benefit of the preceding discussions, the following success factors can be 
identified from this section: 
 Government must be sure of what it wants; 
 A comparison of the costs and performance of work performed by the 
organization and that of potential alternative service suppliers; 
 Cost of product and service production must be determined; 
 A comparison of information costs under each of the alternatives; 
 Good management characteristics - leadership and interpersonal 
relationships; 
Weak 
Central 
Control 
Strong 
Central 
Control 
Process 
Legitimacy 
Output 
Legitimacy 
 
Self-governance 
 
Responsibility for adjudicating 
questions of value devolved to 
the public in new deliberative 
spaces 
 
Network Governance 
 
Multiple ‗stakeholder‘ approach 
to public value 
 
Hierarchical governance 
 
Questions of public value 
determined by political  authority 
/ representative democracy 
 
Managerial governance 
 
Public value a matter of 
calculus: e.g. cost benefit 
analysis, programme 
evaluations 
Figure 4.7: A control and legitimacy matrix considering the origins of public value 
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 Clear direction; 
 Clear division of responsibility of functions; 
 It must be a real partnership, with shared burdens and shared rewards for both 
the public and private participants; 
 There must be real incentives for the private sector or they will not participate, 
or there must be a reasonable expectation that there will be private sector 
interest because of a potential market; 
 The public-sector must use its resources effectively and judiciously, focusing 
on projects where there can be success; 
 Keep it simple for the private-sector by minimizing the bureaucratic procedures 
that can cripple a project; 
 Remember that "Land is King"--it provides the public with the opportunity to 
control the projects; 
 Public-private partnerships are a necessary and important part of the process; 
 Choose the one that meets all the criteria; 
 And is politically acceptable; 
 And is do-able viz-a-viz Labour. (Aiello, 2001; Cuorato, 2002; McQuaid, 
2000:22–25) 
 
In the next section success factors emerging from collaboration literature will be 
discussed. 
4.4 SUCCESS FACTORS FROM PRIVATE SECTOR COLLABORATION 
LITERATURE 
There is a significant body of literature devoted to collaboration in the private, 
commercial sphere and this area was identified as a potential source of information 
on critical success factors for PPPs.  Private-private collaboration must hold some 
lessons for public-private collaboration in the form of partnership and can be related 
to the Network Governance concept described elsewhere in this chapter. 
 
Collaboration is closely linked to vertical integration between entities up- or 
downstream of each other in value / supply chains.  Grant advocates that decisions 
about vertical scope are no longer binary choices of ―make or buy.‖ There is a 
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spectrum of vertical relationships that lie between the polar cases of pure market 
contracts and full vertical integration.  Even within particular organizational modes, 
there are many different ways in which vertical relationships are managed. In recent 
years, the trend has been a growing diversity of intermediate vertical relationships 
that have attempted to reconcile the flexibility and incentives of market transactions 
with the close collaboration that is typical of vertical integration (Grant, 2005:387). 
 
The idea of vertical integration is an anathema to an increasing number 
of companies.  Most of yesterday‘s highly integrated giants are working 
overtime at splitting into more manageable, more energetic units – i.e. 
de-integrating.  Then they are turning around and re-integrating – not by 
acquisitions but via alliances with all sorts of partners of all shapes and 
sizes (Peters, 2005, cited in Grant, 2005:387). 
 
Although collaborative vertical relationships are viewed as a recent phenomenon – 
associated with Silicon Valley and Japanese supplier networks – closely-linked value 
chains in which small, specialist enterprises collaborate are a long-time feature of 
craft industries in Europe, India and elsewhere.  These collaborative vertical 
relationships are evident in the industrial districts of northern Italy – notably in textiles, 
packaging equipment, and motorcycles.  The success of Japanese manufacturing 
companies with their close collaborative relationships with suppliers – including 
extensive knowledge sharing – has exerted a powerful influence on American and 
European companies over the past two decades.  There has been a massive shift 
from arms-length supplier relationships to close vertical relationships with fewer 
suppliers.  Long-term collaboration and single-supplier agreements have increasingly 
replaced competitive tendering and multiple sourcing.  Most large manufacturers 
have drastically reduced their number of vendors and have introduced supplier 
certification programmes as frameworks for quality management and technical 
collaboration (Grant, 2005:404). 
 
The shifting boundaries between firms and markets is a central feature of economic 
organization.  In the capitalist economy, production is organized in two ways: in 
markets – by the price mechanism – and in firms – by managerial direction.  The 
relative roles of firms and markets are determined by efficiency: if the administrative 
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costs of firms are less than the transaction costs of markets (as occurred in the 
English textile industry after the introduction of the factory system), transactions will 
tend to be organized within firms rather than across markets (Grant, 2005:189). 
 
 
 
 
The figure above presents a continuum with two axes, formalization and commitment, 
and indicate the categories of relationships that can occur between entities.  This 
figure has been adapted from Grant (2005:401), with the formalization axis turned 
around to increase upwards instead of downwards as originally presented by Grant.  
The relationship types identified were shifted to reflect this new arrangement.  The 
adaptation was made to reflect the direction of growth in dimensions used in other 
similar figures in this dissertation.  The typology of relationships presented here 
introduces one new dimension of partnership character.  Formalization has already 
been identified as a partnership character dimension in Chapter 2.  Commitment 
presents a new dimension which is sufficiently different from other dimensions 
already identified to be considered on its own.  The partnership character dimensions 
already identified are indicated in the figure below, and two relationship types that 
were indicated in the figure above have been inserted and scored in each dimension 
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of partnership character in order to show how different partnership types can be 
scored and compared. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: PPP Character Dimensions (Updated)  
 
The two chosen partnership types have similar scores in the cooperation dimension, 
but differ somewhat in the remaining three dimensions.  It should be noted that these 
assigned scores are just for illustration purposes and not intended to be accurate 
reflections of the nature of each partnership type at this stage.  It should also be 
borne in mind that two similar types of partnership (for example two JV‘s) could score 
differently on each of the axes, depending on the unique character of each specific 
partnership. 
4.4.1 Value, rewards and risk 
Welborn and Kasten make an important contribution to the vocabulary on 
partnerships when they use the terms of Value and Reward in relation to 
collaboration.  They state that Value is what a partner brings to the partnership, while 
Reward is what the partner gets from the partnership.  All partners in a collaboration, 
in theory at least, will bring value to the collaboration and will expect reward from the 
partnership.  The three key elements of effective collaboration identified by Welborn 
and Kasten, (2003:53) are to: 
0
2
4
6
8
10
Formalization
Cooperation
Network
governance skills
Commitment
PPP CHARACTER DIMENSIONS 
Max
Joint Venture
Franchise
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 271 
 Create the value; 
 Share the rewards; 
 Manage the risks. 
 
Value and rewards have been discussed above, which leaves risk.  Risk and the 
allocation of risk is also emphasised in many definitions of PPPs.  Collaborations are 
considered as inherently risky and potentially costly, but the risk exposure is 
acceptable to the parties in the collaboration because collaborations are pragmatic 
responses to continually drive vitally important innovation in uncertain market 
environments (Welborn & Kasten, 2003:51, 53), which contributes to the longer term 
survival of each of the parties in the collaboration.  Efficient collaboration is the ability 
to manage distributed risk (Welborn & Kasten, 2003:55) which could include 
intellectual property leakage. 
4.4.2 Process steps 
The process steps in collaboration include: finding partners; creating a collaborative 
relationship; collaborating to create value; and closing out the collaboration (Welborn 
& Kasten, 2003:77). 
4.4.3 Building collaboration 
There are as many reasons for organizations to collaborate as there are business 
conditions that drive organizations to choose to collaborate or not (Welborn & Kasten, 
2003:80).  It would be beneficial for an organization planning to participate in 
collaborations to create a ―value port‖ where the organization can expose parts of its 
business and where collaboration can take place. This would likely translate into 
some sort of organizational nodal point for partnering.  Shared knowledge and 
understanding becomes more scalable and cheaper when knowledge is codified, so 
the degree of codification is an important measure of the readiness of an organization 
to collaborate often, rapidly, effectively, and efficiently (Welborn & Kasten, 2003:56).  
This codification concept is illustrated in the table below. 
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Table 4-3: The codification concept - Welborn and Kasten's Semantic Stack (2003:78–101) 
 Tacit Framework Standards Executable 
Environment (The competitive context of 
tacit actions) 
    
Behaviours / Values 
(Making visible invisible actions) 
    
Roles / Metrics 
(Judging performance quality) 
    
Business Processes (where activities of 
people are combined to create particular 
business outcomes) 
    
Applications     
Architecture / Platforms     
Connectivity     
 
In the table, codification increases from left to right and the state of codification is 
named in the top row.  The more codified the information and processes in the 
collaborating organizations, the more scalable and executable by many the 
processes become.  The vertical axis represents domains of interaction.  Welborn 
and Kasten give seven domain names but agrees that this is not the last word on the 
names or the number of domains (2003:80). The domains describe sets of activities 
performed by participants in a collaboration (Welborn & Kasten, 2003:81).  The blue 
blocks denote the progress of a specific collaboration towards the desired fully 
codified and collaborative state where mutual reward is generated.  One could 
consider several different candidate collaborating organizations and map them 
individually on this matrix for comparison purposes and thus discern between 
organizations that are, to varying degrees, prepared for effective and efficient 
collaboration.  The table is applicable to technology companies, but the message for 
PPPs is clear: cooperation is more efficient if the organizations participating in a 
partnership have recorded and standardized or codified all the domains of interaction 
between them to an advanced stage. 
 
One public sector disadvantage is the possibility of the diversion of labour from the 
collaboration to other projects / priorities which become more important to a specific 
decision-maker, which reveals a ―lack of attention span‖ on the side of government.  
This risk will need to be mitigated, and how well it is mitigated will have an effect on 
the successes of a partnership. Continued cooperation can be encouraged by 
making deflections from cooperation more expensive (McQuaid, 2000:28–29).  An 
additional critical success factor emerging from this discussion is the need for 
accurate time assessment to reduce the possibility of a loss of appetite for the 
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partnership on either side.  One can also build cooperation by ―increasing the shadow 
of the future‖: increasing the importance of the future relative to the present may aid 
cooperation (McQuaid, 2000:28–29).  Frequent individual interaction aids stable 
cooperation.  This can be encouraged by binding people in long-term multi-level 
relationships through organization and hierarchies, thus increasing the number and 
importance of likely future interactions.  Constantly changing personnel / 
responsibilities may discourage cooperation (McQuaid, 2000:28–29).  A gradual 
building of trust can be achieved through reciprocal cooperation, learning from 
strategic alliances in commerce and industry, and noting that cooperation is not 
incompatible with competition (sports leagues can be taken as an example) 
(McQuaid, 2000:28–29). 
 
There is also need for favourable local characteristics, including not only a will to 
cooperate, but also the capacity to make a meaningful contribution: Capacity building 
is required to enable local communities to participate in economic-development 
initiatives (McQuaid, 2000:28–29).  A mutualist strategy of marshalling external and 
internal stakeholders with organizational relationships which transcends traditional 
lines of authority, creating complex structures which contrasts with a hierarchical 
management structure and is effective for a public agency in responding to turbulent 
environments in which needs are rapidly changing and where collaboration is 
required to respond (McQuaid, 2000:28–29).  Partnerships and joint ventures are 
more likely to succeed if they are seen as precursors to more intimate cooperation, 
rather than as finite activities.  Holding back and own-interest behaviour is more likely 
if the relationship is likely to come to an end (McQuaid, 2000:28–29).  Meaningful 
collaborations require that each participating body exposes and shares parts of its 
key competencies and core value with the other participants – possibly competitors.  
Welborn and Kasten (2003:37) call this the intimacy of the collaborative relationship.  
A high degree of intimacy, equivalent to putting something of high value to the 
collaborating company at risk, requires a high degree of comfort. 
 
If government seeks to transfer risk from itself to its private partner in the 
establishment of PPPs, the risk of intimacy that government must carry in order to 
collaborate optimally, as described in the previous paragraph, may not be acceptable 
to government.  It is also necessary to consider transactions costs and the build-or-
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buy decision in the collaboration paradigm and relate this to innovation.  Innovation is 
a particular case of a transaction that can occur either inside a firm or with other firms 
in a market environment.  It is to be expected that it would be less expensive for a 
firm to create a new product by using its own internal resources than by buying such 
new products and the right to market them from another firm in an open market 
where it has to compete against other willing buyers.  The cost difference between 
market transaction and internal transaction is the reason why firms exist. Ronald 
Coase, 1991 Nobel Laureate, articulated the dynamics of transaction cost in 1934 
(Welborn & Kasten, 2003:47–46).  If transaction costs prompt collaboration and the 
establishment of firms in order for these firms to minimize their exposure to 
transaction costs, then transaction cost can also promote the establishment of PPPs.  
This subsection has focused on the building of collaboration.  The building of 
collaboration is directly applicable to ensuring the success of PPPs and illustrates 
how the potential partners, public and private, should be approaching partnership. 
4.4.4 The collaboration continuum 
Collaborations can range from stable to dynamic, and from less intimate to more 
intimate. A collaborative landscape can be constructed by combining these two 
continuums into a two-axis diagram as indicated below. 
 
Figure 4.10: The collaborative landscape 
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This collaboration continuum introduces two new dimensions to partnership 
character, being Dynamism and Intimacy.  In the figure below these two new 
dimensions are added to those already identified. 
 
 
Figure 4.11: PPP Character Dimensions (Updated) 
4.4.5 Success factors identified 
Critical success factors for collaboration between commercial entities from Welborn 
and Kasten (2003:53, 56, 79, 99, 229) as well as points on leveraging cooperation 
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 Shared experiences in field; 
 Similar cultures; 
 Cultures that embrace collaboration; 
 Similar measurements of success; 
 Business processes that work together (for example monthly payment versus 
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 Need to have ―shared semantics‖; 
 A separate collaborating body outside of the collaborating entity where a full 
member of a company collaborates with members of other companies to 
innovate; 
 A well-developed shared vocabulary; 
 Reduced transaction cost - the time and cost of establishing collaborative 
relationships. 
 
In the next section success factors from entrepreneurial studies will be highlighted. 
4.5 SUCCESS FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN ENTREPRENEURIAL STUDIES 
This section seeks to identify critical success factors for partnerships from 
entrepreneurial studies.  The reason why entrepreneurial studies specifically are 
investigated is the fact that the formation of a partnership can be seen as an 
entrepreneurial activity.  Institutional entrepreneurship relates to the tactical decisions 
that are needed to bridge the gap between strategy and budget levels. 
 
 
 
In the figure above, the tactical decision-making area indicates the space in which 
entrepreneurship is required.  If one feels that the success rate of PPPs is low, one 
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should investigate the success rate of other new ventures – which is also low.  In the 
next subsection, lessons from the new business venture body of knowledge will be 
used to derive critical success factors for partnerships.  A case can be made out that 
partnerships are like new business ventures / new firm startups.  The field of 
entrepreneurship studies, which focuses on new venture startups, should therefore 
yield important success factors that can be applied to partnerships.  In organising the 
analysis of new firm startups, Per Davidsson (2006:xii) distinguished five components 
of the new venture startup phenomenon as well as the relationships between these 
components.  The components are: Environment, Venture, Individual(s), Process and 
Outcomes – as illustrated in Figure 4.12 below: 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Components and possible relationships of the new venture startup phenomenon 
(Davidsson, 2006:xii) 
 
If one follows Davidsson‘s line of argument, one could conclude that a positive 
outcome for a new start-up (such as a partnership) should depend on: 
 Environment; 
 Venture; 
 Individual(s); 
 Process; and finally  
 Relationships between these components. 
 
The environment refers to the context in which the new start-up firm, which could be 
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disestablished.  It is the environment that will exercise a moderating influence on the 
new venture because its environment will determine what is possible and how it can 
be achieved.  An enabling environment will support a new partnership while an 
indifferent environment will limit the partnership.  The new venture could of course 
seek to influence its environment to its own benefit – but only to the degree that it is 
allowed to influence the environment.  The venture itself is in interaction with its 
environment, with individuals in the venture and in the environment and with the start-
up process.  All of these will contribute to specific outcomes. How the venture is 
conceived and governed will have a significant impact on its chances of success.  
The lesson for partnering is that care must be taken in putting the new organization 
together.  Individuals and their characteristics could also influence partnership 
outcomes. Earlier discussions in this chapter have indicated that the interpersonal 
skills and other personality traits of the individuals or entrepreneurs involved in a 
partnership may have a significant influence on the success or otherwise of a 
partnership, and that this influence is largely unpredictable.  It was further indicated 
that leadership, a concept linked to personality and entrepreneurship, plays a pivotal 
role in partnership success.  Researchers in the field of entrepreneurship have tried 
to isolate personality types and other personal characteristics that could point to the 
potential of individuals to be successful entrepreneurs.  One attempt has looked at 
psychological, socio-demographic and behavioural categories of business founders 
and arrived at a characterization that indicates level of experience, namely: 1) novice, 
2) serial, and 3) portfolio managers (Ucbasaran, Westhead & Wright, 2001).  This is 
rather disappointing in terms of trying to identify personality types that are good at 
creating new ventures, because levels of experience and past successes are not 
personality-specific.  Put simply, if you have been good at creating new business 
ventures in the past, you should be good at creating business ventures in the future.  
This is not very helpful in isolating personality types more adept at creating 
successful new business ventures.   
 
There is however continued interest in trying to look at personality as a predictor of 
successful entrepreneurship. 
 
The best evidence today suggests personality does explain some, albeit 
limited, percentage of the variance in inclination towards and success at 
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entrepreneurial endeavours such as founding a new firm (Davidsson, 
2006:xvi). 
 
The personality approach can also be criticized.  Davidsson (2006:xvii) is of the 
opinion that the personality approach over-ascribes outcomes to characteristics of 
individuals involved, creating the impression that entrepreneurs are ―very special‖.  
He believes that personality does not consistently determine or force behaviour into a 
specific direction. Davidsson argues that direct, strong and universal effects should 
not be expected from this type of variable and hence explanations based on them 
can never be particularly impressive.  
 
What the research actually suggests is that business founders are almost as 
heterogenous a group as any other group of individuals as far as personality 
and other personal characteristics are concerned. 
 
The findings, according to Davidsson, do not present a satisfactory mechanism for 
predictions concerning individual aptitude for entrepreneurial endeavours and it is 
impossible to tell with certainty whether a group difference in personality is a cause or 
an effect (or spurious).  The usual comparisons of business founders with other 
groups confound at least three possibilities: differential propensities to engage in, 
persist in and succeed at entrepreneurial endeavours.  Forbes (1999, cited in 
Davidsson, 2006:xviii) has suggested that at the individual level one should rather 
look at cognitive psychology than personality types, cognitive psychology being the 
psychology of thinking, information processing and decision-making. This opens up 
for studying the influence of situational variables and reduces the need to study only 
―Proven entrepreneurs‖ (Forbes, 1999, cited in Davidsson, 2006:xviii).  Even so, 
Ucbasaran and others argue, due to heterogeneity of individuals and ventures along 
several dimensions, a straight comparison of their relative performance may not be 
the most relevant (Davidsson, 2006:xiii). 
 
If predicting entrepreneurial success on the basis of personality is so difficult, it could 
be argued that trying to find partnership success factors in personality types cannot 
be successful and one should rather constantly ignore individual characteristics and 
look at other variables which are easier to quantify and work with.  One could, for 
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example, decide to make the assumption that the best possible person is in the 
applicable position and then just focus on what else must be put in place to give the 
best opportunity for success.  Put bluntly, one could decide to switch off the 
personality variable in the success equation and rather look at other factors.  To 
ignore individual personal characteristics may however not be the best answer, 
especially since prior knowledge plays such a considerable role and has significant 
implications for the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities by individuals.  
Another important factor related to individuals is that team and network diversity 
shows promise in inspiring innovation (Ruef, 2002; Stanworth J, Stanworth C, 
Ganger & Blyth, 1989).  Individuals will remain important moderators of new venture 
startups and their capacity for entrepreneurship and leadership will have bearing on 
the success of partnerships.   
 
The process of new venture startup concerns discovery (opportunity recognition, 
information search) and exploitation (resource acquisition) (Ucbasaran et al., 2001).  
From a partnership perspective it is thus meaningful to take a closer look at how 
opportunities for partnership are recognized and how information is gathered on 
those opportunities.  Both the public and private sector should be sensitive to the 
environment in order to identify opportunities.  As indicated above, the recognition of 
opportunities may be the result of previous experience and knowledge as well as 
individual personal characteristics and the implementation of decision-making 
processes.  As discussed under Network Governance, the manager of a portfolio of 
partnerships and of relationships with third parties may be best placed to identify 
networking and partnering opportunities.  Individual skills will also influence this 
aspect.  The process of opportunity recognition could also be strengthened through 
the implementation of formal reviews of service delivery to identify alternative service 
delivery options.  The exploitation of opportunities is the second major element of the 
startup process, and has much to do with the establishment of structures, the pulling 
together of resources including human capital, and paying close attention to 
environmental factors which should include stakeholders and the possible client 
base. 
 
The venture, as described in the new venture start-up literature, refers to the 
institutional arrangements that are put in place, including resources, internal 
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processes such as decision-making and production / delivery as well as physical 
infrastructure, goals and objectives.  A wide variety of organizational forms can result 
because, as Ucbasaran et al. (2001) state, new ventures are ―definitely not only 
independent start-ups‖.  In the context of this dissertation, the venture would be a 
PPP.  Outcomes represent the last component of the new venture start-up.  It is also 
referred to as value creation by Van der Veen and Wakkee (2004).  The value 
creation concept links with the idea of the production of public value by partnerships, 
but calling outcomes value creation could be premature judgement on the success of 
the new venture or partnership.  Although there should certainly be an aspiration to 
create value, such an outcome is not guaranteed and cannot be assumed.  Another 
noteworthy point is the question whether the future disestablishment of a new venture 
(or in keeping with the focus of this dissertation, partnership) signals failure or a 
negative outcome.  According to Ucbasaran et al (2001, cited in Davidsson, 
2006:xiii), ―interpreting ‗discontinuance‘ as ‗failure‘ may be a very dubious practice.‖  
The overriding success measure should be determined by the nature of the outcome 
that is being pursued – it is quite possible that the continued existence and long-term 
―survival‖ of a new venture or partnership is not part of its objectives.  This has the 
implication that the continued survival of a partnership does not automatically denote 
success, and that the ability to ensure survival is not a critical success factor for 
partnerships or any other new start-up. 
 
An interesting perspective on new firm start-ups is that of Low and Abrahamson 
(1997) who propose that successful foundings are the result of a fit between five 
dimensions.  These five dimensions are the evolution context of an industry, the 
personal networks of entrepreneurs, the behaviours of entrepreneurs, the motivations 
of stakeholders, and the structures and strategies that the emerging organizations 
pursue (Low & Abrahamson, 1997:141).  The figure below illustrates this perspective.  
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Figure 4.13: Variables that determine new venture founding success (Low & Abrahamson, 
1997:141) 
 
Low and Abrahamson (1997) define an industry as a population of organizations of 
the same form.  When they study industry evolution, they study the diffusion of a 
specific organizational form.  For their purposes, organizations are of the same form 
if they use similar inputs and technologies, produce similar products, and serve 
similar customers (Low & Abrahamson, 1997:143).  An industry evolution context can 
be characterized as Movements (emerging), Bandwagons (growth) or Clones 
(mature).  The table below shows how the five dimensions interact with the different 
industry evolution contexts.  
 
 
 
 
Founding 
success 
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Industry 
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Behaviours of 
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stakehoders 
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Table 4-4: Configuration of generic organising processes (Low & Abrahamson, 1997:155) 
 Movements Bandwagons Clones 
Context Emerging industry: key 
challenge is to 
overcome lack of 
legitimacy 
Growth industry: key 
challenge is to prosper 
amidst rapid growth 
and change 
Mature industry: key 
challenge is to survive 
the competition 
Entrepreneur 
Network 
Strong ties to two or 
more non-overlapping 
networks 
Weak ties Strong ties 
Behaviours Informal confidence 
building 
Formal confidence 
building 
Combination of formal 
and informal confidence 
building 
Stakeholders Motivated by social 
factors 
Motivated by 
instrumental factors 
Motivated by 
combination of 
instrumental and social 
factors 
Strategy / Structure Market based / 
outsourcing 
Entrepreneurial / 
innovative 
Combination of market 
and hierarchy 
Less entrepreneurial / 
some imitation 
Hierarchy based 
Conservative / imitative 
 
This dissertation is concerned with partnership success and as far as PPPs and other 
specific types can be seen as industries, the success-related message from Low and 
Abrahamson‘s perspective is that the partnership management should realize in 
which industry evolution it finds itself and should then act appropriately to ensure a 
good fit with the 5 dimensions of organising processes.  Insights from the preceding 
discussion allow the identification of the following success factors from this section: 
 Build entrepreneurial skills; 
 Improve capacity for tactical decision-making; 
 Sensitivity to environment / context; 
 Establish institutional arrangements with care; 
 Appoint individuals with entrepreneurial experience and skills; 
 Create teams with diversity to encourage creativity; 
 Focus on discovering and exploiting partnership opportunities; 
 Structure the venture with an outcomes focus; 
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 Achieve a fit between the industry evolution context, personal networks of 
entrepreneurs, behaviours of entrepreneurs, motivations of stakeholders, and 
the structures and strategies of the organization. 
 
In the next section some additional perspectives on success will be explored. 
4.6 OTHER PERSPECTIVES ON SUCCESS 
4.6.1 Success factors from a Stakeholder perspective 
There are certain conditions that will encourage stakeholders to support and use 
PPPs.  The SA Treasury (Republic of South Africa, 2001:B6, A3) refers to four PPP 
stakeholders and mention conditions that would encourage these stakeholders to 
support and use PPPs.   
 
Table 4-5: Conditions that encourage partnership 
Stakeholders 
Conditions that would encourage stakeholder support for- 
and use of partnerships 
Government 
departments 
PPPs must be an accessible, relevant, viable and beneficial  
service delivery option 
Users of services PPPs must result in accessible, affordable and safe services that 
meet acceptable quality standards 
Society PPPs must promote goals such as social equity, economic 
empowerment, efficient utilization of scarce resources, and 
protection of the environment 
Private parties PPPs must be sufficiently rewarding in relation to the investment 
required and the risks undertaken 
 
These conditions can be seen as critical success factors for partnerships and has 
relevance to the different perspectives on the utility of partnerships that was 
presented in Chapter 2.  The different perspectives bring the realization that the 
same partnership could be classified as a failure by one stakeholder while another 
stakeholder sees it as successful.  Such different perspectives on success would also 
complicate performance measurement and the isolation of success factors.   
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As an example, one could say that a partnership aimed at raising public awareness 
of a specific social issue could be regarded as successful by the private partner that 
was successful in distributing 20 000 pamphlets to affected communities, but that the 
same partnerships could be seen as a failure by the NGO working in the communities 
if the NGO sees evidence that the pamphlets were not appropriate for the target 
audience, was not read or understood, and did not change behaviour or attitudes.  It 
would therefore be necessary to have agreement on performance indicators between 
partners so that a shared opinion on success or failure can be formed.  The first 
critical success factor emerging from this discussion is the need for shared and 
agreed performance measurement indicators that will enable a shared opinion on the 
success or failure of a partnership.  Additional success factors can be derived from 
the conditions identified by the SA Treasury as encouraging different stakeholders to 
support partnerships.  There is a slight difference in emphasis between promoting the 
idea of partnership as opposed to trying to make partnerships work.  The conditions 
identified by the SA Treasury seem to fit more into the strategic marketing of the 
partnership concept and needs some rewording and re-alignment to make them 
applicable to the discussion in this section.   
 
Government departments require PPPs to be accessible, relevant, viable and 
beneficial service delivery options.  This accessibility of the PPP model relates to an 
enabling environment and support for public managers to explore and implement the 
PPP option. The relevance of the PPP option will remain part of the decision-making 
process where different service delivery options and vehicles are considered and 
there could be circumstances under which the use of a PPP will be a bad idea.  The 
real issue related to relevance, is that PPPs should be chosen as delivery 
mechanisms only when the PPP model is appropriate to the circumstances.  Viability 
of the PPP option will depend on accessibility and relevance, but also on other 
factors required to put any transaction and any infrastructure and any service-delivery 
organization together – factors which are too many to explore in this section.  It is 
obvious that some form of viability assessment will need to be done before 
embarking on forming a PPP, and the results of this dissertation should be useful in 
such a viability assessment.  Finally, the need for a PPP to be beneficial should be at 
the heart of the consideration made by government to decide on service delivery 
options.  The SA Treasury condition is not clear on who should be benefiting from the 
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PPP but it is reasonably safe to assume that the Treasury would see a need that all 
parties to the PPP should benefit, that a win-win situation is engineered.  The delivery 
of mutual benefit is therefore a critical success factor for PPPs.  
 
Users of the services delivered through PPPs require accessible, affordable and safe 
services that meet acceptable quality standards. This condition listed by the SA 
Treasury brings a welcome output focus to the investigation of critical success 
factors.  Services and products are accessible if they are easy to use and delivered in 
a manner and at a place which is convenient for the target market they are intended 
for.  The issue of affordability is a constant source of criticism against PPPs from 
labour unions and civil society, who believe that services delivered through PPPs 
involving large private utility suppliers are almost always more expensive than the 
same service when delivered through governmental structures.  Arguments for and 
against cost recovery also live in the discussions on affordability.  In its simplest form, 
the affordability requirement means that cost should be kept as low as possible and 
that a PPP resulting in marked increases in user charges which significantly exceeds 
the cost of public delivery of the same service, will not be considered a success (See 
discussion on savings or efficiency gains that should offset cost increases at Figure 
2.18 on page 107).  That services should be delivered in a manner that is safe to 
users is clearly a non-negotiable requirement, a critical success factor that links to 
the triple bottom-line value requirement (economic, social and environmental) that 
this dissertation argues is applicable to PPPs.  Acceptable quality standards may 
differ between societies and even communities, but the critical success factor 
emanating from this condition is that quality must remain a focus and that inferior 
products or services should not be tolerated.  There is obviously room for 
performance indicators measuring quality in any assessment of the success of a 
PPP. 
 
Society requires that goals such as social equity, economic empowerment, efficient 
utilization of scarce resources, and protection of the environment should be realized. 
This condition is linked to good corporate governance and the triple bottom line 
imperative which arguably applies to PPPs and requires that an enterprise must 
deliver positive economic, social and environmental results.  Clearly a PPP will be 
held to higher standards in this regard than would any one of its constituting partners 
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acting on its own.  Private partners in PPPs require sufficient reward in relation to the 
investment required and the risks undertaken.  It is quite understandable that a 
private partner would want to be rewarded for work done and services delivered and 
that the private partner would want to make a profit out of its involvement in the PPP.  
How big this profit will be will depend on negotiations during the establishment of the 
PPP and will also depend on the efficiency of the private partner.  There may be 
some cases where a private partner becomes involved from a purely social 
investment or corporate social responsibility perspective and wants no monetary 
benefit from the partnership.  In these cases the private partner will still be interested 
in non-monetary return on its investment such as publicity, positive reputation 
enhancement or the accumulation of experience and expertise. 
 
Discussion of the stakeholder perspective has produced the following identifiable 
success factors: 
 Shared and agreed performance measurement indicators that will enable a 
shared opinion on the success or failure of a partnership; 
 An enabling environment and support for public managers to explore and 
implement the PPP option; 
 PPPs should be chosen as delivery mechanism only when the PPP model is 
appropriate to the circumstances; 
 A pre-partnership viability assessment should be conducted; 
 The partnership should deliver of mutual benefit; 
 Delivery of services that are accessible - easy to use and delivered in a 
manner and at a place which is convenient for the target market they are 
intended for; 
 Delivery of affordable services - cost should be kept as low as possible and 
should normally not exceed public provision costs; 
 Services should be delivered in a manner that is safe to users; 
 Quality must remain a focus and inferior products or services should not be 
tolerated; 
 Goals such as social equity, economic empowerment, efficient utilization of 
scarce resources, and protection of the environment should be realized; 
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 Private partners must have the opportunity to be rewarded for their 
involvement. 
 
In the next section the perspective on success factors as identified by a private 
operator within a PPP will be presented.  
4.6.2 Success factors from an Operator perspective 
The private operators that become involved in PPPs as the providers of services or 
the managers of infrastructure also have specific ideas about what makes for 
successful partnerships. The following success factors were extracted from a 
statement by a senior executive of Johannesburg Water Management: 
 
 An experienced and competent private partner; 
 Sound regulatory frameworks; 
 Fair returns – this point relates to the reward expected by private partners; 
 Integrated risk management - clear and fair balance of risks between the 
various parties; 
 Satisfaction  - the consumers, the decision-makers and the private partner all 
need to be satisfied; and  
 Correct choice of partnership model – in this case the private operator prefers 
the concession model of partnership above further privatization (Plummer, 
2002:22). 
 
In the next section success factors from the perspective of a non-governmental 
organization will be discussed. 
4.6.3 Success factors from a Third Sector / Civil Society perspective 
According to the Mvula Trust, to function effectively, the partnership and the working 
environment require clear objectives, policies and principles before any work takes 
place.  For an NGO working with a very different agenda, it is important to establish 
some rules on transparency.  Despite the new management approach, when it 
comes to their own organization, the private sector can be very closed.  But in 
partnership involving an NGO, some issues – such as the level of profit – need to be 
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transparent, or the NGO will feel uncomfortable being a party to the process.  
Similarly, it is important for government not only to set up the regulatory environment 
and ensure a properly designed contract, but to oversee how and when this is put in 
place.  The private sector works the best, and most cost effective, when the outputs 
are known and the process from beginning to end can be quantified.  More 
consideration needs to be given to the methodology for the procurement of private 
partners in ill-defined projects to avoid governments paying through their nose for the 
service that is being provided (Plummer, 2002:24). 
 
The interpretation of the preceding paragraph produces the following success factors: 
 Clear objectives, policies and principles; 
 Transparency; 
 Enabling regulatory environment; 
 Properly designed contract; 
 Government oversight; 
 Known outputs; 
 Quantified process; 
 Robust procurement methodology that ensures value for money; 
 Well-defined projects. 
4.6.4 Success factors from a Project Management perspective 
PPPs are typically established for the purpose of specific projects and could therefore 
in themselves be regarded as elements of projects.  The life cycle of a PPP, as 
described in Chapter 2, is similar to that of a project or programme. When 
performance evaluation is discussed later in this dissertation, the stage that a PPP 
has reached in the PPP life cycle and project life cycle will become an important 
framework for the evaluation of success.  The normal categories of project risk will 
also apply to PPP projects, and the normal risk mitigation measures instituted in 
project management could also mitigate against the failure of a PPP.  Such risk 
mitigation measures can be considered as success factors for PPPs. 
 
Partnerships closely resemble projects and therefore the project management body 
of knowledge should contain many applicable lessons regarding success factors for 
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partnerships.  There is however one possible central difference between partnerships 
and projects, and this is the single point of responsibility that is so central in project 
management best practice (Burke, 2007:25).  In partnerships each partner possibly 
has a single point of representation while the partnership as a whole, if it is a real 
partnership, does not have a single centralized leadership but rather a collegiate 
leadership. 
 
Burke (2007:35) is of the opinion that matrix organization structure (an organization 
type where human resources are controlled by specialization leaders as well as 
project leaders at the same time) have become synonymous with project 
management and that such a structure might also be appropriate for partnerships.  
Some clear recommendations for partnership projects from the project management 
body of knowledge becomes apparent when Burke (2007:36) argues that the 1970s 
saw a high failure rate in public sector projects due to poor project definition (scope 
management); poorly defined project organization structure (matrix structure), and 
failure to consider the impact of external factors (environment / stakeholders). 
 
The project environment model of Burke, illustrated below, adds the traditional 
understanding of projects as interactions between purpose, scope, time, cost and 
quality to a new understanding that the organizational structure of the project (he 
calls this the OBS – Organization Breakdown Structure) is central to project 
management and that projects occur within a project environment which will affect 
the project to a greater or lesser degree. Burke believes that the model encourages 
project managers to look at the bigger picture and consider all the stakeholder‘s 
needs. These are valuable learning points for partnership projects. 
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Project management is traditionally understood to concern a clearly defined project 
life cycle which is followed for each project irrespective of size or duration.  The figure 
below illustrates one version of the project life cycle as understood by Burke (2007).  
The project life cycle includes the four basic processes of concept and initiation, 
design and development, implementation or construction and commissioning and 
handover.  This life cycle is a valuable tool for planning and managing projects, 
especially those related to the creation of infrastructure. 
 
 
         
OBS 
 
Scope 
 
Quality 
 
Time 
 
Cost 
Purpose 
(Beneficial Change) 
PROJECT ENVIRONMENT 
PROJECT ENVIRONMENT 
Figure 4.14: A Project Environment Model (Burke, 2007: 37) 
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Figure 4.15: A Project life cycle (Burke, 2007:41) 
 
 
One of the drawbacks of this view of project management is however that it begins 
and ends abruptly with little opportunity for client interaction after project completion.  
The commissioning and handover of projects, if not managed properly, have resulted 
in over-the-wall transfer (alluding to the project being tossed over a wall to a client 
who has no interaction with the contractor delivering the project) if it is not 
accompanied by appropriate discussions and explanations (Burke, 2007:42).  This 
and other criticisms of the traditional project approach has prompted Burke to try and 
force project managers to look at the bigger picture by expanding the project life 
cycle to a product life cycle, as illustrated below.  The product life cycle is a more 
client-oriented, comprehensive, cradle-to-grave view.  Burke (2007:49–51) proposes 
8 phases in his rendition of a product life cycle. 
 
 
• The first phase starts the project by establishing a need or opportunity 
for the product, facility or service.  The feasibility of proceeding with the 
project is investigated, and on acceptance of the proposal, moves to the 
next phase 
Concept & Initiation 
• The second phase uses the guidelines set by the feasibility study to 
design the product, outline th ebuild-method and develop detailed 
schedules and plans for making or implementing the product. 
Design and Development 
• The third phase implements the project as per the baseline plan 
developed in the previous phase. 
Implementation or construction 
• The fourth phase confirms the project has been implemented or built to 
the design and terminates the project 
Commissioning and handover 
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Figure 4.16: Product life cycle 
 
 
Although Burke may be criticized for focusing too heavily on facility creation as 
opposed to services delivered through projects, the steps he adds before and after 
the traditional project life cycle will be informative in the development of partnership 
• Projects ususally evolve from the work environment or market within 
which a company operates.  There is usually some event which triggers 
the project.  Managing the pre-project environment is essential to a 
company's survival in a changing world. 
Pre-Project 
• This includes the four phases  discussed above, being: 
• Concept 
• Design 
• Implementation 
• Handover 
Project Life Cycle 
• Although the operation phase may be the whole purpose of the project, 
it usually falls outside the project manager's sphere of influence. The 
project manager would interface with the operation's manager with 
respect to handover, maintenance, upgrade and expansion as well as 
disposal. 
Operation 
• The maintenance phase(s) are embedded in the operation phase to keep 
the facility functioning.  Ease of maintenance and minimum impact on 
production are important design considerations. 
Maintenance 
• Also called half-life refit.  At some point the facility will require a major 
upgrade, refit or expansion to keep it running effciiently  and 
competitively.  New technology, competition, market requirements, 
rules and regulations are all factors influencing this phase. 
Upgrade, Expansion 
• The final part of the product life cycle is decommissioning and disposing 
of the facility. 
Decommission and Disposal 
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projects.  Perhaps the most important contribution the project management field 
makes to partnership management and success is the recognition of differences in 
skills required at different phases in a product life cycle.  In the figure below (Figure 
4.17) the different skills required in different project phases are identified as 
entrepreneurial skills, project management entrepreneurial skills, and small business 
entrepreneurial skills on higher levels and project management skills as well as 
general management and small business management skills at mid-management 
level.  The design of partnership projects must thus also recognize the need for 
different skill sets at different times in the life cycle of a partnership. 
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The figure below illustrates the relationship between the traditional project life cycle, the operation life cycle and the product life 
cycle and at the same time identifies what type of procurement contract will apply to elements within the product life cycle. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4.17: A product life cycle, showing phases, embedded mini projects and required management skills (Burke, 2007: 51 
Entrepreneur Skills Project Management Entrepreneur Skills Small Business Entrepreneur Skills 
Project Management Skills General Management / Small Business Management Skills  
Pre-project Concept Design Implement Handover  M  Upgrade  Disposal 
Concept Design Implement 
Concept Design Implement Handover 
Handover 
Concept Design Implement Handover 
Disposal Project 
Upgrade Project 
Maintenance Project 
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This typology relates to the types of partnership that were discussed in Chapter 2 and adds further understanding to the differences 
between types of partnership. 
 
Figure 4.18: Procurement life cycles (Burke, 2007: 52) 
BOOT – Build Own Operate Transfer 
Project Management  
Pre-project Concept Design Implement Handover Operation Disposal 
Consultants Lump Sum 
Design & Build 
Turnkey 
Project Management Partnership 
Project Life-Cycle 
Product Life-Cycle 
Operation Life-Cycle 
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 From a project management perspective the following success factors can be 
identified in this section: 
 Consider more than just the traditional project life cycle when planning 
partnership projects – look at the complete product life cycle; 
 Establish single coordination point or manage authority vacuum through 
collegiate decision-making; 
 Matrix organizational structure can be efficient for projects; 
 Clear project definition and scope management; 
 Clearly defined project organization structure ; 
 Constantly consider the impact of external factors (environment / 
stakeholders); 
 Ensure appropriate project handover that empowers the client. 
 
In the next section success factors in governance will be analysed in search of 
success factors. 
4.6.5 Success factors in Corporate Governance 
The most important components of corporate governance identified by Du Plessis et 
al.(2005) imply that corporate governance: 
 Is a process of controlling management; 
 Takes into consideration the interests of internal stakeholders and other 
parties who can be affected by the corporation‘s conduct; 
 Aims at ensuring responsible behaviour by corporations; and  
 Has the ultimate goal of achieving the maximum level of efficiency and 
profitability for a corporation (Du Plessis et al., 2005:7). 
 
An obvious key success factor from a corporate governance perspective is that an 
agreed strategy must exist.  Sustainable development is a priority for the proponents 
of good corporate governance.  The three pillars of sustainable development: 
environmental, i.e. social and economic sustainability (Creech & Paas, 2008:13), 
relates to ―triple bottom line‖ advocated by good governance protagonists who 
believe that good governance must result in economic profit, social growth and 
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environmental benefit.  The sustainability issue may however conflict somewhat with 
the adjusted priorities of the ―Post-welfare state‖. 
 
The quasi-legislation of codes of good corporate governance provides further insight 
into success factors from a good corporate governance perspective.  The South 
African-based Institute of Directors published its voluntary code for corporate 
governance in September 2009.  It has been implemented from 1 March 2010.  The 
code is called King III.  King I was published in 1994 and King II in 2002 and applied 
exclusively to listed companies and public enterprises (despite this, it was part of job 
requirements and interviews in at least one municipality – the City of Cape Town).  
There are three shifts in comparison with King II: firstly in the area of application, 
secondly in the structure of the report and thirdly in the emphasis contained in the 
recommendations. The Institute of Directors (IoD) is a non-governmental institution 
and cannot make binding rules.  Van Wyk (2009) indicates that, in the same manner 
as done by other similar organizations elsewhere in the world, the IoD could find 
linkage with an international mood resulting from a series of spectacular business 
scandals.  The IoD and its international counterparts could convince governments 
that the business sector should be given the opportunity to clean its own house 
instead of becoming the target of far-reaching legislative interventions by 
government.  Financial markets, such as the JSE, cooperated by making compliance 
with the King codes (or its foreign counterparts) entrance requirements to listing.  In 
the public sector, the state made the King-code part of its management framework 
through the Public Finance Management Act of 1999.  In the private sector, the 
approach was ―comply or explain‖ - the code could not force companies, but the 
bourse demanded an explanation if they did not comply with the code (Van Wyk, 
2009:17). 
 
The codes became so convincing that big unlisted companies, such as KWV Ltd, 
also voluntarily complied with the codes (Van Wyk, 2009:17).  The power of codes 
such as King, London‘s Combined Code, Germany‘s Cromme and the Netherlands‘ 
Tabaksblat-code relies mostly on credibility (Van Wyk, 2009:17).  King III now prefers 
to use the language of ―implement or explain‖, wording that, according to Van Wyk, is 
borrowed from the Dutch Tabaksblat code.  The wording is intended to discourage 
the use of the code as a minor laundry list. Van Wyk doubts whether it will discourage 
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the workings of auditors and company secretaries.  Van Wyk also believes that King 
III has become over-ambitious by wanting to be applicable to all ―entities‖.  An ―entity‖ 
is apparently any functioning institution with or without profit motive, also a private 
company or a closed corporation and maybe even a family trust.  The whole report is 
still primarily aimed at protecting the stakeholders in big businesses (Van Wyk, 
2009:17).  The over-ambitiousness will give company advisors headaches and can 
undermine the credibility of King III (Van Wyk, 2009:17). 
 
Due to the corporate scandals of the late 1990s and the early 2000s King II, like the 
American Sarbanes-Oxley-act of 2002 and the British model from the same time, 
focused on the checks and balances in the direction of big companies, especially 
concerning the role of boards of directors (Van Wyk, 2009:17).  The collapse of 
banks and other financial institutions from mid 2008, in especially London, New York 
and Zurich, have shown that even boards of directors which complied with the 
structural and functional requirements of codes of governance like the King code and 
its foreign equivalents, were not the be-all and end-all.  The current consensus is that 
they gave preference to short term profits above the long-term sustainability of their 
firms and ignored the risks resulting from this strategy.  That is why King III 
emphasizes sustainability and risk management.  In well-led enterprises, risk 
management is an established management mechanism, which King III is now 
underlining.  The focus on sustainability is connected to current thinking on this 
subject.  Even if the sustainability rhetoric is exaggerated at times in King III and 
elsewhere, modern enterprises can in fact have enormous impact on their 
environments.  This environment includes not only their shareholders, but also 
employees, neighbours, wider society (including the state) and each one‘s physical 
milieu.  This brings about a demand for all-encompassing reporting on activities 
(triple bottom-line reporting), on corporate citizenship and on the necessity of long-
term plans (Van Wyk, 2009:17). 
 
Herman Daly, an American ecological economist, has said, ―There is something 
fundamentally wrong about treating the earth as if it was a business in liquidation.‖  
The triple crunch of the credit crisis, climate change and unstable oil prices are 
signalling a new path forward, a path where we start treating the earth as a valuable, 
finite asset and where corporations increasingly understand that greater 
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environmental responsibility can lead to enhanced economic performance  (McLean, 
2009:5).  Interpretation of the preceding discussion prompts the identification of the 
following success factors: 
 Pursue the triple bottom line; 
 Greater environmental responsibility. 
 
In the next section, some success factors originating from the field of enterprise risk 
management will be analysed. 
4.6.6 Success factors from Enterprise Risk Management 
Enterprise Risk Management is defined as comprehensive risk management that 
allows companies to identify, prioritize, and effectively manage their crucial risks.  An 
ERM approach integrates risk solutions into all aspects of business practices and 
decision making processes (IoD, 2009:51).  The following categories of risk were 
identified in a guideline entitled ―Management of Risk: Guidance for Practitioners‖: 
o Strategic / Commercial; 
o Economic / Financial / Market; 
o Legal, contractual and regulatory; 
o Organizational management / human factors; 
o Political / societal factors; 
o Environmental factors / acts of God (force majeure); and 
o Technical / operational / infrastructure (HMSO, 2002:19). 
 
One success factor is evident in this section: 
 Identify and actively manage risks. 
 
In the next section success factors for public-private partnerships will be identified by 
looking at questions of organizational design. 
4.6.7 Success factors and organizational design 
In this subsection critical success factors that can be identified by considering 
organizational design types will be investigated.  One type of organizational design 
which can also be considered to be a partnership is the hyperarchy. 
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4.6.7.1 Hyperarchy 
A hyperarchy is a ―large scale, self-organizing community that sets free unusually 
high degrees of energy and engagement – despite the lack of clear or direct 
economic payoff for participants‖, says Boston Consulting Group partner Philip Evans  
(Gary, 2005:94).  For example, Toyota‘s famously lean supply chain has evolved 
over the past two decades into a self-organizing community that relies, at times, on 
voluntary contributions almost unthinkable in a conventional business.  The 
significance of this was brought home in 1997, when a fire at a plant of Aisin Seiki, 
one of Toyota‘s tier-one suppliers, destroyed the automaker‘s sole source of p-
valves, a key component in brakes.   
 
Since Toyota intentionally maintained low inventories, the entire supply chain quickly 
ground to a halt.  But the tier-one suppliers decided to improvize the production of p-
valves using whatever general-purpose machinery was available.  Each tier-one 
supplier mobilized its tier-two suppliers; they, in turn, mobilized their tier-three 
suppliers, in a nested, self-replicating fashion.  There was no up-front haggling about 
how people or companies would be re-imbursed.  Instead, ad hoc teams formed 
across firms; Aison Seiki freely shared its blueprints, raw materials, and any 
specialist machinery that had survived the fire.  Other groups stepped forward to 
―traffic-cop‖ the new set of logistics.  Ten days after the fire, more than 60 firms were 
producing enough p-valves to get the entire system running again – thanks to the 
initiative of a number of companies, only one of which was Toyota (Gary, 2005:95). 
 
Perhaps the best-known hyperarchy is the Linux project, part of the broader open-
source software movement in which program source code is given away to 
volunteers who help fix bugs and design new features (Gary, 2005:95–96).  Linux 
operating systems have generated huge economic value, says Evans: they drive 
more than 50% of all embedded devices and have more of the server operating 
systems market than Microsoft‘s Windows NT.  But this value does not show up in 
the GNP because it accrues as a free benefit to users.  The success of such self-
organization ―flies in the face of many economists‘ assumptions about self-interest,‖ 
says Evans, co-author of Blown to Bits: How the New Economics of Information 
Transforms Strategy.  In a conventional market, the primary transaction currency is 
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the contract – the system of negotiating, paying, and litigating, when necessary, to 
enforce agreements.  Moreover, an asymmetry of information – having access to 
data that another participant does not – can often give you bargaining power (Gary, 
2005:96). 
 
Hyperarchies, by contrast, use simple rules to increase transparency and symmetry 
of information.  When all Linux programmers can pretty much see what everyone 
else is doing, everyone has an incentive to reciprocate when others share information 
with them; in the course of such sharing, participants build strong reputations 
throughout the community.  Reciprocity and reputation thus work together to 
establish trust as the primary transaction currency in a hyperarchy.  So when the fire 
occurred at the Aisin Seiki plant, Toyota‘s suppliers didn‘t feel the self-protective 
need to negotiate their compensation first before jumping in to solve the problem 
(Gary, 2005:96).  There is a clear link between hyperarchy and the symbiotic 
relationships discussed in Chapter 2.  To organise according to coordination needs, 
requires understanding of the nature of interdependence within an organization.  
Thompson distinguished three levels of interdependence: pooled interdependence 
(the loosest), where individuals operate independently but depend on one another‘s 
performance; sequential interdependence, where the output of one individual is the 
input of the other; and reciprocal interdependence (the most intense), where 
individuals are mutually dependent.  Thompson argues that organizational design 
needs to begin with creating organizational units at points where interdependence is 
the most intense (Grant, 2005:203).  
 
It is also valuable to consider the effort required to coordinate in a hyperarchy or 
other organic organizations as opposed to in a hierarchy where everyone has one 
superior to report to.  The figure below indicates how many lines of coordination are 
required in both an organic and hierarchical organization. It is clear that coordination 
will require more effort in the former and less in the latter. 
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The implication for PPPs is that they will in all likelihood require more coordination 
than a standard public sector service delivery vehicle working on its own.  However, 
the complexity and need for coordination within public entities should not be under-
estimated. 
4.6.7.2 Mechanistic / Bureaucratic vs Organic organizational structure: 
The relative merits of bureaucratic and organic structures depend on the activities 
undertaken and the surrounding environment.  Where an organization is supplying 
standardised goods and services using well-understood processes, in an 
environment where change is slow and predictable, the bureaucratic model with its 
standard operating procedures and high levels of specialization offers substantial 
efficiency advantages.  The problem occurs when the bureaucratic model has to 
produce heterogenous outputs from heterogenous inputs, using poorly understood 
technologies, in an environment where change requires constant adjustment.  Here, 
the bureaucracy fails because greater organizational flexibility is required (Grant, 
2005:199). 
 
Table 4-6: Mechanistic vs Organic organizational forms 
FEATURE MECHANISTIC ORGANIC 
Task definition Rigid and highly specialized Flexible and less narrowly defined 
Coordination and control 
Rules and directives vertically 
imposed 
Mutual adjustment, common 
culture 
Figure 4.19: How hierarchy economises on coordination (Grant, 2005: 198) 
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FEATURE MECHANISTIC ORGANIC 
Communication Vertical Vertical and horizontal 
Knowledge Centralised Dispersed 
Commitment and loyalty To immediate superior To the organization and its goals 
Environmental context 
Stable with low technological 
uncertainty 
Unstable with significant 
technological uncertainty and 
ambiguity 
Source: Adapted from Butler (1991:76) and Grant (2005:200). 
 
In order to increase organizational flexibility, Grant (2005:201) advises that one 
should reduce hierarchical levels, decentralise decision-making, reduce headquarters 
staff, emphasise horizontal rather than vertical communication and shift the emphasis 
of control from supervision to accountability.  Factors influencing organizational 
design: 
 Tasks; 
 Products; 
 Geography; 
 Process; 
 Coordination intensity; 
 Economies of scale; 
 Economies of utilization; 
 Learning – structured to maximize learning and thereby gain competitive 
advantage; 
 Standardization of control systems. 
 
Grant (2005:204) draws a distinction between knowledge generating activities 
(exploration) and knowledge application activities (exploitation).  Exploration activities 
are likely to require looser, more organic structures and systems, while exploitation 
activities are likely to require more mechanistic approaches.  Reconciling such 
different management systems within the same company is easier if creative 
activities such as research and new product development are separated from the 
more routine activities such as manufacturing and accounting. 
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4.6.7.3 Cost reduction through vertical integration. 
The figure below illustrates how a new venture like a partnership could reduce its 
transaction costs by internalising several steps in its supply or value chain.  In a non-
integrated model, V2 could only be sustained if it paid as little as possible for V1 and 
charged V3 that amount and a considerable overhead.  In a vertically integrated 
model, V2 does not have to add a profit because the transaction is internal and the 
profit only needs to be made where the product is delivered to the client or end-user.  
 
 
 
 
Based on the description above one can argue that the success of a PPP would be 
promoted by reducing transaction costs through internalising as many steps in its 
value chain as possible.  Insights produced by the discussion in this section brings 
forth the following success factors: 
 Transparency; 
 Symmetry of information; 
 Trust built on reciprosity; 
 Organizational flexibility. 
 
This concludes the discussion of organizational-design inspired success factors for 
PPPs. The next section will list the success factors identified in this chapter. 
 
V1 
V2 
V3 
 
 
V1 
 
V2 
 
V3 
 
Supply chain 
with separate 
entities and high 
transaction cost 
Steps of the 
supply chain 
integrated in one 
entity, reduced 
transaction cost 
Figure 4.20: Vertical integration can reduce transaction costs 
(Based on Grant, 2005: 390) 
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4.7 SUCCESS FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN THIS CHAPTER 
In this section the pattern started at the end of Chapter 3 is continued.  All those 
critical success factors identified in this chapter are listed here without any editing.  
The success factors for PPPs identified in this chapter are: 
 
1) Strong local ownership; 
2) Strong champion or driver; 
3) Community support; 
4) Seeing partnership formation as the formation of new for-profit enterprises 
based on social or environmental objectives and values; 
5) Use lessons from private enterprise; 
6) Observe the ―generic observations‖ on partnership success; 
7) Clarity and openness about individual and collective agendas and purpose; 
8) Synergy between individual and collective agendas; 
9) Synergy between individual, collective and societal benefits; 
10) Support in the implementation of partnerships; 
11) Understanding and adjusting for the influence of power relationships upon 
partnership governance; 
12) Transparent procurement processes; 
13) Stakeholders should be empowered to understand that which is supposed to 
be transparent; 
14) Considering the appointment of external consultants to work with the 
government agency on the evaluation of bids; 
15) Procedural disincentives for corruption; 
16) Blacklisting of corrupt contractors; 
17) Civil society assistance with performance measurement; 
18) Recognizing the role of civil society to act on behalf of the community; 
19) Simplify decision-making; 
20) Devolve authority for decisions to the lowest possible level; 
21) Clear lines of accountability; 
22) Integration of activities to enable cost sharing; 
23) Simplify specifications by focusing on outputs and outcomes; 
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24) Ensure tender invitations are complete with all necessary information; 
25) Standardized forms and methodology for bid adjudication; 
26) Increase awareness of cost management among public staff; 
27) Expedite access for new suppliers to staff and premises; 
28) Flexible contracts with simple, robust contract variation procedures; 
29) Rationalize the number of partners; 
30) Fair contract enforcement mechanisms; 
31) Early appointment of a designated team or individual to identify finance 
sources; 
32) Previous experience of partners in partnerships; 
33) Clear identification of all stakeholders; 
34) Open and candid communication with all stakeholders, taking into regard the 
concerns and priorities of each stakeholder; 
35) Conscious stakeholder relationship management; 
36) Keep all stakeholders informed of all aspects of project, with specific focus on 
the intent, purpose, and means of implementation of the project; 
37) Counter misperceptions and myths through audience-appropriate, candid and 
factual information; 
38) Clearly identify all stakeholders and ensure appropriate communication with 
each; 
39) Communication responsibility should be shared among partners, and 
communication should come from the most appropriate partner for the specific 
communication; 
40) Develop a collaborative process; 
41) Incentivise effective collaboration; 
42) Joint capacity building session; 
43) Regular partnership review and reconsideration; 
44) Experiment with collaboration options; 
45) Build interpersonal skills for collaboration. 
46) Understanding of the original partnering motivations and conditions; 
47) Sensitivity to the environment and its influence on the partnership; 
48) Ability to adapt to environmental changes; 
49) Visible political leadership; 
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50) Policy statement to all stakeholders; 
51) Procurement systems that support the partnership approach; 
52) Fully transparent procurement system; 
53) Open competition in the selection of partners; 
54) Confirm / ensure statutory and regulatory authorization; 
55) Public officials must identify and remove legislative, regulatory and 
administrative impediments; 
56) Rally public, political and administrative support; 
57) Strong leadership to overcome institutional inertia / resistance to change; 
58) Recognize the importance of perceptions among leadership; 
59) Contract management to ensure adherence and punish non-compliance; 
60) Access to fair and unbiased judicial relief; 
61) A statutory foundation (enabling legal environment); 
62) Strong individual champions in the private partner; 
63) Flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances; 
64) Commitment of and leadership from top management in the public partner; 
65) Well-informed political leadership involvement from public partner. 
66) Continued active involvement of public partner; 
67) Ongoing performance management; 
68) Clear description of the responsibilities of each partner; 
69) Clearly defined method of dispute resolution; 
70) Contract design should reflect conditions; 
71) Performance oriented goals; 
72) Clearly delineated metrics for performance and reporting; 
73) Clear risk allocation; 
74) Workforce development plan; 
75) Commitment to the partnership process by all partners; 
76) Appropriate skills within the public sector partner; 
77) Reduction in potential for political interference; 
78) Effective communication with all stakeholders; 
79) Open procurement process; 
80) Build on the assets of potential partners; 
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81) Focus the scope and content of the partnership arrangement; 
82) Establish appropriate organizational and contractual arrangements; 
83) Establish sound partnership principles; 
84) Strong local ownership; 
85) Commitment; 
86) Partners contribute according to their capacity; 
87) Contract management; 
88) Contract negotiations; 
89) Financial analysis and planning; 
90) Understanding the business at hand, for example water and sanitation; 
91) An assured income stream for the duration of the partnership; 
92) Selecting a partner that can contribute the most value to the partnership; 
93) Selecting partners with experience in the applicable field; 
94) Regulation to prevent abuse; 
95) Detailed specifications; 
96) Evaluation system (which could include inspection); 
97) Strategic and financial skills within the public sector partner; 
98) Strategic understanding of partnerships within the public sector partner 
99) Confirm each partner‘s individual goals; 
100) Confirm the collective goal of the partnership; 
101) Measure performance against individual and combined goals; 
102) Flexibility - renegotiating outcomes based on changing conditions; 
103) First focus on public value, what public outcome must be produced; 
104) Don‘t get lost in the fine print; 
105) Manage around key values and performance objectives; 
106) Consider finance as a tool among many others; 
107) Make meaningful, even if imperfect, enhancements to the status quo; 
108) Develop appropriate set of core competencies;  
109) Developing effective knowledge-sharing practices; 
110) Invest in the best and brightest human capital for the public sector; 
111) Public sector human capital in contract and network management; 
112) Capacity should be balanced in a partnership; 
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113) Use people with a collaborative mindset; 
114) Strategic human capital plan to acquire the correct skills; 
115) Acquire new governance skills set; 
116) Establish support mechanisms / partnership enablers; 
117) Private sector experience for the public sector; 
118) Focus on the required public outcome; 
119) Manage flexibly around key values and performance objectives; 
120) Use all available resources, not only monetary, to bring partnerships together; 
121) Aim to make meaningful enhancements to the status quo; 
122) Invest in skills and competencies; 
123) Structure partnerships for success; 
124) Government must be sure of what it wants; 
125) Compare costs and performance with alternatives; 
126) Cost of product and service production must be determined; 
127) Compare information costs under alternatives; 
128) Good leadership and interpersonal relationships; 
129) Clear direction; 
130) Clear division of responsibility of functions; 
131) Build real partnership, with shared burdens and shared rewards; 
132) Real incentives for the private sector; 
133) Reasonable expectation of private sector interest due to potential market; 
134) Use public resources effectively and judiciously; 
135) Minimizing the bureaucratic procedures that can cripple a project; 
136) Use land ownership as way for public to control the projects; 
137) Choose the model that meets all the criteria; 
138) Consider political acceptibility; 
139) Consider organized labour opinions; 
140) Shared experiences in field; 
141) Similar cultures; 
142) Cultures that embrace collaboration; 
143) Similar measurements of success; 
144) Build entrepreneurial skills; 
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145) Improve capacity for tactical decision-making; 
146) Sensitivity to environment / context; 
147) Establish institutional arrangements with care; 
148) Appoint individuals with entrepreneurial experience and skills; 
149) Create teams with diversity to encourage creativity; 
150) Focus on discovering and exploiting partnership opportunities; 
151) Structure the venture with an outcomes focus; 
152) Achieve a fit between the industry evolution context, personal networks of 
entrepreneurs, behaviours of entrepreneurs, motivations of stakeholders, and the 
structures and strategies of the organization; 
153) Synchronization of partners‘ business processes; 
154) Shared applications (for example software); 
155) Similar technologies; 
156) Shared communication channels; 
157) Need to have ―shared semantics‖; 
158) Create new organizational collaboration and innovation space; 
159) A well-developed shared vocabulary; 
160) Reduced transaction cost; 
161) Shared and agreed performance measurement indicators; 
162) Shared success or failure evaluation; 
163) Enabling environment; 
164) Support for public managers to explore and implement the PPP option; 
165) PPPs should be chosen as delivery mechanism only when the PPP model is 
appropriate to the circumstances; 
166) Conduct a pre-partnership viability assessment; 
167) The partnership should deliver mutual benefit; 
168) Delivery of services that are accessible - easy to use and delivered in a 
manner and at a place which is convenient for the target market they are intended 
for; 
169) Delivery of affordable services not exceeding public provision costs; 
170) Services should be delivered in a manner that is safe to users; 
171) Quality focus; 
172) Social equity and economic empowerment focus; 
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173) Efficient utilization of scarce resources; 
174) Protection of the environment; 
175) Opportunity to reward private partner for involvement; 
176) An experienced and competent private partner; 
177) Sound regulatory frameworks; 
178) Fair returns for private partners; 
179) Integrated risk management - clear and fair risk balance; 
180) Satisfaction of consumers, decision-makers and private partner; 
181) Correct choice of partnership model; 
182) Clear objectives, policies and principles; 
183) Transparency; 
184) Enabling regulatory environment; 
185) Properly designed contract; 
186) Government oversight; 
187) Known outputs; 
188) Quantified process; 
189) Robust procurement methodology that ensures value for money; 
190) Well-defined projects; 
191) Look at complete product life cycle, not only project life cycle; 
192) Establish single coordination point; 
193) Manage authority vacuum through collegiate decision-making; 
194) Choose optimal organizational structure; 
195) Clear project definition and scope management; 
196) Clearly defined project organization structure; 
197) Consider the impact of external factors (environment / stakeholders); 
198) Ensure appropriate project handover that empowers the client; 
199) Pursue the triple bottom line (financial, societal, environmental); 
200) Greater environmental responsibility; 
201) Identify and actively manage risks; 
202) Transparency; 
203) Symmetry of information; 
204) Trust built on reciprocity; 
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205) Organizational flexibility; 
206) Philosophical match between the private and public partners; 
207) Pay attention to governance issues in partnerships. 
 
The list of success factors provided above can be synthesised into a shorter, 
consolidated collection through the removal of duplicates, the combination of similar 
ideas, and the reformulation of ideas.  
4.7.1 Consolidated success factors from this chapter 
The consolidated list of success factors for PPPs identified in this chapter are shown 
in Annexure C. 
4.8 FURTHER DISTILLATION OF SUCCESS FACTORS 
This list of success factors now need to be compared and integrated with the success 
factors identified in the previous chapter.  The list of factors from the previous chapter 
will be inserted here for easy reference and will then be followed by a combined and 
integrated list compiled through a process of synthesis. 
4.8.1 Consolidated success factors from Chapter 3 
The consolidated list of success factors from Chapter 3 is provided in Annexure C.   
4.8.2 Integrated list of success factors 
In this sub-section the consolidated lists from this chapter and Chapter 3 are 
combined, with duplicates being removed and similar concepts grouped together 
under collective headings.  The consolidated list of success factors is shown in 
Annexure C.  This consolidated and integrated list represents all the success factors 
identified up to this point in this dissertation.  This list will be transferred for use at the 
end of the next chapter, where it will be combined with success factors identified in 
the next chapter. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 314 
4.9 TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK OF PPP EVALUATION 
At the end of this fourth chapter it is now possible to further develop the partnership 
evaluation tool that was discussed at the end of Chapter 3.  In Chapter 3 it was 
proposed that partnership evaluation should start with an assessment of the entity to 
be evaluated, in order to determine whether it qualifies as a PPP.  Secondly, it was 
argued that success factors for PPPs that are identified in this dissertation could 
provide the basis for the development of key performance areas and key 
performance indicators for PPPs.  The table below illustrates the proposed 
framework for evaluation. In the table, the column headings describe what 
information can be entered into the cells below them.  The second row in the table 
below describes what the rows after the heading row should contain once it is 
implemented as an evaluation tool. 
 
Table 4-7: Basic evaluation framework for PPPs 
PPP Name PPP 
Prequalification 
Success 
factors 
Key 
performance 
areas and 
indicators 
Performance 
evaluation 
Contains: 
Name of 
PPP 
Contains: Result 
from eight-point 
checklist to pre-
qualify the entity 
as a PPP. 
Contains: List 
of success 
factors 
identified  
Contains: Key 
performance 
areas (KPAs) 
derived from the 
success factors 
Contains: 
Indication of the 
performance of 
the PPP within 
the KPAs. 
 
The framework for the evaluation of PPPs will include at least some confirmation that 
the entity being evaluated is in fact a PPP, and will also include key performance 
areas that can be derived from the categories of success factors identified within this 
dissertation.  The consolidated categories of success factors identified in the previous 
subsection could serve as key performance areas in the evaluation of PPPs.  The 
collection of success factors is now more mature than the list at the end of the 
previous chapter, but it is still too early to include them in an evaluation tool. One 
major concern is the large number of categories and factors which, if all were to be 
included in the evaluation tool, would make for an extremely cumbersome measuring 
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tool.  It would be more meaningful to wait for further filtering and purification of these 
factors before including them.  The further development of an evaluation instrument 
is the main topic of the next chapter and a finalised evaluation instrument will be 
presented at the end of the chapter. 
4.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
After a good initial understanding of partnerships was developed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
it was possible in this chapter to consult literature to locate any critical success 
factors that are mentioned or implied by various authors and researchers regarding 
partnerships and which can in later chapters be considered alongside success 
factors identified through other methods.  Those success factors that are confirmed 
by subsequent levels of inquiry will eventually form part of the final collection of 
success factors.  This chapter commenced with a search for partnership success 
factors in partnership literature, which included sustainable development partnership 
literature as well as PPP literature.  A second field of study, public governance, was 
subsequently assessed to continue the search for success factors.  The focus then 
turned to private sector collaboration literature and thereafter entrepreneurial studies. 
A collection of perspectives on success was then discussed which also provided 
insight into success factors. The final field to be considered was organizational 
design.   
 
All the success factors identified in this chapter were presented and subsequently 
filtered and reduced to more meaningful categories and sub-categories.  The 
consolidated list of success factors from Chapter 2 was then presented and 
subsequently combined with those from this chapter in a furher distillation process.  
The integrated list of success factors identified up this point was presented for later 
discussion.  Finally, the discussion on the development of a framework for PPP 
evaluation was picked up from Chapter 3 and further developed with due 
consideration for the further development that will occur in the next chapter.  This 
concludes Chapter 4.  In Chapter 5, the evaluation of PPPs and the development of 
an evaluation instrument for PPPs will be the main focus. 
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5 EVALUATING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is aimed at identifying critical success factors for public-private 
partnerships and providing supportive information for public policy-makers and 
managers on when to consider using partnerships as delivery mechanisms and how 
to best ensure the success of such partnerships.  Chapter 1 introduced the research 
question, indicated how the dissertation would be constructed and described some 
initial concepts related to partnerships.  Chapters 2 and 3 provided a comprehensive 
overview of public-private partnerships which included some historical notes on 
partnerships, a comparison between partnerships and synergism in nature, 
definitions relating to partnership, reasons for partnering, uses for partnership, forms 
of partnerships and partnership contract types. Partnership structures and 
management were described, and barriers to partnership and negative aspects of 
partnership were analysed after which the context and life cycle of PPPs were 
presented.  In the previous chapter, Chapter 4, literature was consulted to locate any 
critical success factors that are mentioned or implied by various authors and 
researchers regarding partnerships.  
 
In this chapter the evaluation of PPPs is the main topic of discussion in what is partly 
a continuation of the literature study conducted in the previous chapter and partly an 
effort to create insight into critical success factors for PPPs by considering the 
evaluation of PPPs.   This insight-stimulating effort is in keeping with the exploratory 
research design explained in Chapter 1.  Possible methodologies to evaluate 
partnerships will be discussed, beginning with comparative case study analysis and 
moving on to various alternative approaches.  A methodology to derive performance 
measurement instruments from definitions of partnership will be developed to aid the 
identification of additional success factors, whereafter the evaluation of service 
delivery will be discussed as an option for the evaluation of PPPs. A final outcomes-
based approach to evaluating partnerships will be discussed before moving on to the 
main focus of this chapter, the creation of a measuring instrument for PPP 
performance and success.  The definition of an appropriate success measure will be 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
7 
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described after which an evaluation instrument will be proposed.  The identification of 
success factors will continue in this chapter in the same way that it was done in the 
previous chapter.  The critical success factors identified in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 will be 
considered alongside success factors identified in this chapter and then combined 
and reduced to a new consolidated list. 
 
Further support for identified success factors will be found in Chapter 6, where 
examples of partnership success and failure will be used to confirm or disprove 
identified critical success factors. The success factors that are identified in this 
chapter will be listed at the end of the chapter.  Success factors from the previous 
chapter that are supported by success factors identified in this chapter will be 
transferred to later chapters for additional filtering and discussion.  Those success 
factors that are confirmed by subsequent levels of inquiry will eventually form part of 
the final collection of success factors.  The success measurement instrument 
developed in this chapter will be applied to the case studies in the next chapter to 
determine its suitability while at the same time evaluating the case studies to identify 
success factors.  In Chapter 7, the results of all the prevous chapters will be 
presented and then put through a final filtering process by considering the results 
from questionnaires and interviews.  The presence of patterns of success and failure 
will be investigated.  Chapter 8 will provide a summary of all the findings of this 
research process, and a summary of the whole dissertation, with specific focus on 
the new knowledge generated, the hypothesis that results from this dissertation, and 
opportunities for further research and knowledge development. 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to determine critical success factors for PPPs.  It would 
be possible to identify such critical success factors by investigating successful PPPs 
and then modelling critical success factors on such successful PPPs.  The 
description of success factors through the study of successful partnerships is 
perhaps easier said that done because it will be important to identify exactly what 
made the partnership successful.  Isolating such factors might be possible through 
performance measurement, but measuring performance requires an instrument 
which includes specific performance indicators.  The search for an evaluation 
instrument will thus be a central part of this dissertation and especially this chapter. 
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The concept of partnership as a way of describing relationships between public, 
private and voluntary agencies can take many forms. The evaluation of quality in the 
delivery of services by these partnerships is recognized as complex given the 
differing perspectives not only of the two or more partners but of the various other 
stakeholders, including service users, and the potential for added value arising from 
the partnership itself (Kemshall & Ross, 2000).  It is expected that a variety of 
additional approaches to the evaluation of partnerships can exist. 
 
One option would be to take an epidemiological approach, considering how ―healthy‖ 
partnerships are and trying to identify and explore areas of ―disease‖ in failed 
partnerships.  A second approach could entail the use of performance measurement 
methodologies such as the ―balanced scorecard‖ model posited by Kaplan and 
Norton (1992; 1993; 1996a; 1996b; 2001).  A third approach could be to consider the 
triple bottom line approach to corporate governance and the pillars of sustainability: 
economic, environmental and social performance (Elkington, 2004; Savitz & Weber, 
2006).  Fourthly, the question of the creation of public value can be investigated 
along with other outcomes-based questions such as whether mutual benefit was 
created.  A fifth option is to look at normal project metrics, where partnerships can be 
evaluated as projects or programmes with normal project and/or programme 
evaluation methodologies.  The simple question of whether goals have been 
achieved can also be a basis for evaluation.  A seventh option or variation on the 
evaluation theme is to do a ―360 degree assessment‖ of the partnership where the 
partners, government, the private sector, clients of the partnership, member 
organizations of the partnership and people working within the partnership can 
evaluate the partnership based on their understanding and experience of the 
partnership. 
 
It has been stated that partnerships can make it possible for roleplayers to divert 
resources and that performance measurement and evaluation can reduce the 
possibility of resource diversion.  It is also argued that performance measurement is 
one of the few mechanisms available to ensure that semi-autonomous partnerships 
such as the American variety of business improvement districts (BIDs) create actual 
public benefits: benefits that are distributed across a wider public than a few 
merchants and are generally accessible.  Performance measurement can be seen as 
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a way of reigning in the power of quasi-private structures while also permitting a 
continued reliance on privatized provision of public goods (Caruso & Weber, 
2008:325).  Some commentators such as Plummer (2002) sees the introduction of 
performance management systems as one of the advantages or benefits of PPPs 
(see Section 2.5.5.16 from page 109), but it seems that performance management 
has already become part of  the public sector if one takes into regard the Municipal 
Systems Improvement Grants.  The researcher also has personal experience of 
performance management systems independent of the presence of PPPs in national 
as well as local government from 1991 to 2007 and has seen such systems at work 
in provincial government since 1998. 
 
Whether or not performance management is new to public sector is less relevant 
than the possible usefulness of performance management systems in pointing out 
successful or failed PPPs.  Performance management in itself is also a candidate for 
being a critical success factor in PPPs.  In order to measure performance one of 
course needs performance indicators.  The relationship between performance 
indicators and success factors is such that one can be derived from the other, and 
this quality will be exploited in this chapter to frame additional PPP success factors 
for comparison with those already identified in previous chapters.  With so many 
evaluation options possible, one might get the misleading impression that it will be 
easy to evaluate partnerships.  The fact is that partnership evaluation is all but 
simple, that it is fraught with obstacles, and that the comparison of different 
partnerships in terms of performance or evaluation outcomes is highly problematic.  
Even more problematic is to attempt a comparison between outcomes through 
partnership as opposed to outcomes achieved in the absence of partnership.  If it is 
true that a partnership needs to exhibit an improvement on the individual 
performance of the partners, it is also necessary to evaluate the performance of 
individual partners. Some baseline information will need to exist against which the 
performance of the partnership can be measured.  Taking in regard the complexity of 
evaluating partnerships brings one to the realization that this dissertation, in trying to 
forward critical success factors for partnerships, will also need to be a study of PPP 
evaluation. 
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From the next section various approaches to the measurement of PPP success will 
be raised, beginning with a comparative case study analysis and its process steps.  A 
linkage will be established with the case study analysis that will be conducted in the 
next chapter as part of the process established within this dissertation to identify 
success factors for PPPs. 
5.2 CASE STUDY EVALUATION 
This section is committed to the discussion of a case study evaluation.  The use of 
the methodology as a general evaluation instrument will be discussed, as well as the 
appropriateness of the methodology for the purpose of this investigation into the 
critical success factors for PPPs.  At the commencement of this research project, the 
intention was to conduct comparative case-study research.  It was assumed that a 
wide selection of partnerships could be compared with each other in order to isolate 
critical success factors.  From the outset, however, the nature of the data that could 
be collected on each case study was a concern, and the researcher was concerned 
that it would not be possible to collect the depth of information on enough case 
studies that is required to make a judgement on success or failure.  It was found that 
the minimum requirements for information on each PPP used in a case study 
comparison could be significant.  The research design and experience of Nijkamp et 
al (2002), who conducted a comparative case study of nine Dutch urban revitalisation 
PPP projects, provided important insights in this regard.  A comparative analysis of 
PPP case studies would hold several challenges which will now be described 
individually based on the methodologies and experience of Nijkamp et al (2002). 
5.2.1 Selection criteria for case studies 
In a general sense, the selection criteria for case studies would depend wholly on the 
purpose and boundaries of whatever study is being conducted.  From the perspective 
of a single PPP that needs to be evaluated, such selection criteria are immaterial as 
there is no choice of case study.  Selection of case studies as described here would 
be applicable only if a comparative analysis of a collection of PPPs needs to be 
performed.  The selection criteria for PPP projects that have been used in previous 
comparative analyses (Nijkamp et al, 2002) will now be listed.  Comments on their 
suitability for use in the search for PPP success factors will then be provided. 
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Selection criteria used by Nijkamp et al (2002) included: 
 The project is completed;  
 Sufficient data on the project is available;  
 The project has a PPP element;  
 The project has a substantial financial and institutional scope; 
 Similarity in scope and size between case studies. 
 
Each of the proposed selection criteria will now be evaluated.  Completed projects: 
After completing the literature study in the first part of the research project, the 
researcher realised that, with the long time-frames attached to certain types of PPPs, 
it would be unrealistic to only look at completed projects. Important examples of 
PPPs on the South African landscape would be disqualified from evaluation.  It is 
argued that it must be possible to draw lessons on success from incomplete projects, 
and even to evaluate the success of an incomplete project based on mid-project 
milestones and deliverables. It was therefore decided that the case study selection 
would not exclude incomplete partnerships.  The selection criterion was found to be 
incompatible with the goals of this research project and would also not be 
recommended in general.  The evaluation tool to be used should therefore be flexible 
enough to be applicable to a PPP in any possible life cycle stage.  It is noted that the 
life cycle stage of a PPP could be established as a selection criteria for case studies 
where it is appropriate for a research project. 
 
Sufficient data:  The availability of in-depth data on a disparate and sizable collection 
of PPPs remained a concern and the lack thereof became evident as the literature 
study for this research project progressed.  Most of the available information was 
presented either in the glowingly positive public-relations collateral of those involved 
in partnerships, or in ideologically motivated hyperbole against or for PPPs and its 
associated ―baggage‖ such as privatization.  Even if detailed information could be 
collected on a small collection of cases, given the resources available to the 
researcher, the use of this information would be limited if similar detailed information 
on other case studies was unavailable for comparison.  The researcher thus started 
to consider reducing the amount of information required per case study, but 
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considerably expanding the number of case studies to be evaluated.  A less in-depth 
case study comparative analysis was therefore envisaged in order to reduce the 
dependency on unavailable detailed information on partnerships and to relax the 
selection criteria for case studies.  It is noted that the availability of sufficient data will 
be an important consideration in all partnership evaluation efforts. 
 
PPP element:  It is evident that this selection criterion will be applicable because the 
PPP concept is central to the theme of this research project.  A key difference would 
be the wide variety of PPPs that will be considered, based on the many different 
forms of partnership identified in Chapter 2.  The use of the pre-qualification checklist 
developed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 reflects the intention of the researcher to focus 
on PPPs. The criterion was found to be applicable to this project.  It is noted that this 
criterion will also be applicable to PPP evaluation in general. 
 
Substantial financial and institutional scope:  It is difficult to determine exactly what is 
meant by ―substantial‖, but it could be accepted that some minimum scale should be 
applied as a selection criteria.  It would however be justifiable to ask whether 
―smaller‖ partnerships or partnerships where money does not change hands should 
be excluded as case studies, or whether they could not perhaps also contribute to a 
wider understanding of PPPs.  As the real aim of this dissertation is not to evaluate 
partnerships, but rather to identify critical success factors, the researcher is hesitant 
to arbitrarily exclude partnerships from the discussion and this selection criterion will 
therefore not be applied in this project.  It is noted that a research project could very 
well focus on partnerships with a specific scale or scope, and in such a case this 
criterion would be applicable. 
 
Selection criteria for comparative case study analysis could also include more 
specific requirements in terms of context and purpose. Nijkamp et al (2002), for 
example, looked specifically at urban rejuvenation partnerships within the 
Netherlands. As intimated in the above discussion under ―PPP element‖, a wide 
variety of partnership types were identified in Chapter 2.  It is held that it would not be 
beneficial to exclude any of these partnership types from the search for success 
factors because to exclude a type would be to pre-judge its ability to contribute 
lessons on PPP success.  The same argument is applicable to the question whether 
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PPPs with specific purpose should be excluded.  It is possible that a PPP in water 
and sanitation could assist in understanding success factors for a PPP in urban 
rejuvenation or one in scientific research, and therefore no PPP will be excluded from 
this investigation based on purpose.  The title of this dissertation indicates its special 
focus on South Africa and it could be felt that a selection criterion for case studies 
could be that they should be South African.  Such a parochial approach would not be 
beneficial as it will restrict opportunities to learn from others‘ failures and success.  
Once again the approach will be not to restrict or exclude, but rather to include as 
wide a geographic sample of PPPs as possible in the search for PPP success 
factors. It will still be appropriate to pay special attention to South African cases after 
looking at an international perspective.  It is noted that this criterion would be useful 
for research or evaluation projects with more specific goals. 
 
Similarity in scope and size:  The use of this criterion will be determined by the goal 
of the evaluation being conducted.  For the purpose of this research project a 
similarity in scope and size is not required because it may restrict or limit the 
collection of information on success and failure.  The search for partnership success 
factors is purposely wide-ranging and little similarity in scope is expected.  It can be 
argued that other evaluation projects may purposefully want to compare partnerships 
with differences in scale and scope.  This criterion should therefore be used with care 
and only when appropriate to the evaluation project. It is noted that similarity in scope 
and size will be useful when a systematic comparative analysis of projects is 
required. 
 
In summary, this subsection was used to evaluate the usefulness of various case 
study selection criteria for comparative case study analysis.  It was established that 
some criteria are not useful for use in the necessarily wide-ranging investigation 
conducted in this dissertation, but that most selection criteria could be useful for 
evaluation purposes, depending on the goals of each specific evaluation project.  In 
the next subsection the following process step in Nijkamp et al‘s (2002) evaluation 
process will be described and once again applied to the evaluation of case studies 
that is required within this dissertation. 
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5.2.2 Research fieldwork  
The collection of information is a critical step in any research or evaluation project 
and also in a comparative case study analysis. The steps in the fieldwork process 
that Nijkamp et al (2002) used are listed below and will then be discussed 
individually.  The following activities were carried out: 
 Selection of potentially interesting cases; 
 Exploration of willingness to co-operate among major stakeholders in the 
project concerned; 
 Assessment of available information relevant for a systematic case-study 
approach; 
 Execution of structured interviews with main parties involved; 
 Collection of relevant data from study reports including ‗grey‘ literature and 
experts; and  
 Compilation of a systematic database on features and success factors. 
 
Selection of cases:  The selection of cases will be dependent on the purpose of the 
evaluation or research, and the criteria used to select case studies.  Already 
discussed in detail in the previous subsection, the selection of suitable cases has 
bearing on the success of an evaluation.  As mentioned in the previous subsection, 
the selection of cases is only possible where more than one case needs to be 
evaluated or when specific cases are not pre-indicated for evaluation.  The selection 
of the case studies to be evaluated in the next chapter was based on the need to get 
as wide a range as possible of partnerships, while ensuring good representation from 
South African cases.   
 
Exploration of willingness to cooperate:  The exploration of the willingness of major 
stakeholders in the projects concerned to collaborate requires considerable field-work 
capacity.  It is assumed that the project to evaluate nine PPPs, conducted by Nijkamp 
et al (2002), involved at least the three authors and quite possibly additional research 
assistants for a considerable time.  The workload in this phase is significant because 
there will be several stakeholders for every PPP to be evaluated.  The workload 
could be reduced by opting for telephonic or e-mail communication instead of 
personal meetings with stakeholders, but personal meetings are of course preferable 
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to all other means.  This phase presented a major challenge for the PPP success 
factor research project conducted for this dissertation because of the many 
international examples included.  The researcher did not have unlimited 
opportuniities to visit the stakeholders of PPPs in their geographic settings and 
therefore had to rely on telephonic or e-mail channels for this purpose.  A second 
complication was that some of the chosen partnerships had wrapped up and ceased 
to exist, with a resultant rapid reduction of directly involved stakeholders that could 
assist in evaluation. A third complication that developed was related to language 
barriers which effectively would have limited the research to PPPs in Anglophone 
countries or with Anglophone stakeholders. 
 
Confronted by these challenges, the researcher had to decide on a course of action 
that would be meaningful and practical for a single researcher without support that 
needed to try and evaluate a worldwide sample of PPPs.  The researcher decided to 
re-assess the need for contacting stakeholders and soliciting their collaboration for 
evaluation.  The decision was made that direct contact with stakeholders would be 
sought, but that the absence of such contact should not disqualify a case study from 
further evaluation if sufficient information can be gathered through other means than 
stakeholder involvement.  This approach was justifiable against the background of 
the earlier decision to reduce the information required per case study, as detailed and 
in-depth project-specific information would rarely be accessible without direct 
personal support from at least one PPP stakeholder.  It could be argued that the 
reduction of information requirements and stakeholder contact would fatally weaken 
the envisaged comparative case study analysis.  This would be true if the case study 
analysis was the sole source of data for this dissertation.  The fact is that the case 
study analysis is not the main focus of this dissertation, it represents one of several 
layered data sources that are combined to arrive at a collection of critical success 
factors for PPPs.  In the context of this dissertation, the PPP evaluation instrument 
that is progressively being developed in this dissertation is more important than the 
outcome of the case study analysis.  The reason for this is that the evaluation tool will 
contain valuable indications of success factors. 
 
The next step in the fieldwork process involves the assessment of available 
information relevant for a systematic case-study approach.  This is once again a 
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time-consuming and labour-intensive but critically valuable process.  This process 
would ideally entail meetings and direct contact with stakeholders and physical 
inspection of available information resources.  For the PPP success factor research 
project, the researcher had to accept that only limited information would be available 
and that information would need to be collected using other means than direct access 
through stakeholders.  It was realised that the research channels used for the 
preceding literature study could be re-employed to collect case-specific data, and that 
media channels that could report on PPPs could also provide case-specific 
information. 
 
Structured interviews:  The conducting of structured interviews still requires active 
participation by stakeholders and is also time-intensive.  Structured interviews can be 
conducted via telephone and even e-mail, and this is mostly what the researcher had 
to resort to in the case of the PPP success factor research project, for those 
stakeholders that were able to collaborate.  The structure of the interview could be 
determined by the evaluation areas identified in the development of the PPP 
evaluation tool that will be presented at the end of this project.   
 
Collection of relevant data:  In this stage the fieldworkers can collect information and 
documentation directly from collaborating stakeholders.  This option was not 
available to the researcher except through electronic means.  
 
Compilation of a systematic database:  In an evaluation or research project where the 
outcome of the fieldwork will determine the success of the project, this phase will 
again take considerable time and effort.  For the purpose of the PPP success factor 
research, this database contained the information that could be collected through 
collaboration from stakeholders or own research.  The next step in the process 
entails the codification of case studies.  
5.2.3 Codification of case studies 
The codification of case studies entails creating a database and establishing a 
database front-end that could present the available information in a compact and 
systematic form for comparative processes.  With the lower information requirements 
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per case study that was decided on for the PPP success factor project, this step was 
not necessary.  The next fieldwork step involves the detailed description of each case 
study. 
5.2.4 Detailed descriptions of each case study 
In this stage, there is a need for detailed description of the various attributes of the 
individual cases and systematic insight into: 
 institutional arrangements; 
 financing and risk elements; 
 revenues and costs; and  
 project organisation.  (Nijkamp et al, 2002) 
 
These areas of insight can be likened to the dimensions of character already 
described in earlier chapters.  In the comparative analysis of case studies conducted 
by Nijkamp et al (2002), an extensive information system was built up comprising 
many detailed insights and the detailed systematic information was put into a data 
matrix in which both within-case data and cross-data patterns could be mapped out.  
The information in the database was qualitative in nature, using a categorical 
measurement scale (nominal, binary). This ultimately led to the construction of a 
codified data matrix as illustrated in the table below, which is a concise 
representation of all underlying field information. This multi-attribute table serves as 
the basis for a systematic comparison of the PPP projects which were being 
evaluated.  The fields contained in the attribute table will be defined by the 
performance areas and performance indicators the evaluator chooses to use in the 
evaluation process.  The following table illustrates the performance areas, 
performance indicators and range of possible scores that was used in the project. 
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Table 5-1: Data matrix variables and evaluation indicators for a multi-attribute evaluation 
results table 
Evaluation 
category / 
Performance area 
Evaluation variable / 
Performance indicator 
Possible scores 
1 2 3 
Institutional 
Arrangement 
 
Type of initiative 
(Mainly) public 
with limited 
number of 
players 
Mainly private or 
public-private 
with large 
numbers of 
players 
 
Type of actors‘ co-
operation 
Traditional Joint venture Concession 
Spatial scope Local Regional (Inter)national 
Financing and risk 
Financiers and risk-
bearers 
Mainly public Mainly private 
Joint public-
private activity 
Awareness of different 
risk profiles of project 
parts 
Yes No 
 
Contractual 
arrangements 
Transparency of 
profit(ability) 
requirements 
Yes No 
Nature of contract Global Detailed 
Revenues and 
costs 
Financial transparency Good Fair Poor 
Soil pollution costs High Modest Poor 
Expected rise in land 
price 
Yes No  
Project 
organisation 
Selection procedure of 
partners 
Open selection 
Target group 
approach 
Combination 
Stepwise approach to 
project components 
Yes No  
 
The table in effect describes the character of the different partnerships being 
evaluated. Note the soil pollution and land price aspect, which are specific to the type 
of project and PPP evaluated by Nijkamp et al (2002).  The following table provides 
some sample data to illustrate how the table would be populated from the 
background database. 
 
Table 5-2: Table with sample data 
Evaluation 
category / 
Performance area 
Evaluation variable / 
Performance indicator 
Scores 
Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 
Institutional 
Arrangement 
 
Type of initiative 1 2 2 
Type of actors‘ co-
operation 
3 1 2 
Spatial scope 1 1 2 
Financing and risk 
Financiers and risk-
bearers 
3 3 3 
Awareness of different 
risk profiles of project 
parts 
2 1 2 
Contractual 
arrangements 
Transparency of 
profit(ability) 
requirements 
2 1 1 
Nature of contract 2 2 1 
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Evaluation 
category / 
Performance area 
Evaluation variable / 
Performance indicator 
Scores 
Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 
Revenues and 
costs 
Financial transparency 2 3 1 
Soil pollution costs 1 1 3 
Expected rise in land 
price 
2 2 2 
Project 
organisation 
Selection procedure of 
partners 
3 3 3 
Stepwise approach to 
project components 
2 1 2 
 
After each case study was described in great detail using the above instruments, 
Nijkamp et al (2002) moved on to the next step, which involved the determination of 
success. 
5.2.5 Determining success 
The determination of success was the final step in the process followed by Nijkamp 
et al (2002).  The evaluation process is dependent on the definition of success.  For 
this specific project, Nijkamp et al (2002:1870) interpreted success for urban 
revitalization PPPs as a positive contribution from the following perspectives: 
 an executive and organisational  perspective;  
 an operational and marketing perspective; and,  
 a contractual and building perspective.  
 
The determination of success was based on extensive interviews with stakeholders, 
administrative representatives and local experts.  A common assessment was made 
of the relative success scores of each urban project (and its constituent factors), 
taking into consideration the timing, the institutional environment, the scale, the user 
benefits and the contextual information of the projects.  The following table illustrates 
the success or performance areas and the possible range of scores used in the 
project. 
 
Table 5-3: A three-dimensional success scoring instrument 
Success area Possible scores Case study X – 
example scores 1 2 3 4 
Aggregate 
score 
Unsatisfactory Acceptable Successful Very 
successful 
7 
 
Executive and 
organisational 
Unsatisfactory Acceptable Successful Very 
successful 
2 
Operational 
and marketing 
Unsatisfactory Acceptable Successful Very 
successful 
4 
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Success area Possible scores Case study X – 
example scores 1 2 3 4 
Contractual 
and building 
Unsatisfactory Acceptable Successful Very 
successful 
1 
Nijkamp et al (2002:1873) 
 
 
The following table provides an example of how the table would be filled in after an 
evaluation has been completed. 
 
Table 5-4: A three-dimensional success scoring instrument with example scores 
Success area 
Case study X – 
example scores 
Case study X – 
example scores 
Case study X – 
example scores 
Case study X – 
example scores 
Aggregate 
score 
7 
 
4 9 7 
Executive and 
organisational 
2 1 3 1 
Operational 
and marketing 
4 1 3 2 
Contractual 
and building 
1 2 3 4 
Nijkamp et al (2002:1873) 
 
 
It is interesting to note that Nijkamp et al (2002) separated the success evaluation 
from the description of the partnerships.  An exhaustive process was followed to 
collect information on the case studies, but this information was not used to 
determine success. Instead, interviews were used to determine success.  Nijkamp et 
al (2002) then moved on to take the success measurement results and derive 
reasons for success from it by considering the character of the case study 
concerned.  Using rough set analysis, they could arrive at rules such as:  ―If there is 
no clear awareness of the cost composition and risk distribution of different project 
parts, then the success score in terms of contractual and building performance is 
very poor.‖   The way in which the success of the case studies were determined 
through the quantitative collection of opinion instead of the evaluation of the case 
studies‘ real performance gives substance to previous statements in this dissertation 
that success is a matter of opinion, while the interpretation of success shown here 
confirms a previous statement that success is also a matter of definition.  
 
What also emerged from the description of the case study methodology is that the 
evaluation of a PPP will start with its description or characterisation and that 
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characterisation is in effect evaluation because it is not possible to evaluate 
something without describing it.  Similarly, describing something automatically 
includes an evaluation.  It is not possible to describe or characterise the colour of a 
car without first evaluating that colour.  Evaluation is required before description can 
be done.  The success evaluation conducted by Nijkamp et al (2002) also included a 
descriptive phase.  Once the success evaluation was complete they could look at the 
earlier completed descriptions to identify characteristics of successful partnerships 
and critical success factors.  The methodology shows that predominantly nominal 
and non-numerical qualitative data can effectively be used in PPP case study 
comparisons. 
 
In summary, the case study methodology has been demonstrated to be applicable to 
PPP evaluation.  A similar, although less detailed, approach will be used to evaluate 
the case studies in the next chapter.  Less detail is required because the case study 
analysis is only one of several sources of success factors being explored in this 
dissertation.  This section has focused more on method that on the identification of 
additional success factors, and therefore no newly identified success factors can be 
listed.  In this section comparative case study analysis was described as an 
evaluation tool for PPPs.  In the next section alternative approaches to evaluation will 
be discussed. 
5.3 EVALUATION BASED ON CHARACTERIZATION 
The categories of success factors emerging from the considerable collection of 
success factors that have been collected through the preceding two chapters 
identified at the end of the previous chapter could also serve as a departure point for 
the identification of key performance areas for PPP evaluation.  Performance areas 
can also be called dimensions of performance, and dimensions of performance would 
indicate the dimensions of character of a partnership (Refer discussion of dimensions 
of character in previous chapter).  Müller (2008) proposes a framework for the 
assessment of collaborative environmental governance structures that allows for the 
characterization (and therefore basic evaluation) of different governance structures or 
networks.  This approach is similar to the dimensions of character that was described 
in the previous chapter (See Figure 4.11. on page 275).  Müller argues that such a 
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characterization could also assist in the evaluation of the performance of governance 
structures.  Such a framework for evaluation and characterization could prove useful 
in the context of this dissertation and specifically this chapter on the evaluation of 
PPPs, especially since Müller looks at collaborative structures and PPPs are also 
collaborative structures.  The idea to use characterization or dimensions of character 
for evaluation will also be implemented in this dissertation as already indicated in this 
section.  The table below shows Müller‘s criteria and description in the first and 
second column, with additional interpretation added to relate these to PPP concepts, 
characterization and performance evaluation in the third, right-hand column. 
Suggestions on the use of the criteria for PPP characterization will also be made in 
the right-hand column, and some indication of how each criterion can be presented in 
a measuring tool will also be provided. 
 
Table 5-5: A framework for the characterization of collaborative structures 
Criteria Description Interpretation and linkages with PPP 
concepts 
Scope The set of concerns that is 
addressed through the 
coordination arrangements, no 
matter whether they are 
environmental policies or 
management activities  
This criterion could be equated to the goal or 
objective of a partnership and its anticipated 
outcomes as well as the setting of the PPP. For 
the purpose of PPP characterization, this 
criterion will be renamed Purpose and setting. 
Unique descriptions will be required for each 
PPP. 
Position The stakeholders and role-
players that are involved in the 
coordination activities and their 
roles in the setting (e.g. agency, 
user group, coordinator)  
This criterion seems less concerned with the 
position of the governance structure than the 
names and positions of roleplayers within the 
structure, and seems to be seen from the 
perspective of a specific role-player or person 
representing a role-player.  For the purpose of 
PPP characterization, this criterion will be 
renamed to Structural relationships and 
positions.  Unique descriptions will be required 
for each PPP. 
Boundary How specific individuals and 
stakeholders enter or leave 
those positions (e.g. whether by 
means of appointment, 
nomination or election) 
This criterion relates to internal governance of 
positions and the representation of 
stakeholders, as well as to rules around 
decision making about positions. For the 
purpose of PPP characterization this criterion 
will be renamed Representation rules.  Unique 
descriptions will be required for each PPP. 
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Criteria Description Interpretation and linkages with PPP 
concepts 
Authority The coordination activities (i.e. 
information exchange or conflict 
resolution) in which position 
holders can or cannot 
participate, as well as the 
constraints on autonomy and/or 
individual action and the basis of 
power (e.g. legislation, plan, 
administrative policy or informal 
agreement) 
Three dimensions of authority are discernable 
here.  Firstly the limits of authority for 
participation of individual position holders as 
mandated or imposed by the organizations they 
represent.  Secondly, possibly, the limits to 
authority imposed by the governance structure 
or partnership itself – which relates to decision-
making.  Thirdly the source or basis of authority 
for the partnership itself.  The name of this 
criterion will be used as-is, but with sub-
categories, for PPP characterization.  Unique 
descriptions will be required for each PPP. 
Information and 
knowledge 
management 
The kinds, forms, timing and 
processes of information 
exchange among the different 
position holders (e.g. shared 
database, monthly meetings or 
electronic networks) 
This criterion is Similar to Welborn and Kasten‘s 
Collaborative Landscape and more specifically 
the Jericho Zone, where walls between parties 
are broken down to enable closer collaboration.  
One such ―breaking down of the walls‖ would be 
the use of common databases and even 
common technology and productivity tools. The 
criterion can be used for PPP characterization in 
its present form.  Unique descriptions will be 
required for each PPP, although frequency of 
meetings can be presented on a continuum. 
Decision 
making 
The position holders‘ procedure 
for making collective decisions 
and resolving conflicts (e.g. by 
means of general consensus or 
voting procedures 
This criterion focuses on individual position 
holders, but the same theme as mentioned 
above in Boundary and Authority.  Basically the 
question is: ―How are decisions made in this 
partnership?‖ The criterion can be used as-is for 
PPP characterization. If a limited number of 
decision-making options can be defined, this 
criterion can be indicated per PPP by a multiple 
choice range. 
Pluriformity The extent to which the 
networks are integrated, in so 
far as this will influence their 
likelihood of producing effective 
coordination (such as their level 
of integration, determining 
whether they can be treated as 
a single organization, or need to 
be treated as semi-autonomous 
organizations) 
A rather obscure term, the multiplicity of forms 
of collaboration is rather unattached to the 
description used.  If networks in the plural are 
used then the idea here is that more than one 
network is collaborating. The real point of 
evaluation is whether the degree of integration 
supports effective coordination.  It might 
however be a mistake to equate degree of 
integration with ability for coordination.  It is not 
impossible for unintegrated networks or 
organizations to demonstrate effective 
coordination. This criterion will be renamed to 
Level of integration and coordination, and it can 
be presented on a continuum from low to high. 
Inter-
dependence 
The extent of interdependence 
between the different entities 
making up the network, in so far 
as this influences styles of 
interaction and relationships 
(e.g. loosely coupled or closely 
interconnected), which in turn 
influences their likelihood of 
producing effective coordination 
This criterion also relates to integration and 
effective coordination, but is more focused on 
interdependence, where the partners need each 
other.  The contention is that interdependence 
will foster effective coordination, possibly out of 
necessity. The criterion will remain as as for 
PPP characterization and can be presented on 
a continuum from low to high. 
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Criteria Description Interpretation and linkages with PPP 
concepts 
Formality The level of formality, in so far 
as this influences  their 
likelihood of producing effective 
coordination 
This criterion is appropriate for PPP 
characterization and can remain as is.  
Formality can be presented on a continuum 
from low to high. 
Instruments The nature of the instruments 
used (i.e. planning, formal 
regulations or contracts) as this 
influences their likelihood of 
producing  effective coordination 
This criterion relates to coordination again, this 
time dependent on the nature of instruments 
used – linking to formality as described above.  
A PPP‘s character in terms of instruments used 
will need to be described individually if a limited 
set of instruments cannot be defined that can be 
presented in a multiple choice range.  
Leadership The presence of clear 
government commitment and 
leadership at the highest level 
effectively communicated to the 
various sectors of government 
machinery and across levels of 
government 
This criterion links to the need for a supportive 
environment.  For the purpose of PPP 
characterization it can be renamed Public 
leadership to discern it from the leadership 
required within the private partner.  It is worth 
noting that this leadership also includes 
effective communication, almost advocacy.  
This criterion can be presented in a checklist 
with space for additional unique comments. 
Institutional 
readiness 
The degree to which 
jurisdictions are aware of, and 
primed for, engaging each other 
in collaborative governance of 
the different entities in terms of  
 The level of citizen and 
community interest and 
involvement 
 The availability of existing 
institutions and 
organizations for regional 
governance 
 The degree of practical 
experience  in formal and 
informal cross-sectional 
coordination and 
cooperation, and 
 The amount of knowledge  
and appreciation of the 
missions, goals and 
objectives of the other 
participants 
This criterion encompasses several 
characterizations that can be used to describe 
PPPs.   
 Partner readiness for partnership 
 Citizen and community interest and 
involvement 
 Presence of potential partners 
 Previous partnership experience 
 Intra-partnership awareness of other 
partners‘ missions, goals and objectives 
The criterion can be used as-is with sub-
components.  Each of the 5 sub-components 
can be presented on a continuum from low to 
high. 
Redundancy This occurs where overlap is an 
outcome of cooperative 
arrangements with two or more 
organizations performing the 
same task.  (Refer Jones and 
Thompson, 2007, where 
restructuring of government 
could include shedding non-core 
competencies within the mission 
of the specific agency to other 
entities.) 
This criterion is applicable to PPP 
characterization but will be renamed Overlap 
and duplication to make it clearer. This criterion 
could be presented on a continuum from low to 
high. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 336 
Criteria Description Interpretation and linkages with PPP 
concepts 
Incoherence This arises where the 
cooperative arrangements are 
characterized by policies with 
the same clients, who have 
different goals and 
requirements. 
This criterion relates to a situation where 
policies with different goals and requirements 
are applied to clients that do not differ so 
significantly that they need different policies.  
Such a situation could confuse clients and 
create suspicion of double standards.  The 
criterion will be renamed in a positive sense to 
Policy consistency and can be presented on a 
continuum from low to high. 
Lacunae (A ―lacuna‖ is a gap, missing 
part, or unclear area in an idea, 
or theory) 
These are marked by failure of 
the cooperative arrangements, 
because of the absence of any 
organization performing a 
necessary task. 
This criterion relates to partner failures and 
responsibility allocation failures, but the most 
descriptive term is possibly partnership 
governance- and delivery gaps.  It is applicable 
to PPP characterization and can be presented 
on a continuum from low to high with space for 
further elaboration of unique information if 
required.  
 
When Müller defines the different criteria that can be used to characterize 
collaborative structures, he frequently refers to effective coordination.  Effective 
coordination is perhaps the most fundamental requirement for partnership success, 
but can be expressed more vividly by the words purposeful collaboration.  Effective 
cooperation, or purposeful collaboration, is considered to be important enough to 
warrant an additional criterion for characterization, as illustrated and described below: 
 
Criteria Description Interpretation and linkages with PPP 
concepts 
Purposeful 
collaboration 
The effectiveness of cooperation 
within the partnership.  More 
visible in its absence than 
otherwise, it relates to positively 
working towards a common goal 
and making solid contributions.  
Purposeful collaboration can 
also be seen in working 
intelligently with combined 
resources and ensuring 
economy and efficiency in what 
is done.  
This criterion can be difficult to measure in any 
other way than the quantitative collection of 
opinions, but is a critical indicator nonetheless.. 
It may be possible to use the presence of 
structures to enable collaboration as a proxy 
indicator but there may be no direct relationship 
between the availability of structures and 
collaboration, just as there is no consistent 
relationship between road speed restrictions 
and the speed of travel of road-users. This 
criterion is applicable to PPPs. A qualitative 
score on a range from low to high can be 
assigned for each PPP. 
 
By interpreting and compiling all the comments in the right-hand column of the tables 
above, a new characterization framework that is specifically applicable to PPPs can 
be developed.  The following table is the result of this process. 
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Table 5-6: A derived PPP characterization framework 
PPP Characterization Criteria How characterization can be presented 
Purpose and setting Unique descriptions will be required for each PPP. 
Structural relationships and positions Unique descriptions will be required for each PPP. 
Representation rules Unique descriptions will be required for each PPP. 
Authority  
 limits of representatives‘ 
mandate 
 limits to internal authority  
 source or basis of authority for 
the partnership itself.   
Unique descriptions will be required for each PPP. 
Information and knowledge 
management 
Unique descriptions will be required for each PPP, 
although frequency of meetings can be presented on a 
continuum. 
Decision making  If a limited number of decision-making options can be 
defined, this criterion can be indicated per PPP by a 
multiple choice range. 
Level of integration and coordination This criterion can be presented on a continuum from low 
to high. 
Interdependence The criterion can be presented on a continuum from low 
to high. 
Formality Formality can be presented on a continuum from low to 
high. 
Instruments A PPP‘s character in terms of instruments used will need 
to be described individually if a limited set of instruments 
cannot be defined that can be presented in a multiple 
choice range.  
Public Leadership This criterion can be presented in a checklist with space 
for additional unique comments. 
Institutional readiness  
 Partner readiness for partnership 
 Citizen and community interest and 
involvement 
 Presence of potential partners 
 Previous partnership experience 
 Intra-partnership awareness of 
other partners‘ missions, goals and 
objectives 
 
Each of the 5 sub-components can be presented on a 
continuum from low to high. 
Overlap and duplication This criterion could be presented on a continuum from 
low to high. 
Policy consistency  Policy consistency and can be presented on a 
continuum from low to high. 
Partnership governance- and delivery 
gaps 
This criterion can be presented on a continuum from low 
to high with space for further elaboration of unique 
information if required.  
Purposeful collaboration A qualitative score on a range from low to high can be 
assigned for each PPP. 
 
While some of the characterization criteria identified above are purely descriptive, 
others have elements of performance evaluation in them and could therefore become 
part of an exercise to determine performance areas for PPPs.  As mentioned in the 
previous section, some degree of evaluation is required in order to categorize 
something.  The characterization that can be done using the above table would 
therefore necessarily require a degree of evaluation of each partnership. The table 
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above also reminds one of Nijkamp et al‘s (2002) data matrix as illustrated on page 
329 in the previous section.  It should be remembered that success can also be a 
matter of perception or personal opinion.  This point was also raised in the previous 
section.  It can be argued that a partnership would automatically suffer from 
differences of opinion regarding success due to the fact that a partnership will contain 
at least two dramatically different organizations with divergent skills, attitudes and 
priorities. 
 
Added to possibly conflicting perceptions inside the partnership, various stakeholders 
could also have contrasting perceptions regarding the performance of a PPP.  A 
politician who was involved in the conception of the PPP would have different 
perceptions than a citizen who is a client of the PPP, who would in turn not have the 
same perception as the private entity who also wanted to be part of the PPP but lost 
the bid, or the shop steward from the trade union whose members are affected by the 
PPP.  The implication of these different perspectives on success is that evaluation of 
PPPs should be sensitive for the influence of differing perceptions and should ideally 
promote transparency and inclusivity in the evaluation process.  The following 
success factors can be derived from the derived PPP characterization framework that 
was developed in this section: 
 Defined purpose 
 Defined structural relationships 
 Clear mandates and authority 
 Efficient knowledge and information management 
 Defined and efficient decision-making 
 Appropriate levels of integration and coordination 
 Appropriate levels of interdependence 
 Appropriate levels of formality 
 Use of appropriate management instruments 
 Public leadership 
 Partner readiness for partnership 
 Citizen and community interest and involvement 
 Available potential partners 
 Previous partnership experience 
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 Intra-partnership awareness of other partners‘ missions, goals and objectives 
 Low overlap and duplication 
 Policy consistency 
 Limited governance and delivery gaps 
 Purposeful collaboration 
 
These success factors will be combined with success factors from other sections for 
analysis at the end of this chapter.  This section saw the discussion of how the 
characterization or description of a PPP could allow basic evaluation.  It was shown 
that performance indicators can be developed through characterization and that an 
effort to describe a PPP leads directly to some basic form of evaluation.  A PPP 
characterization framework was developed that can contribute to the PPP success 
measurement instrument that is developed in this chapter.  In the next section the 
current discourse on the evaluation of PPPs will be continued by considering the 
implications of definitions for performance evaluation. 
5.4 THE PURPOSE- AND PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS OF DEFINITIONS 
The discussion of the evaluation of PPPs commenced in the previous section, with 
the explanation of a standard case-study comparison as one way of evaluating 
partnerships.  The development of a measurement instrument for PPPs was 
described and several performance areas have been identified for use in an 
evaluation tool.  In this section additional performance areas and performance 
indicators will be established by breaking PPP definitions down into their component 
parts.   
 
The definition of an entity which delivers a service is perhaps more important in terms 
of performance management than one would at first expect.  This is because the 
measurement of success could be dependent on definition.  How partnerships are 
defined will also define how success should be measured.  If one defines a car as a 
self-propelled vehicle which is used to convey people and goods from one place to 
another, there is an expectation that the car should be able to move, and one could 
then expect to measure how good a car it is by determining how good it is at moving 
people and goods.  If one defines a car as ―a metal box with four wheels‖, there is no 
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expectation flowing from the definition that the car would be able to move at all, and 
whether it is a good car would depend solely on whether it is a metal box and has 
four wheels.  The purpose of the car is restricted in the second definition to being a 
metal box with four wheels.  For the purpose of the argument in this dissertation, the 
elements within a definition that give clues regarding the purpose of the defined 
service delivery entity, will be called assumed purpose components of definitions 
by the researcher.  The purpose components in a definition can be used to derive 
assumed performance measurement indicators.  From the definition of a car as a 
self-propelled vehicle which is used to convey people and goods from one place to 
another, the assumed purpose components could be ―self-propelled vehicle‖, ―convey 
people‖, ―convey goods‖, and ―from one place to another‖.  One could then derive 
assumed performance indicators from these purpose components as illustrated in the 
table below: 
 
Table 5-7: Definition Analysis: Example 
Definition Assumed purpose 
components identified in 
the definition 
Assumed performance indicators derived from 
the purpose components 
A car as a self-
propelled 
vehicle which is 
used to convey 
people and 
goods from one 
place to 
another. 
self-propelled vehicle 
How much energy does the car use to propel itself. 
How far and how long can the car propel itself. 
convey people 
How many people can be conveyed at the same 
time. 
How many people can be conveyed in a specific 
period of time. 
convey goods 
How much goods can be conveyed at the same 
time. 
How much goods can be conveyed in a specific 
period of time. 
from one place to another 
What is the range of the car. 
What kind of terrain can the car cross. 
How fast can the car travel. 
  
A specific definition of a public-private partnership could similarly be analysed to 
arrive at purpose components and performance indicators.  This will be done in 
following sections of this chapter.  As each definition is described, definition 
components will be identified and success indicators will be derived from the 
components of the definitions.  The success indicators can in turn be used to derive 
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critical success factors.  The success indicator can be used to measure the 
performance of a partnership, while the critical success factor can form part of a 
checklist for public managers to evaluate the merits of a proposed partnership.  
Success indicators are used in this chapter to develop an evaluation instrument, 
while the derived critical success factors identified in this chapter through the analysis 
of definitions will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, along with success factors 
identified through case study analysis, questionnaires and interviews. 
 
 
 
The figure above describes the process through which critical success factors are 
identified in this dissertation.  It also shows how an evaluation tool will be developed 
out of the identified performance indicators, and in turn will contribute to the further 
identification of success factors.  It would be possible to compare the performance 
indicators for a specific service delivery entity which was derived from the definition of 
that entity with official purpose statements and performance indicators, as well as 
observed functions and performance, and thus to improve the definition of the service 
delivery entity to something more truly reflective of its real purpose.  In later sections 
of this chapter, when definitions of public-private partnerships are analysed, 
shortcomings in definitions may be identified and amendments to definitions may be 
Figure 5.1: A graphic representation of the success factor identification process in this 
dissertation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical success 
factors identified 
 
 
 
Success 
indicators 
or 
performance 
indicators 
identified 
Literature opinion / 
recommendation 
analysis 
Definitions analysis 
Analysis of case 
studies in literature 
Analysis of 
questionnaire, 
interview and 
observation results 
 
 
 
Literature 
study  
SA Case 
studies 
analysis 
Evaluation tool 
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proposed.  In this section the purpose and performance implications of definitions 
were discussed and it was found that: 
– How an entity is defined will influence assumptions on purpose and 
performance measures. 
– By identifying purpose components in a definition and then deriving 
performance measurement indicators, one could create an instrument with 
which to improve the definition of a specific entity by comparing the entity and 
its existing characteristics with the derived performance indicators. 
 
The analysis of definitions to determine success indicators will commence in the 
following subsection, the SA Treasury definition of a PPP will be the first definition to 
be analysed. 
5.4.1 Definition 1: SA Treasury 
The SA Treasury definition of a PPP will now be examined according to the process 
described in section 5.4 above, where assumed purpose components and 
performance indicators are derived from a definition. 
 
 The assumed purpose components from the PPP definition of the SA Treasury are:  
– a contractual arrangement is made; 
– between a public sector entity and a private sector entity; 
– the private sector performs a departmental function; 
o In accordance with an output-based specification; 
o For a specified, significant period of time; 
– for performing this function, the private sector receives a benefit, normally in 
the form of financial remuneration; 
– the arrangement involves a substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle 
risk to the private sector; 
– the public sector retains a significant role in the partnership project either as  
o the main purchaser of the services provided; 
o or as the main enabler of the project. 
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The following assumed performance indicators can be derived from this Treasury 
definition: 
– a contractual arrangement must be in place; 
– a public sector entity and a private sector entity must be involved; 
– the private sector entity must perform a departmental function 
o for which an output-based specification was drawn up; 
o for the duration of a significant period of time which has been specified; 
– the private sector must receive a benefit for performing the service, normally in 
the form of financial remuneration; 
– a substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle risks to the private sector 
is effected; 
– the public sector must remain a significant role-player in the partnership 
project as either the  
o main purchaser of the services provided; or 
o main enabler of the project. 
 
Table 5-8 on page 344 presents the above analysis in table form.  If the SA Treasury 
definition of a PPP is correct, then the performance indicators derived from the 
definition could be used as a check-list to determine the success or failure of a 
partnership.  There would however be fundamental errors in the exclusive use of the 
above indicators, which will be illustrated later in this chapter.  The implication of 
these fundamental errors would be that the SA Treasury definition of a partnership is 
not accurate and should be reviewed, or at least that the SA Treasury definition of a 
PPP is not appropriate for use as performance benchmark. 
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Table 5-8: Definition analysis: PPP 
Definition Assumed purpose components identified in the 
definition 
Assumed performance indicators derived from the 
purpose components 
A PPP is a contractual 
arrangement between a public 
sector entity and a private sector 
entity whereby the private sector 
performs a departmental function 
in accordance with an output-
based specification for a 
specified, significant period of 
time in return for a benefit, which 
is normally in the form of financial 
remuneration.  It furthermore 
involves a substantial transfer of 
all forms of project life cycle risk 
to the private sector.  The public 
sector retains a significant role in 
the partnership project either as 
the main purchaser of the 
services provided, or as the main 
enabler of the project 
A contractual arrangement is made A contractual arrangement must be in place 
Between a public sector entity and a private sector entity A public sector entity and a private sector entity must be 
involved 
The private sector performs a departmental function… 
 In accordance with an output-based specification  
 For a specified, significant period of time 
 
The private sector entity must perform a departmental 
function 
 For which an output-based specification was drawn up 
 For which a significant period of time has been 
specified 
For performing this function, the private sector receives a 
benefit, normally in the form of financial remuneration 
The private sector must receive a benefit for performing 
the service, normally in the form of financial remuneration 
The arrangement involves a substantial transfer of all 
forms of project life cycle risk to the private sector 
A substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle risks 
to the private sector is effected 
 
The public sector retains a significant role in the 
partnership project either as  
 the main purchaser of the services provided 
 or as the main enabler of the project. 
The public sector must remain a significant role-player in 
the partnership project as either the  
 Main purchaser of the services provided or 
 Main enabler of the project 
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5.4.2 Definition 2: World Bank 
The World Bank (2008) defines a road-building PPP as constituting: 
 
a sustained collaborative effort between the public sector (government agencies) 
and private enterprises to achieve a common objective (e.g., the road project) 
while they pursue their own individual interests. In a PPP each partner: 
– shares in the design of a road project; 
– contributes a portion of the financial, managerial and technical resources 
needed to execute and sometimes operate the project in accordance with 
each partner's comparative advantage; and 
– partially shoulders the risks associated with the project and obtains the 
benefits - those expected by each partner - that the project creates. 
 
This definition should be applicable to most PPPs from the World Bank perspective, 
and will now be examined according to the process described in section 5.4 above, 
where assumed purpose components and performance indicators are derived from a 
definition.   The assumed purpose components from the PPP definition of the World 
Bank are:  
– a sustained collaborative effort; 
– between the public sector and private enterprises; 
– to achieve a common objective; 
– while they pursue their own individual interests; 
– each partner shares the design of the project; 
– each partner contributes a portion of the financial, managerial and technical 
resources required to execute and operate the project in accordance with each 
partner‘s comparative advantage; 
– each partner partially shoulders the risks associated with the project and 
obtains the benefits – those expected by each partner – that the project 
creates. 
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The following assumed performance indicators can be derived from this World Bank 
definition: 
– there is evidence of a sustained collaborative effort; 
– the public sector and private enterprises are involved; 
– a common objective is being pursued; 
– individual interests of partners are pursued; 
– partners share the design or planning for the project; 
– partners contribute portions of the  
o financial, 
o managerial, and  
o technical resources required to execute and operate the project; 
– partner contributions focus on each partner‘s comparative advantage; 
– project risk is shared between partners; 
– all partners obtain a pre-defined benefit. 
 
The assumed performance indicators derived from the SA Treasury and the World 
Bank definitions are compared in the table below. Similar indicators are put next to 
each other.  Where there is no similar indicator, the space in the facing column is left 
open. 
 
Table 5-9: A comparison of derived PPP performance indicators 
Definition 1: SA Treasury Definition 2: World Bank 
a contractual arrangement must be in place  
 there is evidence of a sustained collaborative 
effort 
a public sector entity and a private sector entity 
must be involved 
the public sector and private enterprises are 
involved 
the private sector entity must perform a 
departmental function 
o for which an output-based 
specification was drawn up 
o for which a significant period of 
time has been specified 
 
 a common objective is being pursued 
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Definition 1: SA Treasury Definition 2: World Bank 
the private sector must receive a benefit for 
performing the service, normally in the form of 
financial remuneration 
 
 individual interests of partners are pursued 
a substantial transfer of all forms of project life 
cycle risks to the private sector is effected 
 
 
 project risk is shared between partners 
 partners share the design or planning for the 
project 
the public sector must remain a significant role-
player in the partnership project as either the  
o main purchaser of the services 
provided or 
o main enabler of the project 
 
 partners contribute portions of the  
o financial,  
o managerial and  
technical resources required to execute and 
operate the project 
 partner contributions focus on each partner‘s 
comparative advantage 
 all partners obtain a pre-defined benefit 
 
The comparison of the two definitions reveal only one common performance 
indicator, which is quite surprising as one would imagine that there should be a high 
correlation between the approaches to PPPs of a national treasury and an 
international financial institution like the World Bank.  The SA Treasury definition has 
contributed five unique indicators, and the World Bank definition contributed eight 
unique indicators. 
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5.4.3 Definition 3: OECD and IMF 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines 
PPPs as: 
arrangements whereby the private sector provides infrastructure assets and 
services that traditionally have been provided by government, such as hospitals, 
schools, prisons, roads, bridges, tunnels, railways, and water and sanitation plants 
(OECD, 2007). 
 
The use of the word ―traditional‖ in the OECD definition can be questioned.  It should 
be noted that despite the OECD definition, none of the service mentioned were 
actually provided by the public (government) sector first, never mind ―traditionally‖.  
The oldest school in England, The King‘s School in Canterbury, founded in 567, was 
and is an ―independent‖ or private school. Hebrew schooling in Syria between 1800 
and 1000 BC was associated with religious education and was not government-
funded.  The first formal school in South Africa, opened on 17 April 1658 for the first 
shipment of slaves that arrived in the Cape, was owned by the private Dutch East 
India Company (SAHO, 2009).  The first hospitals established in the US between 
1750 and 1850 were voluntary hospitals established by private charitable 
organizations (Starr, 1982), while the earliest known institutions aiming to provide 
cure were Egyptian temples, signifying a link between religion and medicine with no 
public or government sector involvement (McGrew, 1985:134–135).  San Quentin 
prison in the US was opened as a private enterprise in 1852 while earlier, after the 
American Revolution, the confinement and care of prisoners was contracted out. The 
early provision of public water sources through private investment is also highlighted 
elsewhere in this dissertation. 
 
Returning to the OECD definition of PPPs, cases where the private operator has 
some responsibility for asset maintenance and improvement are also, according to 
the OECD, described as concessions. While the OECD argues that there is no clear 
agreement on what does or does not constitute a PPP, the OECD opinion is that PPP 
should involve the transfer of risk from the government to the private sector (IMF, 
2007, cited in OECD, 2007).  Risk transfer is however not mentioned in the definition 
and is therefore discounted for the purpose of the definition analysis that is being 
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conducted in this section.  The definition will now be examined according to the 
process described in section 5.4 above, where assumed purpose components and 
performance indicators are derived from a definition.  The assumed purpose 
components from the PPP definition of the OECD are:  
 Private sector provides: infrastructure assets and services; 
 Infrastructure assets and services that have been provided by government. 
 
The following assumed performance indicators can be derived from the OECD 
definition: 
 The private sector provides infrastructure or a service that the public sector 
previously provided. 
 
The OECD and IMF definition is not elaborate, and in fact has very little that can be 
derived from it in terms of assumed purpose-components and assumed performance 
indicators.  The assumed performance indicators derived from the SA Treasury, 
World Bank and OECD / IMF definitions are compared in the table below. 
Comparable indicators are put next to each other.  Where there is no comparable 
indicator, the space in the facing column is left open. 
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Table 5-10: A comparison of PPP performance indicators 
Definition 1: SA Treasury Definition 2: World Bank PPP definition Definition 3: OECD and IMF definition 
a contractual arrangement must be in place   
 there is evidence of a sustained collaborative 
effort 
 
a public sector entity and a private sector entity 
must be involved 
the public sector and private enterprises are 
involved 
 
the private sector entity must perform a 
departmental function 
o for which an output-based 
specification was drawn up 
o for which a significant period of 
time has been specified 
 The private sector provides infrastructure or a 
service that the public sector previously provided 
 a common objective is being pursued  
the private sector must receive a benefit for 
performing the service, normally in the form of 
financial remuneration 
  
 individual interests of partners are pursued  
a substantial transfer of all forms of project life 
cycle risks to the private sector is effected 
 
  
 project risk is shared between partners  
 partners share the design or planning for the 
project 
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Definition 1: SA Treasury Definition 2: World Bank PPP definition Definition 3: OECD and IMF definition 
the public sector must remain a significant role-
player in the partnership project as either the  
o main purchaser of the services 
provided or 
o main enabler of the project 
  
 partners contribute portions of the  
o financial,  
o managerial and  
technical resources required to execute and 
operate the project 
 
 partner contributions focus on each partner‘s 
comparative advantage 
 
 all partners obtain a pre-defined benefit  
 
 
In this comparison the OECD definition has not contributed any unique indicators.  In keeping with the objective of this section, 
which is to derive success factors from PPP definitions, it will be necessary to develop a single list of performance indicators from 
which success factors can be derived.  Separate lists of success factors will therefore be aggregated into one single list.  In the next 
table the three lists of performance indicators are aggregated into a single list by removing or combining duplicates and adding 
unique items.  
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Table 5-11: A combination of PPP performance indicators 
Combined definitions 1 - 3 
a contractual arrangement must be in place 
there is evidence of a sustained collaborative effort 
a public sector entity and a private sector entity must be involved 
The private sector provides infrastructure or a service that the public sector previously provided the 
private sector entity must perform a departmental function 
o for which an output-based specification was drawn up 
o for which a significant period of time has been specified 
a common objective is being pursued 
the private sector must receive a benefit for performing the service, normally in the form of financial 
remuneration 
individual interests of partners are pursued 
a substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle risks to the private sector is effected  
project risk is shared between partners 
partners share the design or planning for the project 
the public sector must remain a significant role-player in the partnership project as either the  
o main purchaser of the services provided or 
o main enabler of the project 
partners contribute portions of the  
o financial,  
o managerial and  
technical resources required to execute and operate the project 
partner contributions focus on each partner‘s comparative advantage 
all partners obtain a pre-defined benefit 
 
It is now possible to analyse more PPP definitions to determine whether additional 
success factors can be derived which is not yet included in the aggregated list. 
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5.4.4 Definition 4: Jamali 
The definitions analysed thus far in this section are perhaps lacking in variety of 
origin, because it can be safely assumed that the World Bank, IMF and OECD would 
have similar approaches to the PPP concept.  It is therefore considered prudent to 
also analyse a definition from a significantly different source.  The definition chosen 
for this purpose comes from Beirut in Lebanon, from a paper, written in 2004 by Dima 
Jamali, on PPPs in the Lebanese telecommunications sector.  Jamali frames his 
definition from Nijkamp, Van der Burch and Vindigni who in 2002 published a 
comparative institutional evaluation of public-private partnerships in Dutch urban 
land-use and revitalisation projects.  Jamali‘s reference back to a European 
publication may seem threatening to the ―otherness‖ of this definition, but Nijkamp et 
al‘s (2002) paper was written for an urban studies journal from an academic 
perspective, and does not provide a reference for their definition, and therefore can 
be considered as having a sufficiently different origin from the international financial 
organisation examples already cited.  Jamali states that a PPP is an institutional form 
of cooperation of public and private actors, who on the basis of their own indigenous 
objectives, work together towards a joint target (Nijkamp et al., 2002, cited in Jamali, 
2004).  The original definition in Nijkamp et al (2002:1869) reads: 
A PPP is an institutionalised form of co-operation of public and private actors 
who, on the basis of their own indigenous objectives, work together towards a 
joint target, in which both parties accept investment risks on the basis of a 
predefined distribution of revenues and costs. 
 
In practice, a PPP is not a fixed structural model for collaboration between public and 
private partners, but just a tailor-made organisation for the realisation of a given 
project. Flexibility, speed, cost efficiency and, in general, reduction of transaction 
costs are the main benefits of a PPP (Nijkamp et al., 2002:1869).  The definition will 
now be examined according to the process described in section 5.4 above, where 
assumed purpose components and performance indicators are derived from a 
definition. 
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Table 5-12: Definition Analysis: Jamali 
Definition Assumed purpose 
components identified in the 
definition 
Assumed performance 
indicators derived from the 
purpose components 
A PPP is an institutional form of 
cooperation of public and 
private actors, who on the basis 
of their own indigenous 
objectives, work together 
towards a joint target (Nijkamp 
et al., 2002, cited in Jamali, 
2004). 
 
An institutional form 
A recognisable institutional form 
is established 
Cooperation between public and 
private actors 
Public and private actors are 
involved 
There is cooperation between 
actors 
Actors working from indigenous 
objectives 
Actors are pursueing their own 
objectives 
Joint target (working together) 
Actors are at the same time 
working towards a joint target or 
objective 
 
In the next table the aggregated list of performance indicators is compared with the 
list of indicators derived from the current definition. 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 355 
 
Table 5-13: A comparison of PPP performance indicators 
Combined definitions 1 - 3 Definition 4: Jamali 
 A recognisable institutional form is established 
a contractual arrangement must be in place  
there is evidence of a sustained collaborative effort There is cooperation between actors 
a public sector entity and a private sector entity must be involved Public and private actors are involved 
The private sector provides infrastructure or a service that the public sector 
previously provided the private sector entity must perform a departmental 
function 
o for which an output-based specification was drawn up 
o for which a significant period of time has been specified 
 
a common objective is being pursued Actors are at the same time working towards a joint target or objective 
the private sector must receive a benefit for performing the service, normally in 
the form of financial remuneration 
 
individual interests of partners are pursued Actors are pursueing their own objectives 
a substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle risks to the private sector is 
effected  
 
project risk is shared between partners  
partners share the design or planning for the project  
the public sector must remain a significant role-player in the partnership project 
as either the  
o main purchaser of the services provided or 
o main enabler of the project 
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Combined definitions 1 - 3 Definition 4: Jamali 
partners contribute portions of the  
o financial,  
o managerial and  
technical resources required to execute and operate the project 
 
partner contributions focus on each partner‘s comparative advantage  
all partners obtain a pre-defined benefit  
 
An additional list of indicators will be added to this table from the next definition before aggregating the lists to a single list. 
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5.4.5 Definition 5: SEED 
The previous definition analysed was chosen because it contributed to variety.  The 
SEED definition adds additional variety due to the origins and focus of SEED itself.  
The SEED Initiative is a global partnership for action on sustainable development and 
the green economy.  Founded by UNEP, UNDP and IUCN at the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, SEED supports innovative small-
scale and locally driven entrepreneurships around the globe which integrate social 
and environmental benefits into their business model.  The goal of SEED is to 
support the ability of such entrepreneurs to scale up or replicate their activities. This, 
according to SEED, furthers their contribution to their local economies and 
communities while promoting sustainable management of natural resources and 
ecosystems and reducing poverty, marginalisation and exclusion.  SEED works with 
a specific type of PPP, multi-stakeholder partnerships, and define these as: 
 
social entrepreneurs, communities, women‘s groups, companies and others, 
holding a common vision and pooling their resources to achieve it. 
 
The definition will now be examined according to the process described in section 5.4 
above, where assumed purpose components and performance indicators are derived 
from a definition. 
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Table 5-14: Definition Analysis: SEED 
Definition Assumed purpose 
components identified in the 
definition 
Assumed performance 
indicators derived from the 
purpose components 
social entrepreneurs, 
communities, women‘s groups, 
companies and others, holding 
a common vision and pooling 
their resources to achieve it 
Stakeholders including social 
entrepreneurs, communities, 
women‘s groups, companies 
and others 
Some or all of the following role-
players are involved: 
Stakeholders including social 
entrepreneurs, communities, 
women‘s groups, companies 
and others 
A common vision 
Role-players hold a common 
vision 
Pooling resources 
Role-players pool their 
resources 
Achieving a common vision 
Role-players achieve common 
goals 
 
The list of performance indicators derived from the SEED definition is added to the 
aggregated list and the Jamali list from above in the next table. 
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Table 5-15: A combination of PPP definitions 
Combined definition Definition 4: Jamali Definition 5: SEED 
  Some or all of the following role-players are 
involved: Stakeholders including social 
entrepreneurs, communities, women‘s groups, 
companies and others 
 A recognisable institutional form is established  
  Roleplayers pool their resources 
  Roleplayers achieve common goals 
a contractual arrangement must be in place   
there is evidence of a sustained collaborative effort There is cooperation between actors  
a public sector entity and a private sector entity 
must be involved 
Public and private actors are involved  
The private sector provides infrastructure or a 
service that the public sector previously provided 
the private sector entity must perform a 
departmental function 
o for which an output-based 
specification was drawn up 
o for which a significant period of 
time has been specified 
  
a common objective is being pursued Actors are at the same time working towards a 
joint target or objective 
Role-players hold a common vision 
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Combined definition Definition 4: Jamali Definition 5: SEED 
the private sector must receive a benefit for 
performing the service, normally in the form of 
financial remuneration 
  
individual interests of partners are pursued Actors are pursuing their own objectives  
a substantial transfer of all forms of project life 
cycle risks to the private sector is effected  
  
project risk is shared between partners   
partners share the design or planning for the 
project 
  
the public sector must remain a significant role-
player in the partnership project as either the  
o main purchaser of the services 
provided or 
o main enabler of the project 
  
partners contribute portions of the  
o financial,  
o managerial and  
technical resources required to execute and 
operate the project 
  
partner contributions focus on each partner‘s 
comparative advantage 
  
all partners obtain a pre-defined benefit   
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The three lists from above can now be aggregated into a new single list (see below) by deleting or combining duplications and 
adding unique new indicators.  The Jamali definition has contributed one unique indicator, and the SEED definition has contributed 
three unique indicators. 
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Table 5-16: A combination of performance indicators 
Combined definitions 1 - 5 
Some or all of the following role-players are involved: Stakeholders including social entrepreneurs, 
communities, women‘s groups, companies and others 
A recognisable institutional form is established 
Role-players pool their resources 
Role-players achieve common goals 
a contractual arrangement must be in place 
there is evidence of a sustained collaborative effort 
a public sector entity and a private sector entity must be involved 
The private sector provides infrastructure or a service that the public sector previously provided the 
private sector entity must perform a departmental function 
o for which an output-based specification was drawn up 
o for which a significant period of time has been specified 
A common vision and objective is being pursued 
the private sector must receive a benefit for performing the service, normally in the form of financial 
remuneration 
individual interests of partners are pursued 
a substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle risks to the private sector is effected  
project risk is shared between partners 
partners share the design or planning for the project 
the public sector must remain a significant role-player in the partnership project as either the  
o main purchaser of the services provided or 
o main enabler of the project 
partners contribute portions of the  
o financial,  
o managerial and  
technical resources required to execute and operate the project 
partner contributions focus on each partner‘s comparative advantage 
all partners obtain a pre-defined benefit 
 
It is now again possible to analyse more PPP definitions to determine whether 
additional success factors can be derived which are not yet included in the 
aggregated list.  This iterative process of analysis and aggregation can continue for 
as long as there are new PPP definitions to analyse, but for the purpose of this 
section only one more definition will be analysed. 
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5.4.6 Definition 6: UNDP 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines PPPs as: 
contractual agreements between the public sector (government) and the 
private sector (for-profit companies). Under these agreements, the resources 
and risks of both are shared to meet a specific public need.  
 
This contractual relationship may include non-profit groups (either non-governmental 
organizations or special purpose ones created by government action). In all cases, 
however, at least one for-profit entity (thus the ―private‖ in public-private partnership) 
is included.   PPPs may be developed by a single government partner, or through 
technical cooperation between two or more countries. PPPs may also be triangular, 
that is, developed through technical cooperation among two or more developing 
countries, with financial support from northern donors or international organizations.  
PPPs may be employed for the delivery of social services or the construction, 
operation and/or maintenance of public infrastructure (such as transportation, power, 
water/wastewater, or public buildings). In some cases, both infrastructure and service 
requirements can be combined into a single partnership. 
 
PPPs can be developed in varying forms. Some are limited to the operation and 
maintenance of infrastructure (commonly referred to as O&M contracts).  This is 
particularly common with water and wastewater projects. At the other extreme end 
are partnerships that include design, build, finance, operation and maintenance 
(referred to as DBFOM contracts), where the private sector partner manages all 
aspects of a project under a contract that defines only the performance objectives 
(not the design) of the project or service. Between these two extremes are a number 
of variations in the role of the private sector in the development and operation of 
public infrastructures or services. The ―concession‖ model is another variation, where 
the private sector provides an initial payment for the right to lease an infrastructure 
asset, operate and maintain that asset, and retain all or most of the revenues 
generated by that asset. 
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The UNDP‘s PPP definition will now be examined according to the process described 
in section 5.4 above, where assumed purpose components and performance 
indicators are derived from a definition. 
 
Table 5-17: Definition Analysis: UNDP 
Definition Assumed purpose 
components identified in the 
definition 
Assumed performance 
indicators derived from the 
purpose components 
Contractual agreements between 
the public sector (government) 
and the private sector (for-profit 
companies). Under these 
agreements, the resources and 
risks of both are shared to meet 
a specific public need.  
Contractual agreement 
A contractual arrangement is in 
place 
Public and private sector 
involvement 
Both the public and private 
sector is involved 
Resources and risks shared 
Resource are shared 
Risks are shared 
To meet a specific public need 
An intention to meet a public 
need 
 
The list of performance indicators derived from the definition is compared with the 
aggregated list in the following table. 
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Table 5-18: A combination of PPP performance indicators 
Combined definitions 1 - 5 Definition 6: UNDP definition 
 An intention to meet a public need 
Some or all of the following role-players are involved: Stakeholders including 
social entrepreneurs, communities, women‘s groups, companies and others 
 
A recognisable institutional form is established  
Role-players pool their resources Resource are shared 
Role-players achieve common goals  
a contractual arrangement must be in place A contractual arrangement is in place 
there is evidence of a sustained collaborative effort  
a public sector entity and a private sector entity must be involved Both the public and private sector is involved 
The private sector provides infrastructure or a service that the public sector 
previously provided the private sector entity must perform a departmental 
function 
o for which an output-based specification was drawn up 
o for which a significant period of time has been specified 
 
A common vision and objective is being pursued  
the private sector must receive a benefit for performing the service, normally 
in the form of financial remuneration 
 
individual interests of partners are pursued  
a substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle risks to the private sector 
is effected  
project risk is shared between partners 
Risks are shared 
partners share the design or planning for the project  
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Combined definitions 1 - 5 Definition 6: UNDP definition 
the public sector must remain a significant role-player in the partnership 
project as either the  
o main purchaser of the services provided or 
o main enabler of the project 
 
partners contribute portions of the  
o financial,  
o managerial and  
o technical resources  
required to execute and operate the project 
 
partner contributions focus on each partner‘s comparative advantage  
all partners obtain a pre-defined benefit  
 
The two lists from above can now be aggregated into a new single list by deleting or combining duplications and adding unique new 
indicators.  The UNDP definition has contributed one unique indicator that can be added to the aggregated list.  The aggregated list 
of performance indicators from the six analysed definitions is provided below. 
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Table 5-19: Aggregated PPP performance indicators 
Combined definitions 1 - 6 
An intention to meet a public need 
Some or all of the following role-players are involved: Stakeholders including social entrepreneurs, 
communities, women‘s groups, companies and others 
A recognisable institutional form is established 
Role-players pool and share their resources 
Role-players achieve common goals 
a contractual arrangement must be in place 
there is evidence of a sustained collaborative effort 
a public sector entity and a private sector entity must be involved 
The private sector provides infrastructure or a service that the public sector previously provided the 
private sector entity must perform a departmental function 
o for which an output-based specification was drawn up 
o for which a significant period of time has been specified 
A common vision and objective is being pursued 
the private sector must receive a benefit for performing the service, normally in the form of financial 
remuneration 
individual interests of partners are pursued 
a substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle risks to the private sector is effected  
project risk is shared between partners 
partners share the design or planning for the project 
the public sector must remain a significant role-player in the partnership project as either the  
o main purchaser of the services provided or 
o main enabler of the project 
partners contribute portions of the  
o financial,  
o managerial and  
o technical resources  
required to execute and operate the project 
partner contributions focus on each partner‘s comparative advantage 
all partners obtain a pre-defined benefit 
 
 
The above list now contains all the unique and common performance indicators for 
PPPs derived from six different PPP definitions.  This is a valuable product because it 
can be used as a basis from which to suggest success factors for PPPs, and it can 
be the foundation for a new general definition of PPPs that is a synthesis of current 
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thinking.  By building a definition from this aggregated list of performance indicators, 
one is in effect combining the consensus (common indicators) of the field with 
innovation and new thinking (unique indicators) inside the field.  It is suggested that 
the methodology used in this section is a new contribution to the public management 
field which can be further developed and codified.  The methodology emphasizes the 
importance of definitions and the care that should be taken in their construction.  The 
aggregated list of performance indicators above suggests the following new general 
definition for PPPs: 
 
A PPP is an institutional form that is established through an outcomes-based 
agreement and specification, involving purposeful and sustained collaboration 
over a significant period of time by a combination of public and private parties 
with common vision and objectives to meet a public need (a public sector 
responsibility) by pooling, sharing and contributing portions of the financial, 
managerial, technical and risk management resources required according to 
each partner‘s comparative strengths while the public partner remains a 
significant role-player, and by sharing design, planning and stakeholder 
management in order to achieve the common and individual goals and 
interests of the partners who obtain pre-defined benefits through their 
involvement. 
 
This definition is only an early attempt at combining the aggregated performance 
indicators into a one-sentence description, and can be refined through further 
analysis and review.  There would be more reason to refine the definition if additional 
PPP definitions are analysed and new unique performance indicators are identified.  
If one compares this definition with that of the SA Treasury, its does seem as if some 
elements are missing from the SA Treasury definition.  While the SA Treasury 
definition may be appropriate for the procurement officer, it does not define PPPs in a 
way which is descriptive enough for the general public manager or the uninitiated 
potential private partner who is new to PPPs.  It is suggested that the SA Treasury 
should reconsider its definition and perhaps revisit it to make it more descriptive of 
the true nature of PPPs.  Returning to the discussion on success factors, the 
aggregated list of performance indicators will now be used to develop a set of 
performance indicators. 
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In the table below, performance indicators are listed in the left column with the success factors derived from each indicator listed in 
the right-hand column. 
 
Table 5-20: Deriving success factors from performance indicators 
Combined definitions 1 - 6 Derived success factor 
An intention to meet a public need A public need is met 
Some or all of the following role-players are involved: Stakeholders including 
social entrepreneurs, communities, women‘s groups, companies and others 
Several stakeholders involved 
A recognisable institutional form is established Recognizable institutional form created 
Role-players pool and share their resources Role-players pool and share resources 
Role-players achieve common goals Role-players achieve common goals 
a contractual arrangement must be in place Contractual arrangement in place 
there is evidence of a sustained collaborative effort Sustained collaborative effort 
a public sector entity and a private sector entity must be involved Involvement of both public and private sectors 
The private sector provides infrastructure or a service that the public sector 
previously provided the private sector entity must perform a departmental 
function 
o for which an output-based specification was drawn up 
o for which a significant period of time has been specified 
Private sector provides a traditionally public service against an outputs-based 
specification for a significant period of time 
A common vision and objective is being pursued Common vision and objective 
the private sector must receive a benefit for performing the service, normally 
in the form of financial remuneration 
Private sector receives benefit / award 
individual interests of partners are pursued Partners able to pursue individual goals 
a substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle risks to the private 
sector is effected  
Risk transfer to private sector 
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Combined definitions 1 - 6 Derived success factor 
project risk is shared between partners Risk sharing 
partners share the design or planning for the project Shared project design and planning 
the public sector must remain a significant role-player in the partnership 
project as either the  
o main purchaser of the services provided or 
o main enabler of the project 
Public sector remains significant role-player 
partners contribute portions of the  
o financial,  
o managerial and  
o technical resources  
required to execute and operate the project 
Partners contribute portions of resources 
partner contributions focus on each partner‘s comparative advantage Partners contribute according to own comparative advantage 
all partners obtain a pre-defined benefit All partners obtain pre-defined benefit 
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It would be possible to continue to analyse additional definitions and to derive more 
performance indicators and success factors from them. 
5.4.7 Success factors identified in this section 
The following success factors could be derived from the definitions that were 
analysed in this section: 
 A public need is met 
 Several stakeholders involved 
 Recognisable institutional form created 
 Role-players pool and share resources 
 Role-players achieve common goals 
 Contractual arrangement in place 
 Sustained collaborative effort 
 Involvement of both public and private sectors 
 Private sector provides a traditionally public service against an outputs-based 
specification for a significant period of time 
 Common vision and objective 
 Private sector receives benefit / award 
 Partners able to pursue individual goals 
 Risk transfer to private sector 
 Risk sharing 
 Shared project design and planning 
 Public sector remains significant role-player 
 Partners contribute portions of resources 
 Partners contribute according to own comparative advantage 
 All partners obtain pre-defined benefit 
 
It should be reiterated that these success factors are derived from various PPP role-
players‘ definitions of what a PPP should be, and therefore reflects the expectations 
of PPP success of those who framed the definitions.  These success factors will be 
combined with success factors identified in other sections of this chapter for further 
analysis at the end of this chapter. 
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This concludes the section on the purpose- and performance implications of 
definitions.  In the next section the contribution of programme evaluation for the 
evaluation of the success of PPPs will be investigated. 
5.5 PROGRAMME EVALUATION 
PPPs are, by definition, without exception there to deliver public goods or services, 
PPPs would normally form part of a wider public sector programme.  It is therefore 
not unrealistic to think that the field of programme management and specifically 
social programme evaluation could hold valuable advice for PPP evaluation.  With 
programme evaluation and consequently PPP service delivery evaluation, one can 
dig deeper into the specifics of partnership governance and programme design.  
Evaluators have long recognized the importance of programme theory as a basis for 
formulating and prioritizing evaluation questions, designing evaluation research and 
interpreting evaluation findings.  Programme theory has been used under various 
names including logic model, programme model, outcome line, cause map, and 
action theory.  In the following paragraphs various elements of programme evaluation 
will be explored to determine whether programme evaluation would be useful in the 
evaluation of PPP success.   
 
Programme theory as described by Rossi, Lipsey and Freeman (2004) is ―The 
theory about a specific programme‖, rather than the theory of programmes in general.  
Programme theory is an aspect of a programme that can be evaluated in its own 
right.  Such assessment is important because a programme based on weak or faulty 
conceptualization has little prospect of achieving the intended results (Rossi et al., 
2004:166).  Rossi et al. (2004:139) indicated that there is no general consensus 
about how best to describe a programme‘s theory, and then used their own scheme 
to represent a programme‘s theory as indicated below. 
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Rossi et al‘s scheme as illustrated in Figure 5.2 highlights three interrelated 
components of a programme theory: the programme impact theory, the service 
utilization plan, and the programme‘s organizational plan. They depict a social 
programme as centring on the transactions that take place between a programme‘s 
operations and the population it serves. These transactions might involve any of a 
multitude of possibilities, depending on the specific programme.  Examples include 
counselling sessions for women with eating disorders in therapists‘ offices, 
recreational activities for high-risk youths at a community centre, educational 
presentations to local citizen‘s groups, or any such point-of-service contact.  On one 
side of the programme-target transaction is the programme as an organizational 
entity, with its various facilities, personnel, resources, activities, and so forth.  On the 
other side, are the target participants in their life spaces with their various 
circumstances and experiences in relation to the service delivery system of the 
programme (Rossi et al., 2004:139–141).  A programme whose conceptualization is 
weak or faulty has little prospect for success even if it adequately operationalizes that 
conceptualization.  Thus, if the programme theory is not sound, there is little reason 
to assess other evaluation issues, such as the programme‘s implementation, impact 
or efficiency.  Within the framework of evaluability assessment, findings that the 
programme theory is poorly defined or seriously flawed indicates that the programme 
simply is not evaluable (Rossi et al., 2004:165).  The implication for PPP evaluation is 
that the conceptualization of the PPP is all-important and can, if insufficiently carried 
Programme 
Target Interaction with delivery system 
 
 
 
Programme - Target  
service transactions 
Program facilities, personnel, activities 
Target 
Population 
Service 
Area 
Service Utilization Plan 
Programme’s Organizational 
Plan 
Proximal 
Outcomes 
Distal 
Outcomes 
Impact Theory 
Figure 5.2: Overview of a programme theory 
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out, consign the PPP to failure.  Furthermore, it is clear that evaluation must be 
sensitive to the life cycle stages of a PPP and what should be achieved in each 
stage.  Another implication of what Rossi et al write is that it may not be possible to 
properly evaluate a PPP that was not properly conceptualised.  This is not surprising 
because it is difficult to imagine how one would be able to evaluate whether a PPP 
has achieved its goals if no clear goals were set at its inception.   
 
The most fully developed approaches to evaluating programme theory have been 
described in the context of evaluability assessment, an appraisal of whether a 
programme‘s performance can be evaluated and, if so, whether it should be.  
Evaluability assessment involves describing programme goals and objectives, 
assessing whether the programme is well enough conceptualised to be evaluable, 
and identifying stakeholder interest in evaluation findings.  Evaluability assessment 
may result in efforts by programme managers to better conceptualise their 
programme.  It may indicate that the programme is too poorly defined for evaluation 
or that there is little likelihood that the findings will be used.  Alternatively, it could find 
that the programme theory is well defined and plausible, that evaluation findings will 
likely be used, and that a meaningful evaluation could be done (Rossi et al., 
2004:166).  It is therefore advisable to conduct evaluability assessments on PPPs 
before attempting an evaluation.  This has implications for the resources required to 
evaluate the success of a PPP.  To assess programme theory, it is first necessary for 
the evaluator to describe the theory in a clear, explicit form acceptable to 
stakeholders.  The aim of this effort is to describe the ―programme as intended‖ and 
its rationale, not the programme as it actually is.  Three key components that should 
be included in this description are the programme impact theory, the service 
utilization plan, and the progarmmes‘ organizational plan (Rossi et al., 2004:166).  In 
most cases project descriptions about PPPs dwell more on ―programme as intended‖ 
than ―programme as it actually is‖, this does not bode well for the evaluation of PPPs 
based on documentation emanating from the PPP itself. 
 
The assumptions and expectations that make up a programme theory may be well 
formulated and explicitly stated (thus constituting an articulated programme theory), 
or they may be inherent in the programme but not overtly stated (thus constituting an 
implicit programme theory).  When a programme theory is implicit, the evaluator must 
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extract and articulate the theory by collating and integrating information from 
programme documents, interviews with programme personnel and other 
stakeholders, and observations of programme activities.  It is especially important to 
formulate clear, concrete statements of the programme‘s goals and objectives as well 
as an account of how the desired outcomes are expected to result from programme 
action.  The evaluator should seek corroboration from stakeholders that the resulting 
description meaningfully and accurately describes the ―programme as intended‖ 
(Rossi et al., 2004:166).  The implication is that no partnership can be evaluated 
without meaningful interaction with the stakeholders, and even more so those 
partnerships with implicit programme theories. 
 
There are several approaches to assessing programme theory.  The most important 
assessment the evaluator can make is based on a comparison of the intervention 
specified in the programme theory with the social needs the programme is expected 
to address.  Examining critical details of the programme conceptualization in relation 
to the social problem indicates whether the programme represents a reasonable plan 
for ameliorating that problem.  This analysis is facilitated when a needs assessment 
has been conducted to systematically diagnose the problematic social conditions 
(Rossi et al., 2004:167).  The evaluation of the objectives of a PPP against the public 
need it is supposed to satisfy will be valuable because it can indicate incorrect 
service design or the use of incorrect instruments.  It has already been mentioned 
that a PPP could be running efficiently and looking very effective in delivering its set 
outputs, but could be effectively delivering a service that is not required.  A 
complementary approach to assessing programme theory uses stakeholders and 
other informants to appraise the clarity, plausibility, feasibility, and appropriateness of 
the programme theory as formulated (Rossi et al., 2004:167). 
 
Programme theory also can be assessed in relation to the support for its critical 
assumptions found in research or documented practice elsewhere.  Sometimes 
findings are available for similar programmes, or programmes based on similar 
theory, so that the evaluator can make an overall comparison between a 
programme‘s theory and relevant evidence.  If the research and practice literature 
does not support overall comparisons, however, evidence bearing on specific key 
relationships assumed in the programme theory may still be obtainable (Rossi et al., 
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2004:167).  Evaluators can often usefully supplement other approaches to 
assessment with direct observations to further probe critical assumptions in the 
programme theory.  The importance of a clear understanding of what the PPP should 
achieve should be noted, as it relates to the importance of goal achievement in the 
evaluation of PPP success.  Assessment of programme theory may indicate that the 
programme is not evaluable because of basic flaws in its theory.  Such findings are 
an important evaluation product in their own right and can be informative for 
programme stakeholders.  In such cases, one appropriate response is to redesign 
the programme, a process in which the evaluator may provide advice.  If evaluation 
proceeds without articulation of a credible programme theory, the results will be 
ambiguous.  In contrast, a sound programme theory provides a basis for evaluation 
of how well that theory is implemented, what outcomes are produced, and how 
efficiently they are produced (Rossi et al., 2004:167).  The programme theory would 
have to include the why and the how of the partnership and describe a cause-and-
effect relationship between programme activities and desired outcomes.  If you don‘t 
know where you are going, any road will take you there.  Considering earlier remarks 
on the promotional nature of literature on partnerships, it could be suggested that in 
the PPP environment, the programme theory is better communicated than the results 
of the programme implementation.  The evaluation of the programme theory would 
be an effective, although resource-intensive way of evaluating a PPP and is closely 
related to the way in which information would be gathered for a comparartive case 
study as outlined in an earlier section of this chapter 
 
Impact theory is a causal theory describing cause-and-effect sequences in which 
certain programme activities are the instigating causes and certain social benefits are 
the effects they eventually produce.  Evaluators typically represent programme 
impact theory in the form of a causal diagram showing the cause-and-effect linkages 
presumed to connect a programme‘s activities with the expected outcomes.  Because 
programmes rarely exercise direct control over the social conditions they are 
expected to improve, they must generally work directly by changing some critical but 
manageable aspect of the situation, which, in turn, is expected to lead to more far-
reaching improvements. The simplest programme impact theory is the basic ―two-
step‖ in which services affect some intermediate condition that, in turn, improves the 
social conditions of concern.  For instance, a programme cannot make it impossible 
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for people to abuse alcohol, but it can attempt to change their attitudes and 
motivation toward alcohol in ways that help them avoid abuse.  More complex 
programme theories may have more steps along the path between programme and 
social benefit and, perhaps, involve more than one distinct path (Rossi et al., 
2004:141). 
 
Figure 5.3: Diagram illustrating programme impact theory 
 
Commentators believe that a randomized field experiment is the strongest research 
design for assessing programme impact.  When implemented well, it yields estimates 
of impact that are unbiased (Rossi et al., 2004).    The evaluation of the impact of a 
PPP would be heavily dependent on the purpose of the PPP, and it can be assumed 
that different impact assessment methodologies may be required for different PPPs 
seeing the wide variety of services and products that PPPs could be involved in.  In 
this dissertation the interest is not as much on the detail of higher or lower 
performance, but rather the coarser measure of success or failure – a simple 
judgement instead of a detailed performance measurement.  Arriving at such a 
simple yes or no answer may not be without complication, though. For the purpose of 
this dissertation being highly successful or moderately successful is less important 
than the distinction between being successful or being a failure. 
 
Rossi et al (2004:266) rightfully emphasise the need for unbiased assessment of 
programme impact.  When a randomized design is not feasible, there are alternative 
research designs that an evaluator can use. They all share one problematic 
characteristic, however: even when well crafted and implemented, they may still yield 
biased estimates of programme effects.  Such biases systematically exaggerate or 
diminish programme effects, and the direction the biase may take cannot usually be 
known in advance.  Such biases, of course, can affect stakeholders‘ interests.  
Program participants can be disadvantaged if the bias is such that it makes an 
ineffective or harmful programme appear effective.  Funders and policymakers 
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concerned about wasting resources also are not helped by that circumstance.  On 
the other hand, a bias that makes a truly effective programme appear ineffective or 
harmful would unfairly belittle the accomplishments of programme personnel and 
could possibly cause the programme‘s sponsors to reduce or eliminate the funding 
for the programme.   The clear description of desired impact from the programme 
theory and the need for an unbiased indication of whether the intended impact was 
achieved again underlines the importance of goal achievement as an indicator of 
PPP success.  The above concern with biased assessments of impact and therefore 
success relates directly to the concern expressed at various paces in this dissertation 
with the lack of unbiased information on the performance of PPPs.  The need for 
unbiased impact assessment has implications for the evaluation of PPPs, because it 
is clear that impact assessments will be resource-intensive and will require 
considerable interaction with all categories of project stakeholders.  
 
Organizational plan refers to assumptions and expectations about what the 
programme must do to bring about the transactions between the target population 
and the programme that will produce the intended changes in social conditions.  The 
programme‘s organizational plan is articulated from the perspective of programme 
management and encompasses both the functions and activities the programme is 
expected to perform and the human, financial and physical resources required for 
that performance. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Logic model for a programme 
 
A common way of representing the organizational plan of a programme is in terms of 
inputs (resources and constraints applicable to the programme) and activities (the 
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services the programme is expected to provide).  In a full logic model of the 
programme, receipt of services (service utilization) is represented as programmes 
outputs, which, in turn, are related to the desired outcomes (Rossi et al., 2004:146–
147).  The implication for this dissertation is that programme evaluation is a 
prerequisite for success.  It is patently clear that success can only be ascertained 
through exhaustive evaluation.  Programme evaluation seems to contain the correct 
research design for investigating the success of a PPP, and can be the precursor and 
informant for the comparative case study evaluation methodology described earlier in 
this chapter.   
 
The intensive resource requirements of programme evaluation however limits the 
appropriateness of programme evaluation methodology for the research project 
described in this dissertation aimed at the identification of critical success factors for 
PPPs.  The research design requires the consideration of a wide variety of PPPs 
from around the world, while the resource and time requirements of detailed 
programme evaluation would limit the possible field of enquiry to a small number of 
Cape-Town based partnerships.  The implication for the research design was that in-
depth case-by-case evaluation would not be possible and that other ways would 
need to be found to identify critical success factors.  The evaluation of case studies in 
the next chapter would have to make do with less detailed information per case, and 
the validity of the gathered information would have to be strengthened through 
means.  A major contribution made in this subsection is the confirmation that the 
success of a programme or project like a PPP is directly dependent on achieving the 
pre-determined purpose of the said intervention.  Goal achievement should therefore 
be a primary determinant of success and can indeed, without further analysis, be 
considered to be a critical success factor for PPPs.  Success factors identified in this 
subsection: 
 Strong programme conceptualization; 
 Clarity, plausibility, feasibility, and appropriateness of programme theory which 
shows cause-effect relationships leading to required outcome; 
 Programme impact is aligned to outputs specified in programme theory; 
 Effective, unbiased programme evaluation; 
 Goal achievement. 
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This subsection has been spent looking at the possibility of using programme 
evaluation for the assessment of the success of PPPs.  The methodology is 
eminently suitable for detailed case-by-case assessments but may not be suitable for 
a study involving a large number of PPPs as is the case for this dissertation.  In the 
next sub-section a methodology used to measure the performance of business 
improvement districts will be investigated in search of additional success factors for 
PPPs. 
5.6 MEASURING BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT PERFORMANCE 
It has been stated that one should be able to use performance measures as 
diagnostic and prescriptive tools (Caruso & Weber, 2008:320).  This opinion is 
supported by the way in which the relationship between key performance areas, key 
performance indicators and success factors have been exploited in previous sections 
to synthesise success factors from what is essentially performance management 
data.  In an in-depth analysis of the City of Chicago‘s SSA (Special Service Areas – 
the term used in Illinois to refer to business improvement districts) programme by 
Caruso and Weber (2008) it was found that few BIDs (Business Improvement 
Districts) systematically collect information on their organization‘s performance, and 
those that do, do not collect the appropriate data.  The lack of appropriate data 
prevents local property owners from making informed decisions about renewing their 
BIDs and prevents municipalities from making policy choices about whether to allow 
public funds to be used for these purposes.  As local governments become more 
stretched fiscally and turn to public-private initiatives for neighbourhood revitalization, 
they need information to help them craft the best solution and not just solutions that 
fit the circumstances (Caruso & Weber, 2008:320). 
 
The simultaneous movement towards smaller governance structures and scarcity of 
fiscal resources has moved the discussion of performance measures to the forefront 
of municipal policymaking.  Performance measurements is one of the few 
mechanisms available to ensure that these semi-autonomous enclaves create actual 
public benefits, benefits that are distributed across a wider public than a few 
merchants and are generally accessible.  Performance measures can be seen as a 
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way of reining in the power of these quasi-private structures while also permitting a 
continued reliance on this more privatized provision of public goods (Caruso & 
Weber, 2008:325).  A BID‘s performance is important to multiple categories of 
customers or stakeholders: its individual membership of property owners and 
tenants, its municipality, and the wider citizenry who live, work, or shop in the area 
(Caruso & Weber, 2008:325–326). 
 
The problem with performance measures is that different stakeholders may have very 
different ideas of what would constitute good performance.  Each stakeholder may 
consider a different measure of performance to be the one that most closely captures 
what they feel to be the BID‘s primary obligation – each stakeholder may prioritize a 
different aspect of the organization‘s mission.  A local government may be more 
concerned with a BID‘s ability to increase demand for commercial space and 
therefore may look to property values to evaluate performance, while a merchant 
may be more concerned that her street is accessible and well lit.  Mission statements 
do not bring more clarity because they tend to be generic so that they can 
accommodate these various objectives and almost always focus on economic  and 
community vitality or revitalization within the BID – often (according to Caruso and 
Weber [2008:326]) without ever defining these goals.  Identifying the specific 
missions of BIDs is a first step in avoiding confusion and conflict about performance 
indicators.  A BID that does not seek to enhance security should not be evaluated 
according to its ability to decrease the number of reported property crimes.  This 
mission statement forms the starting point for identifying specific outcomes to be 
measured, and therefore the performance indicators needed (Caruso & Weber, 
2008:327).  It is therefore evident that context affects performance criteria (Caruso 
and Weber, 2008:327), an opinion which is supported by the focus on programme 
theory and the description of desired impact in the previous subsection. 
 
Caruso and Weber organises performance outputs, outcomes, and indicators 
according to the six principal objectives of BIDs, which together comprise the 
intangible and often undefined outcome of area revitalization.  According to them, 
previous studies of the subject had either confused outputs (programmes introduced) 
with outcomes (effects of the programmes) or confused outcomes (customer 
satisfaction) with means of measuring indicators (surveys, renewal proposals) 
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(Caruso & Weber, 2008:327).  The six principal objectives, according to Caruso and 
Weber, of BIDs are: 
 Real estate development; 
 Business development; 
 Convenience; 
 Distinctive identity; 
 Attractiveness; 
 Safety. 
 
The objectives stated above can be considered as performance areas.  Two of the 
performance areas with related outputs and possible outcomes and indicators are 
listed in the following table to illustrate the difference between outputs and outcomes. 
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Table 5-21: Business improvement district objectives, outputs, outcomes and performance indicators 
Objective Outputs Potential positive outcomes Indicators Potential negative outcomes 
Business Development Participation in technical 
assistance programmes (e.g. 
security, merchandizing, 
succession planning) 
Customer participation in 
district promotions (e.g. 
holiday shopping rebate 
programmes) 
Participation in façade rebate 
programme 
Local business success, 
retention, and expansion 
Commercial mix consistent 
with district goals 
Increase in taxable 
commercial sales 
Increase or stability in 
number of local business 
establishments 
Increase in number of jobs 
Increase in lease terms 
Increased automobile 
congestion, trash, and noise 
Poaching of businesses from 
other areas 
Convenience Addition of traffic-calming 
devices, such as pedestrian 
crosswalks, and reduction of 
hazards 
Accessibility Decrease in pedestrian 
accidents 
Increase in pedestrian counts 
Increase in parking facility 
and metered space 
occupancy rates 
Increase in reported crime 
and loitering 
Increase in noise, traffic, and 
pollution 
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Caruso and Weber (2008:340) show how performance is measured on a form used 
by the city of Chicago to conduct an internal review of the BIDs (Special Service 
Areas - SSAs) in the city. 
 
When listing potential measures, it confuses inputs and outputs with 
performance indicators.  For example, it considers the number of street 
planters to be a performance outcome, even if the planters themselves are not 
attractive or are not maintained and potentially detract from the attractiveness 
of the area.  SSAs are allowed to list special events, festivals, and parades as 
performance measures, yet are not required to estimate if these events 
attracted customers to district stores.  Furthermore, the performance measure 
responses are not required to relate to the scope of services the organization 
has proposed to deliver in a given year. (Caruso & Weber, 2008:340) 
 
These revelations relate strongly to arguments elsewhere in this dissertation where it 
is argued that a partnership should not be deemed to be successful if it is not 
delivering the right service.  Efficiency is no success measure either, because an 
unneeded service can be provided very efficiently even if there is no use of the 
service (see discussion in previous subsection).  Unfortunately for the true possible 
value of partnering, interviews revealed that SSA managers assumed that 
commissioners were more interested in programme outputs than outcomes (Caruso 
& Weber, 2008:340).  This assumption is not unrealistic against the background that 
especially elected political leaders will often prefer that money is spent towards 
something visible and tangible (which works well for a photo opportunity) as opposed 
to something without immediate visible impact, such as a partnership programme.  
 
Cases in Chicago revealed that the dissolution of BIDs did not appear to have any 
relation to their ability to meet performance outcomes but rather to internal politics 
about budgeting and representation.  In other words, the performance of a BID is not 
always positively correlated with the decision to renew its overlay status.  Caruso and 
Weber argue that this supports their contention that renewals are not performance 
indicators in and of themselves, nor can they be considered accurate proxies of such.  
―The longevity of this governance structure and its adherence to its organizational 
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mission are two distinct issues that should not be conflated‖ (Caruso & Weber, 
2008:343).  Thus, as already mentioned before, survival and even longevity is no real 
indicator of the success of a partnership structure.  A highly successful partnership 
could be killed off due to political decisions, a weak partnership could be kept alive 
through the same method, and a project which was not intended to be a long-term 
sustainable project could be driven on regardless due to political convenience. 
 
Caruso and Weber (2008: 343-346) advocates the use of annual work plans for BID 
performance evaluation, emphasises the need for flexibility to respond to 
environmental changes and then forwards suggestions regarding the determination 
of appropriate performance indicators.  These can be summarised as follows: 
 Mission matters the most; 
 Meaningful performance measures are those that match the stated objectives 
of the individual BID; 
 The predominant land use within its BID boundaries will affect its mission and 
scope; 
 Data for performance measures should be feasible to collect, especially for 
organizations with small budgets and staff.  The most valuable information is 
normally expensive to collect. Governments should make this less gruelling by 
providing as much of the raw data as possible and offering assistance in 
collecting data. 
 
From the short discussion in this subsection it is clear that performance management 
can contribute towards PPP success. Six performance areas for BIDs were identified 
which could also be applied to PPPs. The potential negative impact of political 
interference and decisions has been pointed out, and the importance of measuring 
outcomes rather than outputs was underlined.  Based on the discussion above, the 
following success factors can be advanced: 
 Outcomes-based performance measurement and management; 
 Protection against political interference; 
 Measure performance against mission / objectives; 
 Consider context in establishing mission and objectives; 
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 Appropriate performance indicators for which data is available and collection 
is feasible. 
 
This concludes the discussion on BID evaluation and how it can contribute to 
evaluating PPP success.  In the next subsection an alternating focus evaluation 
methodology will be discussed. 
5.7 ALTERNATING FOCUS PARTNERSHIP EVALUATION 
The types of evaluation discussed so far in this section require quite detailed case-
by-case information collection and extensive stakeholder consultation.  None of these 
evaluation methods are useful for investigating the success of a large collection of 
disparate PPPs, as is being attempted in this dissertation.  It would be useful to also 
look at evaluation methods using less exhaustive case-specific data and less time for 
stakeholder consultation.  One such methodology is described by Plummer 
(2002:108) and relates to a three-angled line of enquiry which was used to ―learn‖ 
from a specific collection of tri-sector (public, private, third sector) partnerships under 
the ambit of the water and sanitation cluster secretariat of Business Partners for 
Development (BPD).  The methodology consists of three workshop-based iterative 
and complementary approaches that conduct analyses with alternating focus on 
sector-by-sector, theme-based and local analysis. 
5.7.1 Sector-by-sector analysis 
Each sector is brought together to conduct its own SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats) analysis of working in partnership with the other two 
sectors.  Actors from the different sectors approach the partnerships in different 
ways.  They have different expectations, fears, capacities, skills and strengths.  As 
the theory suggests, these combine with their other sector counterparts to enhance 
the projects.  Though initial findings are fairly straightforward to an outside observer 
versed in these types of relationships, the most critical factor is overcoming the 
stereotypes of different sector counterparts. It is critical to make concrete 
assessments of the contributions that individual sectors make, and to build up their 
confidence in making these contributions (Plummer, 2002:108).  Sector perspectives 
on the reasons for partnering were discussed in Chapter 3 and sector-specific 
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perspectives on partnership success are mentioned here.  Sector perspectives could 
be collected through various means including workshops and focus groups. 
5.7.2 Theme-based review 
This approach attempts to address the impact of the tri-sector relationship on specific 
project components or project themes, such as partnerships and cost recovery in 
poor areas, partnerships and alternative approaches to service provision, 
partnerships and land tenure, partnerships and regulatory frameworks and 
partnerships and education / awareness campaigns (Plummer, 2002:108).  Themes 
that are dealt with in this dissertation include leadership, mutual benefit, governance 
structures, enabling legislation and environmental impact, to mention a few.  The 
selection of themes on which to base learning could be somewhat arbitrary. 
5.7.3 Local-level analysis 
This project-by-project or partnership-by-partnership analysis can result in the 
drafting of internal partnership analysis reports that document the successes, 
impacts, challenges and wider contexts of each individual project.  The challenge 
with this approach is that partnerships are actually living organisms that change on a 
daily basis.  Structures put in place and definitions of roles, responsibilities and 
budgets are all influential in (and also significantly different among) projects.  Equally, 
external events, changes in staff, findings in the communities and other externalities 
have an impact on the way the partners work together (Plummer, 2002:108).  Despite 
the many differences between specific partnerships, it should still be possible to 
extract some lessons from this process.  The type of learning and evaluation 
methodology described by Plummer is possibly most appropriate for capacity building 
and staff development.  While it may require fewer resources for information 
collection on individual partnerships and reduces time required for stakeholder 
consultation by pulling stakeholders together in workshops, the workshop 
methodology could reduce the ability to gather and interrogate individual opinions 
and limits the geographic scope of partnerships that can be evaluated.  The 
geographic spread and number of stakeholder representatives that can be involved 
will be dependent on the availability of funds and the individual calendars and 
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goodwill of each stakeholder.  The methodology still requires case-by-case analysis 
and preferably physical visits. 
 
There is merit in conducting theme-based investigations across several partnerships 
through a series of gatherings, but once again this would require considerable 
resources.  Although an alternating focus evaluation can be valuable for stakeholders 
involved in partnerships it would not suit the research design for this dissertation 
which requires the analysis of a wide variety of partnerships.  Based on the 
discussion in this subsection the following PPP success factors could be identified:  
 Overcoming the stereotypes of different sector counterparts. 
 Make concrete assessments of the contributions that individual sectors make, 
and building their confidence in making these contributions. 
5.8 SERVICE DELIVERY EVALUATION 
The evaluation of PPPs is the focus of this chapter.  PPPs are without exception 
vehicles for the delivery of a public product or service, and the evaluation of PPPs 
should thus necessarily include an evaluation of the service or product that is being 
delivered through the PPP, and how this product is perceived by the customer.  The 
focus in this section of the chapter is not the partnership itself, but rather its outputs 
and the relationship between the PPP and its customers. 
5.8.1 Identifying service delivery gaps 
The gaps model of service quality focuses on the difference, or gap, between 
customer perceptions and expectations.  Customer perceptions are subjective 
assessments of actual service experiences.  Both customer expectations (expected 
service) and customer perceptions (perceived service) play a major role in service 
marketing (Zeithaml & Bitner, 1996).  Customer expectations are the standards of or 
reference points for performance against which service experiences are compared, 
and are often formulated in terms of what a customer believes should or will happen 
(Zeithaml & Bitner, 1996:37).  The sources of customer expectations consists of 
producer controlled factors (such as pricing, advertising, sales promises) as well as 
factors that the producer has limited ability to affect (innate personal needs, word-of-
mouth communications, competitive offerings). In a perfect world, expectations and 
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perceptions would be identical: customers would perceive that they receive what they 
thought they would and should. In practice, these concepts are often far removed 
from each other (Zeithaml & Bitner, 1996:38).  The process of closing the customer 
gap can be subdivided into four "company gaps," discrepancies within the 
organization delivering the service that inhibit delivery of quality service.  These four 
company or provider gaps are discussed below. 
5.8.1.1 Gap 1: Not knowing what customers expect 
Producer perception / customer expectation gap:  This exists where management 
does not understand or have failed to identify which aspects of service or quality are 
important to the customers.  Reasons for this gap include no direct interaction with 
customers and inadequate marketing research orientation.  Unwillingness to ask 
about expectations and unpreparedness in addressing them can also cause the 
gap.  In the same manner, a lack of upward communication and an insufficient 
relationship focus will cause a lack of knowledge of customer expectations (Zeithaml 
& Bitner, 1996:39).  Customers hold different types of service expectations.  Desired 
service reflects what customers want, adequate service reflect what customers are 
willing to accept and predicted services reflect what customers believe they are likely 
to get.  Customers have global expectations of their relationships with service 
providers and also expectations of individual service encounters. Customer 
expectations are influenced by a variety of factors, some controllable and other 
uncontrollable by service marketers.  The types and sources of expectations are the 
same for end consumers (in the case of PPPs, the public) and business customers 
(in the case of PPPs, the public sector partner), for pure service and product-related 
service, and for experienced customers and inexperienced customers (Zeithaml & 
Bitner, 1996:99). 
5.8.1.2 Not selecting the right service design standards 
Producer perception / service specification gap:  This gap exists when management 
knows what the customer wants but then allows the service specification laid down to 
fall short. It is the difference between company understanding of customer 
expectations and the development of customer-driven service designs and 
standards.  It can be brought about by a lack of customer-driven service standards, 
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inadequate service leadership, and poor service design (product development) 
(Zeithaml & Bitner, 1996:41). 
5.8.1.3 Not delivering to service standards 
Service specification / service delivery gap, the discrepancy between development of 
customer-driven service standards and actual service performance by company 
employees:  This occurs when front-line staff does not provide the service as laid 
down by management. It is here that strategic measurement systems come into play. 
Historically the domain of finance and accounting, management strategists now call 
for the addition of key marketing indicators in the overall measurement 
programme.  If customer satisfaction is to become a focus of strategy, companies 
must incorporate into their measurement systems important barometers of customer 
and perceived service quality satisfaction (Zeithaml & Bitner, 1996:42).  This gap 
originates in deficiencies in human resource policies, failure to match supply and 
demand, and in customers not fulfilling their co-producer roles (Zeithaml & Bitner, 
1996:44–45). 
5.8.1.4 Not matching performance to promises 
Service delivery / communications gap: This occurs when for example advertising 
promises more than staff can hope to deliver.  It is the difference between service 
delivery and the external communications of the service provider (Titman, 1995:55; 
Zeithaml & Bitner, 1996:38).  This gap is caused by ineffective management of 
customer expectations, over-promising, and inadequate horizontal communications 
(Zeithaml & Bitner, 1996:45–47). 
5.8.1.5 Putting it all together: Closing the gaps 
Zeithaml and Bitner's conceptual model of the four service gaps conveys a clear 
message to managers wishing to evaluate and improve the quality of their service: 
The key to closing the customer gap is to close the four gaps explained above and to 
keep them closed.  To the extent that one or more of the gaps exist, customers 
perceive service quality shortfalls.  This model, called the gaps model, serves as a 
framework for service organizations attempting to improve service quality and 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 391 
services marketing, a framework for understanding and improving service delivery 
(Zeithaml & Bitner, 1996:48–50).  The closing of the service gaps as discussed here 
could be equated with increasing productivity.  This can be a mistaken 
assumption.  Although there is a general belief that improved productivity should 
contribute to improving service delivery, if one feels that service delivery constitutes 
primarily quality of service to customers, productivity might be excluded (Titman, 
1995:22).  Titman (1995:22) argues that productivity is a dichotomy - increase it too 
much or too obviously and customers may perceive it as being a reduction in the 
level of service provided.  This is because ways of increasing productivity include 
options that could involve reducing high service-quality standards, or persuading 
customers to carry out some of the work themselves.  Some of the techniques for 
improving productivity might decrease service quality, which should be one element 
of improved service delivery.  It follows that effectiveness, efficiency and productivity 
do not automatically translate into improved service delivery. 
5.8.2 Determining service needs 
The gaps model of service quality described in the previous subsection seemingly 
ignores the difference between customers‘ perceptions of their needs, and actual 
needs.  And it is actual needs, not perceived ones, which public managers aim to 
satisfy.  It is however true that in order to determine needs, the most generally used 
method would be to ask the customer.  The measurement of service delivery should 
therefore allow for the differences between perceptions and reality.  Tools used in 
marketing research can be used to identify differences between reality and 
perception, and can help to bring perceptions closer to reality (Zeithaml & Bitner, 
1996:37).  This section has described service delivery evaluation, service delivery 
gaps and how a provider can go about closing such gaps.  PPPs are by definition 
involved in the delivery of some or other public service and it will be foolhardy to 
ignore the possible influence of customer dissatisfaction, whether that dissatisfaction 
is based on fact or misperception.  Minnie (2000) has written extensively on the use 
of various marketing tools and techniques to determine and improve on public service 
delivery, and the partners in a PPP would be well-advised to consider using these 
tools to evaluate their service delivery and customer perceptions thereof.  It should 
be noted that the type of research mentioned is not radically different from the 
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evaluation tools already mentioned in this chapter.  Programme evaluation is in fact 
closely related to marketing research. 
 
This evaluation methodology is appropriate and useful for the evaluation of PPP 
success, and provides a useful reminder that the real success of a PPP would lie in 
acceptable levels of service delivery.  The methodology will be as resource-intensive 
as programme evaluation and is therefore not appropriate for the research into critical 
success factors for PPPs as conducted in the research project.  Success factors 
identified in this section: 
 Focus on appropriate product development and service delivery; 
 Know what customers expect 
 Select correct service design standards 
 Deliver to service standards  
 Match performance to promises 
 
This concludes the discussion on service delivery evaluation.  In the next section the 
defining of an appropriate success measure for PPPs will receive attention. 
5.9 DEFINING AN APPROPRIATE SUCCESS MEASURE 
In this section the measurement of success will be discussed with a view to defining 
an appropriate success measure.  It may be naïve to talk about success or failure as 
if it is such a straightforward and self-apparent quality of a partnership.  It may very 
well be that the success or failure of a PPP is not a clearly defined concept and that 
there is no clear, universally applicable success measure.  For example, is it a failure 
when a PPP that becomes unsustainable is responsibly terminated to limit 
expenditure on ineffective service delivery, and is it a success if further money and 
effort is committed to artificially prolong the life of the same partnership?.  These 
points make a clear case that success is not only measured through survival of the 
partnership, and that the evaluation of partnerships may contain some grey areas 
where evaluation needs to be the subject of creative thinking.  It should be noted that 
the life cycle stage of a PPP will determine how it can be evaluated.  It would not 
serve any purpose to evaluate a PPP in its conception phase in the same way that 
one would evaluate another PPP that is well-advanced in the implementation 
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process.  The way to evaluate a PPP with sensitivity to its life cycle stage is to look 
specifically at what is expected of the PPP at the stage of its life cycle that it finds 
itself in.  The achievement of objectives or goals that apply to a specific life cycle 
stage should be measured.  Planned versus actual performance or progress should 
be evaluated per life cycle stage.  An interesting nuance in the life-stage specific 
measurement of performance is that a decision to terminate a PPP process cannot 
necessarily be seen as a failure if the goal in that life cycle stage was to make a ―go‖ 
or ―no go‖ decision based on a comprehensive viability assessment.  In the 
conception stage of a PPP, progress to the establishment or implementation phase of 
the PPP is but one of many possible indicators that the specific life cycle stage was 
successful.  A decision not to proceed can also indicate success in the conception 
stage of a PPP life cycle. 
 
Together with planned versus real progress, other evaluation criteria for a PPP could 
include efficiency and financial indicators such as keeping within budget or unlocking 
savings.  One clear, central and non-negotiable success indicator for a PPP is the 
creation of public value which satisfies a public need.  Similarly important is the 
achievement of goals and delivering service to specification. The evolution of a 
partnership is also an indicator of success and the continued existence of the PPP, 
as envisaged, shows success.  Commercial viability of a service may be regarded as 
a success indicator, but in fact, commercial viability does not relate well to public 
services and should therefore not be considered as an indicator of success.  
Government and public administration is not profit-motivated and PPPs should 
therefore also not be motivated by profit but rather by the affordable delivery of public 
services.  Yet another success measuring option is to consider whether there is 
political will and support behind the partnership.  It may be problematic to reliably 
measure political will, though.  Possible categories of evaluation, or performance 
areas, to measure success of partnerships could include Policy, Planning, Financing, 
Leadership, and Monitoring and Evaluation.  One could look at previous research to 
get guidance on a success measure, but according to Cooper (1993:244-245) there 
are significant problems in interpreting prior research on partnerships because there 
is such a great variation in samples and such a wide variety of performance 
measures which could include: 
o Survival vs. discontinuance;  
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o Growth measures – sales, employee growth; 
o Absolute size (not growth rate); 
o Subjective assessment of performance; 
o Indices of performance (Cooper, 1993:244–245). 
 
Furthermore, according to writers commenting on enterprise survival, factors outside 
the control of the entrepreneur, such as the carrying capacity of an industry, may 
affect the number of existing firms (in this case partnerships) that are able to survive 
(Aldrich, 1990, cited in Cooper, 1993).  Defining a success measure that would be 
able to adjust to such externalities is a challenge.  The framing of a success measure 
has been an ongoing theme throughout the previous chapters and began in earnest 
in Chapter 1 with the creation of an eight-point checklist to pre-qualify a PPP for 
further success evaluation.  Critical success factors have been collected from 
Chapter 2 onwards, and each success factor provides insight into how the success of 
a partnership could be measured.   
 
The development of a framework for evaluation began at the end of Chapter 2, was 
taken further in Chapter 3, and received constant attention throughout this chapter. 
Early in this chapter the comparative analysis of case studies was described and an 
evaluation results table was described as an evaluation instrument for partnerships.  
This table can contribute to the development of a success measure and will be 
applied in the next section. A three-dimensional success evaluation instrument was 
described and it was noted that while detailed information gathering preceded the 
characterisation of the case studies, success was determined solely through a 
qualitative interview process.  The dimensions used in the instrument were: 
Executive and organisational; Operational and marketing and Contractual and 
building.  After the case study evaluation project was described, a characterization 
and evaluation framework for PPPs was developed in a discussion on how 
characterization can be used in evaluation.  This characterization framework can also 
contribute to the development of the success measurement instrument and will be 
applied to the next section.  This completes the discussion of defining an appropriate 
success measure for PPPs.  In the next section an instrument for partnership 
success measurement will be proposed. 
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5.10 MEASURING PARTNERSHIP SUCCESS: AN INSTRUMENT 
Partnership success measuring instruments have been developed progressively from 
Chapter 2. In this section all the performance measurement instruments that have 
been determined in this and previous chapters will be combined into a single 
comprehensive partnership evaluation instrument for PPPs.  The instrument has 
been developed by combining elements of the instrument used for case study 
evaluation by Nijkamp et al (2002), and the characterization framework developed in 
the section on the description of evaluation through characterization.  The intention is 
that the instrument could be used at differing levels of investigation.  At a basic level, 
the instrument could be used to capture the basic information about a partnership 
without stakeholder involvement.  At a second more detailed level, the instrument can 
be used in an interview setting to complete details regarding a partnership based on 
the knowledge of an informant, normally a stakeholder in the partnership.  At the 
third, most detailed level, the instrument will need to be supported with various 
additional information collection instruments that will, once completed, feed the 
instrument with scorings for individual areas of the instrument.  The instrument will 
also provisionally consist of 3 separate sections.  The first section will contain a pre-
qualification checklist where it will be confirmed that the entity under evaluation is 
indeed a PPP.  The second section will focus more on the description of the PPP 
without assigning any performance measures.  It may be difficult to separate 
description or characterization from evaluation due to the close relationship between 
the two concepts, but in general all free-text descriptive fields will be kept in the 
second section.  The third section will contain the performance evaluation fields of 
the instrument. Mostly with either binary ―yes/no‖ fields or with simple ranges of 3 to 5 
choices on a scale.  
5.10.1 Pre-qualification 
This first section of the evaluation tool is used to pre-qualify the entity that is being 
evaluated as a PPP.  If one wants to evaluate a PPP it is important that the entity is 
indeed a PPP, therefore it would be a good starting point to use the checklist 
indicated in the following table to pre-qualify the entity as a PPP. 
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Table 5-22: Checklist to classify a partnership as a PPP: The Roman Circus 
Requirements for partnership classification as PPP: 
 
Complies: 
Yes  / No 
1 A contractual arrangement is in place Yes / No 
2 …between a public sector entity and a private sector entity… Yes / No 
3 …whereby the private sector performs a departmental function…. Yes / No 
4 …in accordance with an output-based specification…. Yes / No 
5 …for a specified, significant period of time… Yes / No 
6 …in return for a benefit, this is normally in the form of financial remuneration. Yes / No 
7 There is a substantial transfer of all forms of project life cycle risk to the private 
sector. 
Yes / No 
8 The public sector retains a significant role in the partnership project either as the 
main purchaser of the services provided, or as the main enabler of the project. 
Yes / No 
5.10.2 Characterization 
In this second section of the evaluation tool, the descriptive and more static 
information regarding the PPP is required. 
 
Table 5-23: Characterization 
 PPP Characterization Criteria 
Evaluation category / 
Performance area 
How characterization can be 
presented 
Evaluation variable / 
Performance indicator 
Possible scores 
 Partnership name:    Unique descriptions will be 
required for each PPP. 
 Partnership goal / purpose:  Unique descriptions will be 
required for each PPP. 
 Primary intended outcome of 
partnership: 
 Unique descriptions will be 
required for each PPP. 
 Project dates / duration:  dd-month-yycc 
 Public sector partners:  Unique descriptions will be 
required for each PPP. 
 Private sector partners:  Unique descriptions will be 
required for each PPP. 
 Third sector partners:  Unique descriptions will be 
required for each PPP. 
 Setting  Unique descriptions will be 
required for each PPP. 
 Structural relationships and 
positions 
 Unique descriptions will be 
required for each PPP. 
 Representation rules  Unique descriptions will be 
required for each PPP. 
 Authority   limits of representatives‘ 
mandate 
 limits to internal authority 
 source or basis of 
authority for the 
partnership itself.   
Unique descriptions will be 
required for each PPP. 
 Form of partnership   1: Informal, 
2: Concession, 
3: Joint venture, 
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 PPP Characterization Criteria 
Evaluation category / 
Performance area 
How characterization can be 
presented 
Evaluation variable / 
Performance indicator 
Possible scores 
 
Spatial scope  
1: Local 
2: Regional 
3: National 
4: International 
 
Financing and risk Financiers and risk-bearers 
1: Mainly public  
2: Mainly private 
3: Joint public-private 
activity 
 Life cycle stage:   1: Pre-project; 
2: Concept; 
3: Design; 
4: Implementation; 
5: Handover; 
6: Operation; 
7: Disposal. 
 Economic sector:  
 
 1: Primary 
2: Secondary 
3: Tertiary 
 Societal sector:  
 
If it is a PPP it should involve the 
public sector and the private 
sector, but could also include the 
third sector. 
1: Public 
2: Private 
3: Third 
 
Contractual arrangements 
Transparency of profit(ability) 
requirements 
1: Yes  
2: No 
 
 Nature of contract 
1 Global  
2 Detailed 
 
5.10.3 Performance 
This third section of the evaluation tool comprises a PPP performance questionnaire 
that collects the dynamic performance information regarding the PPP. 
 
Table 5-24: PPP Performance evaluation 
 PPP Characterization Criteria 
Evaluation category / 
Performance area 
How characterization can be 
presented 
Evaluation variable / 
Performance indicator 
Possible scores 
 
Revenues and costs Financial transparency 
1 Good  
2 Fair  
3 Poor 
 
Partner selection Selection procedure of partners 
1: Open selection  
2: Target group approach  
3: Combination 
 Information and knowledge 
management 
 1: Frequency of meetings 
 Decision making  1: Joint / Central 
 Level of integration and 
coordination 
 1: Low 
2: High 
 Interdependence  1: Low 
2: High 
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 PPP Characterization Criteria 
Evaluation category / 
Performance area 
How characterization can be 
presented 
Evaluation variable / 
Performance indicator 
Possible scores 
 Formalization  1: Low 
2: High 
 Public Leadership This criterion can be presented 
in a checklist with space for 
additional unique comments. 
1: Low 
2: High 
 Institutional readiness  
 
Partner readiness for partnership 1: Low 
2: High 
  Citizen and community interest 
and involvement 
1: Low 
2: High 
  Presence of potential partners 1: Low 
2: High 
  Previous partnership experience 1: Low 
2: High 
  Intra-partnership awareness of 
other partners‘ missions, goals 
and objectives 
1: Low 
2: High 
 Overlap and duplication This criterion could be presented 
on a continuum from low to high. 
1: Low 
2: High 
 Policy consistency  Policy consistency and can be 
presented on a continuum from 
low to high. 
1: Low 
2: High 
 Partnership governance- and 
delivery gaps 
This criterion can be presented 
on a continuum from low to high 
with space for further elaboration 
of unique information if required.  
1: Low 
2: High 
 Purposeful collaboration A qualitative score on a range 
from low to high can be assigned 
for each PPP. 
1: Low 
2: High 
 Readiness Preparation of service delivery 
infrastructure / systems, 
including construction / required 
investments to enable operation 
5: Absolutely, always true;  
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Operation / service delivery Customer satisfaction / Right 
service, right time, right place, 
right cost / Sustainability / 
Profitability 
5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Completion of lifespan Defined objectives met 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Contract in place 
 
Formal contract respected by all 
parties / Informal agreement 
respected by all parties 
5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Collaboration  1: Intimate 
2: Distant 
 Commitment  1: Low 
2: High 
 Triple bottom line  Economic / Financial 
Environmental 
Social 
1: Sustainable 
2: Unsustainable 
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 PPP Characterization Criteria 
Evaluation category / 
Performance area 
How characterization can be 
presented 
Evaluation variable / 
Performance indicator 
Possible scores 
 Level of symbiosis(determines 
mutual benefit) 
 5: Parasitic 
3: Commensal 
1: Mutualistic 
 Inter-partner relationship  5:Adversarial 
3:Neutral 
1: Collaborative 
 Generic Success Factors An initial judgement of success 
can be established if all factors 
below are scored as 4 or 5. 
5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Goal of partnership has been 
established 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Desired outcomes have been 
established 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Partnership more effective than 
separate efforts can be 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Mutual benefit has been 
established 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Managing structure has been 
agreed upon or is self-evident 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Partnership will be of general 
benefit to society 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Sufficient will and goodwill 
exists for goals to be reached 
 5: Absolutely, always true;  
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Partners have sufficient 
capacity to produce desired 
outcomes 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Case-specific Factors At a specific phase in the life-
cycle of the partnership, a 
judgement of success can be 
established if the factors for that 
phase are scored as 4 or 5. 
5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
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 PPP Characterization Criteria 
Evaluation category / 
Performance area 
How characterization can be 
presented 
Evaluation variable / 
Performance indicator 
Possible scores 
 All partners still focus on 
reaching goal 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Planning and establishment 
outcomes have been reached 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Maintenance outcomes have 
been reached 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Partnership can be safely 
terminated 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Sufficient will and goodwill 
exists for goals to be reached 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Partners have sufficient 
capacity to produce desired 
outcomes 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Partners are gaining sufficient 
rewards 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Intended beneficiaries are 
receiving sufficient benefits 
 5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
 Summary   
 Successes of partnership:  Free text 
 Failures of partnership:  Free text 
 
The instrument is still in an early version and may be influenced by what is 
discovered in the next two chapters. 
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5.11 SUCCESS FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN THIS CHAPTER 
In this section the pattern started at the end of Chapter 3 is continued.  All those 
critical success factors identified in this chapter are listed here without any editing.  
The success factors for PPPs identified in this chapter are: 
1) Defined purpose; 
2) Defined structural relationships; 
3) Clear mandates and authority; 
4) Efficient knowledge and information management; 
5) Defined and efficient decision-making; 
6) Appropriate levels of integration and coordination; 
7) Appropriate levels of interdependence; 
8) Appropriate levels of formality; 
9) Use of appropriate management instruments; 
10) Public leadership; 
11) Partner readiness for partnership; 
12) Citizen and community interest and involvement; 
13) Available potential partners; 
14) Previous partnership experience; 
15) Intra-partnership awareness of other partners‘ missions, goals and objectives; 
16) Low overlap and duplication; 
17) Policy consistency; 
18) A public need is met; 
19) Several stakeholders involved; 
20) Recognisable institutional form created; 
21) Role-players pool and share resources; 
22) Role-players achieve common goals; 
23) Contractual arrangement in place; 
24) Sustained collaborative effort; 
25) Involvement of both public and private sectors; 
26) Private sector provides a traditionally public service against an outputs-based 
specification for a significant period of time; 
27) Common vision and objective; 
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28) Private sector receives benefit / award; 
29) Partners able to pursue individual goals; 
30) Risk transfer to private sector; 
31) Risk sharing; 
32) Shared project design and planning; 
33) Public sector remains significant role-player; 
34) Partners contribute portions of resources; 
35) Partners contribute according to own comparative advantage; 
36) All partners obtain pre-defined benefit; 
37) Strong programme conceptualization; 
38) Clarity, plausibility, feasibility, and appropriateness of programme theory 
which shows cause-effect relationships leading to required outcome; 
39) Programme impact is aligned to outputs specified in programme theory; 
40) Effective, unbiased programme evaluation; 
41) Goal achievement; 
42) Outcomes-based performance measurement and management; 
43) Protection against political interference; 
44) Measure performance against mission / objectives; 
45) Consider context in establishing mission and objectives; 
46) Appropriate performance indicators for which data is available and collection 
is feasible; 
47) Limited governance and delivery gaps; 
48) Purposeful collaboration; 
49) Achievement by the partnership of desired goals or outcomes;; 
50) Clearly identified pre-determined goals or outcomes for the partnership; 
51) Goals are actively pursued and performance of the partnership is monitored 
and evaluated against these goals; 
52) Mobilization of a coalition of interests drawn from more than one sector; 
53) Prepare and oversee an agreed strategy; 
54) Focus on appropriate product development and service delivery; 
55) Know what customers expect; 
56) Select correct service design standards; 
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57) Deliver to service standards; 
58) Match performance to promises. 
 
 
The list of success factors provided above can be synthesised into a shorter, 
consolidated collection through the removal of duplicates, the combination of similar 
ideas, and the reformulation of ideas.  
5.11.1 Consolidated success factors from this chapter 
The consolidated success factors for PPPs identified in this chapter are shown in 
Annexure C. 
5.12 FURTHER DISTILLATION OF SUCCESS FACTORS 
This list of success factors now need to be compared and integrated with the success 
factors identified in the previous chapter.  The list of factors from the previous chapter 
is shown in Annexure C and will be followed by a combined and integrated list 
compiled through a process of synthesis. 
5.12.1 Integrated list of success factors 
In this sub-section a synthesis of the integrated list from Chapter 4 and the 
consolidated list from this chapter is made by combining the lists, removing 
duplicates and grouping similar concepts under collective headings.  The 
consolidated list of success factors is shown in Annexure C.  This consolidated and 
integrated list represents all the success factors identified up to this point.  This list 
will be transferred for use at the end of the next chapter, where it will be combined 
with success factors identified in the next chapter. 
5.13 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has focused on the evaluation of PPPs, consitituting a further 
exploration of avenues to identify critical success factors for partnerships.  Various 
evaluation methodologies were described for two reasons: firstly to determine 
whether the methodology would be appropriate  for the evaluation of the success of  
PPPs in general, and secondly to consider whether each evaluation methodology 
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would fit into the exploratory research design for this dissertation and could be used 
for the evaluation of case studies in the next chapter.  The first evaluation 
methodology discussed was comparative case study analysis, after which evaluation 
based on characterization was discussed, which lead to the development of a 
characterization framework for PPPs which can also be used for PPP evaluation. 
Next, the purpose and performance implications of PPP definitions was explored, 
which lead to the development of a methodology to derive PPP performance 
indicators from PPP definitions, as well as the framing of a comprehensive definition 
for PPPs. A discussion of performance management for business improvement 
districts followed, after which programme evaluation was discussed. The discussion 
then moved on to an alternating focus partnership evaluation methodology and the 
evaluation of service delivery, as well as the defining of an appropriate success 
measure for partnerships. 
 
The identification of success factors as well as the development of an instrument for 
partnership success measurement continued throughout this chapter.  Towards the 
end of the chapter a proposed success measurement instrument was presented and 
explained.  It was indicated that the instrument could be used at any life cycle stage 
of a PPP and could be used with various levels of detail, depending on the availability 
of evaluation resources.  At the end of the chapter, the success factors that were 
identified within the chapter wese listed and then refined before being combined with 
the combined list of success factors from the previous chapter for a distillation 
process where duplications were removed or combined and new unique success 
factors were added.  
5.13.1 Conclusion 
This concludes Chapter 5.  In Chapter 6 a collection of case studies will be analysed 
in an effort to test the evaluation tool developed in this chapter, and also to identify 
any additional critical success factors. 
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6 EXAMPLES AND THEIR SUCCESS OR FAILURE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In previous chapters of this dissertation an overview of partnerships was provided, 
success factors for partnerships were discussed and in Chapter 5 the evaluation of 
partnerships was discussed and an instrument for the measuring of partnership 
success was developed.  In this chapter, elements of the instrument developed in 
Chapter 5 are used to evaluate the performance of several partnership examples 
taken from a wide variety of settings and then focusing on some South African 
examples. In discussing many different partnership examples, a pattern can be found 
in the successes and failures in partnerships in order to further expand the 
understanding of success factors for partnerships.  After each example has been 
discussed, indications of performance that appear within the text that describes the 
case study will be lifted out and where sufficient information is available, an indication 
will be given of whether the example partnership was successful or not.  While the 
actual evaluation of case studies is not the central aim of this dissertation, the 
discussion in this chapter will provide additional opportunity to identify critical success 
factors for PPPs. The analysis of case studies aligns well with the exploratory 
research design of this study as described in Chapter 1.   This chapter continues to 
use examples for the systematic extraction of evidence of specific success factors.  
Although each example is unique, a pattern emerges from the combination of all the 
examples.  Each example of a PPP has its own DNA, but common traits can still 
emerge.  At the end of this chapter the PPP success measurement tool developed in 
the previous chapter will be further enhanced with the conclusions regarding success 
factors that will emerge from the body of this chapter. 
6.2 EXAMPLE SELECTION MOTIVATION  
In this section, the selection of PPPs for analysis and evaluation is described.  There 
are so many examples of PPPs worldwide that it may be difficult to decide which 
examples to analyse and evaluate.  Throughout the discussion in this dissertation, it 
has become clear that there are a rich variety of PPPs and in choosing examples to 
analyse one would not want to limit the analysis to a parochial selection of PPPs, 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
7 
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even if the focus of this dissertation is ultimately South African.  The intention to 
consider a wide variety of quite different PPPs may not immediately seem helpful 
because it would be close to impossible to compare examples with each other on an 
equal footing.  It can however be motivated that comparisons between PPPs is not 
the intention in this chapter; the intention is rather to describe a wide variety of PPPs, 
to consider each example on its own merit, and then to consider what the specific 
example can contribute to the wider body of knowledge on PPPs and what pattern 
emerges that can aid the search for critical success factors conducted in this 
dissertation.  The selection of examples will thus have the objective of ensuring 
representivity of PPP examples that cover as wide a spectrum as possible. The 
reason why representivity is seen as a necessity in the choice of PPP examples is to 
firstly make the possible catchment area for success factors as wide as possible, and 
secondly to illustrate the wide variety of PPP types and forms and show how the PPP 
model has been infused into every nook and cranny of society and the economy. 
 
There are of course many different ways of structuring the decision regarding which 
examples of PPPs to analyse.  One approach would be to look at temporal 
structuring, where examples of PPPs are chosen to ensure the representation of 
different periods in history.  A second approach would be to look at locational or 
geographic structuring, where examples of PPPs are chosen to ensure the 
representation of places, countries, regions and continents.  A third approach would 
be to look at the different geographic scales at which PPPs can operate, such as 
local, provincial, national, regional, continental and global scales. A fourth possibility 
is to approach the structuring from a sectoral perspective, where the examples of 
PPPs chosen for analysis are related to the economic sector (primary / secondary / 
tertiary) they represent. Fifthly, it would be possible to choose PPP examples based 
on the sort of product or service that they provide, i.e. the industry they are involved 
in.  A sixth approach would be to consider the life-stage of the PPP examples, and 
ensure that PPPs in all PPP life stages are represented. The structuring of PPP 
examples based on the size of their budgets or resources is a seventh option.  
Finally, as an eighth option, the partnership type can be used as organising 
mechanism.  
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The decision of the researcher is not to apply any one of these possible structuring 
mechanisms on its own, but to rather use all structuring mechanisms at the same 
time by indicating where each example of a PPP used stands in terms of each of the 
six possible structuring mechanisms.  The choice of which examples to examine will 
be informed by the intention to discuss PPPs in every category of each of the six 
possible typologies of partnerships.  The table below illustrates the six typologies and 
some sample categories which could emerge from each typology 
 
Table 6-1: Structuring mechanism for partnership example selection 
Structuring 
mechanism 
Categories within each structuring mechanism 
Time period Before 1900 1900-1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s After 2000 
Location  South Africa 
(Primary 
focus) 
Africa Europe Asia Americas 
Other 
continents 
Scale Local Provincial National Regional Continental Global 
Economic 
Sector 
Primary Secondary  Tertiary    
Product / 
Service / 
Industry 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Transport 
Local 
economic 
development 
Tourism 
Urban 
revitalization 
Social 
development 
Life cycle 
stage 
 
 
 
Pre-project,  
Concept and 
initiation 
Design and 
development 
Implementation 
/ Construction 
Handover / 
Commissioning 
Operation Disposal 
Size 
(budget, 
resources) 
Unfunded Small Medium Large Macro  
Partnership 
type 
BOT BOTT JV Concession 
Service 
contract 
Management 
contract 
6.3 DEPTH OF EVALUATION 
As described in the discussion on evaluation in the previous chapter, and specifically 
in the sections dedicated to comparative case study analysis as well as programme 
evaluation, the best way to evaluate a PPP would be to conduct in-depth programme 
evaluation and rigorous information collection.  In order to really get to know a 
partnership one would need to investigate and comprehensively describe all aspects 
of a PPP, including its founding documentation.  Given the research objective and 
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research design for this dissertation, such a detailed analysis of a large sample of 
PPPs was not necessary.   
 
The approach followed in this dissertation, which is described in Chapter 1, entails 
the methodical and repetitive identification of success factors through different 
perspectives and layers of analysis.  This approach makes it possible to focus less 
on the physical evaluation of case studies, reducing the need for in-depth case study 
analysis.  The step-by-step addition of success factors collected through various 
different perspectives allows the researcher to conduct less intensive case study 
analysis and use the evaluation process, more than its results, in identifying critical 
success factors.  The ideal approach would be to gather information on a wide-
ranging and comprehensive collection of contracts and to evaluate what the 
successes and failures are, but seeing that such fieldwork was not accommodated in 
the research design, the researcher has relied on descriptions of partnerships from 
literature, from the collection of partnership updates through a media monitoring 
mechanism, from personal interviews with stakeholders, and from direct observation. 
6.4 MINIMUM INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EVALUATION 
In this section the minimum information requirements to enable a meaningful 
evaluation of a PPP‘s success or failure will be discussed with a view to the case 
studies or examples that will be considered in this chapter. 
6.4.1 Detailed evaluation and face-value assessment 
The evaluation instrument that has been developed in this dissertation requires the 
availability of a considerable amount of information regarding a partnership before it 
can be assessed.  While a detailed assessment would in all cases be preferable, it 
should be recognized that in some cases it may not be possible to collect all the 
required information about a partnership in order to evaluate it.  A need seems to 
exist for a quicker, face-value assessment of a partnership that only requires limited 
information before a preliminary judgement can be made on the success of a 
partnership.  While the instrument is already designed to accommodate three 
different levels of information collection (basic, intermediate and comprehensive), it 
may be necessary to accommodate cases where very little information is in fact 
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available.  The only viable solution in such cases is to consider the existing 
information at face value, to describe the PPP as far as possible with the available 
information, and make a case-by-case determination of the reliability of the sources 
of information and the validity of the opinions in the information.  A performance 
assessment can then be made with a simplified evaluation instrument.  It is proposed 
that in such a face-value assessment, only two success factors should be used in an 
evaluation instrument.  These are the two critical success factors identified in the 
discussion of programme evaluation in the previous chapter: the satisfaction of a 
public need and the achievement of the goals of the PPP.   
 
Table 6-2: Face-value partnership success evaluation instrument 
Face-value PPP Success Evaluation Instrument 
Partnership description: Characterization 
Evaluability assessment: 
A PPP is evaluable with this instrument on two conditions: 
1: The available information shows whether a public need 
was satisfied. 
2: The goal or purpose of the PPP and its achievement or 
otherwise can be derived from available information. 
Question 1: Has the partnership 
delivered a public need? 
5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
Question 2: Has the partnership 
succeeded in its goal? 
5: Absolutely, always true; 
4: Generally true; 
3: Sometimes true; 
2: Rarely true; 
1: Never/Not true 
Additional comments As required 
 
The evaluation of goal achievement is of course dependent on knowing the goal or 
purpose of the partnership. In cases where the goal of the partnership cannot be 
derived from the available information, the PPP is simply not evaluable, not even with 
the face-value assessment instrument proposed here.  It should be borne in mind 
that the fact that a PPP is not evaluable does not mean that it cannot provide insight 
into PPP success. 
6.4.2 Learning from examples that are not evaluable 
By considering a wide variety of examples, the impact that differences in PPP 
management can have on partnership success can be determined and recorded as 
lessons towards PPP success.  The non-implementation of success factors and 
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factors contributing to failure can also be identified and converted into success 
factors.  As indicated in the previous section and above, there may be difficulties in 
evaluating partnerships, especially when based on limited knowledge of the 
partnership.  If some of the examples are not described well enough to give a good 
indication of success or failure, they may still contain information in which additional 
knowledge of success factors can be found.  The intention is thus to try and 
determine success or failure in each case, and where this is not possible, to at least 
find pointers relating to success factors in each example.  After describing the 
partnership itself, the questions that will be asked regarding each example PPP are: 
 What is the point of this example? 
 What is the new knowledge contained in this example? 
 Is success or failure evident in this example? 
 Which success factors can be derived from this example? 
 Which performance indicators can be derived from this example? 
 
Where possible, success factors will be identified at the end of each case study.  The 
discussion of case studies can now commence.  Partnerships of different scale will 
first be described, progressing from local through regional to international PPPs.  The 
first examples that will be described are partnerships at a local or municipal level. 
6.5 LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS 
6.5.1 Partnerships in rural Sweden 
A number of partnerships, with a focus on local economic development, were created 
in Northern Europe, from the 1950s to the 2000s. 
 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
1950s to 2000s Local economic development Sweden, Northern Europe 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Primary, Secondary, 
Tertiary 
 Operation / Disposal 
Scale: Size: 
Local  
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The municipality of Osby is a small provincial municipality which had about 13 500 
inhabitants in 2002.  This figure declined to around 12 600 in 2007 (Statistics 
Sweden, 2009).  It is located in the north of Scania (Skåne), a county in Southern 
Sweden, and 100-200 km from the densely populated and dynamic areas of western 
Scania.  The people in this northern region have long been known for their 
enterprising spirit.  In the sixteenth century they were well known for their woodwork, 
especially for the production of clogs and baskets, and for the exploitation of their 
forests in their partisan wars against the invading Swedish Army (at the time Scania 
was part of Denmark) (Collin & Hansson, 2000:201).  Osby has two dominant 
employers, the municipality and BRIO, which is a family-company producing wooden 
toys (BRIO Group, 2009).  The rest of the employed people work in the extensive 
small-firm sector.  The number of businesses in Osby is no more than 700 (i.e. one 
business per 20 inhabitants) (Collin & Hansson, 2000:202). 
 
Cooperation between the private sector and the public sector has been present in 
Osby for many years.  In the 1950s, one of the strongmen of the municipality, Gösta 
Darlin, who had started a central-heating business, initiated the construction of a 
compound house (mixed use community and commercial centre), which later 
became a central building in the main borough.  Inside there was a restaurant, an 
assembly hall and a theatre, and the house was financed by several of the large 
employers, among them the municipality, BRIO and Darlin‘s own business (Collin & 
Hansson, 2000:202).  The municipality offers many such examples of public-private 
partnership.  Osbyhälsan AB was created as a limited company by the municipality 
and several private firms as its owners.  The goal of the firm was to provide health 
care for its owners‘ employees.  Södra Sveriges Fastbränsle AB was created during 
the oil crisis of the 1970s in order to exploit peat bogs in the surroundings.  It involved 
cooperation between a number of municipalities located in the area and some private 
firms, among others Södra Skogsägarna, a wood corporation, and Sydkraft, an 
electrical-power company (Collin & Hansson, 2000:202). 
 
The habit of cooperation over institutional borders between the public and private 
sectors in Sweden made it possible for the modern ―partisans‖ in Osby to easily 
organize cooperation between the municipality and several private firms when the 
municipality was besieged by economic hardship in 1991.  The central borough – 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 413 
Osby Municipality – has a station which is part of the national railway system.  The 
railroad runs through the borough, separating it into two halves.  Thus, it is a very 
obvious and important feature of the municipality.  In the autumn of 1991, the State 
Railway Corporation informed Osby Municipality that it had decided to discontinue 
goods traffic as a result of low profitability.  Many businesses in the borough used the 
railroad as an easily available transportation means, and some large industries were 
dependent on the railways.  With no goods traffic to the borough, some of the 
industries would have been forced to leave and relocate their production facilities to 
alternative locations where such transportation means were available.  The politicians 
in the municipality recognized the economic importance of goods traffic, and some 
even thought that this was the beginning of the end for the railway in Osby as it 
occurred to them that without rail traffic, the closure of the railway station would be 
imminent (Anheier & Seibel, 1990:11; Collin & Hansson, 2000:202). 
 
With the maintenance of goods service as their common interest, a group of local 
politicians and entrepreneurs organized a trip to the city of Malmö, the provincial 
capital, where they negotiated with the railway authorities.  They returned home with 
an idea of how to organize a company and how to contract for goods traffic with the 
State Railway Corporation (Collin & Hansson, 2000:202).  OsbyTåg Ek. För. was 
established as an incorporated association to manage railway freight handling 
including shunting, loading and unloading of wagons.  Its purpose was to secure 
continued goods rail traffic to the town.  The municipality and a group of businessmen 
acted as its owners (Collin & Hansson, 2000:202).  Each owner was expected to 
invest at least 10 000 SKr (approx. € 1 100) in the firm.  The firm entered a contract 
with the State Railway Corporation in which it undertook to pay compensation of 
1500 SKr (approx. € 168) for each wagon if the yearly volume of freight did not reach 
at least 400 wagons.  The contract was, however, constructed with a degressive tariff 
that meant that where the freight exceeded a volume of 1000 wagons a year, no 
extra charges would be levied.  The task of this newly founded firm was to take care 
of the freight when it arrived at Osby.  This included shunting, loading and unloading 
of wagons.  The firm did not have any personnel of its own and relied on employees 
of its owners to conduct the work.  The municipality provided the firm with two 
employees and two of the private firms that co-owned the new firm also contributed 
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two employees of their own.  The firm did not have any formal contracts with those 
working for it (Collin & Hansson, 2000:203). 
 
By 2000, Collin and Hansson reported that the operation had been far more 
successful than was first imagined.  One reason is that the firm succeeded in 
persuading IKEA, a large furniture corporation with headquarters not far from the 
municipality, to have a storeroom in Osby, and to use the railroad for the 
transportation of its products.  The degressive tariff combined with an increase in 
traffic led to dramatically good results in 1994 and this, in turn, made it possible for 
the firm to bring down the cost of transportation for the goods of its owners (Collin & 
Hansson, 2000:203).  The workload of the new firm was not shared equally by each 
of its owners, nor was its benefits accrued to them in equal proportion.  The 
municipality itself provided the firm with two of its employees to take care of shunting 
and administration, a substantial investment, and its Secretary for Industrial Policy 
headed the firm.  Although BRIO invested 50 000 SKr (€ 5 600), it hardly utilized the 
railroad.  AB Heinz Nilssons Plåtbearbetning, on the other hand, depends heavily on 
the railroad and has considerably benefited from this joint venture.  Heinz stores its 
customers‘ steel rolls, and on their demand, cuts these rolls and sends them to its 
customers.  The steel rolls are sent by rail to Osby from all over Europe.  Thus, 
without goods traffic, Heinz would have had to find another location for its operations.  
When the threat of the railway closing down was imminent, the young owner of Heinz 
actively engaged in the establishment of OsbyTåg Ek. För.  With the operation of the 
firm becoming routine, Collin and Hansson reported in 2000, he had discontinued his 
engagement in it.  Of course, Heinz is still dependent on the railway traffic, but none 
of its fifteen employees are in any way involved with the operations of OsbyTåg Ek. 
För (Collin & Hansson, 2000:203). 
 
The municipality of Osby is one of the municipalities in Sweden which has the highest 
number of public-private partnerships per capita. It is situated in a part of Sweden 
where the lack of natural resources has made the enterprising spirit of the residents 
its most important resource.  It is this abundant local entrepreneurship which has so 
easily made partnerships possible when the circumstances have made them 
necessary.  These partnerships are mostly based on informal relationships without 
any need for formal contract.  Each partner simply provides the resources it has or 
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can afford to hand over.  Such readiness to establish partnership is not the result of 
any major ideological discussion about crossing the boundary between the public and 
private sectors (Collin & Hansson, 2000:203), but rather a combination of necessity 
and capability.  In short the lesson here is that circumstances have made 
partnerships necessary and that local entrepreneurship has made them possible.  
Also remarkable is that these partnerships have not led to any major conflicts 
between profit-seeking private entrepreneurs and socially aware politicians. The 
readiness or willingness to partner is also, according to Collin and Hansson 
(2000:204), the outcome of a common fear of an external threat, whether it is from 
some state corporation as explained above or an institution such as the Swedish 
Army as experienced in the history of the community.  To counter this threat, both the 
local politicians and entrepreneurs have organized ―partisan‖ partnerships in order to 
mobilize resources and co-ordinate actions. 
 
Performance assessment: 
The partnerships in Osby, based on available evidence from literature, are seen as 
successful due to the endurance of the partnerships and the achievement of 
partnership goals.  The compound house built in the 1950s became a centre of 
community activity, and the train service was continued, which means that in both 
instances the goals of the partnerships were achieved. There is not enough 
information available to make a judgement on the success of the health care and 
peat bog energy partnerships. 
 
Success factors identified from this case study:  
 Formal agreements are not necessarily required to make a partnership 
successful; 
 Common fear of an external threat can motivate parties to form partnerships 
and ensure that such partnerships work.  In this case, the threat was the 
discontinuation of a transport service, which would have impacted on the 
economic livelihood of the town; 
 The need for a survival strategy can be an indicator for motivation to ensure 
success – crisis ensures focused collaboration and increase the chance of 
success; 
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 If a sector (either public or private) fails to provide a required service and the 
need still exists, PPPs are possible; 
 A market for a specific public service exists but is not satisfied by the existing 
public or private sector; 
 Local entrepreneurship; 
 Circumstances that force a collective response. 
 
The discussion now moves from Sweden to the UK. 
6.5.2 Anonymous troubled partnerships from the UK 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
1990 - 2006 Urban regeneration UK, Western Europe 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Tertiary   
Scale: Size: 
Local  
 
Rowe (2006), in an article on abusive partnerships, chose to discuss examples of 
abusive partnership without mentioning the jurisdictions in which these occurred.  In 
his comments on these anonymous partnerships, he indicates that one jurisdiction 
was awarded New Deal for Communities (NDC) funding, and the local authority 
established a partnership that sought to bring a range of people around the table.  
However, unwilling or unable to trust the partnership as an autonomous body, the 
authority seconded staff to the new organization and put in place a tough 
Accountable Body agreement that ensured that all decisions were thoroughly vetted 
by the authority.  While not intended as a way of fixing decisions, partners, and 
particularly residents, balked at the unnecessarily heavy-handed rules and 
procedures that were introduced.  Decisions to hinder progress on some applications 
for funds, many from voluntary and community groups, were in contrast with the 
successful bids submitted by public agencies.  It appeared to be a deliberate attempt 
to control the funding rather than a cautious approach to partnership working.  The 
partnership soon struggled under the burden of suspicions and hostilities.  The 
authority thus undervalued the perspective of residents and other lay persons. It 
seems that signs of danger for a local partnership is when one public agency 
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dominates decision-making or when patterns of spend indicate a bias towards local 
public agencies with few small and/or innovative projects (Rowe, 2006:212). 
6.5.2.1 ―Shotgun partnership‖ 
Rowe also describes a partnership where the partnership was only a means for the 
local authority to access additional funds, without any real intention to involve other 
stakeholders in decision-making.  Stakeholders are told what to do and forced to toe 
the line or face dire consequences.  The example concerns securing Neighbourhood 
Renewal Funds (NRF).  In order to secure such funding, the community was required 
to form a Local Strategic Partnership (LSP).  The local authority intervened at an 
early stage, interpreting the funding as ―theirs‖.  Senior councillors and officers 
believed the process of partnership to be an unnecessarily time-consuming way of 
allocating resources.  Rather than waste time over a relatively small amount of 
money, senior officers were invited to identify priorities for spending to be met from 
NRF. In their enthusiasm, the officers managed to identify ―priorities‖ that would 
require twice the funding available. Thus, all available funding was committed for 
three years.  When the LSP finally met and was tasked to develop a programme 
within a very short timescale, they were presented with one already completed.  The 
local authority did not attempt to pretend that this was up for discussion.  The 
purpose of the LSP was simply to allow them to draw down the funding.  A 
subsequent evaluation diplomatically suggested that their approach was unfortunate.  
Progress on the priorities of the partnership was hindered by this opening ploy, one 
that soured relationships between the major public agencies across the authority.  
Indeed, the community representatives took an adversarial stance against the local 
authority (Rowe, 2006:212).  In this example the local authority ignored due process 
where it would have been advisable to first negotiate priorities with partners, then to 
establish baseline information and set targets, and then to develop interventions – all 
of which takes time (Rowe, 2006:212). 
 
It is interesting that Rowe‘s (2006:212) examples indicate that government 
employees are more entrepreneurial than commonly imagined. This is evident in the 
endemic ―fight for budget‖. Every new funding stream is another opportunity to try to 
secure resources, regardless of the fit with the objectives of the funding stream or 
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with the needs of intended beneficiaries.  For some public agencies, successfully 
securing funds is an important indicator of the effectiveness of officers.  This 
conception often encourages a crude budget-maximizing approach.  Signs of danger 
identified by Rowe that may lead to the malfunctioning of partnerships include: A lack 
of clarity about purpose, roles and responsibilities; opaque decision-making 
processes; projects that show no sign of innovation or of joint-working and are often 
the continuation or extension of existing initiatives; projects with little focus on areas 
of deprivation or on priority client groups; and highly structured meetings with game-
playing and formalized conflict (Rowe, 2006:213). 
 
Performance assessment: 
All the partnerships described by Rowe have obvious problems with internal 
communication and mutual trust.  The partnerships might have achieved their goals 
from the perception of the public partner representatives, but not from the perception 
of the private participants. 
 
Success factors identified: 
 Clear purpose, roles and responsibilities; 
 Transparent decision-making processes; 
 Collaborative innovation; 
 Focus on high priority areas and clients (e.g. deprived areas for social 
programmes); 
 Honest, sincere and respectful collaboration in meetings. 
6.5.2.2 Partnerships of convenience 
In a partnership where all parties are only using the partnership as a way of 
accessing funds without real collaboration, it is possible to speak of a partnership of 
convenience.  The example here concerns Children‘s Fund resources which are 
intended to support innovative projects targeted at children at risk of, for example, 
exclusion from school.  Requirements for access to the funds include that funds 
should be spent by a partnership that engages with and is informed by consultation 
with parents and children.  Awarded a small amount, one local authority created a 
partnership structure. Bringing together the major providers, notably education, social 
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services and health (though with the latter playing a minor role), with their 
constituencies of voluntary sector providers, allowed funding to be diverted to 
supplement existing funding.  Each participant gained funding with minimal scrutiny 
of project proposals.  At the same time, access to resources bought off any possibility 
of dissenting voices, particularly among those voluntary sector organizations 
providing services to the black and minority ethnic communities (Rowe, 2006:213).   
 
The partnership bound participants into a complicit relationship where each benefits 
without being open to scrutiny from the others.  This is a partnership of convenience 
because externally, it presents all the appearance of a partnership, with appropriate 
paperwork detailing discussions about matters such as funding priorities and conflicts 
of interest (Rowe, 2006:213).  Such a partnership of convenience can be predicted to 
lean towards the maintenance of the present status quo and a lack of innovation.  
Rowe (2006:213) indicates that the lack of innovation in the partnership is illustrated 
by the language used in its documentation: 
 ―…the fund will supplement…: 
 ―Fund money will be used to continue paying…‖ 
 ―…the project aims to enhance existing…‖ 
 ―…allow the centre to keep running to full capacity…‖ 
It is evident that signs of problems for a partnership include a spending profile that 
mirrors the participants in the partnership. 
 
Performance assessment: 
 This partnership is a good example of previous discussions in this dissertation 
that indicated that the existence of a partnership does not denote success.  
What is interesting is that the partnership might have achieved its goals, but in 
a way where the ends do not justify the means.  A face-value assessment 
would have indicated success, but a detailed assessment, prompted by 
Rowe‘s observations, will pick up on the concerns regarding a lack of scrutiny 
of processes. 
 
Success factors identified:  
 Real collaboration; 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 420 
 Financial control; 
 Robust internal process to evaluate proposals; 
 Transparency and peer review within partnership; 
 Focus on innovation and improving the status quo. 
6.5.2.3 Abusive partnership 
One regeneration partnership was formed in the face of opposition from the local 
authority, which had wanted other wards to benefit.  Residents of the ward formed a 
board, which they dominated.  However, they lacked experience in the basics of 
establishing an organization, of setting up systems and overseeing staff.  They turned 
for advice to their Accountable Body, a public agency that had stepped in, in place of 
the local authority.  The Accountable Body advised on the appointment of a chief 
executive without a job description or any clear lines of oversight from the board.  
They established project approval and monitoring processes that lacked clarity or 
robustness but over which they had complete control. In effect, the organization 
lacked any rules or structures.  The Accountable Body and chief executive, between 
them, took control of decision-making, the funding and the board. A select group of 
board members were embraced by the chief executive and the Accountable Body 
and given privileged access to decision-making.  Other members of the board were 
excluded from influence.  As a consequence, the two groups of board members 
effectively formed opposing voting blocks over the main issues.  Meanwhile, the chief 
executive and the Accountable Body were able to work deals to spend funds on 
capital projects and investments with little regard to cost-effectiveness or conflicts of 
interest.  While board members blamed each other for the partnership‘s lack of 
impact, the funds were rapidly depleted.  Why is this partnership considered to be 
abusive?  Because the Accountable Body and chief executive quite literally 
manipulated people, their weaknesses and aspirations, in order to pit them against 
each other. 
 
Certain predictors of failure can be deduced from the discussion in the preceding 
pages. The following are possible reasons for failure that have been extracted from 
the literature: 
 an unwillingness or inability to trust the partnership; 
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 heavy-handed rules and procedures have been introduced; 
 deliberate attempts to control the funding; 
 suspicions; 
 hostilities; 
 underestimating value of clients‘ perspectives;  
 preponderance of staff from one public agency; 
 public agency dominating decision-making; 
 patterns of spending indicate a bias; 
 claiming ownership of funding; 
 frustration and inefficiency; 
 decisions taken on behalf of partnership; 
 misuse of the partnership to access funding; 
 soured relationships; 
 adversarial stance; 
 ignored processes. 
 
Performance assessment: 
It is not clear whether the PPP managed to develop the outcome it was established 
for, and therefore it is not possible to evaluate the PPP.  The internal conflict is an 
indicator of failure but it is possible to argue that a partnership which does not deliver 
while everyone gets along famously is in fact less successful than a partnership 
which does deliver but where strained relationships abound.  Except, of course, if the 
goal of the partnership is to be a place where everyone gets along. 
 
Success factors identified:  
 Willingness and ability to trust the partnership; 
 Participation in rule-setting; 
 Transparency in financial management; 
 Joint control of partnership funds; 
 Openness and communication; 
 Conflict management; 
 Understanding the value of clients‘ perspectives;  
 Equality within the partnership; 
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 Joint decision-making; 
 Joint prioritization of spending; 
 Purposeful collaboration; 
 Commitment to partnership goals; 
 Positive attitudes; 
 Established, respected processes. 
 
The above examples have been from the UK and the discussion now moves to the 
German city of Bremen. 
6.5.3 Bremen Online Services 
Bremen Online Services GmbH & Co. KG (BOS) was founded as a private-public 
partnership in 1999. The majority owner is the Freie Hansestadt Bremen - the Free 
Hanseatic City of Bremen (Klein, 2005). 
 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
1999 to date Software development Germany 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Tertiary   
Scale: Size: 
National  
 
BOS develops and implements e-government solutions for national, regional and 
local governments based on modern signature, encryption and payment 
technologies. BOS supports a full variety of public services, ranging from filing and 
reporting systems to the delivery of public notifications and orders (Bremen Online 
Services, 2005).  Deutsche Telekom views Bremen Online Services as an important 
market opener for electronic signature technology, which is a rather expensive 
technology and in which Telekom‘s subsidiary, TeleSec, has invested a lot of 
development efforts. But there are overarching concerns as well. First, creating 
online traffic is the core objective for any telecommunications provider, and 
developing new services is a way to do so. But Deutsche Telekom‘s involvement is 
also justified by the privatization of the German telecommunications market and its 
consequences. Deutsche Telekom once held the monopoly in the German 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 423 
telecommunications market, when it was the national telecommunications provider. 
Now, it is still by far the strongest player, but it needs to operate in a competitive 
market. Especially in bigger cities, new telephone companies run by public utilities or 
now-privatized public telecommunications providers, present a challenge. In general 
terms, participation in Bremen Online Services means a better grounding for 
Deutsche Telekom in the Bremen market, which is also being fostered by other 
projects with the city, such as providing public access points to the Internet in 
schools.   Sparkasse Bremen, the local savings bank, has an almost 50 percent 
market share in private banking of all regional households. Together with the other 
local savings banks in particular, and the whole banking industry in Germany, it has 
introduced a prepaid purse feature on the common, standardized debit card (ec-
Karte). This feature, GeldKarte, is available to every owner of such a card, but it lacks 
usage. For the banks, use of this feature would mean increased balances of book 
money and less handling of paper money, especially coins. Also, with new card-
reader technology, the GeldKarte is usable as a means for Internet payment. Thus, 
for Sparkasse Bremen, partnering with Bremen Online Services means not only an 
added service for its customers and an improved public image, but it might also help 
spur use of the GeldKarte.   
 
Several IT software developers have been and are involved in Bremen Online 
Services. Most significantly, a German start-up company which had acquired a 
significant market share in online banking software, Brokat, hoped to open a new 
market, electronic government, for its technological platform. However, specific 
demands of electronic services for public administration require a highly flexible and 
more complex infrastructure, which was ultimately not developed by this company. 
Other IT-partners have expertise in several fields of IT support in public 
administrations, but lack electronic signature, integration, and online-payment know-
how. For these, partnering with Bremen Online Services is a strategic partnership to 
improve their own products as well. Several local, regional, and national service 
providers have been approached by Bremen Online Service, not as development 
partners, but as partners who offer their services via the same platform. While their 
involvement increases use of the platform and makes its services more attractive, 
these service providers also benefit from cooperation. For example, the local public 
utility company not only offers its services, such as change of address or registering 
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readings of water and electricity meters online, but issues signature cards in its 
customer centres and provides assisted access points. This, in the eyes of the public 
utility company, increases customer service and helps to keep customers. The same 
value proposition can be made for the local public transport company. Other service 
providers, such as Deutsche Post or health insurance providers, are primarily 
partnering with Bremen Online Services because it allows them to be present in the 
One-Stop-Government feature and, as long as public funding is available, to gain 
experience with new signature and payment technology. 
 
The range of BOS services includes individually coordinated and aligned solutions to 
customers, to fit their particular needs and generate the expected benefits.  In its 
company profile statements, BOS state that they pay special attention to their 
customers' satisfaction:  
 
―…we are your partner not only before but also - even more so - after the 
purchase‖ (Bremen Online Services, 2005). 
 
The online information service of the City of Bremen features 120 online services, 60 
of which use electronic signatures in accordance with the German Signature Law. 
BOS refined, realized and operates all of the services, which represent legally 
binding communication between public administration, citizens and businesses. For 
financial services, online payment methods such as direct debit authorization, 
GeldKarte (electronic purse), HBCI-transfer, EC-Cash and credit card payments are 
offered. Among other awards, the Internet portal won the European Commission‘s 
eGovernment Award 2003 (Bremen Online Services, 2005).  BOS has also won 
various other e-government contracts with national and local government agencies 
(Bremen Online Services, 2005), including a leading EU e-government project with 
Bologna, Bremen and Sheffield.  The partnership is therefore enabling Bremen to 
increase its visibility, and it is competing with commercial organizations at an 
international level (Certiserv, 2005).  The BOS client list in 2005 was quite extensive: 
 BISAM Nordrhein-Westfalen (Electronic benefit applications: Basis Information 
System for Employment Politics, North Rhine-Westphalia)  
 Bundesamt für Naturschutz (Federal Nature Conservancy)  
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 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (Federal Office for the 
Security of Information Technology)  
 Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Office of Financial Affairs)  
 Bundesministerium des Inneren (Federal Ministry of the Interior)  
 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (BMWA, Federal Ministry for the 
Economy and Labour)  
 DB Systems (German Railways Systems)  
 Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt (DPMA, German Patent and Trademark 
Office)  
 Deutsches Zentrum für Luft und Raumfahrt (German Aerospace Centre)  
 Freie Hansestadt Bremen (Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, city-state government)  
 Gewoba (Housing company)  
 Justizministerien von acht Bundesländern (Ministries of Justice from eight 
German States)  
 Kommunale Spitzenverbände in Niedersachsen und niedersächsische 
Datenzentralen (Local Government Organizations and Data Centres in Lower-
Saxony)  
 Kooperationsausschuss Automatisierte Datenverarbeitung (Cooperation 
Committee for Automated Information Processing)  
 Landesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz Nordrhein-Westfalen (Regional Office for Health 
and Safety Regulations, North Rhine-Westphalia)  
 Logistikzentrum der Polizei Baden-Württemberg (Centre for Logistics of the 
Baden-Wuerttemberg Police)  
 Nordrhein-Westfalen (German State North Rhine-Westphalia)  
 Saarbrücken (State capital of Saarland)  
 Seestadt Bremerhaven (City of Bremerhaven)  
 Stadt Freiberg (City of Freiberg/Saxony)  
 Stadt Hagen (City of Hagen) 
(Bremen Online Services, 2005) 
 
The establishment of the partnership (BOS) needed considerable seed funding which 
became available through winning a competition (Klein, 2005). 
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Performance assessment: 
It seems to have survived and to still be in operation in 2011, although some 
structural changes may have taken place. Its profitability is unknown. 
 
Success factors identified: 
 Seed funding; 
 Customer service focus; 
 Flexibility to exploit opportunities. 
 
Different local–level partnerships have now been discussed.  In order to unlock more 
variety, the next partnerships will be of an international scale. 
6.6 INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 
In this section international examples of PPPs and other partnerships will be 
described and evaluated. 
6.6.1 The Millennium Development Goals 
This example of a partnership goes beyond national boundaries – it concerns an 
international or global partnership focusing on socio-economic development. 
 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
2000 - 2015 Socio-economic development Global 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
All  In operation 
Scale: Size: 
  
 
The Millennium Goals represent a global partnership for development. The 
agreement makes it clear that it is the primary responsibility of poor countries to work 
towards achieving the first seven Goals. They must do their part to ensure greater 
accountability to citizens and efficient use of resources.  The picture below illustrates 
the 8 millennium development goals, and then emphasizes the eighth goal which 
directly relates to partnerships. 
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For poor countries to achieve the first seven Goals, it is absolutely critical that rich 
countries deliver on their end of the bargain with more and more effective aid, more 
sustainable debt relief and fairer trade rules, well in advance of 2015, the target date.  
(United Nations Millennium Campaign, 2009; United Nations, 2010 [The Millennium 
Development Goals Report 2010]).  It is therefore recognized that a partnership is 
required between poorer and richer nations to address global development, and 
because a partnership is seen as a solution, the inference is that partnerships are 
viable vehicles with which to solve complex problems. 
 
Performance assessment: 
The success of the Millennium Development Goals and specifically the ―global 
partnership‖ is hard to determine, especially because of the timeframe which extends 
to 2015.  There is, however, clear indications that the setting of the goals has focused 
global development activities. 
 
Success factors identified: 
 Each partner to contribute according to its own strengths 
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6.6.2 UN Commission on Sustainable Development 
The next partnership to be discussed is also an international effort – a partnership to 
promote partnerships. 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
2004 – present (undefined 
period) 
Partnership development Global 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
   
Scale: Size: 
  
 
The CSD (Commission on Sustainable Development) Partnerships database was 
first launched in February 2004, in response to a request from the CSD at its 11th 
session. It was redesigned in May 2006 to increase user-friendliness, improve site 
navigation and enable easier access to partnerships-related information. The 
Partnerships Database aims at assisting and facilitating the identification of 
partnerships‘ activities and their valuable contributions to the implementation of 
sustainable development by making available a variety of searchable options. The 
information contained in this on-line resource is based on voluntary self-reports from 
partnerships registered with the Commission on Sustainable Development. In 2007, 
the list contained 344 partnerships (UN-CSD, 2009).  The voluntary nature of the 
reports makes this initiative a partnership. 
 
Performance assessment: 
The goal of the partnership is to make information about partnerships available.  With 
voluntary reports being used, the fact that more than 300 partnerships have added 
their information means that the partnerships database is a success. 
 
Success factor identified: 
 Incentives for partners. 
 
The following international partnership involves supporting entrepreneurs. 
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6.6.3 The SEED Initiative 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
2002 -  Sustainable Development 
Entrepreneurship 
International 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
   
Scale: Size: 
International  
 
The SEED Initiative - Supporting Entrepreneurs for Sustainable Development – is 
another international partnership example.  SEED runs, as part of its activities, an 
international award scheme, which selects promising partnerships for sustainable 
development. The SEED initiative was founded at the World Summit for Sustainable 
Development in 2002, and launched its first award round in 2004 with simultaneous 
events at the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the World Sustainability Forum 
(WSF). By 2008, SEED Partners included the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the 
World Conservation Union (IUCN); the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, 
South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States (Creech & Paas, 
2008:10–11).  The SEED Award, part of the SEED Initiative, is a partnership building 
and capacity development award, through which expertise, advice, and contacts are 
made available to award winners from among its partners and from its support 
programme. The service providers managing SEED‘s support programme work 
intensively with each award winner to assess their needs, agree on a support plan, 
channel funds for specific actions to strengthen and grow their enterprises, access 
technical assistance, build up their business plans, meet new partners, and raise 
their profile (Creech & Paas, 2008:10–11). 
 
Another element of the SEED Initiative is SEED‘s Research and Learning 
Programme (R&L Programme) which closely follows the experiences of the SEED 
Award winners. The case studies created and the lessons drawn are intended to 
inspire and support the creation of new partnerships, inform policy makers and assist 
in tuning the Seed Initiative to provide the highest quality services (Creech & Paas, 
2008:10–11). 
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Performance assessment: 
SEED Remains active and is achieving its purpose.  The partnership can therefore 
be regarded as successful.   
 
The next international partnership is aimed at international policing collaboration. 
6.6.4 Interpol 
The ―International Criminal Police Organization‖, Interpol, is the world‘s largest 
international police organization, with 188 member countries. Created in 1923, it 
facilitates cross-border police co-operation, and supports and assists all 
organizations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or combat 
international crime. 
 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
1923 - Present Crime prevention and 
investigation 
Global 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
   
Scale: Size: 
  
 
It could be argued that Interpol is more a partnership between public sector 
organizations of different countries than it is a public-private partnership.  However, 
Interpol itself is an independent body which is not a public body attached to any 
government, and the relationship between Interpol and its many member countries 
can thus be seen as a partnership between many public entities and one international 
non-governmental organization, residing outside the public sector and somewhere in 
the area of society covered by the private and third sectors.  Interpol aims to facilitate 
international police co-operation even where diplomatic relations do not exist 
between particular countries. Action is taken within the limits of existing laws in 
different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  Interpol‘s constitution prohibits ―any intervention or activities of a political, 
military, religious or racial character‖. 
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6.6.4.1 Leadership 
The President of Interpol and the body‘s Secretary General work closely together in 
providing leadership and direction to the organization. 
6.6.4.2 Structure 
 
 
As defined in Article 5 of its Constitution, Interpol comprises the following: 
 General Assembly; 
 Executive Committee; 
 General Secretariat; 
 National Central Bureaus; 
 Advisers; 
 The Commission for the Control of Interpol‘s Files. 
 
The General Assembly and the Executive Committee form the organization‘s 
Governance.  The General Assembly is Interpol‘s supreme governing body; it meets 
annually and comprises delegates appointed by each member country. The 
assembly takes all important decisions related to policy, resources, working methods, 
finances, activities and programmes. The Executive Committee is a 13-member 
committee elected by the General Assembly, and comprises the president, three 
vice-presidents and nine delegates covering the four regions. The General 
INTERPOL 
General Assembly 
Executive Committee 
General Secretariat 
National Central 
Bureaus 
Advisers 
Commission for the Control of 
INTERPOL‘s files 
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Secretariat, located in Lyon, France, operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and is 
run by the Secretary General. Officials from more than 80 countries work side-by-side 
in any of the organization‘s four official languages: Arabic, English, French and 
Spanish. The Secretariat has seven regional offices across the world; in Argentina, 
Cameroon, Côte d‘Ivoire, El Salvador, Kenya, Thailand and Zimbabwe, along 
with Special Representatives at the United Nations in New York and at the European 
Union in Brussels. 
 
Each Interpol member country maintains a National Central Bureau staffed by 
national law enforcement officers. The NCB is the designated contact point for the 
General Secretariat, regional offices and other member countries requiring 
assistance with overseas investigations and the location and apprehension of 
fugitives.  Advisers, experts in a purely advisory capacity, may be appointed by the 
Executive Committee and confirmed by the General Assembly.  The Commission for 
the Control of Interpol‘s Files (CCF) is an independent body whose mandate is 
threefold: (1) to ensure that the processing of personal information by Interpol 
complies with the organization's regulations, (2) to advise Interpol on any project, 
operation, set of rules or other matter involving the processing of personal 
information and (3) to process requests concerning the information contained in 
Interpol‘s files. 
 
According to Interpol‘s constitution (Article 9), members shall do all within their 
power, in so far as is compatible with their own obligations, to carry out the decisions 
of the General Assembly (Interpol, 2010). It is therefore clear that involvement and 
cooperation with Interpol is purely voluntary, with little if any punitive measures in 
place to encourage member countries.  The only real motivation is the benefit that 
each country receives from being involved in the organization, and this is motivation 
enough for all member states.  The development of a model police cooperation 
agreement is a concept which has quite naturally gained ground within Interpol. 
Indeed, it seems obvious that the organization should provide its member countries 
with the legal tools they need to facilitate the cooperation they initiate bilaterally.  A 
model agreement, based on numerous studies and reflecting a wealth of experience 
in international police cooperation, has therefore been compiled.  In adopting this 
instrument, in particular for those member states that have not yet developed this 
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form of cooperation to a large extent, the organization is fulfilling its role as set out in 
its constitution, namely  ―to ensure and promote the widest possible mutual 
assistance between all criminal police authorities, and to establish and develop all 
institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of 
ordinary law crimes‖ (Interpol, 2010). 
 
Performance assessment: 
Interpol is achieving its goals and providing for a public need, and can therefore be 
considered as successful. 
 
Success factors identified: 
 
 Clear goal setting; 
 Effective organizational structure and systems; 
 Partners benefit from their involvement; 
 Commitment; 
 Separate entity established as collaboration space; 
 Collaboration; 
 Voluntary involvement; 
 Isolation from political influence. 
 
After discussing partnerships at local and international scale, the focus can now 
change to different sectoral perspectives.  Partnerships in the transport sector will 
first be discussed.  Although from the same sectors, the partnerships to be discussed 
may not be on the same scale or from the same geographic location. 
6.7 SECTORAL PARTNERSHIPS 
6.7.1 Road transport 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
30 years from 1997 Transport South Africa 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Secondary Concession Operating 
Scale: Size: 
National and International R 3 bn 
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The Maputo Development Corridor is a partnership involving two countries and a 
private partner.  The project includes 525km of toll road and constitutes a 30 year 
concession contract of the SA and Mozambique governments with Trans African 
Concessions (TRAC) signed in May 1997. Financing was agreed to on 6 Feb 1998.  
(Sanral, 2006a:S19)  Standard Bank was the original financier of the concession 
holder of the N4-East from Witbank (eMalahleni) to Maputo. Standard Bank claims 
that they did an ―innovative R3 billion re-financing of the project‖.  According to their 
publicity, it was the first re-financing of a public-private partnership in South Africa 
(Standard Bank advertisement in Sanral, 2006:5).  A 30-year concession contract 
was also closed between the South African National Roads Agency Limited (Sanral) 
and the N3 Toll Concession (Pty) Ltd (N3TC). The N3 between Gauteng and 
Kwazulu-Natal is the busiest transport corridor in South Africa.  The road is of 
national and regional importance, and an essential connecting route for business 
(Sanral, 2006b:22). 
 
Performance assessment: 
Both of these toll routes are operating and could therefore be seen as successful at 
this stage.   
 
Success factors identified: 
 A market or demand exists for the service; 
 Availability of financing. 
6.7.2 Public transport 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
1950s to present Public transport infrastructure United States; Western Europe; 
China; South Africa 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Secondary Concessions  
Scale: Size: 
 €189 m / €172 m / £ 180 m / € 282 m / €1250 m / $ 4.3 bn / 
R 12 bn – R 25 bn 
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The following collection of examples focus on partnerships formed to establish and 
maintain public transport infrastructure in the United States, Western Europe, Asia 
and South Africa.  Buisson (2006) relates that as public transportation became less 
and less profitable in the middle to late 20th century, the financing of the operation 
and the renewal of public transport systems was widely taken over by local 
authorities. The US is, paradoxically, an extreme example of this evolution.  France, 
in the post-WWII era, had a mixed scene, with a few state or city-owned agencies 
and many private operators contracted by the local authorities. In France, the 
downwards trend of urban transit has been reversed, since the 1970s, by more 
involvement of the central government (mainly in the Paris area) and of the local 
authorities.  Several cities have set up semi-public companies (―société d‘économie 
mixte‖, SEM – ―mixed economy societies‖) to operate their transit systems. In an 
SEM, the local authority is the majority shareholder, with minority private 
shareholders. SEM is thus a kind of private-public partnership which enables a more 
business-like type of management than a traditional public agency. 
 
From the mid 70s, Transdev, as part of the state-owned financial institution Caisse 
des Dépôts, has been a prominent partner of urban transit SEMs in France, despite 
the fact that it also provides transit solutions through 100% owned subsidiaries.  This 
arrangement could be described as a public-public-public partnership.  Typically, 
Transdev has a 15% to 45% stake and manages the undertaking on behalf of the 
authority and provides management staff as well as technical and administrative 
support.  The main SEMs that have chosen Transdev as partner are CTS in 
Strasbourg and SEMITAN in Nantes.  All of them operate state-of-the-art light rail 
systems (LRTs), opened from 1985 (Nantes) to 2006.  The success of the SEM 
concept has prompted its extension to the Italian city of Genoa: In 2005, Transdev 
acquired a 41% stake in AMT, the local municipal company in charge of urban transit 
(buses, trolleybuses, light metros, funiculars) with 2200 employees and €150 m 
revenue.  Transdev provides high-level management and technical support to AMT.  
According to Buisson (2006), this is the first time a major Italian city entrusts the 
management of its transit system to a private operator via an open tender access.  
SEMs are not confined to operation and can act as investors in major-scale projects 
such as light rail transport systems on behalf of the local authority.  Such a scheme 
has been adopted for the Strasbourg light rail. Shareholders in the project are the 
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Local Authority with 80% and CDC combined with Transdev with 20%. The project is 
a concession contract with Strasbourg local authority, subsidized by the central 
government with €189 million and partly financed through loans from banks totalling 
€172 million. 
 
In the UK, a different form of PPP has been established for the construction and 
operation of the Nottingham light rail.  Transdev created Nottingham Tram 
Consortium (NTC), a 50/50 joint venture with the municipally-owned local bus 
operator Nottingham City Transport (NCT), to operate the new system.  The 
concession partnership was organized as part of the UK government‘s Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) programme which encourages private-sector financing of 
public infrastructure (Buisson, 2006).  The ARROW consortium is the investor and 
will operate Nottingham light rail for 30 years (2000–2030).  ARROW Holdings is 
owned by Innisfree, CDC, Carillion, Bombardier, Transdev and NCT.  The 
construction side of the project would be a fixed ―turnkey‖ contract with financing from 
bank loans and equity at a total cost of £180 m (fixed).  The operation of the project is 
organized differently with revenue coming from performance-related availability fees 
from the promoters as well as passenger fares.  The outlay for operations would 
come from interest, and fixed capital, as well as performance-related operations and 
maintenance contracts. 
 
In Reims, France, a 30-year PPP contract was awarded after open tender to the 
MARS consortium in July 2006 to design, build and operate a LRT (Light Rail 
Transport) system and to operate and maintain the existing bus system.  The total 
investment cost would be €282 m and the City will pay an annual fee to the MARS 
consortium covering investment and operation costs, with penalties related to 
performance indicators (Buisson, 2006).  The MARS consortium consists of Alstom 
(17%), Transdev (17%), Bouygues (17%), SNC Lavalin (5%), and the banks CDC, 
CE and Ixis (44%).  In August 2006, the La Réunion regional authority made a final 
decision to build an interurban ―tram-train‖ LRT system.  The first stage of the project 
would stretch over 40 km and include major tunnel and viaduct works at an estimated 
cost of €1250 m.  Due to the investment level, a decision was made to open a tender 
process for a PPP scheme.  The anticipated construction period for the project would 
be from 2009–2013 (Buisson, 2006). 
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In China, Transrapid operates the world‘s first commercial maglev line linking central 
Shanghai with its new international airport.  The Chinese government plans to extend 
the line to the eastern city of Hangzhou in the Zhejiang province at an estimated cost 
of $4.3 billion USD, using German technology and Chinese components.  
Technology transfer, the decision on which parts are to be made in China, and costs 
are issues at stake here (China rail lift-off, 2006). 
 
Moving back to South Africa and public transport in this country, the most high profile 
public transport PPP is certainly the Gautrain rapid rail link between OR Tambo 
International Airport, Sandton and Hatfield in the Gauteng province.  With an 80km 
network, it intends to attract business commuters who would normally take private 
cars onto the congested highways connecting the Johannesburg and Tshwane 
metropolitan areas (Gautrain, 2010).  Negotiation of the concession contract 
commenced in July 2005 (Projectpro, 2010) and construction on the project started in 
2006, with the relocation of water pipes and electrical and telephone cables 
commencing earlier. The Bombela consortium was indicated as the preferred bidder 
for the building and operation of the project which was initially projected to cost 
between R7 bn and R12 bn.  (Gautrain, 2010; Phasiwe, 2005) Later estimations of 
full project cost were around R25 billion (Slabbert, 2009:25). 
 
The Bombela consortium comprises of, among others, Murray and Roberts and their 
French partner, Bouygues Construction, Bombardier and originally the Loliwe 
companies.  Murray & Roberts owns 25% of the 20 year concession to build and 
operate the transport system while Bouygues owns 17%.  Both have a share of 45% 
in the Bombela Civils Joint Venture which is responsible for building the infrastructure 
for the project (Gautrain, 2005; Slabbert, 2009:25).  Operation and maintenance of 
the system will be carried out for 15 years by RATP Développement in association 
with its South African partners, through a local operating company. Thereafter the 
contract will be transferred to the Gauteng government (Slabbert, 2009:25).  The 
project will be completed in two phases.  The first phase was initially planned to be of 
a 45 months contractual duration, but was completed three weeks ahead of this, on 
08 June 2010, in time for the 2010 FIFA World Cup™ in South Africa. The first phase 
includes the network between the OR Tambo International Airport and Sandton and 
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includes the stations at OR Tambo, Rhodesfield, Marlboro and Sandton, together 
with the Depot and Operations Control Centre located near Allandale Road in 
Midrand.  The second phase, constructed concurrently, will be completed during 
2011. It includes the remainder of the rail network and stations linking Sandton to 
Park Station in Johannesburg and the route from Midrand to Hatfield (Gautrain, 
2010). 
 
According to Mr Mbhazima Shilowa, premier of Gauteng when the project was 
launched, the Gautrain project would be the biggest private public partnership on the 
African continent (Le Roux, 2005b:12; Projectpro, 2010).  The project had and still 
has its critics and from the inception of the project experts were sceptical about how 
commuters would be transported in comfort to and from the stations.  While the 
consortium is also responsible for bus transport to and from the stations and parking 
at stations, some commentators believed that there would be considerable scope for 
additional business opportunities in providing transport services that could feed into 
the Gautrain network (Le Roux, 2005b:12).  In what can be seen as a move towards 
establishing PPPs to benefit from the larger Gautrain PPP, the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) intended to invest ―millions‖ to establish a supporting 
transport network for the Gautrain project (Le Roux, 2005b:12). At that stage the IDC 
indicated that the Gautrain project could give excellent opportunities for small 
operators to link into what the IDC potentially saw as an extremely profitable project.  
―Naturally we believe that we can make money out of it.  We will also look at the 
secondary industry that will develop around the project‖ (Le Roux, 2005b:12).  The 
IDC‘s policy is to concentrate especially on the development of black enterprises, in 
step with the government‘s empowerment requirements. 
(Le Roux, 2005a) 
 
By August 2009, the main building contractors in the project were expressing 
reservations about the profitability of their involvement in the project, which had been 
affected by delays and disruptions.  Murray & Roberts construction company were 
indicating that, as a result of the size and duration of the Gautrain and other mega-
projects it is difficult for them to report income without negatively affecting either 
current or future shareholders (Slabbert, 2009:25).  Despite delays in the project, 
Phase 1 of the project was commissioned in time for the World Cup and Gautrain had 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 439 
transported more than one million passengers by September 2010 (Gautrain passes 
‗million passengers‘ mark, 2010). 
 
Performance assessment: 
It is not possible to express a definitive opinion on the success or otherwise of any of 
these public transport partnerships due to the long duration of the contracts and 
concessions. Even so, it should not be necessary to wait until a partnership has run 
its course and has been disestablished before an opinion can be constructed about 
the level of success of the partnership.  This raises the question of whether there 
should be different success measurements for functioning partnerships and 
―completed‖ partnerships – partnerships which have reached the end of their 
intended lifespan.  If, as stated in previous chapters, success is largely determined by 
the achievement of objectives, the bulk of the public transit PPPs mentioned in this 
subsection has achieved at least the goal of establishment.  Some have progressed 
towards construction of infrastructure which would be operated by the partnership, 
and some have moved beyond construction into fully-fledged operation and delivery 
of public services. This narrative gives the impression that one could establish a set 
of generic partnership milestones which would indicate success of a partnership in 
various stages of its life cycle.  This would however be a dangerous assumption 
because if no appropriate performance criteria are attached to such a milestone, the 
milestone could be meaningless.  An example of a meaningless milestone would be 
the signing of a partnership contract, simply because, cynical as it may seem, the 
signing of a contract has little demonstrated bearing on the success or failure of 
partnerships, in the same way that the signing of a marriage contract does not 
guarantee a successful marriage. 
 
With a lack of any meaningful way of measuring the success of the public transit 
partnerships mentioned here, one can hazard the opinion that the mere fact that they 
are operating, shows some degree of success, even if mere operation is not a sure 
sign of success. 
 The Gautrain project is still in construction and partial operation at the time of 
writing this dissertation.  It has been successful in terms of its stated 
objectives. 
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 The Chinese maglev train is in operation and could therefore be considered as 
successful at this stage. 
 The various public transport projects in Europe are not described well enough 
to determine their success. 
 
Success factors identified:  
 Satisfying a public necessity - modern cities require modern transport 
structure; 
 The project is a priority within a strategic plan; 
 Right service at the right place at the right time; 
 Sufficient public users of the service (market);  
 Satisfying context-specific legal requirements, such as BEE in South Africa. 
 
The discussion will now move from the transport sector to the energy sector. 
6.7.3 Energy Sector: US (Nuclear) Power Reactor Development Programme 
This example comes from the 1950s and concerns the establishment of the nuclear 
power industry in the United States.  The focus of this particular example is thus 
advanced technology and the geographical setting is North America. 
 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
1950s Nuclear power industry United States, Northern America 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Secondary  Completed 
Scale: Size: 
National  
 
American commercial nuclear power began in the 1950s with the federal 
government‘s Power Reactor Development Programme, promoted by the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC), the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 
National Laboratory scientists, other nuclear energy specialists, and the White House 
as an initiative of the Eisenhower administration‘s Atoms for Peace Programme (Del 
Sesto, 1979).  The Power Reactor Development Programme became a PPP, which 
was unique at the time, created to develop and to market nuclear technologies for 
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electric power generation.  Directed by the AEC, it intended to ―promote and 
encourage free competition and private investment in the development work, while at 
the same time accepting on the part of the government certain responsibilities for 
such development‖ (Del Sesto, 1979:52; Rosenbaum, 2000:61).  The American 
federal government alternately seduced and coerced the initially wavering utilities 
and reactor manufacturers into creating a commercial nuclear capability (Bupp & 
Derian, 1981; Rosenbaum, 2000:61). 
 
Performance assessment: 
Commercial nuclear power generation became a major industry in the US and the 
PPP can therefore be regarded as successful.  The fact that the industry is providing 
a public need, being electricity, satisfies the second requirement of a face-value 
success assessment. A more detailed analysis could however uncover information 
which could prompt a re-evaluation of this assessment. 
 
The case study does contain information that point to success factors for PPPs, and 
these are listed below.   
 
Success factors identified: 
 Active public sector involvement; 
 High-level political leadership / champion; 
 Available potential partners with the capacity to participate. 
6.7.4 Establishing power generation capacity 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
Current - 2050 Power Generation Democratic Republic of Congo, 
South Africa, SADC 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Secondary Joint Venture Pre-project 
Scale: Size: 
National and Continental $5 bn - $80 bn construction cost 
Up to $15 bn annual revenue 
Up to 50 000 MW electricity generation capacity 
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The Grand Inga hydro-electrical scheme in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
has a potential electricity generation capacity of 39 500 MW, which is the same as 22 
Koeberg nuclear power stations.  Eskom, the South African parastatal power utility, 
has been interested in developing this opportunity. The World Energy Council, an 
international organization of electricity suppliers, indicated that the process to 
establish the partnerships between private investors and governments must start 
before the project can become a reality.  ―We are telling politicians that they can end 
up in a situation where they made progress on political level, but that none of the 
economical and technical preparations have been made‖. The scheme will use water 
in the lower Congo river. The precursors to the project were Inga I (completed in 
1972) and Inga II (completed in 1982).  These hydro-electric dams are currently 
operating at 20% efficiency.  Inga III is currently in design phase and will generate 
3500 MW, enough for the DRC, and can be completed by 2025. The Grand Inga 
scheme will generate 39 000MW, more than SA‘s total current capacity.  The target 
date for its completion is between 2030 and 2050, with high voltage lines that will run 
north to Egypt and south to South Africa. (Bank Information Center, 2009; Reuters, 
2009; Rainforest News, 2010; Vidal, 2008:16; Wachter, 2007; Wait, 2009; World 
Rainforest Movement, 2009) 
Performance assessment: 
The possible partnership is still in pre-project conception phase, therefore no real 
performance assessment can be made.  A goal can be assumed but in this early 
phase of the life-cycle the project conceptualization must still be completed. 
 
Success factors identified: 
 Comprehensive preparations for programme conceptualization; 
 A public need must exist. 
 
This concludes the power sector discussion.  The next partnership will be from the 
agricultural and water sector. 
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6.7.5 Agriculture and irrigation sector 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
2007 -  Irrigation South Africa and Egypt 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Primary  Establishment / In operation 
Scale: Size: 
National  
 
The use of a partnership governance structure is a popular service delivery model for 
projects that require large initial capital investments, such as irrigation schemes.  
Examples include the Namibian wine farms irrigation scheme on the Orange River 
and the Lower Olifants River Water Users Association operating in the Clanwilliam / 
Vredendal area on the West Coast of South Africa.   
 
In Egypt a partnership for sustainable irrigation involved the central government, a 
mobile phone company, clients represented in newly established water boards, Dutch 
experience in water boards and projects as well as financing support from the 
German development agency GTZ.  ―The Blue Line‖ is the name of the public-private 
partnership between GTZ, the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Mobinil, the 
largest mobile phone operator in Egypt, launched in Cairo on 21 October 2007. It is 
intended to make the inhabitants of rural areas better able to organize their 
agricultural water supply themselves.  Cuts in public services have left the 
approximately 50 000 kilometres of agricultural irrigation and drainage channels that 
have been created over thousands of years in danger of decay. Now the Egyptian 
Government is taking measures to counteract this. With support from GTZ, the 
Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation has developed an extensive reform 
strategy. As part of the decentralization of the irrigation sector, the Ministry is 
establishing independent district water boards with support from the Netherlands. 
The partnership with Mobinil and GTZ is intended to reinforce this process. Mobinil 
was initially prepared to equip up to five new district water boards under ―The Blue 
Line‖ initiative. 
 
The first phase of the project included the provision of tractors and diggers by the 
private partner to newly established water boards for maintaining the water channels. 
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In addition Mobinil is supplying over two hundred telephones, computers, fax 
machines and telephone connections for mobiles and landlines at reduced rates. A 
hotline would also make it easier for customers to contact their water boards.  The 
water boards are assuming responsibility for water management. This assumption of 
responsibility combined with involvement of the private sector was considered to be 
of prime importance for the successful decentralization of the irrigation sector. The 
Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation signed the PPP agreement. It 
was argued that district water boards were closer to customers and were therefore 
better placed to meet their needs. Furthermore, they were easier to contact when 
problems arose.  The mobile phone company is motivated by the opportunity to 
become better known, particularly in rural areas, and acquire new customers there. It 
is argued that the public-private partnership ultimately benefits all involved (GTZ, 
2007). 
 
Performance assessment: 
Information is not enough for an assessment.  It does seem as if structures have 
been established and equipment has been distributed.  If it can be confirmed that the 
water boards are functioning as intended, the project could be declared successful. 
 
Success factors identified: 
 All partners should be able to benefit; 
 Public need exists; 
 Supportive environment; 
 Supportive public sector. 
  
In the next section, specifically South African partnerships, from various sectors and 
at different scales, will be discussed. 
6.8 SOUTH AFRICAN PARTNERSHIPS 
The focus of this dissertation is to identify critical success factors for PPPs in South 
Africa.  In this section, various specifically South African PPP examples will be 
discussed. 
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6.8.1 Dealing with power blackouts in the Western Cape 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
2006 Electricity supply crisis Cape Town, Western Cape, South 
Africa 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Secondary   
Scale: Size: 
Local  
 
In 2006 South Africa staggered through a period of widespread and extended 
planned and unplanned power interruptions as a result of a sudden, also unplanned, 
reduction in generating capacity and increased demand.  The main supplier of 
electrical power in South Africa is the parastatal Eskom, who supplies electricity 
either directly to mostly rural clients, or to municipalities such as the City of Cape 
Town, who in turn distributes power to its clients.  A slight complication to this 
arrangement in Cape Town is that, due to historical reasons, Eskom also provides 
electricity directly to certain clients within the jurisdiction of the City and also provides, 
through the City, to a third category of client where Eskom has control over ripple 
load-shedding equipment on the City electrical grid.  Over a period of several weeks, 
the situation developed from one where there was constant mud-slinging between 
the City and Eskom about who was causing which problems, through a process 
where both parties had to start communicating effectively between themselves and 
with their interwoven client bases, to a situation where they jointly published double-
page spread advertisements in newspapers to inform the public of planned load 
shedding – an ―integrated load shedding schedule‖ jointly compiled by the City of 
Cape Town and Eskom (Eskom and City of Cape Town, 2006).  This partnership also 
required the active involvement of citizens who could reduce the chances of load-
shedding by reducing their domestic energy consumption at critical times. 
Advertisements and indicators showing the extent of the crisis in the press and on 
radio and prime-time television encouraged public participation in energy demand 
management and energy efficiency (Eskom, 2007; Smith, 2007).  Business also had 
a role to play as Eskom negotiated on a national level with industry to reduce their 
energy consumption at peak times and even requested whole industrial sectors, such 
as mines, to stop operations for critical periods.   
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Performance assessment: 
The partnership can be seen as successful because demand for electricity was 
reduced, public awareness increased, and increased cooperation between agencies 
was achieved. 
6.8.2 Plettenberg Bay Aerodrome 
The Plettenberg Bay Aerodrome is a small airport in a tourist hot-spot on the Garden 
Route in South Africa. 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
20 – 40 years Aviation industry Plettenberg Bay, Western Cape, 
South Africa 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Tertiary Lease agreement Pre-project 
Scale: Size: 
Local  
 
In 2006 the Bitou Municipality, with its seat in Plettenberg Bay on the Cape Garden 
Route of South Africa, advertised a tender asking for submissions to enter into a 
public-private partnership over the Plettenberg Bay Aerodrome (Bitou Municipality, 
2006). 
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By 27 March 2008, the municipality was indicating that after a dispute regarding the 
tender for the development and management of the aerodrome, it was in the process 
of appointing a transactional advisor.  A dispute resolution hearing decided that the 
appointment of the advisor would serve the best interest of Bitou Municipality.  In 
September 2010 a municipal official responsible for the aerodrome, which was at that 
stage still directly operated by the municipality, indicated that the municipality ―had 
problems‖ with the PPP route, and have decided to rather lease the airport to a still-
to-be-determined private entity on a 20 to 40 years lease agreement (Satula, 2010).  
The official indicated that the leasing opportunity would be advertised in due course. 
The lessee would need to upgrade the airport, extend the runway, and install a 
weather station as required by the Civil Aviation Authority.  Regarding the attempt to 
establish a PPP, the official explained that there is unnecessary red tape in the 
process to establish a PPP, and that it would be more useful to reduce the red tape 
and speed up the process by going the route of the lease agreement (Satula, 2010). 
 
Performance assessment: 
In this case the PPP was not established and failed to move into the contracting 
phase. Although an initial contract was awarded, it was subsequently contested and 
overturned.  The appointment of a transactional advisor was recommended by the 
Treasury and one could say that the municipality did not follow the correct 
procedures.  The PPP idea seems to have floundered.  However, it should be 
remembered that a lease agreement is also a form of PPP and that the route the 
municipality is now taking is still within the ambit of the SA National Treasury‘s 
guidelines on municipal service delivery partnerships. 
 
Success factors identified: 
 Well-defined procurement process; 
 Source expert advice in contracting phase. 
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6.8.3 The National Sea Rescue Institute 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
1967 - present In-shore sea rescue South African coast 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Tertiary Informal Operating 
Scale: Size: 
National R22.5 m / R230 m per annum 
920 unpaid volunteers 
30 coastal and three inland rescue bases 
72 rescue craft 
21 vehicles 
 
The National Sea Rescue Institute (NSRI) is an unformalized PPP.  It is a voluntary 
non-profit organization which depends on sponsorship, which it also receives from 
government, for its operating costs, but it has a government mandate for inshore 
rescue and it can be mobilized through government channels.  The NSRI is run by 
920 unpaid volunteers who are on standby day and night throughout the year. 
Donations and sponsorships cover annual running cost of R22.5 m. The volunteers 
save the NSRI a salary bill in excess of R230 m per annum (NSRI, 2010).  There are 
30 coastal and three inland rescue bases, a fleet of 72 rescue craft, 21 vehicles and 
access to a range of helicopters. The NSRI enjoys a good working relationship with 
other emergency services and ―believe that it is through team effort that lives are 
saved‖ (NSRI, 2010). 
The urgent need for a sea rescue organization in South Africa was highlighted in 
1966 when 17 fishermen drowned after their trawler sank near Still Bay due to the 
lack of a rescue service.  Following this incident, Miss Patti Price (whose own life had 
been saved by life boat rescue in the British Channel) began a committed letter-
writing campaign to motivate the formation of a sea rescue organization.  Captain 
Bob Deacon and Mr Ray Lant were the first volunteers to respond to this call. The 
National Sea Rescue Institute (NSRI) was established in 1967 when it acquired its 
first rescue craft – a 4.7m inflatable boat called Snoopy donated by the Society of 
Master Mariners (NSRI, 2010).  The fact that the NSRI must constantly do 
fundraising is illustrated in its category of ―Platinum Partners‖ for its biggest sponsors.  
Platinum membership is marketed as an exclusive opportunity to potential donors 
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and participation is limited to ten partners at any one time. Membership is described 
as a long term partnership and brand investment over 5 years (NSRI, 2010). 
Performance assessment: 
The NSRI is a successful organisation that provides a public service on a daily basis.  
It can be considered a successful partnership, although there seems to be limited 
involvement from the public partner.  In 1967 and still today, a public need for an 
inshore sea rescue service exists, but is not satisfied by government.  Rather, 
Government has given the NSRI a mandate and supports the NSRI through 
donations. 
 
Success factors: 
 A public need exists which was not satisfied by government; 
 Stakeholder and community support and involvement; 
 Goodwill; 
 Commitment. 
6.8.4 Jewellery Manufacturing Hub in Cape Town 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
2005 Jewellery Manufacture / 
Economic Development 
Cape Town, Western Cape, South 
Africa 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Secondary Joint Venture; Lease agreement Terminated 
Scale: Size: 
Local R18 m 
R425 m 
 
The information in this subsection is based on Bailey and Essop (2006), City of Cape 
Town (2005), Hartshorne (2010), Pietersen (2010), Powell (2005), and Powell and 
Kassiem (2006).  The Jewellery City project, a joint venture between the Department 
of Minerals and Energy Affairs and the City of Cape Town, was announced in 2005 
and would eventually cost R425 m.  The Jewellery City would be part of a national 
beneficiation strategy by the Department of Minerals and Energy (references 
provided below).  An entrepreneur, also acting as consultant for the Department of 
Minerals and Energy, approached the City with a proposal for the Jewellery City, a 
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CBD showcase of jewellery-making. The contract was awarded five days after the 
presentation to the City about the concept, and the entrepreneur was assigned to be 
project manager, receiving R4.2 million for the nine months he worked.  The City 
Manager approved a contract for the second phase of the project on the day that his 
own contract was controversially extended for a year.  The joint venture was awarded 
a 99-year lease on the Foreshore for the second Jewellery City site, opposite the 
Cape Town International Convention Centre.  The other site would be at the 
Ebenezer Road depot in the V&A Waterfront, near the Clock Tower precinct.  The 
second phase was put on ice after unsuccessful bidders complained that the tender 
process was irregular and allegations were made that the business plan was 
poached.  The R18 million project never materialized.  After an opposing coalition 
took over the city, an investigation found that several contracts, including that for the 
Jewellery City, had been improperly awarded.  According to a mayoral committee 
member, the entrepreneur was paid without a contract in place, and the tender was 
never put out.  The City cancelled the tender and handed the case to the police.  The 
City brought a civil claim against the entrepreneur, and in 2008 the Western Cape 
High Court ordered him to repay R1.2 million or risk having his assets attached.  
 
Performance assessment: 
The partnership was established, but private partners were appointed based on 
contracts that were not legal.  The purpose of the partnership has certainly not been 
met, but the partnership can still be revived with new private partners. 
 
Success factors identified: 
 Market research; 
 Following due legal process; 
 Transparency and accountability; 
 Properly mandated representatives; 
 Public political will; 
 Appropriate partner selection. 
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6.8.5 World Cup Stadium in Cape Town 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
2006 - 2010 Stadium Construction and 
Operation 
Cape Town, South Africa 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Tertiary  Operating 
Scale: Size: 
  
 
 
It is possible to describe the 2010 FIFA World Cup™ which was hosted in South 
Africa during June and July 2010 as a country-wide partnership.  Public and private 
entities co-operated in many fields to make the tournament possible and to ensure its 
success.  The construction of several new stadiums was one of the challenges that 
had to be met.  Cape Town had to build one of these new stadiums.  In 2006, with 
opposing political parties governing the City of Cape Town municipality and the 
Western Cape Province, it was mooted that  a company that ‗would not be disturbed 
by political instability‘ would be set up to establish the World Cup 2010 stadium at 
Green Point.  The company, similar to Convenco which managed the building of the 
Cape Town International Convention Centre, was to be ready in 2006.  
Representatives of national, provincial and local government, as well as the private 
sector, were to serve on the board of the company, known in government terms as a 
―special purpose vehicle‘.  The company would share the responsibilities and risks of 
the project, and would drive the process.  The company was to be established in 
terms of the Provincial Finance Management Act.  Western Cape premier Ebrahim 
Rasool announced at the time that the exact modelling would be discussed with the 
government and the city council (Essop, 2006; Herman & Kassiem, 2006).  The 
proposed company was never established.  Instead, a different PPP approach was 
followed in which the municipality took ownership of the project and appointed 
contractors.  The financing of the project was under pressure by 2007 and at that 
time Investec (a private bank) guaranteed R185 million as surety for a contract to hire 
and operate the new Green Point Stadium after 2010 for 30 years.  There was no 
guarantee that Investec would get the contract – part of the agreement with the City 
of Cape Town was that the contract would be awarded through a public tender 
process.  The guarantee made it possible for building to proceed after it solved a 
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funding shortcoming that the City could not address (Van der Westhuizen, 2007:2).  
The stadium was completed in time for the tournament, but concerns exist regarding 
its future sustainability. 
 
Performance assessment: 
The stadium stands and therefore the goal of the partnership that was to be 
established has been achieved.  However, the PPP never came into being.  The first 
PPP from 2006 was thus never a PPP and cannot be evaluated.  The guarantee by 
Investec sought to get construction underway to ensure the on-time completion of the 
stadium, and this succeeded.  The second PPP can therefore be considered 
successful, although unconventional. 
 
Success factors identified: 
 Partners contribute according to their strengths; 
 All proposed partners need to agree to establishment; 
 Different types of risk are carried by the partner most suitable for it. 
6.8.6 Biking and hiking trail on the Wild Coast 
Time period: Focus Area / Sector: Location / Setting: 
2006 – 2026 Conservation, Local economic 
development, Tourism 
Wild Coast, Eastern Cape Province 
Economic sector: Partnership type: Life cycle stage: 
Tertiary Concession Operating 
Scale: Size: 
Local  
 
 
A tourist hiking and biking trail developed in the northern section of the Wild Coast in 
the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa provides an example of a partnership 
where external help was pulled in to make a partnership project work. In 2006 the 
trails were being developed by Drifters Safaris, which won a tender bidding process 
initiated by the Eastern Cape government.  The trails had originated as a European 
Union-funded project that had ―gone a bit foul‖ according to the operations manager 
of the contracting company.   
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A lot of money went missing and people didn‘t really know how to make this 
thing work.  So we were approached to bid for a new tender programme by the 
Eastern Cape government – the deal was, they wanted someone with 
professional ability to come in and actually make this thing work. (Yeld, 2006) 
 
The community had been disappointed on several occasions during the previous 
attempts at making the project work. 
 
…people just want something to work for a change – there have been so 
many promises made and so many broken (Yeld, 2006). 
 
The six 24-bed overnight sites fall within five tribal authority areas, where the local 
communities have become involved as partners through their respective 
development trusts.  Each community will get a certain percentage of revenue, and 
there was confidence that the system would work quite well because of its simplicity. 
 
The trails would be either guided or non-guided, depending on demand, and the local 
communities would also supply porters for hikers who prefer to walk less 
encumbered. Community members were employed as helpers, carriers and brick-
layers to get operations going.  It was believed that if the community saw the 
partnership operating, they would begin to believe that it could work. 
 
Community involvement was solicited in ensuring safety, which was a major concern 
to potential tourists and holidaymakers wanting to visit Transkei, but scared off by 
some horror crime stories (Yeld, 2006).  In a telephonic interview in September 2010, 
it was determined that 4 camps and one lodge have been built, that the hiking trail 
was in operation and receiving satisfactory bookings.  Retallick (2010) indicated that 
the partnership was working well.  Communities were involved in the partnership and 
received funds directly from the project into trust funds administered by committees 
established for this purpose within the respective communities.  He indicated that the 
project failed previously with the EU, but that it was now on course and attracting 
business.  He did express the need for the communities to realize that benefit will be 
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accruing to them over time.  The concession from the Eastern Cape government is 
for 20 years. 
 
Performance assessment: 
The PPP is achieving its goals and is delivering a public service, therefore it can be 
considered to be successful at this stage. 
 
Success factors identified: 
 Benefit for partners; 
 Experience in the service to be delivered; 
 Stakeholder support; 
 A market exists for the service being delivered. 
 
This concludes the discussion in this chapter. 
6.9 SUCCESS FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN THIS CHAPTER 
The success factors for PPPs identified in this chapter are: 
 
1) Formal agreements are not necessarily required to make a partnership 
successful; 
2) Common fear of an external threat can motivate parties to form partnerships 
and ensure that such partnerships work; 
3) The need for a survival strategy can be an indicator for motivation to ensure 
success – a crisis ensures focused collaboration and increases the chance of 
success; 
4) If a sector (either public or private) fails to provide a required service and the 
need still exists, PPPs are possible; 
5) A market for a specific public service exists but is not satisfied by the existing 
public or private sector; 
6) Local entrepreneurship; 
7) Circumstances that force a collective response; 
8) Clear purpose, roles and responsibilities; 
9) Transparent decision-making processes; 
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10) Collaborative innovation; 
11) Focus on high priority areas and clients (e.g. deprived areas for social 
programmes); 
12) Honest, sincere and respectful collaboration in meetings; 
13) Real collaboration; 
14) Financial control; 
15) Robust internal process to evaluate proposals; 
16) Transparency and peer review within partnership; 
17) Focus on innovation and improving the status quo; 
18) Willingness and ability to trust the partnership; 
19) Participation in rule-setting; 
20) Transparency in financial management; 
21) Joint control of partnership funds; 
22) Openness and communication; 
23) Conflict management; 
24) Understanding the value of clients‘ perspectives;  
25) Equality within the partnership; 
26) Joint decision-making; 
27) Joint prioritization of spending; 
28) Purposeful collaboration; 
29) Commitment to partnership goals; 
30) Positive attitudes; 
31) Established, respected processes; 
32) Seed funding; 
33) Customer service focus; 
34) Flexibility to exploit opportunities; 
35) Each partner to contribute according to its own strengths; 
36) Incentives for partners; 
37) A market or demand exists for the service; 
38) Availability of financing; 
39) Satisfying a public necessity - modern cities require modern transport 
structure; 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 456 
40) The project is a priority within a strategic plan; 
41) Right service at the right place at the right time; 
42) Sufficient public users of the service (market);  
43) Satisfying context specific legal requirements, such as BEE In South Africa; 
44) Active public sector involvement; 
45) High-level political leadership / champion; 
46) Available potential partners with the capacity to participate; 
47) Comprehensive preparations for programme conceptualization; 
48) A public need must exist; 
49) All partners should be able to benefit; 
50) Public need exists; 
51) Supportive environment; 
52) Supportive public sector; 
53) Well-defined procurement process; 
54) Source expert advice in contracting phase; 
55) A public need exists which was not satisfied by government; 
56) Stakeholder and community support and involvement; 
57) Goodwill; 
58) Commitment; 
59) Market research; 
60) Following due legal process; 
61) Transparency and accountability; 
62) Properly mandated representatives; 
63) Public political will; 
64) Appropriate partner selection; 
65) Partners contribute according to their strengths; 
66) All proposed partners need to agree to establishment; 
67) Different types of risk are carried by the partner most suitable for it. 
68) Benefit for partners; 
69) Experience in the service to be delivered; 
70) Stakeholder support; 
71) A market exists for the service being delivered  ; 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 457 
The list of success factors provided above can be synthesized into a shorter, 
consolidated collection through the removal of duplicates, the combination of similar 
ideas, and the reformulation of ideas.  
6.9.1 Consolidated success factors from this chapter 
The consolidated list of success factors from this chapter is shown in Annexure C. 
6.10 FURTHER DISTILLATION OF SUCCESS FACTORS 
This list of success factors now need to be compared and integrated with the success 
factors identified in the previous chapter.  The list of factors from the previous chapter 
is shown in Annexure C and will be followed by a combined and integrated list 
compiled through a process of synthesis.  In the next sub-section, the list from 
Chapter 5 will be synthesised with the list of factors identified in this chapter to create 
a single integrated list of success factors. 
6.10.1 Integrated list of success factors 
The consolidated list of success factors, produced by combining the success factors 
identified in this chapter with the consolidated list created in the previous chapter, is 
shown in Annexure C.  This consolidated and integrated list represents all the 
success factors identified up to this point.  This list will be used at the end of the next 
chapter, where it will be combined with success factors identified in the next chapter. 
6.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has been concerned with the analysis of partnership examples to 
determine their success or failure.  In this process, the selection of examples was 
motivated by pointing out the various characterizations according to which 
partnerships can be described and grouped together, and by arguing that a wide 
variety of partnerships would need to be evaluated.  The depth of evaluation required 
was also discussed and it was proposed that a basic face-value assessment could be 
a valuable addition to the detailed type of evaluation proposed in the previous 
chapter which requires the availability of considerably detailed information on each 
evaluated partnership.  Minimum requirements for evaluation were suggested and 
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the ability to extract success factors from case studies, even from unevaluable case 
studies, was demonstrated.  Subsequently, several partnership examples were 
described and the success of the partnerships was measured if the example was 
measurable.  The types of partnerships evaluated include local, international, sectoral 
and South African examples. 
 
As in previous chapters, success factors were identified throughout this chapter and 
presented at the end of the chapter, after which these factors were consolidated and 
then combined with those from previous chapters through synthesis.  In the next 
chapter the latest consolidated list of success factors will be compared with opinions 
from questionnaires to further develop the collection of success factors.  
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7 SUCCESS AND FAILURE: SEARCHING FOR A PATTERN 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, Chapter 6, the characteristics and performance of a wide 
variety of partnerships were compared in order to identify patterns in their success or 
failure that could further illuminate the search for critical success factors for PPPs. 
The PPP performance evaluation instrument designed through a process that 
commenced in Chapter 2 and 3 was conceptualized at the conclusion of Chapter 4, 
and was available to evaluate case studies within Chapter 6.  Success factors that 
could be identified in the case studies discussed in Chapter 6 were isolated 
throughout the chapter and were collected at the end of the chapter, where they were 
compared with success factors that have been generated through a distillation 
process that began in Chapter 1 and was continued at the conclusion of each chapter 
as new possible success factors were identified.  It is generally accepted that it is 
possible to learn from mistakes and it would therefore make sense to pay close 
attention to mistakes made in the use of PPPs as service delivery mechanisms.  In 
this chapter, a final filter will be applied to the PPP success factors that were 
progressively generated and refined through a process of distillation that commenced 
in Chapter 1.  Opinions about the success and failure of partnerships, collected from 
targeted respondents through interviews and questionnaires, will first be presented 
and then used as a purification instrument to reduce and strengthen the success 
factors formulated at the conclusion of Chapter 6. 
7.2 QUESTIONNAIRES 
Two different questionnaires were used to collect information for this chapter.  The 
questionnaires and their results will be described in this section. The first 
questionnaire was quantitative and was distributed to incident management 
partnership workshop participants in the Western Cape during the first half of 2008 
and will be described in the next subsection.  The second questionnaire was a 
targeted e-mail questionnaire with a qualitative interview nature which will be 
described in the subsequent subsection. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
7 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 461 
7.2.1 Disaster Preparedness, Response and Relief Stakeholders 
Disaster management and response routinely involves a variety of emergency, 
essential and social services that have to work closely together to effectively deal 
with the problems they face.  Disaster Management stakeholders are therefore 
expected to understand the need for partnerships and would have an opinion of 
partnerships built on personal experience.  During 2008, within a research project 
aimed at promoting inter-discipline cooperation and collaboration in disaster 
management and identifying critical success factors for Disaster Management 
partnerships, an opportunity arose to administer an in-depth questionnaire to 
participants in a series of provincial Disaster Management workshops in the Western 
Cape.  With considerable background and experience in Disaster Management and 
as a consultant in Disaster Management, the researcher was well-placed to ensure 
total alignment between the goals of the research project on disaster management 
partnerships and this dissertation, both of which aimed to identify critical success 
factors for partnerships between public and private roleplayers.  
 
The questionnaires were distributed to participants at the start of each workshop and 
they were requested to feel free to give their opinions about Disaster Management 
and Incident Management partnerships.  Respondents were informed that the results 
of the questionnaire would be used for two purposes: firstly to identify current 
perceptions of collaboration for the purpose of the research project on disaster 
management partnerships, and secondly to collect opinions that would inform this 
dissertation.  It was agreed that anonymity would be maintained and that respondent 
did not have to complete the questionnaire if they were hesitant to do so.  The 
voluntary completion of the questionnaires and a complete disclosure of the purpose 
of the questionnaire were regarded as central to the administering of the 
questionnaire.  Although more specifically focused on disaster management 
partnerships, the questionnaire would still produce valuable insight into partnerships 
in general and provide an additional layer of success factors to add to the other 
layers being accumulated in this dissertation.  
 
The workshops with Disaster Management stakeholders also aimed to define generic 
disaster response and relief activities on behalf of the Western Cape Disaster 
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Management Centre.  The number of possible role players identified for just response 
and relief for major incidents and disasters occurring within the Western Cape 
Province were 121.  Where responsibility is broken down into smaller units across the 
province, additional role-players become involved and there is an exponential 
increase in complexity.  The questionnaire was presented to 64 workshop delegates 
asking them what they thought makes for successful and failed partnerships in 
disaster response.  The following introductory paragraph was provided on the 
questionnaire: 
Major incidents and disasters bring many different role-players together who 
are responding to an impact and who need to manage the consequences and 
requirements of the situation in partnership with each other. 
 
The following questions were asked in the questionnaire:  
1) In your personal opinion and experience, what should be done for this 
partnership to be successful? 
2) What should be avoided to ensure successful incident management 
partnerships? 
3) What are the critical success factors for incident management partnerships?  
 
The third question was the most important, and the two questions before were 
intended only to familiarize the respondent with the topic so that more meaningful 
responses could be expected on Question 3.  The questionnaire was consciously 
presented in a free-text format instead of a multiple-choice format.  The reason for 
this was that the researcher did not want to exert any influence on the respondents 
which could influence their thinking on categories of success factors.  Due to the free-
form format of the questionnaire, the researcher had to discover patterns in the 
answers in order to create some form of prioritization for success factors.  Through a 
process of combining answers with similar topics, the researcher discovered 22 
unique categories of success factors.  The next step was to count the number of 
answers referring to each category. 
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Figure 7.1: Questionnaire administered to workshop participants 
 
 
The categories into which answers could be grouped are indicated below, with the 
number of respondents who referred to each category indicated in brackets after the 
category name. The categories are presented in descending order of priority.  The 
following factors were identified by delegates: 
1) Management (31) 
2) Organization (29) 
3) Communication (27) 
4) Personal Capacity (24) 
5) Policies, standards (22) 
6) Active participation (15) 
7) Information and knowledge (14) 
8) Stakeholder support (10) 
9) Relationships (8) 
10) Common goal (7) 
11) Learning (6) 
12) Trust and respect (5) 
13) Common values (4) 
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14) Leadership (4) 
15) Planning (3) 
16) Attitudes (1) 
17) Documentation (1) 
18) Partner choice (1) 
19) Context and mandate (1) 
20) Professional approach (1) 
21) Creativity (1) 
22) No window dressing (1) 
 
This list of categories can be regarded as key performance areas for incident 
management partnerships. It would be possible to transfer these performance areas 
to the wider partnership field to test their applicability.  The figure below presents the 
results of the questionnaire in graphic format. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 465 
 
Figure 7.2: Results of Questionnaire 1 
 
 
The results of the questionnaire suggest that participants consider five performance 
areas especially important in incident management partnerships.  Of the five, the first 
three are closely related to each other and have a governance focus, while the fourth 
(personal capacity) relates more to the skills, training and experience of individuals.  
The fifth performance area communicates the importance for common formalized 
rules that govern interaction in the partnership. 
7.3 TARGETED E-MAIL QUESTIONNAIRE  
The second questionnaire that was used in this dissertation was targeted at specific 
persons with previous experience of partnerships and can be considered as 
qualitative expert interviews due to the methodology used. 
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The questionnaire contained the questions as indicated in the box below: 
 
 
Question 1:  
In your experience, what is the success rate of public-private partnerships?  . 
Choose between:  
1) Total failure  
2) Dismal  
3) Poor  
4) Negative  
5) Positive  
6) Encouraging  
7) Very Good  
8) Excellent 
 
Question 2: 
In your opinion, what are the most frequent mistakes made in public-private 
partnerships? 
 
Question 3: 
In your opinion, what distinguishes successful partnerships from failed partnerships? 
 
Question 4: 
Please name as many examples as you can of successful and failed public-private 
partnerships: 
Successful Partnerships: 
Failed Partnerships: 
 
Question 5: 
In what year or in which 5-year period did you first encounter the term ―Public-Private 
Partnership‖? 
 
Box 1: The content of the targeted e-mail questionnaire 
 
The number of respondents that completed the questionnaire was 34.  The sample 
includes considerable variety in terms of location and experience as can be seen in 
the respondent details which are included in Annexure B.   
7.3.1 Question 1 
Question 1 requested respondents to provide a rating of PPP success in general by 
choosing one of eight possible values.  The responses to Question 1 are indicated in 
the chart below.  The majority of respondents found the general performance of 
PPPs to be ―encouraging‖, while the second most popular rating was ―positive‖.  
―Very good‖ was the third most popular rating.   
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Figure 7.3: The success rate of PPPs 
 
 
The sample of respondents thus had a predominantly positive perception of PPP 
experience. 
7.3.2 Question 2 
In this question, respondents were requested to provide an opinion on the most 
frequent mistakes made in public-private partnerships. 
7.3.2.1 Question 2: Most frequent mistakes 
The responses received on Question 2 were obviously negative and can be seen in 
their original form in the response table in Annexure B.  As a first step in data 
processing, all the responses were listed below each other and similar answers were 
grouped together.  A collective title was then developed for the groups of mistakes 
that formed natural clusters.  The clusters and their collective titles are presented 
below: 
   
1. Mistakes made regarding the mutual understanding of the other partner‘s 
functions and limitations, position and problems: 
1.1 No clear understanding of the different kinds of interests among the 
participating partners; 
1.2  Insufficient time and effort invested for both the parties involved to 
jointly explore and assess their respective interests, goals, ways of working, 
expectations and (importantly) acceptable timeframes; 
1.3 No proper explanation of what is required on both sides; 
1.4 No proper guarantees of what exactly each part of the relationship will 
bring to the project; 
1.5 No prior agreement on clear roles and responsibilities; 
0
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1.6 Roles and responsibilities of parties not comprehensive enough and not 
clearly defined; 
1.7 No clear statement of the roles and responsibilities of each partner; 
1.8 The public partner does not understand the workings or motivations of 
its private counterpart; 
1.9 Lack of understanding between public and private partners; 
1.10 Lack of experience in business practice by the public sector side (local 
government or even big ministries) so that the public side negotiates bad deals 
for the public, and the private sector does (too) well out of it.  In UK health and 
education sector PPPs, there have been enormous cost overruns and often the 
PPP project cost more than the public sector infrastructure would have; 
 
2. Inappropriate use of human resources: 
2.1 Allowing inexperienced/unqualified persons to be involved at an 
important level; 
2.2 Junior officials from the public sector with limited jurisdiction are sent to 
meetings, hampering decision-making and wasting time; 
2.3 The best and most experienced officials are not used to participate in 
the partnership (or to represent the government department in negotiations) 
because they do not represent the "right" demographic profile; 
2.4 Not having a core of people on both sides that remain consistent 
throughout the project; 
2.5 The head of the programme or project is not skilled or dynamic enough 
to further develop and ensure sustainability; 
 
3. Inappropriate performance management: 
3.1 Failure to meet deadlines; 
3.2 Specific parameters and criteria for measuring success of the 
programme are seldom included in the contract; 
3.3 No set deadlines for critical delivery items; 
 
4. Lack of communication: 
4.1 Lack of sustained communication between parties; 
4.2 Both parties not being honest/frank regarding negative issues 
encountered; 
4.3 Sharing of information is a problem. Proper consultation about 
processes is lacking. Representivity is not based on true leadership from within 
the affected geographical boundaries; 
4.4 Poor marketing strategies; 
 
5. Unrealistic expectations; 
 
6. Not maintaining the partnership: 
6.1 Setting up the partnership and then doing nothing to maintain it; 
6.2 Not continuing the process; 
6.3 Losing focus; 
 
7. Inappropriate goal setting: 
7.1 Not setting up common goals; 
7.2 Establishing unattainable goals; 
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7.3 No SMART goals defined; 
7.4 Not setting up common goals; 
7.5 No focus or common objective (something to accomplish); 
7.6 Different goals - expecting the partner to have the same goal; 
 
8. Not maintaining continuity / too much focus on individuals: 
8.1 New people in charge are not aware of the details of the partnership; 
8.2 Partnerships are between individuals  rather than organizations (so 
when one person leaves, the partnership falters); 
8.3 Not having a core of people on both sides that remains consistent 
throughout the project; 
 
9. Inappropriate time management: 
9.1 Partnerships are not given enough time to develop and evolve; 
9.2 Failure to clearly define time horizons; 
9.3 Not investing sufficient time and effort for both parties involved to jointly 
explore and assess their respective interests, goals, ways of working, 
expectations and (importantly) acceptable timeframes; 
 
10. Inappropriate partner selection: 
10.1 Assuming the partnership has to be with a for-profit corporation; 
10.2 Not investing sufficient time and effort for both parties involved to jointly 
explore and assess their respective interests, goals, ways of working, 
expectations and (importantly) acceptable timeframes; 
 
11. Not managing public expectations or providing information to the public: 
11.1 Public not adequately trained/informed by PPP, leading to distrust 
among members of the public; 
11.2 Public not given continual feedback and further education/information, 
which may  lead to breach of contract; 
11.3 Public misunderstands partnerships; 
 
12. Personal gain focus of persons in public sector:   
12.1 Public representatives often want personal gain, leading to distrust in 
private sector; 
12.2 Decisions based on individual interests, not on a sustainable ―common 
objective‖; 
12.3 Often enough there is straightforward collusion and corruption between 
government officials and the private company.  In the UK, there has been, for 
example, the "rotating door" between top Ministry of Defence officials 
responsible for procurement and the big arms manufacturers; 
 
13. Vulnerability to political pressure not addressed;  
 
14. Motivation: 
14.1 No broad sense of urgency; 
14.2 No real buy-in from public sector officials; 
14.3 All parties being more interested in high profile post-disaster work than 
in forgotten emergencies or disaster risk reduction; 
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14.4 Misunderstanding / underestimating the time and resources 
commitment to make a partnership successful; 
 
15. Not addressing vulnerability to changing financial conditions; 
 
16. Insufficient resources (material, human or financial); 
 
17. Not addressing vulnerability to corruption and nepotism; 
 
18. Insufficient financial planning / awareness: 
18.1 Failure to pay the full costs of the project -- usually indirect costs are 
underestimated and corporate, general and administrative, indirect or core costs 
such as fund raising costs are ignored or limited; 
18.2 Projections made use dubious calculations; 
18.3 Failure to identify the benefits and costs associated with networking and 
local logistics support that is frequently provided to projects by local NGOs; 
18.4 Small, local NGOs have no knowledge of their real cost(s) structure, nor 
reasonable and customary ways to identify and recover these costs (This 
observation is based specifically on 30+ years of experience of my own 
environmental NGO providing various forms of technical assistance and training 
for the management of small NGOs); 
18.5 Both government departments and private sector participants are too 
ready to bend the rules (explicit or implicit) of good financial governance; 
18.6 Insufficient funding 
18.7 The underlying - but deeply buried and even denied - motivation from 
the public side that its aim is not so much cost savings, but cost deferrals, i.e. 
the government getting into the deal is in effect getting an expensive capital 
loan from the private sector which will be paid back by later generations of tax 
payers, or at least, after the next election! ―Cut taxes now, and let your kids pay 
for the hospitals, roads, schools, sewers, etc. etc.! 
 
19. No clear organizational structure with clear responsibility lines within the PPP; 
 
20. Insufficient business case research: 
20.1 There is no business case made at the start of the PPP project to clarify 
costs, return on investment and critical success factors; 
20.2 Public partners do not understand the core business and business plan; 
20.3 A private partner jumping into something because it‘s a ―good cause‖, 
despite not fully understanding the intricacies of the project, or getting involved 
because they perceive some ―commercial‖ benefit or benefit of visibility; 
20.4 An uncritical assumption that the private sector is more efficient than 
the public sector (sometimes true, sometimes not, but most PPPs don't even 
question it); 
20.5 Opportunistic by nature, not enough research to develop excellence; 
 
21. Insufficient risk management – not well organized: 
21.1 Lack of insurance against non-performance of other partner (true for 
both private and public partners); 
 
22. Failure to specify:  
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22.1 success measures;  
22.2 the required evolution of the relationships;  
22.3 the various timeframes of a partnership; 
 
23. Failures of public sector: 
23.1 to understand that private (local, national or small) organizations need 
to retain their own vision and mission, even if they accept a relatively large PPP 
grant; 
23.2 to protect the private partners and partnership commitments from shifts 
in priorities and public perceptions; 
23.3 Policies change every time a new political head is appointed, making 
long-term planning very difficult  (e.g. aid for development may depend on 
incumbent US President); 
23.4 Officials ignore any information that they do not understand or do not 
have the courage to defend in front of their bosses.  Important aspects of the 
project are then planned sub-optimally, while senior officials are unaware or 
ignore what they don't want to hear; 
23.5 The public officials are incapable of taking responsibility;  
23.6 The public side, especially researchers, are not willing to make the 
effort to communicate to the private sector on the private sector‘s terms; 
23.7 Political interference and officials interfering in projects and trying to 
gain personal profit; 
 
24. Failures of the private sector: 
24.1 The private sector may be too impatient for results and publicity and 
may have a short attention span; 
24.2 They may not fully embrace corporate responsibility by making some 
work, including research, proprietary;   
 
25. Legal environment: 
25.1 Conflict between the legal mandate of the government departments (by 
law) and how policy is interpreted (a mismatch between legal mandate and 
implementation policies); 
 
26. The tender process is cumbersome and wastes huge amounts of time; 
 
27. Financial irregularities keep on occurring despite cumbersome tender processes; 
 
28. Insufficient leadership;  
 
29. The "power imbalances" are not levelled out at the beginning and therefore 
uneven expectations or indicators of success continue until the enterprise 
founders; 
 
30. Insufficient resource planning: 
30.1 The almost universal expectation that the resources will come from the 
"private side" of the partnership; 
30.2 Bargaining on promised funding (without having plan B and C in place); 
30.3 Lack of resources available; 
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31. Over-commitment and under-delivery on one or both sides; 
32. No true risk sharing; 
33. Flawed design, one / more missing element; 
34. Inappropriate leadership in partnership; 
35. Inappropriate trust between / among the leaders (forgiveness for inappropriate 
statements meant for their ―base‖);  
36. Insufficient commitment and an unwillingness or inability to suffer inevitable 
setbacks that may happen along the way; 
37. Not knowing when to end a positive relationship: 
37.1 Sometimes partnerships form almost spontaneously, e.g. during a 
disaster event, and it is clear that the synergy is greater than the sum of the 
parts.  But once the event is over, and the particular cause or need has 
dissipated, some partnerships try to find ways to continue and the essence of 
what made them special can be lost.  Some partnerships are destined to be 
short, and better left that way;  
38. Expectation that resources will be provided by public entities;  
39. Instant gratification is the aim – sustainability is therefore rare; 
40. No training is perceived to be necessary; 
41. The time factor: The public sector works / decides more slowly;  
42. Bureaucracy: The public sector is inherently inflexible or unable to improvise; 
43. Expectations: The public sector objectives are wide  and the targets too large;  
44. Not enough training to imitate a unique idea and thereby increase the status of 
partnership. 
 
An interesting response from one of the respondents can be mentioned here: 
Some of the failures noted above are mirrored in conditions when a private 
mega-NGO works with a small, local or national public authority. In the small 
island states and dependencies of the Caribbean and South Pacific, there 
have been many examples of unsuccessful projects of this nature, which are 
often more accurately described as public-private-public partnerships in which 
bi-lateral or inter-governmental programmes and organizations team with 
mega-NGOs to inflict the latest development fad on local governments or 
agencies. 
 
The further processing of the responses to question 2 will be discussed in the next 
section. 
7.3.3 Question 3 
In this question respondents were asked to voice their opinions on what distinguishes 
successful partnerships from failed partnerships.  This question was purposefully 
almost the direct opposite of Question 2.  Respondents were answering almost 
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exactly the same question, but had to think in a positive manner as opposed to the 
negative manner used in the previous question.  The intention with the converse 
repetition was to provide the maximum opportunity for respondents to relate their 
negative and positive experiences of PPPs.   The purpose of this question was also 
to find out how people recognize successful partnerships, or which characteristics of 
a partnership can be seen as indicators of success.  The results of the question are 
provided in the questionnaire response table in Annexure B.  As a first step in 
processing the results from Question 3, all the results were considered and then 
clustered according to themes or clusters that emerged during the analysis.  The 
clusters that were determined, each with a summarizing title, are presented below.  
 
1. Mutual benefit: Successful partnership should present a win-win-situation, so all 
parties must benefit or the partnership has failed. All parties are to recognize 
and accept that the only successful course is to build a middle road that does 
not fully subscribe to any one party‘s wishes or needs. This takes time and 
investments in time; 
2. Mutual understanding: Of mission, goals and objectives; 
3. Common goals: A clear and commonly held statement of purpose is an essential 
starting point. This also needs subsequent and serious, sustained commitment. 
Set goals and objectives that are agreed to by all, well-aligned and mutually 
beneficial.  The objectives of both sides are clear and transparent to both sides 
and the partnership is based on finding a balance between both sides‘ 
objectives. There must be a common shared purpose and goal, with the time 
and investment to pursue these; 
4. Communication: Ongoing sharing of information among all involved as project 
progresses; Regular communication on progress; Constant flow of information 
between all parties in the partnership (regular feed-back meetings); Regular 
feed-back between partners; Short communication lines; One point of entry into 
parties involved in the partnership; Continually showing benefit to community 
and to elders as project progresses and give credit to them; Failures stem from 
opportunism and a lack of popularity; Do not underestimate the ignorance 
amongst the masses; 
5. Joint activities; 
6. Flexibility:  The partnership must adapt to changes in the community. Quick 
interventions may be necessary to ensure positive outcomes; 
7. Motivation: Buy-in from all parts of the organizations is needed, from the 
leadership to the grassroots. 
8. Ethical conduct: Public / community leaders who want personal gain should be 
exposed. Greed in the private sector may be problematic; 
9. Relationship of trust: Developing a very good relation / trust with the chief and 
elders of the area is important, even if they are represented by another elected 
body; 
10. Continuity; 
11. Training and education: The ongoing education of all involved is needed; 
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12. Legislative framework: The laws and administration necessary to organize the 
partnership must be in place and of good quality; 
13. Planning:  A practical business plan is needed; proper planning prevents poor 
performance; Do not build on unproven assumptions: ‖obvious‖ solutions often 
prove to be impractical; 
14. Enhanced service delivery to communities: Quality and reliable services / 
products are imperative; 
15. Partner selection: Private partners' sustainability, ability of companies to really 
deliver; 
16. Size and knowledge of both partners: Both elements are usually needed because 
it takes an excess of certain resources to develop a partnership with the 
attention and care that it needs.  Because partnership design is really 
complicated, it is too often delegated to junior staff without the prerequisite 
experience; 
17. Human resource needs: Stable personnel over the course of the partnership; 
Committed individuals in each institution involved; Much of the success comes 
down to personal relationships, people who are willing to make things happen 
and look for reasons  to continue, rather than seeking excuses to complain; 
Committed people on both sides who want to make the partnership work; The 
quality (knowledge, experience and commitment) of the main drivers of the 
particular project;  It comes down to the people in charge - who make the 
difference; Staff exchange - both ways - private and public; Much better 
preparation by (and training for) the public officials who will be involved; The 
reliability and trustworthiness of the people nominated to the partnership, with 
clear mandates and service boundaries, ensure success;  Appropriate 
personality traits: patience, persistence, and a sense of humour; Ability of staff 
to grasp and understand the goals and objectives; 
18. Focus on outcomes:  Good research and communication on what the outcomes 
should be; 
19. Financial control and discipline: Cost effectiveness; 
20. Leadership: Leaders willing to take the lead and responsibility; 
21. Management: Adherence to deadlines; Focus on small steps with clear 
deliverables; Implement / follow through on checks and controls required; 
22. Financial backing: Adequate funding;  
23. Stakeholder management: Sufficient understanding by decision makers in 
government; 
24. Selling your plan: Using the correct strategy;  
25. Performance measuring:  Successfully accomplished measurable objectives 
(short or long term);  Focus on small steps with clear deliverables; Sustained 
monitoring of the process/project; 
26. Post-project survival:  Sustainable relationships; project / objective accomplished; 
but the PPP continues to operate; It becomes institutionalized / a regular part of 
day to day business; 
27. Clearly defined unsatisfied need for a product or a service: Realistic assessment 
(commonly shared) of the need for which the partnership is to be formed; 
28. Customer satisfaction: The community (or other beneficiary) of the partnership 
activity must perceive that they are being served by the partnership; 
29. Commitment: Commitment to time and other resources required to successfully 
accomplish tasks; Total commitment to achieving goals; A medium-term 
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commitment (2-5 years), but always thinking towards the long-term while 
seeking short-term, small-step successes and completed initiatives; 
30. Organization:  Small, not big; highly focused;  
31. Customer focus: Continually showing benefit to community elders as project 
progresses and give credit to them. Elected or non-elected public officials who 
have compassion for the poor; Public benefit is above private benefit; 
Community involvement; Community participation in the PPP, or, in private 
sector management language: customer interaction and involvement in product 
development. 
 
Additional processing of the responses to Questions 2 and 3 will be discussed in the 
next section. 
7.3.4 Question 4 
In this question, respondents were asked to list as many examples as they could of 
successful and failed PPPs.  The responses received are presented below.  It should 
be noted that the respondents answered these question from the perspectives of 
their own primary interests and the responses can therefore contain references to 
specific industries or disciplines in which partnerships are used. 
7.3.4.1 Question 4A: Examples of Successful Partnerships 
Respondents listed the following examples of successful partnerships: 
 
1. Weather service and DRM (Disaster Risk Management); 
2. Relief NGOs; 
3. Golden Arrow bus service and DRM/CoCT (City of Cape Town); 
4. Trauma counselling and DRM/COCT; 
5. CEDIM/cedim AG; (the one I am involved in) – sorry, I don‘t have much 
knowledge about others, so I am not of great help here; 
6. Chile has the private and public sectors doing their DR testing for a week every 
year; 
7. Nassau LI Community does joint testing; 
8. Police in NYC are setting up partnerships and have a web set up for sharing 
information;  
9. The biggest example in the US is called Project Impact, a FEMA (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency) funded programme developed in the late 
1990s and later cut by the Bush Administration.  Some communities, like Seattle, 
Washington, still have a Project Impact programme and are vocal 
proponents.  This project provided funding to encourage, among other things, 
public-private partnerships; 
10. Hurricane Expositions:  This is a relatively new phenomenon in the US.  They can 
include convention hall exhibits of disaster resistant products, like storm shutters 
and windows, building supplies/techniques, as well as information on government 
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programmes and services and emergency preparedness.  They  can also be 
smaller events in the parking lot of a building supply/hardware store like Home 
Depot (maybe like MICA in SA) where do-it-yourselfers and local  construction 
workers can get information on how to do disaster reduction projects (while the 
store can get their business).  At the beginning of hurricane season, nearly all 
these types of stores in coastal areas offer package deals for hurricane 
emergency preparedness kits (with batteries, radios, flashlights, tarps) where the 
store benefits and the public is better prepared; 
11. Battle to find them, I know of failures; 
12. Religious house ceremonies; 
13. Greenery planned partnerships; 
14. School teachers‘ activities for the poor; 
15. DWAF agreements with irrigation boards / water user associations; 
16. Beer companies and cricket teams; 
17. Beer companies and rugby teams; 
18. Beer companies and soccer teams; 
19. Barcelona has many successful projects; 
20. The PPS between the safety region Rotterdam-Rijnmond and the Rotterdam Port 
Authority about organizing port security; 
21. The PPS between the safety region Zuid-Holland Zuid and the water company 
Evides about organizing the vital infrastructure to provide drinking water; 
22. The PPS about organizing risk communication between the safety region 
Rotterdam-Rijnmond and different companies and governmental bodies about the 
Year of Transport, 2009; 
23. The PPS about cell broadcasting between Telecom providers such as KPN, 
Vodafone en Telfort, and the Ministries of Verkeer en Waterstaat, VWS, BZK en 
Economische Zaken; 
24. M7 Westlink, Sydney; 
25. Can't think of any that were really unqualified successes; 
26. City Improvement Districts in Cape Town; 
27. Marketing of 107 PECC Cape Town; 
28. Toll Routes in SA; 
29. Payment of City of Cape Town rates accounts at Pick ‗n Pay;  
30. Purchasing of pre-paid power at private outlets in Cape Town; 
31. Not engaged in any partnerships in the past; 
32. Examples of corporate responsibility for disaster risk reduction research are 
provided, but judging them as ―successes‖ or ―failures‖ is unfair. All projects have 
some successes and some failures; 
33. John Twigg's study at 
http://www.benfieldhrc.org/disaster_studies/csr/csr_index.htm; 
34. An overwhelming amount of material related to private insurance. I attach some 
samples, but I have much more, plus I mentioned my PhD already 
(http://www.ilankelman.org/phd.html). While the topic covered by some of this 
material is not necessarily corporate responsibility or PPP, parts of the content 
are directly applicable to both these topics, even where it needs to be interpreted 
as such; 
35. ProVention (http://www.proventionconsortium.org/?pageid=32&projectid=12); 
36. Utah (http://www.amazon.com/Extending-helping-hand-responsibility-
contribution/dp/ B000EXDVUE); 
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37. Nokia (http://www.nokia.com/A4946176), and hundreds of other companies with 
similar pages; 
38. Willis Research Network (http://www.willisresearchnetwork.com); 
39. Linking insurance and science 
(http://www.actuaries.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/26685/ tsunami.pdf, 
project now finished); 
40. "Business continuity", "micro-insurance", and "micro-finance" are other examples 
of keywords where numerous publications, projects, initiatives, and ideas exist for 
disaster risk reduction.  There are so many and they are so easy to find, that I do 
not provide any specifics; 
41. Project Impact - in some of the localities where it was adopted (e.g. Seattle); 
42. Probably some of the commitments during or post-Tsunami, but most all of them 
were related to provision of emergency goods and services. Ericsson 
Communications has subsequently expanded its roles and outlooks. Also TNT, 
DHL and similar logistics on demand programmes for international emergencies 
may qualify as successes; 
43. Production of Natural Disaster management and Know Risk books by Tudor Rose 
Publishers, but pointedly NOT successive efforts to build on that for shared PPP 
involvement in upgrading and production of public awareness materials (on 2 
occasions, with 2 different UN agencies); 
44. Probably the pharmaceutical industry vaccine programme with the UN (don't 
know the name of it); 
45. Koeberg Emergency plan - despite many active role players and constant 
changes, the plan works; 
46. Study Buddy programme with Koeberg and the Atlantis schools; 
47. Developing of women in Atlantis via Red Door organization; 
48. Mostar bridge; 
49. Alcan International Sustainability Award; 
50. World Economic Forum Water Initiative; 
51. Bambanani, Community Safety; 
52. Ke Moya Drug Abuse, Substance Abuse Programme, Dept of Social 
Development; 
53. Social Security Pension Forums, Black Areas of Cape Metropole for the last two 
decades; 
54. Disability Network with NGOs , Dept of Social Development; 
55. Shell – the oil company in Oman; 
56. Ukuvuka;  
57. Working on Fire; 
58. Ukuvuka; 
59. The first and only long term PPP is the Los Angeles, CA, BICEPP, Business 
Industry Council for Emergency Preparedness and Prevention (name may be 
wrong).  Started in the early 1980s to coordinate public-private planning in case of 
a major earthquake.  I believe it continues.  Many others have been created, 
operated for a few years and failed.  Today, Memphis, TN, has a functioning PPP;  
60. ChemTrec – A public service by the chemical industry that (I believe) still provides 
valuable information to fire services and other government entities; 
61. US Department of State‘s Overseas Security Advisory Council.  Government 
funded forum for international companies and NGOs to share / exchange 
emergency and security-related information in real time;  
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62. Project Impact, a PPP started during the Clinton administration to identify and 
reduce risk in communities. Ines Pearce (cc above) can provide more information.  
Some examples continue, even though funding and staff support were stopped by 
the Bush Administration;  
63. I suppose it depends upon one‘s perspective whether it was good or not, but one 
of the first PPPs is likely to have been the ―Marshall Plan‖, the primary plan of the 
United States for rebuilding and creating a stronger foundation for the countries of 
Western Europe after World War II. The plan was in operation for four years 
beginning in July 1947. During that period, some USD 13 billion in economic and 
technical assistance was given to help the recovery of the European countries 
that had joined in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (quick 
summary courtesy of Wikipedia).  This is not disaster per se, but you get the idea.  
Relating to some of my earlier comments, this was a case where the US 
encouraged US business to ―partner‖ in the redevelopment of Europe with the 
dual objective of ―doing good‖ and making money; 
64. It‘s hard to say, categorically, what are successes and failures.  Several PPPs 
that began in the disaster area were successful at various stages, or successful 
for just having been conceived and motivating others to consider options.  The 
early days of satellite and mobile communications saw several partnerships, for 
example INTELSAT and INMARSAT, as well as Ericsson Motorola working with 
the UN System, International Organizations and NGOs (i.e., active involvement, 
particularly by Ericsson, in and support of the International Working Group on 
Emergency Telecommunications – WGET, and INTELSAT support for the US-
USSR Telemedicine Spacebridge in response to the earthquake in Armenia in 
1988); 
65. Another, nurtured by Ollie Davidson while at OFDA, was the Caribbean Basin 
Private Sector Disaster Advisory Committee (Ollie can give you more if he hasn‘t 
donated the files to some library); 
66. Victim support;  
67. Rural safety;  
68. Community police forums; 
69. Neighbourhood watches; 
70. Business Against Crime;  
71. Toll roads; 
72. Construction of prisons. 
 
7.3.4.2 Question 4B: Failed Partnerships 
1. Relief NGOs (there are successes and failures in this partnership); 
2. Golden Arrow bus service and DRM/COCT (as above); 
3. NYC set up a programme to train private CPE group on Hazmat (Hazardous 
Materials).  On 911 the members were not called in because the new people in 
charge did not know about it.  Also, the database with the names was not backed 
up and the information was lost; 
4. The Research Triangle Park area of North Carolina, USA, received a Project 
Impact grant of about $100,000 around 2000 or 2001.  However, the many cities 
and counties in the area were unable to agree to work together.  The partnership 
failed to get buy in from the various participants before getting started and they 
ended up returning the grant funds; 
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5. A Re Phepafatseng community/NW government project - Mafikeng; 
6. Soweto: ANC Youth League project with Sappi: Recycling with door-to-door 
collection;  
7. Randburg recycling project: Des D'Ligneres/E L Bateman/ municipality; 
8. GEF partnership with a consortium of environmental NGOs in the Philippines, 
2002; 
9. GEF-Colombia with CORALINA of San Andres 2001; 
10. TNC - Jamaica - country-wide conservation plan 1985; 
11. EU (or Cariforum?) with the Caribbean Conservation Association 2001 - CREP; 
12. Cross City Tunnel Sydney; 
13. Lane Cove Tunnel Sydney; 
14. Local authorities and organized agriculture - trying to address intrusion of 
untreated sewage into rivers used for irrigation; 
15. Metrorail and private security on trains (Rail Police (SAPS) re-established); 
16. SAWS service to Eskom Koeberg (managing weather station at Koeberg);  
17. Diyatalawa apple project in the Free State; 
18. Mt Paul dairy project; 
19. IBM international committee for disaster reduction (ca. 1997-98); 
20. Many never got off the ground or beyond the rhetoric involved. Jon Twigg's paper 
on PPP realities in the later 1990s (1998 or so?) delve into several examples; 
21. Building of children's ward with Atlantis Government hospital; 
22. Ministerial Advisory Council, Dept of Social Development;  
23. Community Based Forums for Municipality development, Integrated Development 
Planning, City of Cape Town; 
24. Some tourism projects; 
25. Trauma Centre / CoCT; 
26. The International Disaster Advisory Committee (IDAC), the first disaster-related 
PPP started as a formal USG Advisory Committee during the first Bush 
administration. (Marilyn Quayle, wife of the US Vice President, was Chairman, I 
was Executive Director).  Major corporations represented sectors that could cure 
(mitigate or prevent) or cause disasters, food, transport, insurance, fuel, 
insurance, communications, etc.  Discontinued by the Clinton administration, but 
an inspiration for Project Impact (within the USA);  
27. The Disaster Resource Network (DRN) started by the World Economic Forum and 
perhaps continuing in some diminished form (our colleagues in Europe should 
provide more precise information); 
28. Youth Against Crime;  
29. Sport Against Crime; 
30. Maintenance of hospitals; 
31. Service delivery – water, waste, housing. 
7.3.5 Question 5 
In this question, respondents were asked to indicate when they first encountered the 
term ―Public-Private Partnership‖.  The responses to Question 5 are provided in the 
table below: 
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Table 7-1: First encounter with the term "PPP" 
Year Number of respondents 
1987 1 
1990 2 
1991 1 
1992 1 
1993 1 
1995 2 
1996 1 
1997 2 
1998 3 
1999 1 
2000 3 
2001 1 
2002 5 
2003 1 
2005 1 
2007 1 
 
The majority of respondents first encountered the term between 1996 and 2003.  The 
results from both Question 1 and Question 5 have limited use for the purpose of this 
dissertation and will therefore not be discussed in further detail.  The results from 
Question 4 are interesting but are of limited use in the identification of success 
factors.  The partnerships mentioned in the responses could be the subject of future 
detailed evaluation and research but will not be used in the rest of this dissertation.  
The responses to Question 2 and Question 3 present the real value of the targeted e-
mail questionnaire which, due to the profile of the respondents, could be regarded as 
an expert panel.  From the next section on, these responses will be used to derive 
additional success factors for PPPs. 
7.4 DERIVING SUCCESS FACTORS FROM QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
In the previous section it was shown how the results from Question 2 and Question 3 
were interpreted and processed to reveal cluster titles.  Each cluster title summarizes 
the points collected underneath it and can therefore represent the cluster in a further 
processing step.   
7.4.1 List of cluster heading statements from Question 2 results 
The cluster titles from Question 2 were collated into a single list of negative 
statements, provided below:   
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1) Mistakes made regarding the mutual understanding of the other partner‘s 
functions and limitations, position and problems; 
2) Inappropriate use of human resources; 
3) Inappropriate performance management; 
4) Lack of communication; 
5) Unrealistic expectations; 
6) Not maintaining the partnership; 
7) Inappropriate goal setting; 
8) Not maintaining continuity / too much focus on individuals; 
9) Inappropriate time management; 
10) Inappropriate partner selection; 
11) Not managing public expectations or providing information to the public; 
12) Personal gain focus of persons in public sector;  
13) Vulnerability to political pressure not addressed;  
14) Motivation; 
15) Not addressing vulnerability to changing financial conditions; 
16) Insufficient resources (material, human or financial); 
17) Not addressing vulnerability to corruption and nepotism; 
18) Insufficient financial planning / awareness; 
19) No clear organizational structure with clear responsibility lines within the PPP; 
20) Insufficient business case research; 
21) Insufficient risk management – not well organized; 
22) Failure to specify; 
23) Failures of public sector; 
24) Legal environment; 
25) The tender process is cumbersome and wastes huge amounts of time; 
26) Financial irregularities keep on occurring despite cumbersome tender 
processes; 
27) Insufficient leadership;  
28) The "power imbalances" are not levelled out at the beginning and therefore 
uneven expectations or indicators of success continue until the enterprise 
founders; 
29) Insufficient resource planning; 
30) Over-commitment and under-delivery on one or both sides; 
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31) No true risk sharing; 
32) Flawed design, one / more missing element; 
33) Inappropriate leadership in partnership; 
34) Inappropriate trust between / among the leaders (forgiveness for inappropriate 
statements meant for their ―base‖);  
35) Insufficient commitment and an unwillingness or inability to suffer inevitable 
setbacks that may happen along the way; 
36) Not knowing when to end a positive relationship; 
37) Sometimes partnerships form almost spontaneously, for example during a 
disaster event, and it is clear that the synergy is greater than the sum of the 
parts.  But once the event is over, and the particular cause or need has 
dissipated, some partnerships try to find ways to continue and the essence of 
what made them special can be lost.  Some partnerships are destined to be 
short, and better left that way;  
38) Expectation that resources will be provided by public entities;  
39) Instant gratification is the aim – sustainability is therefore rare; 
40) No training is perceived to be necessary; 
41) The time factor: The public sector works / decides more slowly;  
42) Bureaucracy: The public sector is inherently inflexible or unable to improvise; 
43) Expectations: The public sector objectives are wide  and the targets too large;  
44) Not enough training to imitate a unique idea and thereby increase the status of 
partnership. 
 
The intention now is to compare and combine the results from Question 2 and 
Question 3 so that a consolidated list of success indicators and ultimately success 
factors can be synthesized from the questionnaire results.  It is expected that there 
may be overlap between the two lists, and this process will neutralize such 
duplication.  The negative statements from above will first have to be converted into 
positive statements to make them comparable with the results of Question 3. 
7.4.2 Question 2 cluster headings converted to positive statements 
This subsection contains the list of cluster headings converted from negative to 
positive statements.  Some interpretation had to be applied to some of the headings 
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in order to convert them to positive statements.  The last heading was removed 
because it is not meaningful. 
 
1) Understanding the other partner; 
2) Optimal human resource utilization; 
3) Effective performance management; 
4) Effective communication; 
5) Common understanding of expectations; 
6) Purposeful maintenance of the partnership; 
7) Realistic joint goal setting; 
8) Continuity and succession planning; 
9) Time management; 
10) Careful partner selection; 
11) Manage public and stakeholder expectations; 
12) Ensure alignment of partner and partnership goals; 
13) Reduce vulnerability to political pressure; 
14) Motivation; 
15) Flexibility to address changing financial conditions; 
16) Resource planning (material, human or financial); 
17) Addressing vulnerability to corruption and nepotism; 
18) Improved financial planning / awareness: 
19) Clear organizational structure with clear responsibility lines within the PPP; 
20) Conduct appropriate business case research; 
21) Planned shared risk management; 
22) Specificity; 
23) Public sector commitment; 
24) Supportive legal environment; 
25) Efficient tender process; 
26) Financial control and transparency; 
27) Optimized tender processes; 
28) Strong leadership;  
29) Manage power relations to ensure equality, mutual respect and shared goals 
and objectives; 
30) Conduct resource planning; 
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31) Realistic promises, full delivery; 
32) Risk sharing; 
33) Comprehensive programme design; 
34) Appropriate leadership in partnership; 
35) Mutual trust and respect between / among leaders; 
36) Commitment and resilience to setbacks; 
37) Knowing when to end a positive relationship; 
38) Clarity on resource contributions;  
39) Focus on long-term sustainability instead of quick wins; 
40) Training and skills development for partnership participation; 
41) Allow time for processes, attempt synchronization;  
42) Public sector flexibility and innovation; 
43) Realistic objectives and expectations. 
7.4.3 List of cluster heading statements from Question 3 results 
This subsection contains the cluster headings from the Question 3 results with all 
other points removed. These cluster headings already represent performance areas 
and success factors, but will be strengthened through a combination with the cluster 
headings from Question 2 that has been converted to positive statements. 
 
1) Mutual benefit; 
2) Mutual understanding; 
3) Common goals; 
4) Effective communication; 
5) Joint activities; 
6) Flexibility; 
7) Motivation; 
8) Ethical conduct; 
9) Relationship of trust; 
10) Continuity; 
11) Training and education; 
12) Legislative framework; 
13) Planning; 
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14) Enhanced service delivery to communities; 
15) Partner selection; 
16) Size and knowledge of both partners; 
17) Human resource needs; 
18) Focus on outcomes; 
19) Financial control and discipline; 
20) Leadership; 
21) Delivery management; 
22) Financial backing;  
23) Stakeholder management; 
24) Selling your plan;  
25) Performance measuring;   
26) Post-project survival;   
27) Clearly defined unsatisfied need for a product or a service; 
28) Customer satisfaction; 
29) Commitment; 
30) Lean and focused organization;  
31) Customer focus. 
 
 
The cluster headings from Question 2 and Question 3 will now be combined into a 
single list.  In the process of combination, duplications will be removed, 
complementary points will be combined and unique points will be listed separately.  
Conflicting ideas will be pointed out and discussed if present.  The combined cluster 
heading list now represents the PPP success factors identified in this chapter. These 
factors are listed in the next section. 
7.5 SUCCESS FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN THIS CHAPTER 
The success factors for PPPs identified in this chapter are: 
 
1) Understanding the other partner;  
2) Optimal human resource utilization;  
3) Effective performance measuring and management; 
4) Effective communication;  
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5) Common understanding of expectations; 
6) Purposeful maintenance of the partnership; 
7) Realistic joint goal setting; 
8) Continuity and succession planning; 
9) Time management; 
10) Partner selection; 
11) Stakeholder management; 
12) Manage public and stakeholder expectations; 
13) Common goals: Goal alignment between partners and partnership; 
14) Reduce vulnerability to political pressure; 
15) Motivation; 
16) Flexibility to address changing financial conditions; 
17) Resource planning (material, human or financial); 
18) Addressing vulnerability to corruption and nepotism; 
19) Improved financial planning / awareness; 
20) Clear organizational structure with clear responsibility lines within the PPP; 
21) Conduct appropriate business case research; 
22) Planned shared risk management; 
23) Specificity; 
24) Public sector commitment; 
25) Supportive legal environment; 
26) Efficient tender process; 
27) Financial control, discipline and transparency; 
28) Optimized tender processes; 
29) Strong leadership; 
30) Manage power relations to ensure equality, mutual respect and shared goals 
and objectives; 
31) Conduct resource planning; 
32) Realistic promises, full delivery; 
33) Risk sharing; 
34) Comprehensive programme design; 
35) Appropriate leadership in partnership; 
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36) Mutual trust and respect between / among leaders;  
37) Commitment and resilience to setbacks;  
38) Knowing when to end a positive relationship; 
39) Clarity on resource contributions;  
40) Focus on long-term sustainability instead of quick wins; 
41) Training and skills development for partnership participation; 
42) Allow time for processes, attempt synchronization;  
43) Public sector flexibility and innovation; 
44) Realistic objectives and expectations; 
45) Not enough training to imitate a unique idea and thereby increase the status 
of partnership; 
46) Post-project survival; 
47) Mutual benefit; 
48) Joint activities; 
49) Flexibility; 
50) Ethical conduct; 
51) Relationship of trust; 
52) Training and education; 
53) Planning; 
54) Enhanced service delivery to communities;  
55) Size and knowledge of both partners;  
56) Focus on outcomes; 
57) Delivery management; 
58) Financial backing;  
59) Selling your plan;  
60) Clearly defined unsatisfied need for a product or a service;  
61) Customer satisfaction; 
62) Lean and focused organization;  
63) Customer focus. 
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7.6 FURTHER DISTILLATION OF SUCCESS FACTORS 
The above list of success factors now need to be compared and integrated with the 
success factors identified in Chapter 6.  The list of factors from the previous chapter 
is shown in Annexure C.  A process of synthesis will now be performed where the 
two lists are compared, duplications are removed, complementary factors are 
combined and unique new factors are added. If conflicting success factors are 
identified they will be discussed and resolved. 
7.6.1 Integrated list of success factors 
The consolidated list of success factors is shown in Annexure C. This consolidated 
and integrated list represents all the success factors identified in this dissertation. 
This list will be further described in the next chapter. 
7.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This dissertation aims to identify critical success factors for PPPs.  In Chapter 6 the 
characteristics and performance of a wide variety of partnerships were compared in 
order to identify patterns in their success or failure that could further illuminate the 
search for critical success factors for PPPs. The PPP performance evaluation 
instrument designed through a process that commenced in Chapter 2 was 
conceptualized at the conclusion of Chapter 4, and was available to evaluate case 
studies within Chapter 6.  Success factors that could be identified in the case studies 
discussed in Chapter 6 were isolated throughout the chapter and were collected at 
the end of the chapter, where they were compared with success factors that have 
been generated through a distillation process that began in Chapter 1.  In this chapter 
a final level of analysis was applied to the PPP success factors that were 
progressively generated and refined through a process of distillation that commenced 
in Chapter 1.  Opinions about the success and failure of partnerships, collected from 
targeted respondents through interviews and questionnaires, were firstly presented 
and then used as an instrument to enhance and strengthen the success factors 
formulated at the conclusion of Chapter 6.  In Chapter 8 the success factors collected 
throughout this dissertation will be discussed in more detail and the dissertation will 
be summarize and concluded. 
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8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: KEY ASPECTS OF 
SUCCESSFUL PARTNERSHIPS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, Chapter 7, a final filter was applied to the PPP success 
factors that were progressively generated and refined through a process of distillation 
that commenced in Chapter 1.  Opinions about the success and failure of 
partnerships, collected from targeted respondents through interviews and 
questionnaires, were firstly presented and then used as a purification instrument to 
reduce and strengthen the success factors formulated at the conclusion of Chapter 5.  
In Chapter 6 the characteristics and performance of a wide variety of partnerships 
were compared in order to identify patterns in their success or failure that could 
further illuminate the search for critical success factors for PPPs. The PPP 
performance evaluation instrument designed through a process that commenced in 
Chapter 2 was conceptualized at the conclusion of Chapter 4, and was applied to 
evaluable case studies within Chapter 6.  Success factors that could be identified in 
the case studies discussed in Chapter 6 were isolated throughout the chapter and 
were collected at the end of the chapter, where they were compared with success 
factors that have been generated through a distillation process that began in Chapter 
1.  In Chapter 7, an additional layer of evidence was added by identifying and 
including success factors emanating from the opinions of targeted experts collected 
over several months as well as roleplayers in Disaster Management, collected 
through questionnaires at workshops.  Success factors were derived from the results 
of questionnaires and synthesised with success factors identified in previous 
chapters.  At the end of the chapter, a consolidated list of all the success factors 
identified within this dissertation was presented. 
 
In this chapter a synthesis of all the success factors identified in previous chapters 
will be presented, and a final list of success factors will be compiled through a 
process of comparison, elimination of duplication, and reformulation of success 
factors.  A consolidated list of success factors will be created from the disparate 
factors presented, explored, derived and discovered in the past chapters.  This 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
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dissertation has consciously and purposely trangressed the boundaries of the narrow 
definition of PPPs as postulated by the SA Treasury, and has also ranged beyond the 
well-trodden paths of the public management body of knowledge.  By exploring 
beyond traditional boundaries, a learning process evolved which saw rich and useful 
lessons being drawn from other disciplines and fields of study and other 
manifestations of the partnership idea.  Bringing these interdisciplinary lessons back 
to the partnership concept and applying them to a variety of partnership forms 
creates new opportunities for learning. 
8.2 SUCCESS FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN THIS DISSERTATION 
Several collective headings or cluster titles have emerged from the process of 
synthesis and filtering to which the identified success factors were submitted.  A total 
of 43 such headings were identified and will be listed below.  At least 466 individual 
success factors have been identified, which has been distilled to 324 success factors 
listed under the above-mentioned 43 collective headings.  Three of the headings 
have only one success factor listed under them, while four headings stand alone.  It 
would be possible to spend additional time and reduce the current list even further by 
combining similar concepts, but as the aim of this dissertation is to identify critical 
success factors, the intention is to stop at a level of reduction where identified factors 
do not loose too much of their original meaning.  Similarly, the original success 
factors identified in each chapter have been listed and remain available for further 
discussion, investigation and elaboration by other researchers.  The temptation to 
further analyse each of the identified success factors has been resisted as such 
further analysis can lso be the subject of further research stemming from this 
dissertation.  The aim of this dissertation was the identification of success factors, 
and the identified success factors should be seen as the result of this dissertation 
rather than a step contributing towards another result or product.  The success 
factors for partnerships identified in this dissertation are presented below. 
8.2.1 Leadership 
It is not surprising that leadership was identified as a collective title for key success 
factors.  Various aspects of leadership can influence the success of PPPs and 
success factors clustered under this heading include: 
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a. Strong leadership to overcome institutional inertia / resistance to 
change: 
i. Good leadership and interpersonal relationships; 
ii. Clear direction; 
b. Strong champion or driver: 
i. Strong individual champions in the private partner; 
c. Visible political leadership: 
i. Well-informed political leadership involvement from public 
partner; 
ii. Stable political leadership; 
iii. Appropriate levels of political involvement;  
iv. Protection against political interference; 
v. Policy consistency; 
vi. Reduce vulnerability to political pressure; 
d. Recognize the importance of perceptions among leadership; 
e. Commitment of and leadership from top management in the public 
partner; 
f. Clear division of responsibility of functions; 
g. High-profile proponents / champions of the model; 
h. Competent, motivated management; 
i. Favourable internal political environment; 
j. Motivation. 
8.2.2 Partners ready for partnership 
It is clear that potential partners in a PPP must be ready and willing to partner if a 
PPP is to be successful. Factors clustered under this heading have bearing on 
partners‘ ability to establish and maintain positive relationships.  Success factors 
clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Partners able to pursue individual goals; 
b. Partners contribute portions of resources; 
c. Partners contribute according to own comparative advantage; 
d. Available potential partners; 
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e. Understanding the other partner;  
f. Previous partnership experience; 
g. Relationship of trust: 
i. Trust built on reciprocity; 
ii. Mutual trust and respect between/among leaders;  
h. Organizational cultures receptive for partnership; 
i. Public sector understanding of private sector incentives and NGO 
approaches; 
j. Genuine engagement of public sector with policies promoting 
partnership;  
k. Public sector inter-departmental cooperation in support of partnership;  
l. Price flexibility from private partner; 
m. Effective change management;  
n. Commitment: 
i. Willingness to invest time and effort; 
ii. Support of stakeholders; 
iii. Continued active involvement of public partner; 
iv. Commitment to the partnership process by all partners;  
v. Public sector commitment. 
8.2.3 Learning 
From the success factors identified in this dissertation it is clear that a willingness to 
learn and a focus on learning will improve the prospects for success for a PPP. The 
complete collection of identified success factors in this dissertation will hopefully 
assist such learning.  Success factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Use lessons from private enterprise; 
b. Observe the ―generic observations‖ on partnership success. 
8.2.4 Common purpose, goal alignment, synergy and mutual benefit 
This collection of success factors were clustered together because they all refer to a 
commonality of purpose and benefit that is required for partnership success.  
Success factors clustered under this heading include: 
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a. The existence of potential for synergy between partners; 
b. Clarity and openness about individual and collective agendas and purpose; 
c. Confirm each partner‘s individual goals; 
d. Confirm the collective goal of the partnership; 
e. Synergy between individual and collective agendas; 
f. Synergy between individual, collective and societal benefits; 
g. Build real partnership, with shared burdens and shared rewards; 
h. Common goals: Goal alignment between partners and partnership;  
i. Realistic joint goal setting; 
j. Mutual benefit; 
k. Satisfaction of consumers, decision-makers and private partner; 
l. The partnership should deliver mutual benefit; 
m. All partners obtain pre-defined benefit; 
n. Private sector receives benefit / award; 
o. All partners should be able to benefit. 
8.2.5 Goal achievement 
This heading indicates that some outcome must be achieved, and that the outcomes 
of a partnership and its achievement of its goals will influence its success.  The two 
success factors clustered under this heading are: 
 
a. Outcomes; and  
b. Role-players achieve common goals. 
 
Point b also relates back to the commonality of purpose indicated under the previous 
heading and further underlines the need for all parties in the partnership to achieve 
their goals and therefore benefit from the partnership. 
8.2.6 Partnership establishment 
The success of a partnership is heavily dependent on how the partnership is 
established and this category of success factors contains a long list of success 
factors that relate to the organisational design and implementation of the partnership 
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and the partner selection process.  Success factors clustered under this heading 
include: 
 
a. Seeing partnership formation as the formation of new for-profit enterprises 
based on social or environmental objectives and values; 
b. Support in the implementation of partnerships; 
c. Rationalize the number of partners; 
d. Understanding of the original partnering motivations and conditions; 
e. Focus the scope and content of the partnership arrangement; 
f. Establish appropriate organizational and contractual arrangements; 
g. Establish sound partnership principles; 
h. Expedite access to staff and premises for new suppliers; 
i. Confirm / ensure statutory and regulatory authorization; 
j. Create teams with diversity to encourage creativity; 
k. Focus on discovering and exploiting partnership opportunities; 
l. Structure the venture with a focus on outcomes; 
m. Developing effective knowledge-sharing practices;  
n. Clear lines of accountability; 
o. Comprehensive all-stakeholder calculation of total benefit; 
p. Effective contractual arrangements; 
q. Access to learning experiences from other partnerships; 
r. Appropriate delegation of powers from parent organizations: 
i. The representatives of the partners in the partnership have sufficient 
delegated decision-making powers; 
ii. Policy-making powers are delegated with care, if at all; 
s. Partnership design: 
i. Conduct a pre-partnership viability assessment; 
ii. PPPs should be chosen as delivery mechanism only when the PPP 
model is appropriate to the circumstances; 
t. Structuring the partnership: 
i. Create new organizational collaboration and innovation space; 
ii. Clearly defined project organization structure; 
iii. Organizational flexibility; 
iv. Structure partnerships for success; 
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v. Symmetry of information; 
vi. Establish institutional arrangements with care; 
vii. Lean and focused organization;  
u. Comprehensive partner-selection process: 
i. Previous experience of partners in partnerships; 
ii. Open competition in the selection of partners; 
iii. An experienced and competent private partner; 
iv. Selecting partners with experience in the applicable field; 
v. Selecting a partner that can contribute the most value to the 
partnership; 
vi. Partners contribute according to their strengths; 
vii. Different types of risk are carried by the partner most suitable for it; 
viii. Available potential partners with the capacity to participate; 
ix. Local entrepreneurship; 
v. Recognisable institutional form created: 
i. Involvement of both public and private sectors; 
ii. Several stakeholders involved; 
iii. Contractual arrangement in place; 
iv. Defined structural relationships; 
v. Limited governance and delivery gaps; 
vi. Low overlap and duplication. 
 
While many of the success factors listed under this heading point to the creation of 
formal arrangements, it should be noted that informally constituted partnerships can 
also be successful and this will be discussed in a later category heading. 
8.2.7 Power relationships 
Specific attention should be given to the power relationships and aspects that affect 
power relationships within a partnership if it is to be successful.  Success factors 
clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Understanding and adjusting for the influence of power relationships upon 
partnership governance; 
b. Capacity should be balanced in a partnership; 
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c. Equality within partnership;  
d. Power sharing; 
e. Balancing of power; 
f. Balanced representivity; 
g. Manage power relations to ensure equality, mutual respect and shared 
goals and objectives. 
8.2.8 Transparency and accountability 
It is evident that transparency and accountability is essential for partnerships, and 
especially partnerships involving public funds such as PPPs invariably do.  Success 
factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Transparent procurement processes; 
b. Stakeholders should be empowered to understand that which is supposed 
to be transparent; 
c. Fully transparent procurement system; 
d. Fighting corruption: 
i. Procedural disincentives for corruption; 
ii. Blacklisting of corrupt contractors; 
e. Ethical conduct; 
f. Addressing vulnerability to corruption and nepotism. 
 
Points a and c seem like duplicates but it can be argued that there may be a 
difference between processes and systems to support processes, therefore both 
have been retained. 
8.2.9 Performance management 
Performance management is a generalised recommendation for improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of organisations, but is no less important for partnerships 
and is picked up in many of the success factors identified in this dissertation.  
Success factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Civil society assistance with performance measurement; 
b. Evaluation system (which could include inspection); 
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c. Regular partnership review and reconsideration; 
d. Ongoing performance management; 
e. Shared and agreed performance measurement indicators; 
f. Measure performance against individual and combined goals; 
g. Shared success or failure evaluation; 
h. Performance oriented goals; 
i. Clearly delineated metrics for performance and reporting; 
j. Outcomes-based performance measurement and management; 
k. Measure performance against mission / objectives; 
l. Effective, unbiased programme evaluation; 
m. Programme impact is aligned to outputs specified in programme theory; 
n. Goals are actively pursued and performance of the partnership is 
monitored and evaluated against these goals; 
o. Deliver to service standards;  
p. Match performance to promises; 
q. Focus on long-term sustainability instead of quick wins. 
8.2.10 Internal governance 
More than thirty of the identified success factors relate to the internal governance 
arrangements of partnerships and are presented under this collective heading.   
Various aspects of internal governance are touched upon and the success factors 
clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Correct choice of partnership model; 
b. Clear objectives, policies and principles; 
c. Simplified joint decision-making; 
d. Devolve authority for decision-making to the lowest possible level; 
e. Joint capacity building session; 
f. Environmental monitoring: 
i. Ability to adapt to environmental changes; 
ii. Consider the impact of external factors (environment / 
stakeholders); 
g. Sensitivity to environment / context: 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 499 
i. Achieve a fit between the industry evolution context, personal 
networks of entrepreneurs, behaviours of entrepreneurs, motives of 
stakeholders, and the structures and strategies of the organization; 
ii. Consider political acceptability; 
h. Establish single coordination point; 
i. Manage authority vacuum through collegiate decision-making; 
j. Choose optimal organizational structure; 
k. Clearly defined method of dispute resolution; 
l. Reducing and managing complexity; 
m. Streamlined, appropriate, respected procedures; 
n. Effective performance management; 
o. Formalized inclusive and consensual decision-making; 
p. Clear assignment of specific decision-making powers; 
q. Improved effectiveness and efficiency; 
r. Adequate skills and managerial capacity;  
s. Efficient knowledge and information management; 
t. Defined and efficient decision-making; 
u. Use of appropriate management instruments; 
v. Appropriate levels of formality; 
w. Participate rule-setting; 
x. Transparency and peer review within partnership; 
y. Clear purpose, roles and responsibilities; 
z. Purposeful collaboration;  
aa. Clear organizational structure with clear responsibility lines within the PPP; 
bb. Realistic promises, full delivery; 
cc. Realistic objectives and expectations; 
dd. Time management; 
ee. Resource planning (material, human or financial). 
8.2.11 Contracting 
The contracting phase of partnership formation is related to partnership 
establishment, which is already listed as a collective heading within this section (see 
sub-section 8.2.6 above).  In that sub-section it was mentioned that a formal 
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agreement is not always required to have a successful partnership - a point which will 
be discussed later in this section.  When a formal contract is however used, the 
indication from the gathered success factors is that such a contract and the process 
of contracting can have considerable influence on partnership viability.  Success 
factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Ensure tender invitations are complete with all necessary information; 
b. Standardized forms and methodology for bid adjudication; 
c. Fair contract enforcement mechanisms; 
d. Contract management to ensure adherence and punish non-compliance; 
e. Contract design should reflect conditions; 
f. Contract management; 
g. Contract negotiations; 
h. Don‘t get lost in the fine print; 
i. Detailed specifications; 
j. Simplify specifications by focusing on outputs and outcomes; 
k. Flexible contracts with simple, robust contract variation procedures; 
l. Properly designed contract; 
m. Clear description of the responsibilities of each partner; 
n. Open procurement process; 
o. Bid evaluation: 
a. Considering the appointment of external consultants to work with the 
government agency on the evaluation of bids; 
p. Robust internal process to evaluate proposals; 
q. Efficient tender process; 
r. Optimized tender processes. 
8.2.12 Cost management 
Identified success factors suggest that cost management will influence partnership 
success and cost management was therefore established as one of the collective 
headings for success factors. The following success factors were clustered under this 
heading: 
 
a. Increased awareness of cost management among public staff; 
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b. Integration of activities to enable cost sharing; 
c. Compare costs and performance with alternatives; 
d. Reduced transaction cost; 
e. Cost of product and service production must be determined; 
f. Compare information costs under alternatives. 
8.2.13 Stakeholder engagement 
Communication with and involvement of stakeholders was consistently identified as a 
significant area affecting the success of partnerships and a stakeholder engagement 
heading was therefore established.  Success factors clustered under this heading 
include: 
 
a. Clear identification of all stakeholders; 
b. Open and candid communication with all stakeholders, taking into regard 
the concerns and priorities of each stakeholder; 
c. Conscious stakeholder relationship management; 
d. Keep all stakeholders informed of all aspects of project, with specific focus 
on the intent, purpose, and means of implementation of the project; 
e. Counter misperceptions and myths through audience-appropriate, candid 
and factual information; 
f. Recognizing the role of civil society to act on behalf of the community; 
g. Policy statement to all stakeholders; 
h. Effective communication with all stakeholders;  
i. Engagement with organized labour: 
i. Consider organized labour opinions; 
ii. Positive engagement with organized labour; 
iii. Seeking labour support; 
iv. Having due consideration for labour concerns and priorities; 
j. Reduction in potential for political interference; 
k. Honest, positive, transparent and constructive consultation with 
stakeholders; 
l. Real engagement of excluded voices;  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 502 
m. Understanding of and capacity for engagement with external and internal 
stakeholders;  
n. Effective communication across barriers such as language; 
o. Absence of gatekeepers and allegiances; 
p. Manage public and stakeholder expectations; 
q. Selling your plan. 
8.2.14 Effective communication 
Stakeholder engagement and communication is integrally linked, but it was felt that 
communication also warrants its own collective heading due to the prominence given 
to it among the identified success factors.  While communication is a consistent 
theme throughout many of the identified success factors, the two most prominent 
success factors that can be collected under the communication heading are that 
communication responsibility should be shared among partners, and communication 
should come from the most appropriate partner for the specific communication. 
8.2.15 Purposeful collaboration 
Several identified success factors can be joined to the concept of purposeful 
collaboration between partners.  It is evident that collaboration should be a constant 
and purposeful activity to enable a partnership to flourish.  Success factors clustered 
under this heading include: 
 
a. Develop a collaborative process; 
b. Provide incentives for effective collaboration; 
c. Experiment with collaboration options; 
d. Build interpersonal skills for collaboration; 
e. Build on the assets of potential partners; 
f. Appropriate levels of integration and coordination; 
g. Appropriate levels of interdependence; 
h. Sustained collaborative effort; 
i. Intra-partnership awareness of other partners‘ missions, goals and 
objectives; 
j. Role-players pool and share resources; 
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k. Public sector remains significant role-player; 
l. Mobilization of a coalition of interests drawn from more than one sector; 
m. Real collaboration; 
n. Honest, sincere and respectful collaboration in meetings; 
o. Purposeful maintenance of the partnership. 
8.2.16 Supportive systems 
Partnerships are able to achieve more if they are supported by internal and external 
systems, both administrative and organisational.  Success factors clustered under 
this heading include: 
 
a. Procurement systems that support the partnership approach; 
b. Rally public, political and administrative support; 
c. Establish support mechanisms / partnership enablers; 
d. Strong local ownership; 
e. Community support. 
8.2.17 Supportive environment 
A supportive internal and external environment has been pointed out as a 
requirement for the attainment of partnership goals and partnership success.  
Success factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Supportive policy and political environment; 
b. Supportive models of public-private interaction; 
c. Sufficient social capital to accommodate the social capital requirements of 
the partnership and/or sufficient time to build social capital;  
d. Supportive, enabling legal environment: 
i. A statutory foundation (enabling legal environment); 
ii. Public officials must identify and remove legislative, regulatory and 
administrative impediments; 
iii. Access to fair and unbiased judicial relief; 
iv. Regulation to prevent abuse; 
e. Stakeholder support; 
f. Citizen and community interest and involvement; 
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g. The project is a priority within a strategic plan; 
h. Stakeholder and community support and involvement. 
8.2.18 Flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances 
Four identified success factors have bearing on flexibility on the side of partnerships.  
Success factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Flexibility - renegotiating outcomes based on changing conditions; 
b. Manage flexibly around key values and performance objectives; 
c. Achieving context specific requirements, such as black economic 
empowerment in South Africa; 
d. Flexibility to address changing financial conditions. 
8.2.19 Financial analysis, control, planning and sustainability 
The financial aspects of partnerships cannot be ignored and was sufficiently present 
within identified success factors to warrant a collective heading.  Success factors 
clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Finance sources; 
b. An assured income stream for the duration of the partnership; 
c. Transparency in financial management; 
d. Joint control of partnership funds; 
e. Joint prioritization of spending; 
f. Financial control, discipline and transparency; 
g. Improved financial planning / awareness; 
h. Financial backing. 
8.2.20 Service delivery 
This collective heading pertains to the need for a partnership to actually deliver a 
service. Success factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Understanding the business at hand, for example water and sanitation; 
b. Quality focus; 
c. Services should be delivered in a manner that is safe to users; 
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d. Delivery of services that are accessible - easy to use and delivered in a 
manner and at a place which is convenient for the target market they are 
intended for; 
e. Delivery management. 
8.2.21 Human resources 
As in any type of organisation, the quality of the human resources or –capital 
employed by the organisation has bearing on the success of the organisation.  In the 
case of partnerships, the human resources involved in the organisation may not 
necessarily be employed by the partnership itself, which complicates matters.   
Several identified success factors tie in with the need for good calibre human 
resources and are clustered under this heading: 
 
a. Skills: 
i. Strategic and financial skills within the public sector partner; 
ii. Strategic human capital plan to acquire the correct skills; 
iii. Appropriate skills within the public sector partner; 
iv. Build entrepreneurial skills; 
v. Workforce development plan; 
vi. Acquire new governance skills set; 
vii. Private sector experience for the public sector; 
viii. Invest in the best and brightest human capital for the public sector; 
ix. Develop appropriate set of core competencies; 
x. Appoint individuals with entrepreneurial experience and skills; 
xi. Invest in skills and competencies; 
xii. Public sector human capital in contract and network management; 
xiii. Improve capacity for tactical decision-making; 
xiv. Training and education; 
xv. Training and skills development for partnership participation; 
b. Use people with a collaborative mindset; 
c. Continuity and succession planning; 
d. Skills transfer possible from public to private sector; 
e. Optimal human resource utilization;  
f. Financial capacity. 
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8.2.22 Partners contribute according to their capacity 
Partnerships consist of more than one partner, each of which would ostensibly have 
different contributions to make to the partnership.  This collective heading originates 
from a success factor first identified in subsection 4.2.2.17 starting on page 242 and 
was converted to a heading as other additional success factors were found that 
supported its assertion that partners should contribute according to their capacity.  
Success factors clustered under this heading read like instructions for each of the 
possible partners and include: 
 
a. Focus on the required public outcome; 
b. Aim to make meaningful enhancements to the status quo; 
c. Make meaningful, even if imperfect, enhancements to the status quo; 
d. First focus on public value, what public outcome must be produced; 
e. Manage around key values and performance objectives; 
f. Clarity on resource contributions. 
8.2.23 Use public resources effectively and judiciously 
The effective and judicious use of public resources was first identified as a success 
factor in Chapter 4 in a discussion of public sector governance literature.  Two 
success factors that relate to this heading include: 
 
a. Efficient utilization of scarce resources; 
b. Use land ownership as a way for the public to control the projects. 
8.2.24 Use all available resources, not only monetary, to bring partnerships 
together 
While there is a necessary focus on financial issues in the identified success factors, 
other resources than finance must also take their place and therefore a specific 
success factor identified in this regard is to consider finance as a tool among many 
others.  The need to consider all available resources to bring partnerships together 
was first identified in a network governance discussion in Chapter 4.  
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8.2.25 Willing private partner 
This and the following collective heading relate to each other as well as the 
previously explained readiness for partnership.  It is self-evident that for a PPP one 
would need both a willing private and public partner.  There are also other more 
descriptive success factors that were identified and which align very well with these 
two headings.  Success factors clustered under this first heading related to the 
willingness of the private partner include: 
 
a. Appropriate incentive and reward structures; 
b. Profit potential for private sector; 
c. Fair returns for private partners; 
d. Real incentives for the private sector; 
e. Market opportunity: 
i. Reasonable expectation of private sector interest due to potential 
market; 
8.2.26 Willing public partner 
Similarly, success factors clustered under the heading related to the willingness of 
the public partner include: 
 
a. Strategic understanding of partnerships within the public sector partner; 
b. Minimizing the bureaucratic procedures that can cripple a project; 
c. Support for public managers to explore and implement the PPP option; 
d. Public political will; 
e. High-level political leadership / champion; 
f. Active public sector involvement; 
g. Public sector commitment; 
h. Public sector flexibility and innovation. 
8.2.27 Compatibility 
Willing partners is not sufficient if compatibility, another identified success factor, is 
not also in evidence.  At least fourteen success factors link to the concept of 
compatibility and are clustered under this heading: 
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a. Shared applications (for example, software); 
b. Similar technologies, procedures, systems and equipment; 
c. Shared communication channels; 
d. Shared semantics; 
e. A well-developed shared vocabulary; 
f. Shared experiences in field; 
g. Similar cultures or overcoming cultural and institutional differences;  
h. Cultures that embrace collaboration; 
i. Similar measurements of success; 
j. Synchronization of partners‘ business processes; 
k. Philosophical match between the private and public partners or overcoming 
potential conflict caused by differences in philosophy; 
l. Common ground in terms of political doctrine;  
m. Compatible levels of technical expertise; 
n. A common understanding of the concept of public-private partnership. 
8.2.28 Value for money 
The need for value for money is strongly articulated within the success factors 
identified.  Success factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Delivery of affordable services not exceeding public provision costs; 
b. Robust procurement methodology that ensures value for money; 
8.2.29 Risk management 
Risk management is a well-known tool to ensure that an entity reaches its objectives 
and should therefore also be of use in the PPP context.  Several identified success 
factors have a relationship with risk management and risk management is also part of 
the SA Treasury definition of PPP.  Success factors clustered under this heading 
include: 
 
a. Integrated risk management - clear and fair risk balance; 
b. Identify and actively manage risks; 
c. Clear risk allocation; 
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d. Risk transfer to private sector; 
e. Risk sharing; 
f. Planned shared risk management. 
8.2.30 Government oversight 
Government oversight was identified as a success factor in a discussion of third 
sector or civil society perspectives on partnership success in Chapter 4. This heading 
does not easily fit under any of the other collective headings.  
8.2.31 Strong programme conceptualization 
A programme must be properly conceptualised before it can be implemented, and 
from the collection of identified success factors quite a few have bearing on 
programme conceptualisation. Success factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. A public need is met: 
i. Private sector provides a traditionally public service against an 
output-based specification for a significant period of time; 
b. Prepare and oversee an agreed strategy; 
c. Common vision and objective; 
d. Defined purpose; 
e. Clearly identified pre-determined goals or outcomes for the partnership; 
f. Clear mandates and authority; 
g. Clarity, plausibility, feasibility, and appropriateness of programme theory 
which shows cause-effect relationships leading to required outcome; 
h. Shared project design and planning; 
i. Consider context in establishing mission and objectives; 
j. Appropriate performance indicators for which data is available and 
collection is feasible. 
k. Government must be sure of what it wants; 
l. Known outputs; 
m. Focus on outcomes; 
n. Quantified process; 
o. Clear project definition and scope management; 
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p. Ensure appropriate project handover that empowers the client; 
q. Focus on appropriate product development and service delivery; 
r. Know what customers expect; 
s. Select correct service design standards; 
t. Comprehensive preparations for programme conceptualization; 
i. Pre-contract / Conceptualization: 
1. Proposed public partners need to agree to establishment; 
2. Availability of financing; 
3. Following due legal process; 
4. Properly mandated representatives; 
5. Market research; 
ii. Well-defined procurement process; 
iii. Source expert advice in contracting phase; 
u. Transparency and accountability;  
v. Conduct appropriate business case research. 
8.2.32 Look at complete product life cycle, not only project life cycle 
This is another stand-alone success factor that was identified in this dissertation.  
The success factor relates to the focus in PPP projects and suggests that the total 
product life cycle of the service that is being delivered through the PPP should be 
considered in in the management of such a PPP, not only the project life cycle. 
8.2.33 Pursue the triple bottom line 
The triple bottom line of financial, societal and environmental viability is just as 
important for the good governance and ultimate success of partnerships as it is for 
individual business or government entities.  First mentioned in a discussion on 
corporate governance in Chapter 4, this aspect of success has grown into a collective 
heading as the discussion progressed.  Success factors clustered under this heading 
include: 
 
a. Greater environmental responsibility;  
b. Protection of the environment; 
c. Social equity and economic empowerment focus. 
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8.2.34 Partnership character 
Certain of the identified success factors, it was realised, describe partnership 
character and it seems that a sustainable and successful partnership should exhibit a 
specific character. Success factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. The service involved is appropriate for delivery through partnership; 
b. Reasonable resource costs; 
c. Clear, agreed goals; 
d. Achievement of an important social benefit; 
e. A focus on positive goals, positive social impact and public good; 
f. Increased effectiveness in use of resources. 
8.2.35 Formal agreements are not necessarily required to make a partnership 
successful 
Another stand-alone success factor, this statement could be seen as conflicting with 
other success factors that argue for formalised contracting within PPPs.  It was felt 
that this point should be retained because of the ability of certain PPPs to function 
and perform without formal agreements.  This success factor serves to illustrate that 
the concept of PPP is perhaps wider than generally considered, and that the success 
or failure of PPPs is note solely reliant on effective contracting. 
8.2.36 A public need exists which is not satisfied by the public sector 
The nature of the collected success factors prompts the realisation that PPP success 
is dependent on the existence of a public need which is not adequately satisfied.  
Success factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. A market or demand exists for the service; 
b. A public need must exist. 
c. A market exists for the service being delivered   
d. Sufficient public users of the service (market);  
e. Satisfying a public need; 
f. If a sector (either public or private) fails to provide a required service and 
the need still exists, PPPs are possible; 
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g. A market for a specific public service exists but is not satisfied by the 
existing public or private sector; 
h. Clearly defined unsatisfied need for a product or a service. 
8.2.37 Circumstances that force a collective response 
This collective heading derives from one of the first literature studies conducted as 
part of this research project and embodies one of the first insights into the 
requirements for success in partnership achieved by the researcher (see discussion 
in section 2.6.36.5.1 on page 411).  Success factors clustered under this heading 
include: 
 
a. Common fear of an external threat can motivate parties to form 
partnerships and ensure that such partnerships work; 
b. The need for a survival strategy can be an indicator for motivation to 
ensure success – crisis ensures focused collaboration and increase the 
chance of success. 
8.2.38 Internal relationship management 
More than just organisational management, the optimal management of relationships 
internal to the partnership has also been revealed as a key ingredient to success.  
Success factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Equality within the partnership; 
b. Openness and communication; 
c. Conflict management; 
d. Positive attitudes; 
e. Goodwill; 
f. Transparent decision-making processes; 
g. Willingness and ability to trust the partnership; 
h. Allow time for processes, attempt synchronization. 
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8.2.39 Customer service focus 
The collected success factors indicate that a customer service focus is a requirement 
for partnerships, and perhaps more so in partnerships where partners may become 
so involved in internal arrangements that they forget about the customer.  Success 
factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Right service at the right place at the right time; 
b. Understanding the value of clients‘ perspectives;  
c. Focus on high priority areas and clients (for example, deprived areas for 
social programmes); 
d. Customer satisfaction; 
e. Enhanced service delivery to communities. 
8.2.40 Collaborative innovation 
This collective heading first emerged in a discussion on ―shotgun partnerships‖ in 
Chapter 6 where it was found that innovation was used to strengthen one party in a 
partnership at the expense of the other party.  The insight achieved from the 
discussion was that innovation should be collaborative, aiming for shared benefit.     
Success factors clustered under this heading include: 
 
a. Flexibility to exploit opportunities; 
b. Focus on innovation and improving the status quo. 
8.2.41 Satisfying context-specific legal requirements, such as BEE in South 
Africa 
This stand-alone success factor indicates that context-specific legal requirements 
need to be adhered to and satisfied in order to have successful partnerships. 
8.2.42 Commitment 
The collected success factors brought the realisation that a high degree of 
commitment may be required to carry through a partnership and make it work.  
Success factors clustered under this heading include: 
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a. Commitment to partnership goals; 
b. Commitment and resilience to setbacks. 
8.2.43 Knowing when to end a positive relationship 
This final category of success factors stems from two identified success factors, both 
related to the lifespan of a PPP.  The first of these two success factors became the 
collective heading which also applies to the second success factor, which mentioned 
post-project survival of partnerships.  The message in terms of PPPs from these two 
success factors is that the existence of a positive relationship is no reason to 
perpetuate the life of a PPP and further cautions that there is a risk of much effort 
being put into trying to ensure the survival of a PPP purely for the sake of survival 
instead of for the sake of a project or public service delivery.  The success factors 
from this collective hading can therefore be summarised as: 
a. Know when to end a positive relationship; 
b. Beware efforts to perpetuate PPPs‘ life beyond project completion purely 
for the sake of survival. 
 
This then concludes the listing and discussion of individual identified success factors. 
8.2.44 Section Summary 
In this section the final and complete list of success factors that were identified in this 
dissertation was presented.  The next section will summarize the methodology used 
and knowledge generated in this dissertation. 
8.3 METHODOLOGY USED AND KNOWLEDGE GENERATED 
In the previous section, a synthesis of all the critical success factors identified in this 
dissertation was presented. In this section the methodology used in the research 
process in this dissertation as well as the knowledge generated in this dissertation 
will be summarized.  The study was of an exploratory, hypothesis-generating nature 
and the process steps followed in the research will be described in the next section.  
The exploratory research project commenced with an uncertain conception of what 
makes partnerships work, but the uncertainty became less and confidence became 
more as the argument moved from literature to case studies to the opinions of 
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respondents.  This research project has been a journey of learning and discovery 
which started in 2005 and came to a conclusion in 2011.  The six years that passed 
as the research project progressed and evolved awarded the researcher with the 
opportunity to see many partnerships move through several life stages.  During the 
full duration of the project the researcher maintained a media monitoring regime 
which made it possible to follow developments regarding specific partnerships over 
time. One prominent example is the Cape Town Stadium which moved from concept 
to reality in the research period.  In the next section the process followed to identify 
critical success factors will be described.  
8.3.1 Process steps in identifying critical success factors  
Partnerships that exhibit good performance have been investigated in some detail to 
determine good practice, while evidently failed partnerships have been analysed for 
examples of what should be avoided or mitigated against in the creation and 
management of partnerships.  The figure below illustrates how evidence was 
collected and filtered as the discussion progressed through the chapters. 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Layers of evidence in which success factors are identified also act as filters.  Each 
success factor gains legitimacy if confirmed through other filtering levels. 
 
 
Success factors from literature 
 
Success factors from PPP Examples / Case studies 
 
Success factors from Interviews 
Layers of evidence 
 
Critical Success Factors 
FILTERING ADDITION 
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In Chapter 1, PPPs were defined, the evident popularity of partnerships in public 
service delivery was discussed and the need for guidance on critical success factors 
for such partnerships was motivated.  The chapter includes the problem statement, 
the research design and methodology and the argument structure that was used. 
 
In Chapter 2 an overview of PPPs and other public service delivery partnerships was 
commenced with more detailed discussion on the history of partnerships, the defining 
elements of partnerships, definitions relating to partnership, reasons for partnering,  
the uses of partnership, and the purposes for which partnerships are used.  The 
history of partnerships was discussed.  Where opinions on success factors were 
prominent they were recorded and listed at the end of Chapter 3 for further 
discussion in later chapters.   In Chapter 3 the overview of PPPs and other public 
service delivery partnerships was continued.  The variety of partnership forms and 
governance arrangements for partnerships was discussed. Where opinions on 
success factors were prominent they were recorded and listed at the end of the 
chapter for further discussion in later chapters.  At the end of the chapter, a start was 
made with the design of a framework for the evaluation of partnerships which would 
be further developed in later chapters for eventual use in evaluating case studies. 
 
Chapter 4 was specifically intended to capture the opinions available in literature 
regarding success factors for partnerships. These opinions were listed as an 
untested source of factors which was analysed in later chapters.  In this chapter, 
perspectives from related disciplines and concepts were also explored and where 
appropriate, added to the untested list of success factors.  The framework for 
partnership evaluation that was commenced in Chapter 2 was expanded at the end 
of Chapter 3 and was the main topic of discussion in the next chapter.  
 
The goal of Chapter 5 was to discuss ways of evaluating partnerships and to define 
an appropriate success measure for partnerships. Upon the conclusion of the chapter 
a simple and robust success measurement instrument was proposed.  Once again, 
where success factors become apparent in the discussion, they were listed at the 
end of the chapter for analysis in later chapters. 
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In Chapter 6 several examples of partnerships were discussed, based on the 
success measuring instrument developed in Chapters 4 and 5.  Several examples 
each of apparently failed or successful partnerships were described. The examples 
were chosen to provide as representative a sample as possible from a wide variety of 
countries, sectors and types. Particular attention was paid to presenting a wide 
variety of examples from South Africa. The discussion was based on findings from 
research described in literature, from expert interviews and questionnaires, and from 
direct observation by the researcher.  Success factors were collected from each case 
study and listed at the end of the chapter for further discussion in Chapter 7.  
 
In Chapter 7 success factors identified in all previous chapters through literature 
study, expert interviews and questionnaires as well as case study analysis in 
literature and through direct observation were compared in an effort to see whether 
any pattern could be discerned regarding factors that influence the success of 
partnerships.  Where patterns became apparent, the success factors that define 
those patterns were captured and listed for further discussion in Chapter 8.  
 
In Chapter 8 the results of the pattern search from the previous chapters are 
consolidated and presented with the aim of identifying critical success factors for 
public service delivery partnerships. The Chapter also summarizes the research 
question, premise, research methodology and arguments presented in this 
dissertation, and will present the conclusions regarding critical success factors for 
public service delivery partnerships with a related hypothesis on the critical success 
factors for public-private partnerships and similar instruments. 
8.3.2 New knowledge generated 
This dissertation and research project has contributed a methodology to derive 
performance indicators from definitions; it has proposed a PPP characterization 
framework for evaluation; developed a new comprehensive encompassing definition 
of the PPP concept, and has provided a new understanding of the life cycle of a PPP.  
A study of evaluation has become an implicit part of this investigation, and a new 
PPP success or performance measurement instrument was also created in this 
dissertation.  The main contribution of the dissertation is the extensive collection of 
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success factors that have been identified and the methodology used to collect them.  
This study will contribute to the public management body of knowledge by covering 
new ground in terms of the evaluation and management of public-private 
partnerships.   In the next section challenges that were experienced in trying to 
identify critical success factors will be highlighted. 
8.4 CHALLENGES IN IDENTIFYING CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
Challenges to the identification of success factors included the promotional / public 
relations nature of PPP case study literature and the significant resources required 
just to be able to comprehensively describe a PPP.  The significant resources 
required to conduct case study comparisons forced the researcher to develop an 
alternative research methodology which would not require in-depth case study 
analysis.  In the next section the circumstances under which PPPs would be 
appropriate service delivery vehicles will be explored. 
8.5 WHEN TO USE PARTNERSHIP AS DELIVERY VEHICLE 
The analysis of the PPP concept in this dissertation has shown that PPPs exist and 
are successful in a wide variety of settings and sectors.  It seems as if a PPP could 
potentially be used in almost any circumstance.  However, based on the success 
factors identified in this dissertation, it seems that a PPP is most useful where the 
public sector is failing to provide a public need for which a market exists.  There are 
more externalities to consider, such as whether a supportive environment exists, and 
whether appropriate private sector partners are available and would be interested in 
the project.  The success factors mentioned would guide the public manager in a 
decision about when to use PPP as a delivery mechanism and when not to.  One 
interesting nuance is that a PPP would not be a good idea if there is a lack of 
financial management skills in the public sector, because a successful PPP is also 
reliant on skills in the public sector.  This seems counter-intuitive when considering 
that PPPs are normally seen as ways in which to help the under-capacitated public 
sector.  Each of the success factors indicated in the comprehensive list of success 
factors presented in this chapter can serve to guide the decision-making of public 
managers regarding when to use PPPs as service delivery vehicles.  It is however 
accepted that the list may be somewhat daunting and that each factor could require 
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considerable effort to realise.  It is therefore suggested that re-packaging the success 
factors into a format which is less intimidating could be a useful follow-on project to 
this dissertation.  In the next section implications for performance evaluation will be 
discussed. 
8.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
The evaluation of PPPs has several implications for performance evaluation in the 
public sector.  Indicators that can point out success or failure of PPPs will also have 
some bearing on the performance of the public sector partner participating in the 
PPP.  The indicators developed in this dissertation should therefore be considered as 
potential performance evaluation indicators in the public sector.  In the next section 
the most critical success factors that have been identified will be discussed. 
8.7 CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
A wide variety of success factors were identified through the process used in this 
dissertation.  A total of 466 individual success factors were identified from Chapter 2 
to Chapter 7.  These factors were reduced to 43 individual headings with underlying 
collections of a total of 324 success factors.  Even with the 43 collective headings, 
once confronted with the large collection of success factors, the understandable 
reaction would be to enquire whether one could isolate the truly critical success 
factors from the bigger collection.  In Chapter 6, in order to enable the face value 
evaluation of incompletely described PPPs, a two-point evaluation instrument was 
developed and utilised.  This tool only considers whether a public service is provided, 
and whether the partnership is achieving its goals.  The satisfaction of these two 
requirements leads to a provisional declaration of the success of the PPP under 
consideration.  The implication is that these two success factors are the most critical 
of all the factors identified in this dissertation.  In the next section a hypothesis will be 
formulated. 
8.8 HYPOTHESIS 
As stated in the introductory chapter where the research design was described, an 
exploratory, hypothesis-generating approach was followed in this study.  The 
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intention was not to test a hypothesis but rather to generate one – the study was 
seminal rather than definitive.  This section is therefore dedicated to formulating a 
hypothesis based on the insights and comprehension of critical PPP success factors 
achieved through the study.   In preparing to construct a new hypothesis, it is useful 
to reflect on the research question addressed in this dissertation, which is: 
 
―What are the critical factors that can be replicated that separate successful PPPs 
from PPPs that do not deliver or that collapse? 
 
The answer to this question is that critically, two conditions must be met to make a 
PPP successful, and those two conditions are that the goals of the PPP must be 
achieved and that a public need must be satisfied.  There are many additional 
success factors which can further define success and degrees of success, all of 
which are descriptions of desired conditions.  A large collection of such success 
factors was developed in this study and this collection forms a reference point for the 
construction of a new hypothesis which can serve as the basis for future research.  
The hypothesis is that: 
 
If public managers are faced with a choice of service delivery options, and the 
use of a PPP is one option, and if the manager applies the recommended 
critical success factors identified in this dissertation, the manager will be able 
to determine whether a PPP would be an appropriate service delivery vehicle, 
and furthermore, if PPP is chosen as service delivery vehicle, the public 
manager would, through the application of the success factors identified in this 
chapter, have a greater chance of successful implementation of the PPP 
through purposeful collaboration. 
8.9 FURTHER RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
The success factors identified within this dissertation and the processes used provide 
several avenues to explore in terms of further research.  The first and obvious option 
would be to re-evaluate the proposed success factors through experimentation or 
detailed programme evaluation.  From a public management perspective, and 
especially when considering that the public and development manager is prepared 
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for her or his career through studying public management, it may be useful to 
investigate whether current teaching methodologies are sufficiently preparing public 
managers for participating in collaborative ventures. The many human resources and 
skills-related success factors identified could provide a basis for such investigation.  
Another interesting avenue of research would be to compare the failure rate of PPPs 
and private firms.  There is an untested opinion that PPPs may in fact be more likely 
to succeed than businesses are.  Research could thus compare the percentage of 
businesses that fail with the percentage of partnerships that fail, and then look at the 
number of private partnerships that fail as a percentage against businesses in 
general that fail. 
 
While considerable effort was spent in this dissertation to develop a success 
measurement instrument, the final product could not be implemented in a fully 
detailed analysis of a case study.  While it may require considerable resources, a 
field test of the instrument to evaluate a significant sample of PPPs would provide 
valuable information on the validity of the tool.  The instrument was designed to 
accommodate at least three levels of evaluation, but the supportive documentation 
for an in-depth analysis remains to be developed.  Further research in this regard 
could be beneficial.  There seems to be room for developing a guideline which could 
be used by private or non-governmental organizations to assess the characteristics 
and assets of possible public partners.  While such an investigation is outside the 
scope of this dissertation, it is recommended as possible further research on the topic 
of PPPs.  Another interesting and potentially valuable pursuit would be to use a much 
larger collection of PPP definitions than used in this dissertation and take the analysis 
of definitions to identify success factors which can in turn be used to redefine PPPs 
even further with a view to arriving at a definition which becomes stable because it 
already encompasses all possible descriptive components.  Finally, it is critical that 
an independent comprehensive, detailed, comparative case study analysis of a 
significant sample of South African PPPs is carried out to expand the scientifically 
valid information regarding PPPs and mitigate the reliance of researchers on either 
the constantly negative reporting from organized labour or the consistently 
promotional nature of publications from the pro-PPP organizations.  
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8.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This final chapter commenced with the presentation of the final consolidated list of 
success factors identified in this dissertation, and then provided a summary of the 
dissertation and the process which was followed to identify critical success factors for 
PPPs.  The process steps followed were described and the challenges that were 
experienced in the search for critical success factors were pointed out.  Some 
suggestions were made about when it would be appropriate to use a PPP as public 
service delivery vehicle.  Implications for performance evaluation were described, 
and a short description of critical success factors was provided before the new 
knowledge developed in this dissertation was presented.  A hypothesis was 
forwarded and finally opportunities for further research were suggested. 
 
The public-private partnership remains a viable and popular instrument for public 
service delivery.  It is hoped that this dissertation will make a contribution to the 
further understanding and effective use of the PPP option by public managers. 
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The following abbreviations are used in this dissertation: 
 
APOPS Asset procurement and operating systems 
APU  accredited procurement unit  
BOT build-operate-transfer  
BoTT  build-operate-train-transfer  
CBO  community-based organization  
CMIP Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme, South Africa  
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions  
CPI  Consumer price index 
DBOT  design-build-operate-transfer  
DBSA Development Bank of Southern Africa  
DCF  Discounted cash flow  
DFID  Department for International Development, UK  
DPLG Department of Provincial and Local Government, South Africa 
DSCR  Debt service coverage ratio  
DWAF Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, South Africa 
EIA  environmental impact assessment  
EIB  European Investment Bank  
EU  European Union  
FINIDA Finnish International Development Agency  
GDP  gross domestic product  
GEAR growth, employment and redistribution strategy, South Africa  
GNP  gross national product  
GoSA  Government of South Africa  
GPPI  Global Public Policy Institute  
IDP  integrated development plan  
IDS  Institute of Development Studies, UK 
IDTT  interdepartmental task team  
IIED International Institute for Environment and Development  
ILO  International Labour Organization  
IRR  Internal rate of returm 
LED  local economic development 
MIIF Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework, South Africa   
MIIU Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit, South Africa 
MoU  memorandum of understanding 
MSP  Municipal Service Partnership 
MTEF  Medium Term Economic Framework  
NBI  National Business Initiative, South Africa 
NCPPP National Council on Public-Private Partnerships 
NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Advisory Council, South 
Africa 
NGO  non-governmental organization  
NPV  Net present value  
NRA  National Roads Agency 
OECD Organization for Economic Coordination and Development 
OJEU Official Journal of the European Union 
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OJEC Official Journal of the European Communities - published by the Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities 
P4  Property Public-Private Partnership  
PFI  Private Finance Initiative 
PFMA  Public Finance Management Act, 1999 
PPIAF Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, World Bank 
PPP  Public-Private Partnership 
PPPU  Public-Private Partnership Unit of the SA Treasury 
PPPUE Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban Environment, UNDP 
Programme 
PSC  Public sector comparator 
PSP  Private sector participation 
PUK  PartnershipsUK 
RDP Reconstruction and Development Plan, South Africa 
RFP  Request for proposals 
RFQ Request for pre-qualification / request for qualifications 
RSA Republic of South Africa 
SALGA South African Local Government Association 
SAMWU South African Municipal Workers Union 
Sanral  South African National Roads Agency Ltd 
SATRA South African Telecommunications Regulatory Agency 
SEED The SEED Initiative – Supporting Entrepreneurs for Sustainable 
Development 
SIDA  Swedish International Development Agency 
SPV  Special Purpose Vehicle 
SWOT strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
ToR  terms of reference 
TRAC  Trans African Concessions (Pty) Limited 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WSP  Water and Sanitation Programme, International 
WSSA Water and Sanitation Services South Africa 
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 11 ANNEXURE A: PPP ENABLERS PER COUNTRY 
This annexure contains a list of countries with institutional support for PPPs.  The table below provides information on the countries 
concerned, the name of the enabling body, and a description of the enabling body. The descriptions are mostly copied verbatim 
from the write-ups provided by the organisations themselves, if such a write-up exists. A detailed supporting listing of these 
enablers with the relevant contact details will be provided at the following web address: https://sites.google.com/site/pppresources/. 
 
Table 11-1: List of PPP enablers / central PPP implementing units per country 
Country Enabling body Description 
Australia Infrastructure Partnerships Australia Infrastructure Partnerships Australia draws the public and private sectors together to 
promote best practice in the identification, design and delivery of nationally significant 
infrastructure assets and services. 
Australia 
(South 
Australia) 
 
Projects and Government Enterprises 
Branch (PGE) 
Projects and Government Enterprises Branch (PGE) facilitates private sector participation in 
infrastructure development where appropriate. Located in the Department of Treasury and 
Finance, the Branch reports directly to the Under Treasurer. Agencies are required to 
consult with PGE in regard to all public-private partnerships in South Australia.  
Belgium Vlaams Kenniscentrum PPS In 2002, the Flemish regional government established a PPP Knowledge Centre. The 
Walloon region is now considering developing a similar PPP unit. 
Brazil PPP Unit in the Federal Ministry of 
Planning, Budget & Management 
PPP Council, PPP Unit, Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão 
 
Canada PPP Canada PPP Canada was created as a Crown corporation with an independent Board of Directors 
reporting through the Minister of Finance to Parliament.  The Corporation became 
operational in February 2009 with the appointments of a Chair of the Board of Directors and 
a Chief Executive Officer.  PPP Canada‘s mandate is to improve the delivery of public 
infrastructure by achieving better value, timeliness and accountability to taxpayers, through 
P3s.  PPP Canada was created to deliver more P3s by leveraging incentives, 
demonstrating success, and providing expertise; and to deliver better P3s by promoting P3 
best-practice, and capacity-building. 
Czech 
Republic 
PPP Centrum PPP Centrum a.s. (joint stock company) was formed on the 1st of July 2004 under authority 
of the government decree. PPP Centrum‘s only shareholder is the Ministry of Finance of the 
Czech Republic (MF CR). PPP Centrum was established to speed up preparation of legal 
environment and methodological procedures in relation to PPP in the Czech Republic. Its 
public mission is to apply the best practice knowledge in governance and preparation of 
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Country Enabling body Description 
PPP projects. At present, PPP Centrum acts as a knowledge centre for implementation of 
PPP projects. 
Denmark The Competition Authority The Danish Finance Act of 2010 reinforces the effort of promoting Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPP). The law devotes 10 million DKK annually to the promotion of PPP in 
the municipalities and regions in Denmark. A fund is created to strengthen development and 
market maturation of Public-Private welfare solutions. In the future, the work regarding 
Public-Private Partnerships will be performed jointly by The Danish Enterprise and 
Construction Authority, The Danish Competition Authority, Udbudsportalen  and 
Udbudsrådet. As a consequence of the new assignment of responsibilities between the 
parties, the PPP Task Force and the co-financing pool administered by The Danish 
Enterprise and Construction Authority ended on January 1st 2010. 
Egypt PPP Central Unit, Ministry of Finance. 
Ministry of Investment: PPP Section 
The Unit is in charge of the study, application, implementation as well as coordination with 
line Ministries and with the Private Sector to develop this PPP theme in a policy framework 
and a clear action plan.`  A ―Centre of Expertise‖ which is vested with the Mission  to 
introduce and communicate the Public Private Partnership policy, to develop practice and to 
take a vital role in the delivery of the initial projects. The Centre will bring in support and 
experience from domestic and overseas experts.  It is a department of the Ministry of 
Finance that is charged by Government to oversee and implement the policy. 
Ethiopia Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development 
No additional current data available 
France Mission d'appui aux PPP, Ministère de 
l'Économie, de l'Industrie et de l'Emploi, 
France 
PPP unit, 'Les Partenariats Public-Privé'.  A Decree of 19 October 2004 provided for the 
creation of a specialised governmental taskforce (the Mission d‘appui à la réalisation des 
contrats de partenariat or MAPPP), which was established on 27 May 2005 by the Minister 
of Economy and Finance.  This body is responsible for the preliminary evaluation (a 
mandatory obligation) of all Partnership Contracts contemplated by the French State (local 
governments are not obliged to consult with the MAPPP for this evaluation) and which may 
assist public entities (and not only the State) in the preparation, negotiation and follow up of 
their Partnership Contracts.  It must report on the effective use of Partnership Contracts and 
can propose legislative changes to the government.  Similar bodies have been established 
by the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice (the Agence de Maîtrise d‘Ouvrage des 
Travaux du Ministère de la Justice or AMOTMJ) and the Ministry of Health 
(Mission Nationale d‘Appui à l‘Investissement Hospitalier or MAINH) 
Germany Public Private Partnership Taskforce, 
BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR VERKEHR, 
BAU UND STADTENTWICKLUNG 
(Ministry of Transport and Urban 
Planning) 
In order to develop PPP in Germany, so-called "PPP Task Forces" or "Centres of 
Competence" have been set up by the Federal Government as well as by several regions.  
These task forces mainly collect and distribute information, gather details of transactions to 
establish best practices and try to compile non-binding standard documents.  They also 
organise conferences on PPP and facilitate networking between the different players in the 
PPP sector.  They do not have any legal competence. 
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Greece Special Secretariat for PPPs at the 
Ministry of Economics and Finance of the 
Hellenic Republic 
In addition to the Special Secretariat, an interministerial PPP committee was set up to 
approve PPP projects and contractual payments to private entities. It is chaired by the 
Minister of Economics and Finance and makes decisions on the basis of proposals by the 
Special Secretariat 
Hungary The Ministry of National Development of 
The Republic of Hungary 
The Government has set up an intra-governmental committee that coordinates the PPP 
projects organised by the different ministries, prepares the necessary legislation and 
comments on PPP plans 
India PPP Cell, Department of Economic 
Affairs, Ministry of Finance 
The Government has supported the creation of nodal agencies such as the PPP Cells at a 
State or sector level.  The Government has established an appraisal mechanism for PPP 
projects. The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs of the Government has created the 
PPP Appraisal Committee (PPPAC) 
Ireland Central PPP Unit in the Department of 
Finance and also the National 
Development Finance Agency (NDFA), 
The Ministry of Finance of the Republic of 
Ireland 
The role of the Central PPP Unit in the Department of Finance is to facilitate the PPP 
process centrally, by developing the general policy framework (including, where necessary, 
the legal framework) within which PPPs operate and by providing central guidance to 
Departments and other State Authorities in that context.  Ireland has extended the functions 
of its National Development Finance Agency (NDFA) to allow it to procure a Centre of 
Expertise for procuring Public Private Partnership projects on behalf of State 
authorities.  Through this legislation, the NDFA is allocated a new procurement function 
giving the Agency the power to enter into PPPs with a view to transferring them to the 
relevant State authority, or to act as agents for State authorities for PPP procurement. 
Italy UNITÀ TECNICA FINANZA DI 
PROGETTO - PRESIDENZA DEL 
CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI DELLA 
REPUBBLICA ITALIANA 
A PFI Unit (Unità Tecnica Finanza di Progetto – UFP) was established by Law 144/99.  The 
UFP belongs to the Ministry of Economy and Finance and reports to the inter-ministerial 
Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE: Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione 
Economica).  UFP should assist the awarding authorities in connection with their PFI 
exercise.  However (differently from the UK Treasury Taskforce, precursor of the current 
Partnerships UK), the UFP has no power of initiative and awarding authorities are not 
bound to seek its assistance.  Several Regions have set up their own task forces to promote 
PFI/PPP projects at a local level (e.g. Infrastrutture Lombarde S.p.A. – ILSPA in Lombardy). 
Japan Japan PFI Association A unique NPO that supports its activities through membership fees collected from member 
organizations in the private and public sectors.  
Korea Public and Private Infrastructure 
Investment Management Center, Korea 
In Korea the Public and Private Investment Management Center (PIMAC) plays an essential 
part in evaluating feasibility studies and bids. Private participation in infrastructure has 
picked up considerably since the government created PIMAC‘s predecessor, the Private 
Infrastructure Investment Center of Korea (PICKO), in 1999. 
Latvia Latvian Investment and Development 
Agency (LIDA) 
The Ministry of Economics and its supervised agency ―Latvian Investment and Development 
Agency‖ (LIDA) were designated as responsible state institutions for elaborating the PPP 
policy and promoting the PPP.  In order to improve the cooperation between competent 
PPP bodies, an advisory PPP council was established operating as an advisory and 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 555 
Country Enabling body Description 
coordinating body and having the objective of promoting a unified development of the PPP 
policy and its implementation. 
Mauritius Public-Private Partnership Unit of the 
Ministry of Finance 
The PPP-Unit was established on July 1, 2002 at the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development.  The role of the Unit is to deal with all PPP projects especially 
those which have financial and other contingent implications for Government. 
Mexico PPS Programme Technical Task Force 
within Ministry of Finance 
PPS Programme (Provision of Public Services) on UK PFI model.  Inter-sectorial committee 
has been established, as well as a Technical Taskforce within the Ministry of Finance.  Also: 
Programa para el Impulso de Asociaciones Público-Privadas en Estados Mexicanos 
(PIAPPEM)  
Netherlands PPP Knowledge Centre (Ministry of 
Finance) 
The PPP Knowledge Centre, which is part of the Ministry of Finance, was established on 1 
January 1999 and has two main functions: to gather knowledge and experience, and to 
assist in de formulation of government policy on partnerships between the public and 
private sectors. The PPP Knowledge Centre acts as a kind of central information desk and 
adviser for all public-sector bodies interested in this kind of cooperation.  To that end the 
PPP Knowledge Centre has established policy guidelines for the government's use of 
financial instruments in PPP projects, a list of basic prerequisites for a successful PPP, 
checklists for the different PPP contract types, guidelines for risk and contract management 
etc. 
Nigeria Ministry of Privatization and Enterprise 
Restructuring 
The FGN established, in June 2003,  the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit 
(BMPIU), which generally has the goal of ensuring full compliance with laid down guidelines 
and procedures for the procurement of capital projects as well as associated goods and 
services.  Although it was not specifically set up to oversee any PFI/PPP regime, the 
BMPIU has the mandate of verifying contract terms and prices for all public sector contracts 
at the federal level.  It can thus, to a certain extent, be said to be the pioneer unit set up to 
over see PFI/PPP at the federal level with regards to contracts that come within in its 
jurisdiction. 
Poland Centrum PPP, THE MINISTRY OF 
ECONOMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
POLAND 
Centrum PPP is a newly established unit (since 10 of July 2008.), with a main purpose to 
promote public-private undertakings in Poland on a non-profit basis. We believe PPP to be 
a solution perfectly answering challenges lying ahead of the Polish public service. Centrum 
PPP to perform the role of government agency in preparation of the best practice standards 
and PPP promotion in Poland.  Centrum PPP was founded by 41 entities including banks, 
law firms, consulting companies, firms, regional development agencies, foundations, 
associations, chambers and business agencies. The Centrum enjoys strong support of the 
Polish government – presently an agreement between Centrum PPP and The Polish 
Government is being drafted obliging Centrum PPP to perform the role of government 
agency in preparation of the best practice standards and PPP promotion in Poland. 
Portugal PARPUBLICA S.A. Parpublica SA is a state firm which acts as a PPP knowledge centre and advisor to the 
Portuguese Finance Minister.  
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Romania NASSPA Under GEO No. 34/2006 and GEO No. 54/2006, the body overseeing the PFI/PPP regime 
is the N.A.S.S.P.A. 
Senegal PPP Unit within Ministry of Finance had something on World Bank website but could not read it 
South 
Africa 
PPP Unit 
(SA Treasury) 
In April 1997, the South African Cabinet approved the appointment of an inter-departmental 
task team to develop a package of policy, legislative and institutional reforms to create an 
enabling environment for PPPs. Pioneering PPP projects were undertaken between 1997 to 
2000 by the SA National Roads Agency for the N3 and N4 toll roads; by the Departments of 
Public Works and Correctional Services for two maximum security prisons; by two 
municipalities for water services; and by SA National Parks for tourism concessions. 
Drawing early lessons from these projects and from international experience, a Strategic 
Framework for PPPs was endorsed by Cabinet in December 1999, and in April 2000, 
Treasury Regulations for PPPs were first issued in terms of the Public Finance 
Management Act (Act 1 of 1999). By mid-2000, with technical assistance funding from 
USAID, GTZ and DFID, the PPP Unit was established in National Treasury with five 
professional staff members drawn from both the public and private sectors. National 
Treasury's PPP Unit now comprises five cross-functional desks: Financial, Legal, Business 
Development, Project Evaluation and Municipal, funded almost wholly by Treasury, with the 
remaining donor support phasing out in 2005. Each professional staff member gives hands-
on technical assistance to a sector-specific (for example health, tourism, IT, 
accommodation) portfolio of registered projects, and each also gives his/her specialist (eg 
financial, legal, BEE) advice on every regulated PPP project at various phases in the PPP 
project cycle. All PPP Unit staff members are active in ongoing policy formulation and 
training.  
Tanzania Tanzania Investment Centre No additional current data available. 
Uganda Privatisation Unit of the Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development 
PPP Unit proposed, decision due in 2011 
United 
Kingdom 
PartnershipsUK, InfrastructureUK, Local 
Partnerships UK 
PartnershipsUK (PUK) is a Public-Private Partnership which has a unique public sector 
mission:  to support and accelerate the delivery of infrastructure renewal, high quality public 
services and the efficient use of public assets through better and stronger partnerships 
between the public and private sectors. PUK, formed in 2000 out of HM Treasury, is a joint 
venture that bridges the gap between public and private sectors, with a majority stake held 
by the private sector. PUK wasdissolved in 2010 and replaced by InfrastructureUK and 
Local Partnerships UK. 
United 
Kingdom 
(Ministry of 
Defence) 
The Public/Private Partnership Unit, 
Ministry of Defence 
The PPPU acts as the MoD‘s focus for PFI and other public-private partnership initiatives. 
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United 
States 
National Council for Public-Private 
Partnerships  
The mission of The National Council for Public-Private Partnerships is to advocate and 
facilitate the formation of public-private partnerships at the federal, state and local levels, 
where appropriate, and to raise the awareness of governments and businesses of the 
means by which their cooperation can cost-effectively provide the public with quality goods, 
services and facilities. 
Zambia Originally the Privatization Agency, since 
2009 the PPP Unit in the Ministry of 
Finance 
Established a Public Private Partnership (PPP) unit in the Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning in 2009 
Inter-
national 
World Bank  
UNDP 
European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC), 
European Investment Bank 
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12 ANNEXURE B: QUESTIONNAIRE TABLES 
 
12.1 QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE TABLES 
 
For each question, replies were put into a table.  All replies were listed below each other and similar 
answers were grouped together.   
 
In one case, where the respondent was responding to Question 2: ―Most frequent mistakes‖, a positive 
statement that slipped, possibly due to the respondent forgetting the tone of the question, was 
changed to a negative statement, while keeping the meaning, i.e. ―Putting together a good team‖ was 
replaced by ―Not putting together a good team‖. 
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Table 12-1: Respondent answers to survey questions 
Resp. Q2: Most frequent mistakes Q3: What distinguishes successful 
partnerships from failed partnerships 
Q4: Successful Partnerships Q4: Failed Partnerships 
1 1.  Failure of the 2 to understand exactly 
how the other functions and their limitations 
2.  Allowing inexperienced/unqualified 
persons to be involved at an important level 
3.  Failure to meet deadlines 
1.  Total commitment to achieving goals 
2.  Ability of staff to grasp and understand 
the goals and objectives 
3.  Failure to implement/follow through on 
checks and controls required 
1.  Weather service and Disaster Risk 
Management 
2.  Relief NGOs 
3.  Golden Arrow bus service and 
DRM/COCT 
4.  Trauma council and DRM/COCT 
1. Relief NGOs (there are successes and 
failures in this partnership) 
2. Golden Arrow bus service and 
DRM/COCT (as above) 
 
2 1. lack of communication 
2. lack of understanding of the other side‘s 
position and problems 
3. wrong/too high expectations 
 
1. successful partnership should be a win-
win-situation, so both should benefit, 
everything else I would classify as failed 
 
1. CEDIM/cedim AG (the one I am involved 
in) – sorry, I don‘t have much knowledge 
about others, so I am not of great help here.  
Note by researcher: Interesting point – if you 
are involved in one you are not necessarily 
interested in PPP‘s, you are rather just 
doing your specific job. 
 
3 1. Setting up the partnership and then doing 
nothing to maintain it 
2. Not setting up common goals 
3. New people in charge are not aware of 
the details of the partnership 
1. Common Goals 
2. Communication 
3.  Joint testing of DR plans 
1. Chile has the private and public sectors 
do their DR testing for a week every year 
2. Nassau LI Community does joint testing 
3. Place in NYC are setting up partnerships 
and have a web set up for sharing 
information  
1. NYC set up a programme to train Private 
CPE group on Hazmat - On 911 the 
members were not called in because the 
new people in charge did not know about it. 
Also, the DB with the names was not 
backed up and the information was lost. 
4 1. Establishing unattainable goals 
2. partnerships are between 
individuals  rather than organizations (so 
when one person leaves, the partnership 
falters) 
3. partnerships are not given enough time to 
develop and evolve 
4. Assuming the partnership has to be with 
a for-profit corporation 
1.  They become institutionalized/ a regular 
part of day to day business 
2.  They adapt to changes in the community.  
3.  Buy in from all parts of the organizations, 
from the leadership to the grassroots 
4.  All the partners benefit in some way 
1.  The biggest example in the US is called 
Project Impact, a FEMA funded programme 
developed in the late 1990s and later cut by 
the Bush Administration.  Some 
communities, like Seattle, Washington still 
have a Project Impact programme and are 
vocal proponents.  This project provided 
funding to encourage, among other things, 
public-private partnerships. 
2.  Hurricane Expositions.  This is a 
relatively new phenomenon in the US.  They 
can include convention hall exhibits of 
disaster-resistant products like storm 
shutters and windows, building 
supplies/techniques, as well as information 
on government programmes and services 
and emergency preparedness.  They  can 
also be smaller events in the parking lot of a 
building supply/hardware store like Home 
Depot (maybe like MICA in SA) where do-it-
yourselves and local  construction workers 
can get information on how to do disaster 
1. The Research Triangle Park area of 
North Carolina, USA, received a Project 
Impact grant of about 
$100,000  around  2000 or 2001.  However, 
the many cities and counties in the area 
were unable to agree to work together.  The 
partnership failed to get buy in from the 
various participants before getting started 
and they ended up returning the grant 
funds.  
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reduction projects (and the store can get 
their business).  At the beginning of 
hurricane season, nearly all these types of 
stores in coastal areas offer package deals 
for hurricane emergency preparedness kits 
(with batteries, radios, flashlights, tarps) 
where the store benefits and the public is 
better prepared. 
5 1. Public not adequately trained/informed by 
PPP-leading to distrust in Public 
2. Public not given continual feedback and 
further education/information - leading to 
breach of contract 
3. Public representatives often want 
personal gain - leading to distrust in private 
sector 
1. Continual education of all involved 
2. Continual sharing of information as 
project progress - all involved 
3. Exposing public/community leaders who 
want personal gain 
4. Developing a very good relation/trust with 
the chief and elders of the area, even if they 
are represented by another elected body 
5. Continually showing benefit to community 
to elders as project progresses and give 
credit to them 
1. Battle to find them, I know of failures 
 
1. A Re Phepafatseng community/NW 
government project - Mafikeng 
2. Soweto - ANC youth league 
project/Sappi: Recycling with door-to-door 
collection  
3. Randburg recycling project: Des 
D'Ligneres/E L Bateman/ municipality 
6 1. not continuing the process 
2. not enough training for generating a 
similar concept for a unique thought to 
increase the status of partnership 
3. misunderstanding by some of the people 
about partnerships 
1. continuity 
2. training and education 
3. good and clear law and administration 
1. religious house ceremonies 
2. greenery planned partnerships 
3. school teachers activities for the poor 
 
7 1.  PPP dissolved due to political pressure 
2.  Changing financial conditions 
3.  Lose focus 
Proper planning   
8 1. The ever present possibility of corruption 
and nepotism 
2. Political influences on service delivery 
 
1. Enhanced service delivery to 
communities 
2. Quality and reliability of services/products 
3. Ability of companies to really deliver  
4. Private partners' sustainability 
DWAF agreements with irrigation 
boards/water user associations 
 
9 1.  The failure to pay full costs of the project 
-- usually indirect costs are underestimated 
and corporate general and administrative, 
indirect or core costs such as fund raising 
are ignored or limited. 
 
2.  Small, local NGOs have no knowledge of 
their real cost(s) structure, nor reasonable 
and customary ways to identify and recover 
those costs. This observation is based 
specifically on 30+ years of experience of 
my own environmental NGO providing 
various forms of technical assistance and 
1.  Size and knowledge of both partners. 
Both elements are usually needed because 
it takes a certain excess of resources to 
develop a partnership with the attention and 
care that it needs, and because partnership 
design is really complicated - too often it is 
delegated to junior staff without the requisite 
experience. 
 
2.  Stable personnel over the course of the 
partnership. 
 
1.  Beer companies and cricket teams 
 
2.  Beer companies and rugby teams 
 
3.  Beer companies and soccer teams 
 
1.  GEF (Global Fund for the Environment) 
partnership with a consortium of 
environmental NGOs in the Philippines 
2002. 
 
2.  GEF-Colombia with CORALINA of San 
Andres 2001 
 
3.  TNC - Jamaica - country-wide 
conservation plan 1985 
 
4.  EU (or Cariforum?) with the Caribbean 
Conservation Association 2001 -- CREP 
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training for the management of small NGOs. 
 
3.  Failure on the part of both parties to 
clearly define the time horizons, success 
measures, and evolution of the relationships 
for various timeframes of a partnership. 
 
4.  Failure to identify the benefits and costs 
associated with networking and local 
logistics support that is frequently provided 
to projects by local NGOs. 
 
5.  Failure of public authorities to 
understand that private (local, or national, 
small) organizations need to retain their own 
vision and mission, even if they accept a 
relatively large PPP grant. 
 
6.  Failure on the part of public partners to 
protect the private partners and partnership 
commitments from shifts in priorities and 
public perceptions. 
 
[Note that some of the failures noted above 
are MIRRORED in conditions when a 
PRIVATE MEGA-NGO works with a small, 
local or national PUBLIC authority. In the 
small island states and dependencies of the 
Caribbean and South Pacific, there have 
been many examples of unsuccessful 
projects of this nature, which are often more 
accurately described as public-private-
public partnerships in which bi-lateral or 
intergovernmental programmes and 
organizations team with mega-NGOs to 
inflict the latest development fad on local 
governments or agencies.] 
 
 
10 1. Clear statement of the responsibilities of 
each part 
 
1. planning 
 
1. Barcelona has many successful projects 
 
 
11 1. There are no SMART goals defined 
2. There isn‘t a broad sense of urgency and 
a clear understanding of the different kinds 
of interests with the participating partners 
1. If the different criteria defined in question 
2 are well-handled, then you will have a 
greater chance of a successful# PPS. If not, 
you will organize your own failure 
1. The PPS between the safety region 
Rotterdam-Rijnmond and the Rotterdam 
Port Authority about organizing Port 
Security 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 563 
Resp. Q2: Most frequent mistakes Q3: What distinguishes successful 
partnerships from failed partnerships 
Q4: Successful Partnerships Q4: Failed Partnerships 
3. There is no clear organizational structure 
with clear responsibility lines within the PPP 
4. There isn‘t a business case made at the 
start of the PPP project in which not only the 
costs but also the return on investment is 
made clear. In the business case there is 
also a clear understanding of the critical 
success factors. 
5. The risk management isn‘t well organized  
 
 2. The PPS between the safety region Zuid-
Holland Zuid and the water company Evides 
about organizing the vital infrastructure 
about drinking water 
3. The PPS about organizing risk 
communication between the safety region 
Rotterdam-Rijnmond and different 
companies and governmental bodies about 
the Year of Transport 2009. 
4. The PPS about cell broadcasting 
between Telecom providers as KPN, 
Vodafone en Telfort, and the ministries of 
Verkeer en Waterstaat, VWS, BZK en 
Economische Zaken. 
 
14 1. The projections made use dubious 
calculations 
 
1. community involvement 
 
1. M7 Westlink Sydney 
 
1. Cross City Tunnel Sydney 
2. Lane Cove Tunnel Sydney 
 
15 1. Unclear roles and responsibilities 
2. Junior officials from the public sector with 
limited jurisdiction are sent to meetings, 
hampering decision-making and wasting 
time 
3. Conflict between the legal mandate of the 
government departments (by law) and how 
they interpret policy (mismatch between 
their legal mandate and the implementation 
policies) 
4. Policies change every time a new political 
head is appointed, making long-term 
planning very difficult. 
5. Officials ignore any information that they 
do not understand or do not feel that they 
have the courage to defend in front of their 
bosses.  Important aspects of the project 
are then planned sub-optimally, while senior 
officials are unaware or ignore what they 
don't want to hear. 
6. The best and most experienced officials 
are not used to participate in the partnership 
(or to represent the government department 
in negotiations) because they do not 
represent the "right" demographic profile. 
7. Both government departments and 
private sector participants are too ready to 
bend good financial governance.  
8. The tender process is cumbersome and 
1. The quality (knowledge, experience and 
commitment) of the main drivers of the 
particular project.  It comes down to the 
people in charge - that makes all the 
difference 
 
1. Can't think of any that were really 
unqualified successes 
 
1. Local authorities and organized 
agriculture - trying to address intrusion of 
untreated sewage into rivers used for 
irrigation 
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wastes huge amounts of time, and yet 
financial irregularities keep on occurring. 
 
16 1. No real buy-in from public sector officials 
2. Lack of sustained communication 
between parties 
3. Both parties not being honest/frank 
regarding negative issues encountered. 
 
1. Good research and communication on 
what the outcomes should be 
2. Sustained monitoring of the 
process/project 
3. Regular communication on progress 
4. Quick interventions to ensure positive 
outcomes. 
 
1. City improvement Districts Cape Town 
2. Marketing of 107 PECC Cape Town? 
3. Toll Routes in SA? 
4. Payment of accounts at Pick ‗n Pay, City 
of Cape Town 
5. Purchasing of pre-paid power at private 
outlets, CoCt 
 
1.Metrorial and private security on trains 
(Rail Police (SAPS) re established ) 
2.SAWS service to Eskom Koeberg 
(managing weather station at Koeberg )  
 
17 1. The public officials are incapable of 
taking responsibility  
2. Political interference and officials  
interfere in projects and try to gain 
personally 
 
1. Proper management 
 
 1. Diyatalawa apple project in the free State 
 
2. Mt Paul dairy project 
 
18 1. Funding 
2. Not knowing what to do 
3. Taking the lead 
1. Cost effective 
2. Taking the lead and responsibility 
3. Lack of departments to commit 
themselves because of other failed PPP 
programmes (specifically mentioned 
previous HOD) 
Not engaged in any partnerships in the past Not engaged in any partnerships in the past 
19 1. The public side, especially researchers, 
not being willing to make the effort to 
communicate to the private sector on the 
private sector‘s terms. 
 2. The private sector being too impatient for 
results and publicity and having a short 
attention span. 
 3. The private sector not fully embracing 
corporate responsibility by making some 
work, including research, proprietary. 
 4. All partners being more interested in high 
profile post-disaster work than in forgotten 
emergencies or disaster risk reduction. 
 
1. Committed individuals in each institution 
being involved. Much of the success comes 
down to personal relationships, people who 
are willing to make things happen and to 
seek excuses to continue, rather than 
seeking excuses to complain. 
2. Patience, persistence, and a sense of 
humour. 
 3. A medium-term commitment (2-5 years), 
but always thinking towards the long-term 
while seeking short-term, small-step 
successes and completed initiatives. 
 
 
Examples of corporate responsibility for 
disaster risk reduction research are 
provided, but judging them as ―successes‖ 
or ―failures‖ is unfair. All projects have some 
successes and some failures. 
 
1.John Twigg's study 
http://www.benfieldhrc.org/disaster_studies/
csr/csr_index.htm 
 
2. An overwhelming amount of material 
related to private insurance. I attach some 
samples, but I have much more, plus I 
mentioned my PhD already. 
http://www.ilankelman.org/phd.html  While 
the topic covered by some of this material is 
not necessarily corporate responsibility or 
PPP, parts of the content are directly 
applicable to both these topics, even where 
it needs to be interpreted as such. 
 
3. ProVention 
http://www.proventionconsortium.org/?pagei
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 565 
Resp. Q2: Most frequent mistakes Q3: What distinguishes successful 
partnerships from failed partnerships 
Q4: Successful Partnerships Q4: Failed Partnerships 
d=32&projectid=12 
 
4. Utah http://www.amazon.com/Extending-
helping-hand-responsibility-
contribution/dp/B000EXDVUE 
 
5. Nokia http://www.nokia.com/A4946176 
(and hundreds of other companies with 
similar pages). 
 
6. Willis Research Network 
http://www.willisresearchnetwork.com 
 
7. Linking insurance and science 
http://www.actuaries.org.uk/__data/assets/p
df_file/0009/26685/tsunami.pdf (project now 
finished). 
 
8. "Business continuity", "micro-insurance", 
and "micro-finance" are other examples of 
keywords where numerous publications, 
projects, initiatives, and ideas exist for 
disaster risk reduction.  There are so many 
and they are so easy to find, that I do not 
provide any specifics. 
 
20  Not setting up common goals - but more 
fundamentally - not investing sufficient time 
and effort for both the parties involved to 
jointly explore and assess their respective 
interests, goals, and ways of working, 
expectations and (importantly) acceptable 
time frames. Some people also suggest that 
the "power imbalances" are not levelled out 
at the beginning and therefore uneven 
expectations or indicators of success 
continue until the enterprise founders. 
  
There is also always the Resources issue, 
with almost universal expectations that the 
source of the resources will come from the 
"private side" of the partnership. 
Common shared purpose with the time and 
investment to pursue them. there is also a 
crucial need for both parties to recognize 
and accept that the only successful course 
is to build a middle way that does not fully 
subscribe to either party‘s wishes or needs. 
And that takes time, and related 
investments. Certainly a clear and 
commonly held statement of purpose is an 
essential starting point. But then that needs 
subsequent and serious sustained 
commitment too. 
 
Project Impact - in some of the localities 
where it was adopted (e.g. Seattle) 
  
Probably some of the commitments during 
or post-Tsunami, but almost all of them 
were related to provision of emergency 
goods and services. Ericsson 
Communications has subsequently 
expanded its roles and outlooks. Also TNT, 
DHL and similar logistics on demand 
programmes for international emergencies 
may qualify as a success. 
  
Production of Natural Disaster management 
and Know Risk books by Tudor Rose 
Publishers, but pointedly NOT successive 
efforts to build on that for shared PPP 
involvement in upgrading and production of 
public awareness materials (on 2 occasions, 
with 2 different UN agencies) 
  
IBM international committee for disaster 
reduction (ca. 1997-98) 
Many never got off the ground or beyond 
the rhetoric involved. Jon Twigg's paper on 
PPP realities in the later 1990s (1998 or 
so?) delve into several examples. 
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Probably the pharmaceutical industry 
vaccine programme with the UN (don't know 
the name of it) 
 
21 1. No proper explanation of what is required 
on both sides 
 
 
2. No proper guarantees of what exactly 
each part of the relationship will bring to the 
project 
 
3. Must have a core of people on both sides 
that remain consistent throughout the 
project 
 
4. Over-commitment and under-delivery on 
either or both sides 
 
5. No set deadlines for critical delivery items 
 
1. Committed people on both sides that 
want to make the partnership work 
 
 
2. Set goals and objectives that are agreed 
by all 
 
 
3. Constant flow of information between all 
parties in the partnership (regular feedback 
meetings) 
 
4. One point of entry into parties involved in 
the partnership 
 
5. Adherence to deadlines 
 
1. Koeberg Emergency plan - despite many 
active role players and constant changes, 
the plan works. 
 
2. Study Buddy programme with Koeberg 
and the Atlantis schools 
 
 
3. Developing of women in Atlantis via Red 
Door organization 
 
1. Building of children's ward with Atlantis 
Government hospital 
 
22 1. no prior agreement on clear roles and 
responsibilities 
 
2. no true risk sharing 
 
3. lack of insurance against non-
performance of another partner ( true to 
both private and public partners) 
 
1. well align and mutually beneficial goals 
 
2. regular feed-back between partners 
 
3. staff exchange - both ways - private and 
public 
 
1. Mostar bridge 
 
2. Alcan International Sustainability Award 
 
3. World Economic Forum Water Initiative 
 
 
23 Sharing of information a problem. Proper 
consultation about processes is lacking. 
Representivity are not based on true 
leadership from affected geographical 
boundaries. 
Reliability and trustworthiness of nominated 
people to partnership with the mandates of 
service boundaries ensures success. 
Failures stems from opportunism and lack of 
popularity. Do not underestimate the 
ignorance amongst the masses out there. 
There is a saying: You must always know 
your people. 
Bambanani , Community Safety 
Ke Moya Drug Abuse, Substance Abuse 
Programme, Dept of Social Development 
Social Security Pension Forums, Black 
Areas of Cape Metropole for the last two 
decades 
Disability Network with NGOs , Dept of 
Social Development 
Ministerial Advisory Council, Dept of Social 
Development  
Community Based Forums for Municipality 
development , Integrated Development 
Planning, City of Cape Town 
24  1. When the legislation frameworks, which 
organize the partnership, are ready. 
2. When the objectives of both sides are 
clear for both and the partnership is based 
on finding balance between both sides‘ 
objectives.   
3. When the public benefits are above the 
privet benefit. 
Shell – the oil company in Oman some tourism projects 
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4. When the community participates in the 
PPP relation. 
25 1.  Specific parameters and criteria for 
measuring success of the programme is 
seldom included in the contract 
2. Roles and responsibilities of parties not 
comprehensive enough and not clearly 
defined 
3.  The head of the programme or project 
not skilled or dynamic enough to further 
develop and ensure sustainability 
4.  Poor marketing strategies  
 
1  Elected or Non elected Public officials 
who do not have compassion for the poor 
2.  Inadequate funding  
3.  Greed in the private sector  
4.  Lack of understanding by decision 
makers in gov. 
 
1.  Ukuvuka  
2. Working on Fire 
 
1.Trauma Centre / CoCT 
 
26 1. Public partners must understand the core 
business and business plan  
2. Never bargain on promised funding (have 
plan B & C in place) 
 
1. Selling your plan not using the correct 
strategy (also see attached) 
2. No business plan or impractical business 
plan 
 
1. Ukuvuka 
 
 
27     
28 1. Lack of understanding between public 
and private partners 
2. Based on individual interests, not on a 
sustainable ―common objective‖. 
3. Flawed design, one/more missing 
element 
Explanation: When successful PPPs were 
evaluated near the end of the Clinton 
administration, these factors in successful 
PPPs were identified: 
1. Leadership in each partnership 
2. Trust between/among the leaders 
(forgiveness for statements meant for their 
―base‖)  
3. A Focus or a common objective 
(something to accomplish) 
4.Resources (material, human or financial) 
These were noted in priority order, e.g. 
resources alone did not make a success. 
 
1. Successful: Accomplished a measurable 
objective (short or long term)   
2. Failed:  Built on unproven assumptions 
(looking like slam dunks, often are NOT 
possible)   
3. Successful:  Sustainable relationships, 
project/objective accomplished, but the PPP 
continues to do other activities. 
 
1. The first and only long term PPP is the 
Los Angeles CA BICEPP, Business Industry 
Council for Emergency Preparedness and 
Prevention (name may be wrong).  Started 
in the early 1980s to coordinate public-
private planning in case of a major 
earthquake.  I believe it continues.  Many 
others have been created, operated for a 
few years and failed.  Today, Memphis, TN. 
has a functioning PPP.   
2. ChemTrec – A public service by the 
chemical industry that (I believe) still 
provides valuable information to fire 
services and other Government entities. 
 3. US Department of State‘s Overseas 
Security Advisory Council.  Government 
funded forum for international companies 
and NGOs to share/exchange emergency 
and security-related information in real time.  
4. Project Impact, a PPP started during the 
Clinton administration to identify and reduce 
risk in communities. (Ines Pearce, cc above) 
can provide more information.  Some 
examples continue, even though funding 
and staff support were stopped by the Bush 
administration. 
1. The International Disaster Advisory 
Committee (IDAC), the first disaster-related 
PPP, started as a formal USG Advisory 
Committee during the first Bush 
administration. (Marilyn Quayle, wife of the 
US Vice President was Chairman, I was 
Executive Director).  Major corporations 
represented sectors that could cure 
(mitigate or prevent) or cause disasters, 
food, transport, insurance, fuel, insurance, 
communications, etc.  Discontinued by the 
Clinton administration, but an inspiration for 
Project Impact (within the USA).   
2. The Disaster Resource Network (DRN) 
started by the World Economic Forum and 
perhaps continuing in some diminished form 
(our colleagues in Europe should provide 
more precise information)  
 
 1. The private partner jumping into 1.  Realistic assessment (commonly shared) I suppose it depends upon one‘s  
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something because it‘s a ―good cause‖ 
whose intricacies they may not fully 
understand, or getting involved because 
they perceive some ―commercial‖ benefit or 
benefit of visibility. And, on the other side, 
the Public partner not taking the time or 
being unable to understand the workings or 
motivations of its Private counterpart 
 
2. Misunderstanding/underestimating the 
time and resources commitment to make a 
partnership successful and, perhaps, 
unwillingness or inability to suffer inevitable 
setbacks that may happen along the way 
 
3. Not knowing when to end a positive 
relationship - Sometimes partnerships form 
almost spontaneously, during a disaster 
event, and it‘s clear that the synergy is 
greater than the sum of the parts.  But once 
the even is over, and the particular cause or 
need has dissipated, some partnerships try 
to find ways to continue and the essence of 
what made them special can be lost.  Some 
partnerships are destined to be short, and 
better left that way.  
 
of the need for which the partnership is to 
be formed 
 
2. Mutual understanding of mission, goals 
and objectives 
 
3.Commitment to time and other resources 
required to successfully accomplishing tasks 
 
4. Does the community (or other 
beneficiary) of the partnership activity 
perceive they are being served by the 
partnership? 
 
perspective whether it was good or not, but 
one of the first PPPs is likely to have been 
the ―Marshall Plan‖, the primary plan of the 
United States for rebuilding and creating a 
stronger foundation for the countries of 
Western Europe after World War II. The 
plan was in operation for four years 
beginning in July 1947. During that period 
some USD 13 billion in economic and 
technical assistance were given to help the 
recovery of the European countries that had 
joined in the Organization for European 
Economic Co-operation (quick summary 
courtesy of Wikipedia).  This is not disaster 
per se, but you get the idea.  Relating to 
some of my earlier comments, this was a 
case where the US encouraged US 
business to ―partner‖ in the redevelopment 
in Europe with the dual objective of ―doing 
good‖ and making money. 
 
It‘s hard to say, categorically, what are 
successes and failures.  Several PPPs that 
began in the disaster area were successful 
at various stages, or successful for just 
having been conceived and motivating 
others to consider options.  The early days 
of satellite and mobile communications saw 
several partnerships, for example 
INTELSAT and INMARSAT, as well as 
Ericsson Motorola working with the UN 
System, International Organizations and 
NGOs (i.e., active involvement, particularly 
by Ericsson, in and support of the 
International Working Group on Emergency 
Telecommunications – WGET, and 
INTELSAT support for the US-USSR 
Telemedicine Spacebridge in response to 
the earthquake in Armenia in 1988). 
 
Another, nurtured by Ollie Davidson while at 
OFDA, was the Caribbean Basin Private 
Sector Disaster Advisory Committee (Ollie 
can give you more if he hasn‘t donated the 
files to some library). 
 
See attached documents for other 
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partnerships 
 
30 1.  Lack of Resources available  
2.  Expectation that resources will be 
provided by public entities  
 
1.  Commitment  
2.  Common goal  
 
1.  Victim Support  
2.  Rural Safety  
3.  Community Police Forums 
4.  Neighbourhood Watches 
5.  Business Against Crime  
 
1.  Youth against Crime  
2.  Sport Against Crime 
 
31 1. opportunistic by nature, not enough 
research to develop excellence 
2. instant gratification is the aim – 
sustainability is therefore rare 
3. no training is perceived to be necessary 
 
proper planning prevents poor performance 1. toll roads 
2. construction of prisons 
 
1. maintenance of hospitals 
2. service delivery – water, waste, housing 
 
32 1. an uncritical assumption that the private 
sector is more efficient than the public 
sector (sometimes true, sometimes not) but 
most PPPs don't even question it 
 
2. lack of experience in business practice by 
the public sector side (local govt or even big 
ministries) so that the Public side negotiates 
bad deals for the public, and the private 
sector does (too) well out of it.  In UK with 
PPP in the health and education sectors 
there have been enormous cost overruns 
and often the PPP project has cost more 
than the public sector infrastructure would 
have 
 
3. the underlying - but buried deep and 
maybe even denied - motivation from the 
public side that, it is not so much for cost 
savings, but for cost deferrals.  i.e. the Govt 
getting into the deal is getting in effect an 
expensive capital loan from the private 
sector which will be paid back by later 
generations of tax payers, or at least, after 
the next election!!  Cut taxes now, and let 
your kids pay for the hospitals, roads, 
schools, sewers, etc. etc.!! 
 
4. often enough there is straightforward 
collusion and corruption between the Govt 
Officials & the private company:  e.g. from 
UK, the "rotating door" between top Ministry 
1.  small, not big, highly focused 
 
2.  much much better preparation by (and 
training for) the public officials who will be 
involved 
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Resp. Q2: Most frequent mistakes Q3: What distinguishes successful 
partnerships from failed partnerships 
Q4: Successful Partnerships Q4: Failed Partnerships 
of Defence officials responsible for 
procurement and the big arms 
manufacturers 
 
33 1.  Time - Public sector works/decides more 
slowly  
2.  Bureaucracy - Public sector is inherently 
inflexible or unable to improvise 
3.  Expectations - Public sector tends to put 
too wide objectives/large targets  
4. Different Goals - expecting the partner to 
have the same goal 
 
1.  Focus - small steps with clear 
deliverables   
2.  Short communication lines  
3.  Transparency of both party objectives  
 
  
34 Did not answer Did not answer Did not answer Did not answer 
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 12.2 RESPONDENT DETAILS AND ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
No. Respondent Additional comments 
1 Stephen van Rensburg 
Disaster Risk Management 
City of Cape Town 
 
2 Liesch, Tanja 
[T.Liesch@cedim-ag.com] 
CEDIM-AG 
Karlsruhe, Germany 
Dear Johan, 
 
As I promised you in Davos, I will try to answer your questions as good as I can. I hope you will make good progress 
with your research! I am really interested in your results, so I would highly appreciate it, if you could let me know, when 
you will publish them… 
 
Best wishes, 
Tanja 
 
Dr. Tanja Liesch 
Project Manager 
 
cedim AG 
Karlstraße 45b 
D- 76133 Karlsruhe 
 
Tel.  +49 (0)721 9134510 
Fax.  +49 (0)721 9134599 
Mob. +49 (0)172 7202671 
 
http://www.cedim-ag.com 
 
Vorstand: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Lothar Stempniewski, Bent Sternfeld, Dipl.-Ing. Hans Fahr 
Aufsichtsrat (Vorsitz): Dr. jur. Dietmar Ertmann 
Handelsregister: HR Mannheim, HRB 11261 
 
3 Ms Michael Redmond 
[msmichaelredmond@ 
redmondworldwide.com] 
―Continuity solutions that 
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work‖ 
4 Todd Owen 
[towen@email.unc.edu] 
Hi Johan 
 
Good to hear from you.  This sounds like a very interesting research project.  As I note below, in the US, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency had a programme that encouraged public-private partnerships.  FEMA  (Federal 
Emergency Management Institute) has eliminated nearly all references to it on its website but you can learn about it 
elsewhere. The second link below gives a pretty good overview of the programme when it first began. 
 
http://www.seattle.gov/emergency/programs/projectimpact/ 
http://www.drj.com/articles/sum98/fema.htm 
 
Todd Owen 
Associate Director 
Center for Urban & Regional Studies 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
919/962-3076 
http://curs.unc.edu/ 
5 Annette Naude 
[anaude@internetix.co.za] 
 
Hallo Johan  
 
Ek stel voor dat jy ook een stuur aan Ingrid Hutty. Sy is 'n vriendin van ons en Jorina sal haar dalk ken. Jan ken haar 
goed. Sy het meer ondervinding hiermee as enige iemand anders waarvan ek bewus is. Groete, Annette. 
Ps: Ek het reeds 'n ander e-pos ingevul en teruggestuur. 
  
ingrid@tiscali.co.za 
IH sel:0824565830 
6 Bijan Yavar 
[yavar@iuc.ac.ir] 
Tehran, Iran 
 
 
7 Wendy Young 
[Wendy@edendm.co.za] 
Disaster Management 
Eden District Municipality 
 
 
8 Roy Veldtmann 
[rcv@lando.co.za] 
Disaster Management 
Cape Winelands District 
Municipality 
Hallo Johan, 
  
Ek sal nou nie al jou vrae kan beantwoord nie, maar het onlangs in my eie studies te hore gekom van die Nelspruit 
Waterkonsessie, maar bloot 'n verwysing daarna en geen verdere info. Miskien is jy reeds bewus daarvan. Ek het dit 
vanmôre "gegoogle" en daar is verskeie resultate, soos byvoorbeeld, die stadsraad self, DPLG, Investec, ens. Dit lyk 
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 na 'n suksesverhaal, maar daar is ook sites wat klaarblyklik aanvanklike probleme uitspel, soos naledi.org.za 
  
Ek dink ook DWAF (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry) se Bertrand van Zyl behoort baie inligting te hê oor 
besproeiingsrade wat beheer oorneem van staatsdamme namens die departement. Voorbeelde hiervan is Kougadam 
(voorheen Paul Sauerdam in die Gamtoosvallei) en Roode Elsbergdam by De Doorns wat deur Hexvallei 
Besproeiingsraad bestuur word. 
Ek is oortuig laasgenoemde is 'n suksesverhaal. 
Ek forward ook jou vraelysie na ons paaiedepartement wat hul egter meer toespits op Small Medium Micro Enterprise 
(SMME) bemagtiging. Ek het pas te hore gekom dat Prov. Paaie (Piet Stofberg) wil herorganiseer en omtrent alle 
onderhoud- en herstelwerke gaan deur klein kontrakteurs uitgevoer word in die toekoms! 
  
Sterkte vorentoe met die groot taak. 
  
RCV 
 
9 Potter at Island Resources 
[bpotter@irf.org] 
 
My responses are directed at public-private partnerships involving local, mostly community-based NGOs (Non-
governemntal organizations).  My observation over the past 44 years (since my first US Peace Corps service in 1964) 
is that the experience of very large national, regional and global NGOs working with national and international public, 
intergovernmental and quasi-public groups is very different. 
 
In fact, I believe it is the success of the public-private partnership concept for mega-NGOs and their strong 
endorsement and management of the process that is responsible for its global spread, in spite of the damage done to 
small, local, inexperienced groups. 
 
I am not familiar with many long-term (e.g., 12-months or more) public-private partnerships involving private 
commercial or industrial businesses. For five years I worked for the New York Headquarters of the Exploration and 
Producing Division of Mobil Oil Corporation (1980-'85, before Mobil was acquired by EXXON), providing technical 
assistance to managers of Mobil E&P affiliates in developing countries and Norway to define modes of operation, 
investment and training that would have a true developmental impact on host societies. Some, but not many of those 
activities would have been defined as public-private partnerships, except possibly for the most fevered ravings of the 
public relations department. 
 
 
Question 1: 
Your answer: ___between dismal and poor for small, local and national NGOs ________ 
 
10 geisa bugs [geisabugs@ 
googlemail.com] 
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11 Heijnen, Alexander  
Walaardt Sacrestraat 405 
1117 BM Schiphol Oost 
The Netherlands 
T +31 (0)20 4499 900 
F +31 (0)20 4499 999 
M +31 (0)6 53 18 92 12 
Drs. Alexander Heijnen  
Director 
Alexander.Heijnen@dcecon
sultants.com  
 
 
12 David Mwaniki 
[mailto:david@ 
globalcrisissolutions.org] 
 
Hi Johan, 
 Great to hear from you and I will respond to your questionnaire. I will however only have feedback on public non-profit 
partnerships where I have more substantive experience and assuming that you also classify non-profits in the Private 
company category. 
  
Take care and regards 
 
13 Gordon Denoon 
[denoon@un.org] 
United Nations Disaster 
Assistance Committee 
 
Dear Johan  
 
I am sorry to say that coming from an NGO background I have no experience of PPP so I am unable to comment. 
 
Good luck with your research. 
 
Kind Regards, 
 
Gordon Denoon 
Humanitarian Affairs Officer 
UN OCHA Regional Office for Southern Africa 
Ph: + 27 (0) 734465888 
 
14 Brian Cooper [brianadr@ 
optusnet.com.au] 
 
Dear Johan 
 
Professor Walker at the School of Accounting at the University of NSW should be able to assist with your questions 
especially in this area. In my state it has been a very negative experience. The assumptions often used to justify the 
costs of construction to give a return have proven to be very incorrect. Hence the cost to the users is higher or the 
company concerned has gone under.  
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There are some PPPs with the construction of new schools. These have been more successful. Those with health have 
proved to be as successful as the tunnels and railways. 
 
Brian 
 
15 Barnes, Jo, Dr 
[jb4@sun.ac.za] 
Environmental Health 
Specialist 
University of Stellenbosch 
 
 
16 Geoff Laskey 
Disaster Management 
Solutions 
Cape Town, South Africa 
 
 
17 Andries Jordaan 
[JordaanA.SCI@ufs.ac.za] 
Director: Centre for Disaster 
Management Training 
Free State University 
 
 
18 Schalk Carstens 
Director: Disaster 
Management and Fire 
Brigade Services 
Provincial Government of 
the Western Cape 
Cape Town, South Africa 
 
 
19 Ilan Kelman - Ilan Kelman 
[ilan_kelman@hotmail.com] 
 
Dear Johan, 
 
Thank you for the further information and details.  No problem, then.  As requested, I fill out your survey below from a 
corporate responsibility perspective.  Note that I am not referring to CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility), even 
though that is the most common phrase in the literature.  Many are now switching to the phrase "corporate 
responsibility" to encompass both social responsibility and environmental responsibility as well as beyond - even 
though other ambiguities are introduced such as http://www.disasteraction.org.uk/corporate.htm 
 
Again, I emphasise that my perspective is far from encompassing and is somewhat out-of-date, but I nonetheless 
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provide survey answers to the best of my ability.  You will see that I open up numerous avenues for further exploration.  
To me, they are part of and are relevant to PPP - but I take a broad definition and often do not worry too much about 
constraining specifics when defining a topic.  I could, of course, fully accept if some of the sources or ideas did not 
seem to be relevant from other perspectives. 
 
I also attach some Dilbert comics on corporate (social) responsibility. 
 
Hope that this now provides what you need and don't hesitate if you would need anything further.  Best wishes for it 
and I look forward to staying in touch, 
 
Ilan 
 
Question 5: In what year or in which 5-year period did you first encounter the term "Public-Private Partnership" 
 
I do not know, but it was most likely during my PhD from 1999-2002 and probably within the context of the Blairite 
approach to public services (e.g. the London Tube and semi-privatized hospitals) rather than in the context of corporate 
responsibility for disaster risk reduction research 
 
20 Terry Jeggle 
[tjeggle@yahoo.com] 
United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction Secretariat  
Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
Question 1:  In your experience, what is the success rate of public-private partnerships?   
  
3 - Generally poor, successes often depend on critical or situation-specific circumstances, individuals or considerations. 
I think many PPPs are embarked upon either without a clear understanding of the concept, or are pursued through 
superficial efforts of an enthusiast. They really need careful and thorough consideration, shared deliberation, and 
enduring support from higher levels of authority and corporate/organizational responsibility.  
  
The subsequent discussion of "CSR" has also blurred what people think or subscribe to PPP really being. Hence PPP 
has now become a vaguely generic concept, which does not help as people seize on it as a possibility to be pursued. 
  
It will be interesting to see if the latest "social entrepreneurship" concepts fare any better - and if so, why and with what 
"success factors". 
 
First heard of PPP in 1991-92 when I was working at ADPC in Bangkok.  
 
21 Carin de Villiers 
Eskom Generation Group  
Senior Advisor - 
Communication 
Tel / Fax: 021 - 872-7214  
Cell: 083 679 1775 
In your experience, what is the success rate of public-private partnerships? -  6.  Encouraging, provided all the ground 
rules are laid out right from the beginning 
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E-mail: carin.devilliers@ 
eskom.co.za 
 
22 Andrei Iatsenia 
[iatsenia@un.org] 
Senior Adviser, 
Private-Public Partnerships, 
United Nations 
 
Mobile +41794698563 
Fax +41229178964 
 
International Environmental 
House II, 
Chemin de Balexert 7-9,  
CH-1219, 
Geneva, Switzerland 
 
 
23 Thomas Jeftha 
Department Social 
Development 
Directorate Monitoring and 
Evaluation 
14 Queen Victoria street 
4TH Floor, Union House 
Cape Town 
8000 
Tel : +2721 483 4624 
Fax : +2721 483 4555 
Cell : 083 463 4804 
E - mail : 
tjeftha@pgwc.gov.za 
 
Private Bag x 9112 
Cape Town 
8000 
South Africa 
 
Website: 
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http://www.capegateway. 
gov.za/socdev 
 
24 Amina Abdullah Al Balushi 
[AminaB@ 
omantourism.gov.om] 
Director of Tourism 
Statistics and Geographical 
Information, 
Oman 
 
 
25 Mark Pluke [Mark.Pluke@ 
capetown.gov.za] 
Disaster Risk Management 
City of Cape Town 
 
 
26 Pierre Combrinck 
[pierre@wofire.co.za] 
Working on Fire 
George, South Africa 
 
I only have experience relating to my time in Ukuvuka. I know we compiled a final report on the campaign which may 
be very useful. 
Luthfia, do you perhaps have an electronic copy of the final report and original business plan? 
Johan, my answers below, keeping in mind my experience as mentioned above 
 
Regards 
Pierre 
 
27 Suzanne L. Frew 
The Frew Group 
Multi-Cultural Risk 
Communications/Strategic 
Planning/Emergency 
Management 
510-289-1448 
suzanne@ 
thefrewgroup.com 
 
dear johan –  
 
i plan to respond to your email though have been hit with a very sick daughter and immediate departure for a national 
conference!  i promised terry that i would provide good intel. 
 
also, i hope to get you some from BENS.  please google the name, it is well worth your time. 
 
28 Oliver R. Davidson 
Senior Advisor 
Business Civic Leadership 
Center 
US Chamber of Commerce 
Johan, 
 
I will answer your questions, but I‘m copying several of my long time friends because they are specialists in some 
aspect of this subject.  I'm adding John Scott and Fred Krimgold who did ground breaking original research on this 
subject in the late 1980s.  
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Private-Public Partnerships 
PPPartners@Comcast.net 
301-548-7774 
 
Also, I‘m interested in their feedback on this issue.  The problem with general questions to many people is that some of 
us know a lot about this subject, or some aspect of it.  Others know less.  For example, John Twigg has done extensive 
research on this subject and his answers should carry more weight/respect than mine.  That said, here are some 
insights. 
Now that we have a real President, come see us!!!  
Regards to all, 
Ollie 
 
29 John Scott 
[jcscott@cpsc.com] 
 
Hello Johan (and friends)  
 
Prompted by others' comments, I'm using toothpicks to keep my eyes open while I try to get some thoughts for you at 
nearly 2:00 in the morning. There's more, I'm sure, but if I don't at least get something to you now, I don't know when I'll 
get to it.  Please contact me if you have any questions about my comments. 
 
Regards, 
 
John 
 
(Ollie:  you might get a kick out of the two attachments I'm sending to Johan.  It's a flashback when you see some of 
the names of the people and groups we worked with back then). 
 
Somewhere between Negative and Encouraging (I‘m not sure ―positive‖ is the right word.) 
 
See accompanying white paper I prepared for Ollie back in 1991 titled ―Sensitizing The Business Community To 
Opportunities For Disaster Preparedness‖.  I think it was probably one of the first of its kind.  I haven‘t read it for a 
while, and it might seem elementary now, but for background you might find it useful (note:  It was produced in some, 
now archaic, word processing software that is not all that compatible with Microsoft WORD, so the layout and 
pagination might be a little off).  Also attached is a paper I did during that same time period, entitled, ―Business and 
Community Partnerships in Disaster Preparedness, an Annotated Compendium‖ (same note regarding layout and 
pagination). 
 
30 nms/PROVINSIALE HOOF: 
MISDAADVOORKOMING: 
WES-KAAP 
f/PROVINCIAL HEAD: 
CRIME PREVENTION: 
WESTERN CAPE 
(N NILSSON) 
Tel: (021) 417 7206  
[As ons misdaad in die toekoms wil voorkom, dan MOET ons kinders vandag oortuig om standpunt teen misdaad in te 
neem].  
If we wish to prevent crime in the future, than we HAVE TO convince children today to take a stand against crime]. 
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Cell: 082 820 7512  
Fax: (021) 417 7264  
POLICE e-J: WC: 
Partnership Policing 
INTERNET e-J: 
wc.partnership@ 
saps.org.za 
 
31 Ingrid Hutty 
[ ingrid@tiscali.co.za] 
Ingrid Hutty - 082 456 5830 
Entrepreneurial Business 
Development & Project  
Co-ordination 
Too Blessed to be 
stressed 
 
Hullo, Johan! 
 
Thanks for the second reminder – and I do apologise for not getting back to you.  However, I was away and indisposed 
(at the same time) when your first request came in. 
 
As much as I value my friend, Annette‘s opinion, I do not feel that my experience is of sufficient academic nature to be 
of value in your research.  I am a project co-ordinator and intensely hands-on in what I do. Therefore the intellectual 
value is virtually zero. 
 
My real sentiment is that people are opportunists and will always find a way out of a difficult situation, whether imposed 
by law or just ‗suggested‘ (usually politically motivated) and suspect. 
 
Sadly, we do not have sufficient social anthropologists to properly and effectively see to the training aspects previously 
provided by artisan apprenticeships and now being given lip-service by the various committees hosting ‗talks-about-
talks‘ whilst hastily stuffing their pockets at the expense of those desperately needing skills.   
 
You are asking for success and failure models and I believe that it is too early to tell – things could still go either way & 
being the resourceful people we have proven ourselves to be, when the going gets tough, the tough get going and the 
next 2-3 years should be very interesting. 
 
I‘m sorry that you have had such poor response and input into your valuable work and am sorry that I cannot be of 
more help to you.   
 
Kind regards  
 
32 Mike McCall [mccall@itc.nl]  
 
To: Johan Minnie 
Subject: RE: Quick Partnership Questions 
 
how could i refuse such a request??! 
  
but Johan. what I'm not clear about is what kind of PPPs?  are you focusing on any particular type?  what i know most 
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about is not first hand experience and is PPP in the big world of infrastructure and services etc.  i don't think i really 
know much personally about PPP in education - we haven't tried joining up with private sector for courses, a little bit for 
sponsorship. 
therefore I'm not surprised not much response from our PPGIS D group, the partnerships they all deal with are partners 
between Donors - Govts - and NGOs – communities. 
  
cheers  
Mike 
 
Successful Partnerships: 
 
1. not an answer to this Qtn - but i suggest take a look at public sector services  which have been allowed by their 
Governments to act more like private business and compete in the commercial sector  eg. Danish State Railways, 
German State Railways, German & Dutch post offices.  Bank of China!!, China State Oil co.  (i dont know the specifics, 
but worth looking at>.   
 
Failed Partnerships: 
 
1. check the websites critical of EU spending  
 
2. ditto for critiques of UK PPP 
 
Question 5: 
 
In what year or in which 5-year period did you first encounter the term "Public-Private Partnership" 
 
Your answer: ___199?? 1995 or 6 probably.  (i had a new Prof. who was gung ho about PPP.  Willem van den Toorn, 
now retired ____ 
 
33 Jeroen Verplanke 
[verplanke@itc.nl]  
 
To: Johan Minnie 
Subject: RE: Quick Partnership Questions 
 
Hi Johan, 
 
Your questionnaire is hiding under my e-mail pile; I've been abroad so much that I still have a backlog of several 
hundreds of mails. Good thing you reminded me! Better for me to answer right away otherwise this one will also 
disappear in the black hole called "inbox"... My experience is a bit limited in this field so I couldn't provide you with 
actual examples. Hope the rest of my answers are of use. I hope you'll get some more responses to add to your 
research. 
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I'm off for a last trip this year next week to Mozambique (2 weeks course) and then I hope to stay at home a few 
months. Certainly because we're expecting our first family addition end of Feb.! 
  
Keep me posted on your research and your travels (if any). 
 
34 David Mwaniki, 
Group Chief Executive 
Global Crisis Solutions 
www.globalcrisissolutions. 
org 
 
Dear Johan,  
 
Happy New Year. I must start by apologizing for the delay in responding to your initial mail. I trust that you are well. 
I have attached a paper I did on partnerships for Actionaid international and I hope that it addresses the key questions 
you had asked. If this is too late then I apologize once more. 
 
Regards and keep in touch  
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 13 ANNEXURE C: COMPILATION OF IDENTIFIED SUCCESS 
FACTORS 
13.1 CONSOLIDATED SUCCESS FACTORS AT END OF CHAPTER 3 
1) Potential for synergy: 
a. The existence of potential for synergy between partners; 
2) Compatibility: 
a. Common ground in terms of political doctrine;  
b. Partners‘ procedures, systems and equipment are compatible; 
c. Compatible levels of technical expertise; 
d. Overcoming cultural and institutional differences;  
e. A common understanding of the concept of public-private partnership; 
f. Overcoming potential conflict caused by differences in philosophy; 
3) Supportive environment: 
a. Supportive legislative, policy and political environment; 
b. Supportive models of public-private interaction; 
c. Sufficient social capital to accommodate the social capital requirements 
of the partnership and/or sufficient time to build social capital;  
4) Leadership: 
a. Stable political leadership; 
b. High-profile proponents / champions of the model; 
c. Competent, motivated management; 
d. Favourable internal political environment;  
e. Appropriate levels of political involvement;  
5) Skills and capacity: 
a. Skills transfer possible from public to private sector; 
b. Financial capacity; 
6) Appropriate incentive structures: 
a. Profit potential for private sector; 
7) Partners ready for partnership: 
a. Organizational cultures receptive for partnership; 
b. Public sector commitment; 
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c. Public sector understanding of private sector incentives and NGO 
approaches; 
d. Genuine engagement of public sector with policies promoting 
partnership;  
e. Public sector inter-departmental cooperation in support of partnership;  
f. Price flexibility from private partner; 
g. Effective change management;  
h. Commitment: 
i. Willingness to invest time and effort; 
ii. Support of stakeholders; 
8) Stakeholder engagement: 
a. Honest, positive, transparent and constructive consultation with 
stakeholders; 
b. Real engagement of excluded voices;  
c. Understanding of and capacity for engagement with external and 
internal stakeholders;  
d. Effective communication across barriers such as language; 
e. Absence of gatekeepers and allegiances; 
9) Partnership establishment: 
a. Comprehensive all-stakeholder calculation of total benefit; 
b. Comprehensive partner-selection process; 
c. Effective contractual arrangements; 
d. Access to learning experiences from other partnerships; 
e. Appropriate delegation of powers from parent organizations: 
i. The representatives of the partners in the partnership have 
sufficient delegated decision-making powers; 
ii. Policy-making powers are delegated with care, if at all; 
10) Partnership character: 
a. The service involved is appropriate for delivery through partnership; 
b. Reasonabe resource costs; 
c. Clear, agreed goals; 
d. Achievement of an important social benefit; 
e. A focus on positive goals, positive social impact and public good; 
f. Increased effectiveness in use of resources; 
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11) Positive engagement with organized labour: 
a. Seeking labour support; 
b. Having due consideration for labour concerns and priorities; 
12) Achieving context specific requirements, such as black economic 
empowerment in South Africa; 
13) Internal governance of partnership: 
a. Reducing and managing complexity; 
b. Streamlined, appropriate procedures; 
c. Effective performance management; 
d. Formalized inclusive and consensual decision-making; 
e. Clear assignment of specific decision-making powers; 
f. Improved effectiveness and efficiency; 
g. Adequate skills and managerial capacity;  
14) Power relationships: 
a. Equality within partnership;  
b. Power sharing; 
c. Balancing of power; 
d. Balanced representivity. 
 
13.2 CONSOLIDATED SUCCESS FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN CHAPTER 4 
1) Leadership: 
a. Strong champion or driver; 
b. Visible political leadership; 
c. Strong leadership to overcome institutional inertia / resistance to 
change; 
d. Recognize the importance of perceptions among leadership; 
e. Strong individual champions in the private partner; 
f. Well-informed political leadership involvement from public partner. 
g. Good leadership and interpersonal relationships; 
h. Commitment of and leadership from top management in the public 
partner; 
i. Clear direction; 
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j. Clear division of responsibility of functions; 
2) Learning: 
a. Use lessons from private enterprise; 
b. Observe the ―generic observations‖ on partnership success; 
3) Common purpose, goal alignment, synergy and mutual benefit: 
a. Clarity and openness about individual and collective agendas and 
purpose; 
b. Confirm each partner‘s individual goals; 
c. Confirm the collective goal of the partnership; 
d. Synergy between individual and collective agendas; 
e. Synergy between individual, collective and societal benefits; 
f. Build real partnership, with shared burdens and shared rewards; 
g. Mutual benefit: 
i. Satisfaction of consumers, decision-makers and private partner; 
ii. The partnership should deliver mutual benefit; 
4) Partnership establishment: 
a. Seeing partnership formation as the formation of new for-profit 
enterprises based on social or environmental objectives and values; 
b. Support in the implementation of partnerships; 
c. Rationalize the number of partners; 
d. Understanding of the original partnering motivations and conditions; 
e. Focus the scope and content of the partnership arrangement; 
f. Establish appropriate organizational and contractual arrangements; 
g. Establish sound partnership principles; 
h. Expedite access to staff and premises for new suppliers; 
i. Confirm / ensure statutory and regulatory authorization; 
j. Create teams with diversity to encourage creativity; 
k. Focus on discovering and exploiting partnership opportunities; 
l. Structure the venture with an outcomes focus; 
m. Developing effective knowledge-sharing practices;  
n. Clear lines of accountability; 
o. Partnership design: 
i. Conduct a pre-partnership viability assessment; 
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ii. PPPs should be chosen as delivery mechanism only when the 
PPP model is appropriate to the circumstances; 
p. Structuring the partnership: 
i. Create new organizational collaboration and innovation space; 
ii. Clearly defined project organization structure; 
iii. Organizational flexibility; 
iv. Structure partnerships for success. 
v. Symmetry of information; 
vi. Establish institutional arrangements with care; 
q. Partner selection: 
i. Previous experience of partners in partnerships; 
ii. Open competition in the selection of partners; 
iii. An experienced and competent private partner; 
iv. Selecting partners with experience in the applicable field; 
v. Selecting a partner that can contribute the most value to the 
partnership; 
5) Power relationships: 
a. Understanding and adjusting for the influence of power relationships 
upon partnership governance; 
b. Capacity should be balanced in a partnership; 
6) Transparency and accountability: 
a. Transparent procurement processes; 
b. Stakeholders should be empowered to understand that which is 
supposed to be transparent; 
c. Fully transparent procurement system; 
d. Fighting corruption: 
i. Procedural disincentives for corruption; 
ii. Blacklisting of corrupt contractors; 
7) Performance management: 
a. Civil society assistance with performance measurement; 
b. Evaluation system (which could include inspection); 
c. Regular partnership review and reconsideration; 
d. Ongoing performance management; 
e. Shared and agreed performance measurement indicators; 
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f. Measure performance against individual and combined goals; 
g. Shared success or failure evaluation; 
h. Performance oriented goals; 
i. Clearly delineated metrics for performance and reporting; 
8) Internal governance: 
a. Correct choice of partnership model; 
b. Clear objectives, policies and principles; 
c. Simplified decision-making; 
d. Devolve authority for decision-making to the lowest possible level; 
e. Joint capacity building session; 
f. Environmental monitoring: 
i. Sensitivity to the environment and its influence on the 
partnership; 
ii. Ability to adapt to environmental changes.; 
iii. Consider the impact of external factors (environment / 
stakeholders); 
g. Sensitivity to environment / context; 
i. Achieve a fit between the industry evolution context, personal 
networks of entrepreneurs, behaviours of entrepreneurs, 
motivations of stakeholders, and the structures and strategies of 
the organization; 
ii. Consider political acceptability; 
h. Establish single coordination point; 
i. Manage authority vacuum through collegiate decision-making; 
j. Choose optimal organizational structure; 
k. Clearly defined method of dispute resolution; 
9) Contracting: 
a. Ensure tender invitations are complete with all necessary information; 
b. Standardized forms and methodology for bid adjudication; 
c. Fair contract enforcement mechanisms; 
d. Contract management to ensure adherence and punish non-
compliance; 
e. Contract design should reflect conditions; 
f. Contract management; 
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g. Contract negotiations; 
h. Don‘t get lost in the fine print; 
i. Detailed specifications; 
j. Simplify specifications by focusing on outputs and outcomes; 
k. Flexible contracts with simple, robust contract variation procedures; 
l. Properly designed contract; 
m. Clear description of the responsibilities of each partner; 
n. Open procurement process; 
o. Bid evaluation: 
i. Considering the appointment of external consultants to work with 
the government agency on the evaluation of bids; 
10) Cost management: 
a. Increased awareness of cost management among public staff; 
b. Integration of activities to enable cost sharing; 
c. Compare costs and performance with alternatives; 
d. Reduced transaction cost; 
e. Cost of product and service production must be determined; 
f. Compare information costs under alternatives; 
11) Stakeholder engagement: 
a. Clear identification of all stakeholders; 
b. Open and candid communication with all stakeholders, taking into 
regard the concerns and priorities of each stakeholder; 
c. Conscious stakeholder relationship management; 
d. Keep all stakeholders informed of all aspects of project, with specific 
focus on the intent, purpose, and means of implementation of the 
project; 
e. Counter misperceptions and myths through audience-appropriate, 
candid and factual information; 
f. Recognizing the role of civil society to act on behalf of the community; 
g. Policy statement to all stakeholders; 
h. Effective communication with all stakeholders;  
i. Engagement with organized labour: 
i. Consider organized labour opinions; 
j. Reduction in potential for political interference; 
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12) Effective communication: 
a. Communication responsibility should be shared among partners, and 
communication should come from the most appropriate partner for the 
specific communication; 
13) Collaboration: 
a. Develop a collaborative process; 
b. Provide incentives for effective collaboration; 
c. Experiment with collaboration options; 
d. Build interpersonal skills for collaboration; 
e. Build on the assets of potential partners; 
14) Supportive systems 
a. Procurement systems that support the partnership approach; 
b. Rally public, political and administrative support; 
c. Establish support mechanisms / partnership enablers; 
d. Strong local ownership; 
e. Community support; 
15) Supportive, enabling legal environment: 
a. A statutory foundation (enabling legal environment); 
b. Public officials must identify and remove legislative, regulatory and 
administrative impediments; 
c. Access to fair and unbiased judicial relief; 
d. Regulation to prevent abuse; 
16) Flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances: 
a. Flexibility - renegotiating outcomes based on changing conditions; 
b. Manage flexibly around key values and performance objectives; 
17) Commitment: 
a. Continued active involvement of public partner; 
b. Commitment to the partnership process by all partners; 
18) Financial analysis, planning and sustainability; 
a. Early appointment of a designated team or individual to identify finance 
sources; 
b. An assured income stream for the duration of the partnership; 
19) Service delivery: 
a. Understanding the business at hand, for example water and sanitation; 
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b. Quality focus; 
c. Services should be delivered in a manner that is safe to users; 
20) Human resources 
a. Skills: 
i. Strategic and financial skills within the public sector partner; 
ii. Strategic human capital plan to acquire the correct skills; 
iii. Appropriate skills within the public sector partner; 
iv. Build entrepreneurial skills; 
v. Workforce development plan; 
vi. Acquire new governance skills set; 
vii. Private sector experience for the public sector; 
viii. Invest in the best and brightest human capital for the public 
sector; 
ix. Develop appropriate set of core competencies; 
x. Appoint individuals with entrepreneurial experience and skills; 
xi. Invest in skills and competencies; 
xii. Public sector human capital in contract and network 
management; 
xiii. Improve capacity for tactical decision-making; 
b. Use people with a collaborative mindset; 
21) Partners contribute according to their capacity: 
a. Focus on the required public outcome; 
b. Aim to make meaningful enhancements to the status quo; 
c. Make meaningful, even if imperfect, enhancements to the status quo; 
d. First focus on public value, what public outcome must be produced; 
e. Manage around key values and performance objectives; 
22) Use public resources effectively and judiciously: 
a. Efficient utilization of scarce resources; 
b. Use land ownership as a way for the public to control the projects; 
23) Use all available resources, not only monetary, to bring partnerships together: 
a. Consider finance as a tool among many others; 
24) Reasonable expectation of private sector interest due to potential market; 
25) Public partner 
a. Strategic understanding of partnerships within the public sector partner; 
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b. Minimizing the bureaucratic procedures that can cripple a project; 
c. Support for public managers to explore and implement the PPP option; 
26) Compatibility: 
a. Shared applications (for example software); 
b. Similar technologies; 
c. Shared communication channels; 
d. Need to have ―shared semantics‖; 
e. A well-developed shared vocabulary; 
f. Shared experiences in field; 
g. Similar cultures; 
h. Cultures that embrace collaboration; 
i. Similar measurements of success; 
j. Synchronization of partners‘ business processes; 
k. Philosophical match between the private and public partners; 
27) Delivery of services that are accessible - easy to use and delivered in a 
manner and at a place which is convenient for the target market they are 
intended for; 
28) Value for money: 
a. Delivery of affordable services not exceeding public provision costs; 
i. Robust procurement methodology that ensures value for money; 
29) Opportunity for rewarding private partner for its involvement: 
a. Fair returns for private partners; 
b. Real incentives for the private sector; 
30) Risk management: 
a. Integrated risk management - clear and fair risk balance; 
b. Identify and actively manage risks; 
c. Clear risk allocation; 
31) Government oversight; 
32) Well-defined projects: 
a. Government must be sure of what it wants; 
b. Known outputs; 
c. Quantified process; 
d. Clear project definition and scope management; 
e. Ensure appropriate project handover that empowers the client; 
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33) Look at complete product life cycle, not only project life cycle; 
34) Pursue the triple bottom line: 
a. Greater environmental responsibility;  
b. Protection of the environment; 
c. Social equity and economic empowerment focus; 
35) Trust built on reciprocity. 
 
13.3 CONSOLIDATED SUCCESS FACTORS AT END OF CHAPTER 4 
1) Leadership: 
a. Strong leadership to overcome institutional inertia / resistance to 
change; 
i. Good leadership and interpersonal relationships; 
ii. Clear direction; 
b. Strong champion or driver; 
i. Strong individual champions in the private partner; 
c. Visible political leadership; 
i. Well-informed political leadership involvement from public 
partner. 
ii. Stable political leadership; 
iii. Appropriate levels of political involvement;  
d. Recognize the importance of perceptions among leadership; 
e. Commitment of and leadership from top management in the public 
partner; 
f. Clear division of responsibility of functions; 
g. High-profile proponents / champions of the model; 
h. Competent, motivated management; 
i. Favourable internal political environment;  
2) Partners ready for partnership: 
a. Trust built on reciprosity. 
b. Organizational cultures receptive for partnership; 
c. Public sector understanding of private sector incentives and NGO 
approaches; 
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d. Genuine engagement of public sector with policies promoting 
partnership;  
e. Public sector inter-departmental cooperation in support of partnership;  
f. Price flexibility from private partner; 
g. Effective change management;  
h. Commitment: 
i. Willingness to invest time and effort; 
ii. Support of stakeholders; 
iii. Continued active involvement of public partner; 
iv. Commitment to the partnership process by all partners;  
v. Public sector commitment; 
3) Learning: 
a. Use lessons from private enterprise; 
b. Observe the ―generic observations‖ on partnership success; 
4) Common purpose, goal alignment, synergy and mutual benefit: 
a. The existence of potential for synergy between partners; 
b. Clarity and openness about individual and collective agendas and 
purpose; 
c. Confirm each partner‘s individual goals; 
d. Confirm the collective goal of the partnership; 
e. Synergy between individual and collective agendas; 
f. Synergy between individual, collective and societal benefits; 
g. Build real partnership, with shared burdens and shared rewards; 
h. Mutual benefit: 
i. Satisfaction of consumers, decision-makers and private partner; 
ii. The partnership should deliver mutual benefit; 
5) Partnership establishment: 
a. Seeing partnership formation as the formation of new for-profit 
enterprises based on social or environmental objectives and values; 
b. Support in the implementation of partnerships; 
c. Rationalize the number of partners; 
d. Understanding of the original partnering motivations and conditions; 
e. Focus the scope and content of the partnership arrangement; 
f. Establish appropriate organizational and contractual arrangements; 
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g. Establish sound partnership principles; 
h. Expedite access to staff and premises for new suppliers; 
i. Confirm / ensure statutory and regulatory authorization; 
j. Create teams with diversity to encourage creativity; 
k. Focus on discovering and exploiting partnership opportunities; 
l. Structure the venture with an outcomes focus; 
m. Developing effective knowledge-sharing practices;  
n. Clear lines of accountability; 
o. Comprehensive all-stakeholder calculation of total benefit; 
p. Effective contractual arrangements; 
q. Access to learning experiences from other partnerships; 
r. Appropriate delegation of powers from parent organizations: 
i. The representatives of the partners in the partnership have 
sufficient delegated decision-making powers; 
ii. Policy-making powers are delegated with care, if at all; 
s. Partnership design: 
i. Conduct a pre-partnership viability assessment; 
ii. PPPs should be chosen as delivery mechanism only when the 
PPP model is appropriate to the circumstances; 
t. Structuring the partnership: 
i. Create new organizational collaboration and innovation space; 
ii. Clearly defined project organization structure; 
iii. Organizational flexibility; 
iv. Structure partnerships for success. 
v. Symmetry of information; 
vi. Establish institutional arrangements with care; 
u. Comprehensive partner-selection process; 
i. Previous experience of partners in partnerships; 
ii. Open competition in the selection of partners; 
iii. An experienced and competent private partner; 
iv. Selecting partners with experience in the applicable field; 
v. Selecting a partner that can contribute the most value to the 
partnership; 
6) Power relationships: 
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a. Understanding and adjusting for the influence of power relationships 
upon partnership governance; 
b. Capacity should be balanced in a partnership; 
c. Equality within partnership;  
d. Power sharing; 
e. Balancing of power; 
f. Balanced representivity. 
7) Transparency and accountability: 
a. Transparent procurement processes; 
b. Stakeholders should be empowered to understand that which is 
supposed to be transparent; 
c. Fully transparent procurement system; 
d. Fighting corruption: 
i. Procedural disincentives for corruption; 
ii. Blacklisting of corrupt contractors; 
8) Performance management: 
a. Civil society assistance with performance measurement; 
b. Evaluation system (which could include inspection); 
c. Regular partnership review and reconsideration; 
d. Ongoing performance management; 
e. Shared and agreed performance measurement indicators; 
f. Measure performance against individual and combined goals; 
g. Shared success or failure evaluation; 
h. Performance oriented goals; 
i. Clearly delineated metrics for performance and reporting; 
9) Internal governance: 
a. Correct choice of partnership model; 
b. Clear objectives, policies and principles; 
c. Simplified decision-making; 
d. Devolve authority for decision-making to the lowest possible level; 
e. Joint capacity building session; 
f. Environmental monitoring: 
i. Sensitivity to the environment and its influence on the 
partnership; 
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ii. Ability to adapt to environmental changes.; 
iii. Consider the impact of external factors (environment / 
stakeholders); 
g. Sensitivity to environment / context; 
i. Achieve a fit between the industry evolution context, personal 
networks of entrepreneurs, behaviours of entrepreneurs, 
motivations of stakeholders, and the structures and strategies of 
the organization; 
ii. Consider political acceptability; 
h. Establish single coordination point; 
i. Manage authority vacuum through collegiate decision-making; 
j. Choose optimal organizational structure; 
k. Clearly defined method of dispute resolution; 
l. Reducing and managing complexity; 
m. Streamlined, appropriate procedures; 
n. Effective performance management; 
o. Formalized inclusive and consensual decision-making; 
p. Clear assignment of specific decision-making powers; 
q. Improved effectiveness and efficiency; 
r. Adequate skills and managerial capacity;  
10) Contracting: 
a. Ensure tender invitations are complete with all necessary information; 
b. Standardized forms and methodology for bid adjudication; 
c. Fair contract enforcement mechanisms; 
d. Contract management to ensure adherence and punish non-
compliance; 
e. Contract design should reflect conditions; 
f. Contract management; 
g. Contract negotiations; 
h. Don‘t get lost in the fine print; 
i. Detailed specifications; 
j. Simplify specifications by focusing on outputs and outcomes; 
k. Flexible contracts with simple, robust contract variation procedures; 
l. Properly designed contract; 
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m. Clear description of the responsibilities of each partner; 
n. Open procurement process; 
o. Bid evaluation: 
i. Considering the appointment of external consultants to work with 
the government agency on the evaluation of bids; 
11) Cost management: 
a. Increased awareness of cost management among public staff; 
b. Integration of activities to enable cost sharing; 
c. Compare costs and performance with alternatives; 
d. Reduced transaction cost; 
e. Cost of product and service production must be determined; 
f. Compare information costs under alternatives; 
12) Stakeholder engagement: 
a. Clear identification of all stakeholders; 
b. Open and candid communication with all stakeholders, taking into 
regard the concerns and priorities of each stakeholder; 
c. Conscious stakeholder relationship management; 
d. Keep all stakeholders informed of all aspects of project, with specific 
focus on the intent, purpose, and means of implementation of the 
project; 
e. Counter misperceptions and myths through audience-appropriate, 
candid and factual information; 
f. Recognizing the role of civil society to act on behalf of the community; 
g. Policy statement to all stakeholders; 
h. Effective communication with all stakeholders;  
i. Engagement with organized labour 
i. Consider organized labour opinions; 
ii. Positive engagement with organized labour: 
iii. Seeking labour support; 
iv. Having due consideration for labour concerns and priorities; 
j. Reduction in potential for political interference; 
k. Honest, positive, transparent and constructive consultation with 
stakeholders; 
l. Real engagement of excluded voices;  
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m. Understanding of and capacity for engagement with external and 
internal stakeholders;  
n. Effective communication across barriers such as language; 
o. Absence of gatekeepers and allegiances; 
13) Effective communication: 
a. Communication responsibility should be shared among partners, and 
communication should come from the most appropriate partner for the 
specific communication; 
14) Collaboration: 
a. Develop a collaborative process; 
b. Provide incentives for effective collaboration; 
c. Experiment with collaboration options; 
d. Build interpersonal skills for collaboration: 
e. Build on the assets of potential partners; 
15) Supportive systems 
a. Procurement systems that support the partnership approach; 
b. Rally public, political and administrative support; 
c. Establish support mechanisms / partnership enablers; 
d. Strong local ownership: 
e. Community support; 
16) Supportive environment: 
a. Supportive policy and political environment; 
b. Supportive models of public-private interaction; 
c. Sufficient social capital to accommodate the social capital requirements 
of the partnership and/or sufficient time to build social capital;  
d. Supportive, enabling legal environment: 
i. A statutory foundation (enabling legal environment); 
ii. Public officials must identify and remove legislative, regulatory 
and administrative impediments; 
iii. Access to fair and unbiased judicial relief; 
iv. Regulation to prevent abuse; 
17) Flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances: 
a. Flexibility - renegotiating outcomes based on changing conditions; 
b. Manage flexibly around key values and performance objectives; 
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c. Achieving context specific requirements, such as black economic 
empowerment in South Africa; 
18) Financial analysis, planning and sustainability; 
a. Early appointment of a designated team or individual to identify finance 
sources; 
b. An assured income stream for the duration of the partnership; 
19) Service delivery: 
a. Understanding the business at hand, for example water and sanitation; 
b. Quality focus; 
c. Services should be delivered in a manner that is safe to users; 
d. Delivery of services that are accessible - easy to use and delivered in a 
manner and at a place which is convenient for the target market they 
are intended for; 
20) Human resources 
a. Skills: 
i. Strategic and financial skills within the public sector partner; 
ii. Strategic human capital plan to acquire the correct skills; 
iii. Appropriate skills within the public sector partner; 
iv. Build entrepreneurial skills; 
v. Workforce development plan; 
vi. Acquire new governance skills set; 
vii. Private sector experience for the public sector; 
viii. Invest in the best and brightest human capital for the public 
sector; 
ix. Develop appropriate set of core competencies; 
x. Appoint individuals with entrepreneurial experience and skills; 
xi. Invest in skills and competencies; 
xii. Public sector human capital in contract and network 
management; 
xiii. Improve capacity for tactical decision-making; 
b. Use people with a collaborative mindset; 
c. Skills transfer possible from public to private sector; 
d. Financial capacity; 
21) Partners contribute according to their capacity: 
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a. Focus on the required public outcome; 
b. Aim to make meaningful enhancements to the status quo; 
c. Make meaningful, even if imperfect, enhancements to the status quo; 
d. First focus on public value, what public outcome must be produced; 
e. Manage around key values and performance objectives; 
22) Use public resources effectively and judiciously: 
a. Efficient utilization of scarce resources; 
b. Use land ownership as a way for the public to control the projects; 
23) Use all available resources, not only monetary, to bring partnerships together: 
a. Consider finance as a tool among many others; 
24) Willing private partner: 
a. Appropriate incentive and reward structures; 
b. Profit potential for private sector; 
c. Fair returns for private partners; 
d. Real incentives for the private sector 
e. Market opportunity 
i. Reasonable expectation of private sector interest due to potential 
market; 
25) Willing public partner 
a. Strategic understanding of partnerships within the public sector partner; 
b. Minimizing the bureaucratic procedures that can cripple a project; 
c. Support for public managers to explore and implement the PPP option; 
26) Compatibility: 
a. Shared applications (for example software); 
b. Similar technologies, procedures, systems and equipment; 
c. Shared communication channels; 
d. Shared semantics 
e. A well-developed shared vocabulary; 
f. Shared experiences in field; 
g. Similar cultures or overcoming cultural and institutional differences;  
h. Cultures that embrace collaboration; 
i. Similar measurements of success; 
j. Synchronization of partners‘ business processes; 
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k. Philosophical match between the private and public partners or 
overcoming potential conflict caused by differences in philosophy; 
l. Common ground in terms of political doctrine;  
m. Compatible levels of technical expertise; 
n. A common understanding of the concept of public-private partnership; 
27) Value for money: 
a. Delivery of affordable services not exceeding public provision costs; 
b. Robust procurement methodology that ensures value for money; 
28) Risk management: 
a. Integrated risk management - clear and fair risk balance; 
b. Identify and actively manage risks; 
c. Clear risk allocation; 
29) Government oversight; 
30) Well-defined projects: 
a. Government must be sure of what it wants; 
b. Known outputs; 
c. Quantified process; 
d. Clear project definition and scope management; 
e. Ensure appropriate project handover that empowers the client; 
31) Look at complete product life cycle, not only project life cycle; 
32) Pursue the triple bottom line: 
a. Greater environmental responsibility;  
b. Protection of the environment; 
c. Social equity and economic empowerment focus; 
33) Partnership character: 
a. The service involved is appropriate for delivery through partnership; 
b. Reasonable resource costs; 
c. Clear, agreed goals; 
d. Achievement of an important social benefit; 
e. A focus on positive goals, positive social impact and public good; 
f. Increased effectiveness in use of resources; 
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13.4 CONSOLIDATED SUCCESS FACTORS FROM CHAPTER 5 
1) Strong programme conceptualization; 
a. A public need is met: 
i. Private sector provides a traditionally public service against an 
outputs-based specification for a significant period of time; 
b. Prepare and oversee an agreed strategy; 
c. Common vision and objective; 
d. Defined purpose; 
e. Clearly identified pre-determined goals or outcomes for the partnership; 
f. Clear mandates and authority; 
g. Clarity, plausibility, feasibility, and appropriateness of programme 
theory which shows cause-effect relationships leading to required 
outcome; 
h. Shared project design and planning; 
i. Consider context in establishing mission and objectives; 
j. Appropriate performance indicators for which data is available and 
collection is feasible; 
k. Focus on appropriate product development and service delivery; 
l. Know what customers expect; 
m. Select correct service design standards; 
2) Recognisable institutional form created: 
a. Involvement of both public and private sectors; 
b. Several stakeholders involved; 
c. Contractual arrangement in place; 
d. Defined structural relationships; 
e. Limited governance and delivery gaps; 
f. Low overlap and duplication; 
3) Internal management: 
a. Efficient knowledge and information management; 
b. Defined and efficient decision-making; 
c. Use of appropriate management instruments; 
d. Appropriate levels of formality; 
4) Public leadership: 
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a. Protection against political interference; 
b. Policy consistency; 
5) Partner readiness for partnership: 
a. Partners able to pursue individual goals; 
b. Partners contribute portions of resources; 
c. Partners contribute according to own comparative advantage; 
d. Available potential partners; 
e. Previous partnership experience; 
6) Supportive environment: 
a. Stakeholder support; 
b. Citizen and community interest and involvement; 
7) Risk management: 
a. Risk transfer to private sector; 
b. Risk sharing; 
8) Mutual benefit: 
a. All partners obtain pre-defined benefit; 
b. Private sector receives benefit / award; 
9) Goal achievement: 
a. Achievement by the partnership of desired goals or outcomes; 
b. Role-players achieve common goals; 
10) Performance management: 
a. Outcomes-based performance measurement and management; 
b. Measure performance against mission / objectives; 
c. Effective, unbiased programme evaluation; 
d. Programme impact is aligned to outputs specified in programme theory; 
e. Goals are actively pursued and performance of the partnership is 
monitored and evaluated against these goals; 
f. Deliver to service standards; 
g. Match performance to promises; 
11) Purposeful collaboration: 
a. Appropriate levels of integration and coordination; 
b. Appropriate levels of interdependence; 
c. Sustained collaborative effort; 
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d. Intra-partnership awareness of other partners‘ missions, goals and 
objectives; 
e. Role-players pool and share resources; 
f. Public sector remains significant role-player; 
g. Mobilization of a coalition of interests drawn from more than one sector. 
 
13.5 CONSOLIDATED SUCCESS FACTORS AT END OF CHAPTER 5 
1) Leadership: 
a. Strong leadership to overcome institutional inertia / resistance to 
change; 
i. Good leadership and interpersonal relationships; 
ii. Clear direction; 
b. Strong champion or driver; 
i. Strong individual champions in the private partner; 
c. Visible political leadership; 
i. Well-informed political leadership involvement from public 
partner; 
ii. Stable political leadership; 
iii. Appropriate levels of political involvement;  
iv. Protection against political interference; 
v. Policy consistency; 
d. Recognize the importance of perceptions among leadership; 
e. Commitment of and leadership from top management in the public 
partner; 
f. Clear division of responsibility of functions; 
g. High-profile proponents / champions of the model; 
h. Competent, motivated management; 
i. Favourable internal political environment;  
2) Partners ready for partnership: 
a. Partners able to pursue individual goals; 
b. Partners contribute portions of resources; 
c. Partners contribute according to own comparative advantage; 
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d. Available potential partners; 
e. Previous partnership experience; 
f. Trust built on reciprocity; 
g. Organizational cultures receptive for partnership; 
h. Public sector understanding of private sector incentives and NGO 
approaches; 
i. Genuine engagement of public sector with policies promoting 
partnership;  
j. Public sector inter-departmental cooperation in support of partnership;  
k. Price flexibility from private partner; 
l. Effective change management;  
m. Commitment: 
i. Willingness to invest time and effort; 
ii. Support of stakeholders; 
iii. Continued active involvement of public partner; 
iv. Commitment to the partnership process by all partners;  
v. Public sector commitment; 
3) Learning: 
a. Use lessons from private enterprise; 
b. Observe the ―generic observations‖ on partnership success; 
4) Common purpose, goal alignment, synergy and mutual benefit: 
a. The existence of potential for synergy between partners; 
b. Clarity and openness about individual and collective agendas and 
purpose; 
c. Confirm each partner‘s individual goals; 
d. Confirm the collective goal of the partnership; 
e. Synergy between individual and collective agendas; 
f. Synergy between individual, collective and societal benefits; 
g. Build real partnership, with shared burdens and shared rewards; 
h. Mutual benefit: 
i. Satisfaction of consumers, decision-makers and private partner; 
ii. The partnership should deliver mutual benefit; 
iii. All partners obtain pre-defined benefit; 
iv. Private sector receives benefit / award; 
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5) Goal achievement: 
a. Achievement by the partnership of desired goals or outcomes; 
b. Role-players achieve common goals; 
6) Partnership establishment: 
a. Seeing partnership formation as the formation of new for-profit 
enterprises based on social or environmental objectives and values; 
b. Support in the implementation of partnerships; 
c. Rationalize the number of partners; 
d. Understanding of the original partnering motivations and conditions; 
e. Focus the scope and content of the partnership arrangement; 
f. Establish appropriate organizational and contractual arrangements; 
g. Establish sound partnership principles; 
h. Expedite access to staff and premises for new suppliers; 
i. Confirm / ensure statutory and regulatory authorization; 
j. Create teams with diversity to encourage creativity; 
k. Focus on discovering and exploiting partnership opportunities; 
l. Structure the venture with an outcomes focus; 
m. Developing effective knowledge-sharing practices;  
n. Clear lines of accountability; 
o. Comprehensive all-stakeholder calculation of total benefit; 
p. Effective contractual arrangements; 
q. Access to learning experiences from other partnerships; 
r. Appropriate delegation of powers from parent organizations: 
i. The representatives of the partners in the partnership have 
sufficient delegated decision-making powers; 
ii. Policy-making powers are delegated with care, if at all; 
s. Partnership design: 
i. Conduct a pre-partnership viability assessment; 
ii. PPPs should be chosen as delivery mechanism only when the 
PPP model is appropriate to the circumstances; 
t. Structuring the partnership: 
i. Create new organizational collaboration and innovation space; 
ii. Clearly defined project organization structure; 
iii. Organizational flexibility; 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 608 
iv. Structure partnerships for success. 
v. Symmetry of information; 
vi. Establish institutional arrangements with care; 
u. Comprehensive partner-selection process; 
i. Previous experience of partners in partnerships; 
ii. Open competition in the selection of partners; 
iii. An experienced and competent private partner; 
iv. Selecting partners with experience in the applicable field; 
v. Selecting a partner that can contribute the most value to the 
partnership; 
v. Recognisable institutional form created: 
i. Involvement of both public and private sectors; 
ii. Several stakeholders involved; 
iii. Contractual arrangement in place; 
iv. Defined structural relationships; 
v. Limited governance and delivery gaps; 
vi. Low overlap and duplication; 
7) Power relationships: 
a. Understanding and adjusting for the influence of power relationships 
upon partnership governance; 
b. Capacity should be balanced in a partnership; 
c. Equality within partnership;  
d. Power sharing; 
e. Balancing of power; 
f. Balanced representivity. 
8) Transparency and accountability: 
a. Transparent procurement processes; 
b. Stakeholders should be empowered to understand that which is 
supposed to be transparent; 
c. Fully transparent procurement system; 
d. Fighting corruption: 
i. Procedural disincentives for corruption; 
ii. Blacklisting of corrupt contractors; 
9) Performance management: 
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a. Civil society assistance with performance measurement; 
b. Evaluation system (which could include inspection); 
c. Regular partnership review and reconsideration; 
d. Ongoing performance management; 
e. Shared and agreed performance measurement indicators; 
f. Measure performance against individual and combined goals; 
g. Shared success or failure evaluation; 
h. Performance oriented goals; 
i. Clearly delineated metrics for performance and reporting; 
j. Outcomes-based performance measurement and management; 
k. Measure performance against mission / objectives; 
l. Effective, unbiased programme evaluation; 
m. Programme impact is aligned to outputs specified in programme theory; 
n. Goals are actively pursued and performance of the partnership is 
monitored and evaluated against these goals; 
o. Deliver to service standards; 
p. Match performance to promises; 
10) Internal governance: 
a. Correct choice of partnership model; 
b. Clear objectives, policies and principles; 
c. Simplified decision-making; 
d. Devolve authority for decision-making to the lowest possible level; 
e. Joint capacity building session; 
f. Environmental monitoring: 
i. Sensitivity to the environment and its influence on the 
partnership; 
ii. Ability to adapt to environmental changes; 
iii. Consider the impact of external factors (environment / 
stakeholders); 
g. Sensitivity to environment / context; 
i. Achieve a fit between the industry evolution context, personal 
networks of entrepreneurs, behaviours of entrepreneurs, 
motivations of stakeholders, and the structures and strategies of 
the organization; 
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ii. Consider political acceptability; 
h. Establish single coordination point; 
i. Manage authority vacuum through collegiate decision-making; 
j. Choose optimal organizational structure; 
k. Clearly defined method of dispute resolution; 
l. Reducing and managing complexity; 
m. Streamlined, appropriate procedures; 
n. Effective performance management; 
o. Formalized inclusive and consensual decision-making; 
p. Clear assignment of specific decision-making powers; 
q. Improved effectiveness and efficiency; 
r. Adequate skills and managerial capacity;  
s. Efficient knowledge and information management; 
t. Defined and efficient decision-making; 
u. Use of appropriate management instruments; 
v. Appropriate levels of formality; 
11) Contracting: 
a. Ensure tender invitations are complete with all necessary information; 
b. Standardized forms and methodology for bid adjudication; 
c. Fair contract enforcement mechanisms; 
d. Contract management to ensure adherence and punish non-
compliance; 
e. Contract design should reflect conditions; 
f. Contract management; 
g. Contract negotiations; 
h. Don‘t get lost in the fine print; 
i. Detailed specifications; 
j. Simplify specifications by focusing on outputs and outcomes; 
k. Flexible contracts with simple, robust contract variation procedures; 
l. Properly designed contract; 
m. Clear description of the responsibilities of each partner; 
n. Open procurement process; 
o. Bid evaluation: 
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i. Considering the appointment of external consultants to work with 
the government agency on the evaluation of bids; 
12) Cost management: 
a. Increased awareness of cost management among public staff; 
b. Integration of activities to enable cost sharing; 
c. Compare costs and performance with alternatives; 
d. Reduced transaction cost; 
e. Cost of product and service production must be determined; 
f. Compare information costs under alternatives; 
13) Stakeholder engagement: 
a. Clear identification of all stakeholders; 
b. Open and candid communication with all stakeholders, taking into 
regard the concerns and priorities of each stakeholder; 
c. Conscious stakeholder relationship management; 
d. Keep all stakeholders informed of all aspects of project, with specific 
focus on the intent, purpose, and means of implementation of the 
project; 
e. Counter misperceptions and myths through audience-appropriate, 
candid and factual information; 
f. Recognizing the role of civil society to act on behalf of the community; 
g. Policy statement to all stakeholders; 
h. Effective communication with all stakeholders;  
i. Engagement with organized labour: 
i. Consider organized labour opinions; 
ii. Positive engagement with organized labour: 
iii. Seeking labour support; 
iv. Having due consideration for labour concerns and priorities; 
j. Reduction in potential for political interference; 
k. Honest, positive, transparent and constructive consultation with 
stakeholders; 
l. Real engagement of excluded voices;  
m. Understanding of and capacity for engagement with external and 
internal stakeholders;  
n. Effective communication across barriers such as language; 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 612 
o. Absence of gatekeepers and allegiances; 
14) Effective communication: 
a. Communication responsibility should be shared among partners, and 
communication should come from the most appropriate partner for the 
specific communication; 
15) Purposeful collaboration: 
a. Develop a collaborative process; 
b. Provide incentives for effective collaboration; 
c. Experiment with collaboration options; 
d. Build interpersonal skills for collaboration; 
e. Build on the assets of potential partners; 
f. Appropriate levels of integration and coordination; 
g. Appropriate levels of interdependence; 
h. Sustained collaborative effort; 
i. Intra-partnership awareness of other partners‘ missions, goals and 
objectives; 
j. Role-players pool and share resources; 
k. Public sector remains significant role-player; 
l. Mobilization of a coalition of interests drawn from more than one sector; 
16) Supportive systems: 
a. Procurement systems that support the partnership approach; 
b. Rally public, political and administrative support; 
c. Establish support mechanisms / partnership enablers; 
d. Strong local ownership: 
e. Community support; 
17) Supportive environment: 
a. Supportive policy and political environment; 
b. Supportive models of public-private interaction; 
c. Sufficient social capital to accommodate the social capital requirements 
of the partnership and/or sufficient time to build social capital;  
d. Supportive, enabling legal environment: 
i. A statutory foundation (enabling legal environment); 
ii. Public officials must identify and remove legislative, regulatory 
and administrative impediments; 
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iii. Access to fair and unbiased judicial relief; 
iv. Regulation to prevent abuse; 
e. Stakeholder support; 
f. Citizen and community interest and involvement; 
18) Flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances: 
a. Flexibility - renegotiating outcomes based on changing conditions; 
b. Manage flexibly around key values and performance objectives; 
c. Achieving context specific requirements, such as black economic 
empowerment in South Africa; 
19) Financial analysis, planning and sustainability; 
a. Early appointment of a designated team or individual to identify finance 
sources; 
b. An assured income stream for the duration of the partnership; 
20) Service delivery: 
a. Understanding the business at hand, e.g. water and sanitation; 
b. Quality focus; 
c. Services should be delivered in a manner that is safe to users; 
d. Delivery of services that are accessible - easy to use and delivered in a 
manner and at a place which is convenient for the target market they 
are intended for; 
21) Human resources 
a. Skills: 
i. Strategic and financial skills within the public sector partner; 
ii. Strategic human capital plan to acquire the correct skills; 
iii. Appropriate skills within the public sector partner; 
iv. Build entrepreneurial skills; 
v. Workforce development plan; 
vi. Acquire new governance skills set; 
vii. Private sector experience for the public sector; 
viii. Invest in the best and brightest human capital for the public 
sector; 
ix. Develop appropriate set of core competencies  
x. Appoint individuals with entrepreneurial experience and skills; 
xi. Invest in skills and competencies; 
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xii. Public sector human capital in contract and network 
management; 
xiii. Improve capacity for tactical decision-making; 
b. Use people with a collaborative mindset; 
c. Skills transfer possible from public to private sector; 
d. Financial capacity; 
22) Partners contribute according to their capacity: 
a. Focus on the required public outcome; 
b. Aim to make meaningful enhancements to the status quo; 
c. Make meaningful, even if imperfect, enhancements to the status quo; 
d. First focus on public value, what public outcome must be produced; 
e. Manage around key values and performance objectives; 
23) Use public resources effectively and judiciously; 
a. Efficient utilization of scarce resources: 
b. Use land ownership as a way for the public to control the projects; 
24) Use all available resources, not only monetary, to bring partnerships together; 
a. Consider finance as a tool among many others; 
25) Willing private partner: 
a. Appropriate incentive and reward structures: 
b. Profit potential for private sector; 
c. Fair returns for private partners; 
d. Real incentives for the private sector; 
e. Market opportunity 
i. Reasonable expectation of private sector interest due to potential 
market; 
26) Willing public partner: 
a. Strategic understanding of partnerships within the public sector partner; 
b. Minimizing the bureaucratic procedures that can cripple a project; 
c. Support for public managers to explore and implement the PPP option; 
27) Compatibility: 
a. Shared applications (e.g. software); 
b. Similar technologies, procedures, systems and equipment; 
c. Shared communication channels; 
d. Shared semantics; 
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e. A well-developed shared vocabulary; 
f. Shared experiences in field; 
g. Similar cultures or overcoming cultural and institutional differences;  
h. Cultures that embrace collaboration; 
i. Similar measurements of success; 
j. Synchronization of partners‘ business processes; 
k. Philosophical match between the private and public partners or 
overcoming potential conflict caused by differences in philosophy; 
l. Common ground in terms of political doctrine;  
m. Compatible levels of technical expertise; 
n. A common understanding of the concept of public-private partnership; 
28) Value for money: 
a. Delivery of affordable services not exceeding public provision costs; 
b. Robust procurement methodology that ensures value for money; 
29) Risk management: 
a. Integrated risk management - clear and fair risk balance; 
b. Identify and actively manage risks; 
c. Clear risk allocation; 
d. Risk transfer to private sector; 
e. Risk sharing; 
30) Government oversight; 
31) Strong programme conceptualization; 
a. A public need is met: 
i. Private sector provides a traditionally public service against an 
outputs-based specification for a significant period of time; 
b. Prepare and oversee an agreed strategy; 
c. Common vision and objective; 
d. Defined purpose; 
e. Clearly identified pre-determined goals or outcomes for the partnership; 
f. Clear mandates and authority; 
g. Clarity, plausibility, feasibility, and appropriateness of programme 
theory which shows cause-effect relationships leading to required 
outcome; 
h. Shared project design and planning; 
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i. Consider context in establishing mission and objectives; 
j. Appropriate performance indicators for which data is available and 
collection is feasible; 
k. Government must be sure of what it wants; 
l. Known outputs; 
m. Quantified process; 
n. Clear project definition and scope management; 
o. Ensure appropriate project handover that empowers the client; 
p. Focus on appropriate product development and service delivery; 
q. Know what customers expect; 
r. Select correct service design standards; 
32) Look at complete product life cycle, not only project life cycle; 
33) Pursue the triple bottom line: 
a. Greater environmental responsibility;  
b. Protection of the environment; 
c. Social equity and economic empowerment focus; 
34) Partnership character: 
a. The service involved is appropriate for delivery through partnership; 
b. Reasonable resource costs; 
c. Clear, agreed goals; 
d. Achievement of an important social benefit; 
e. A focus on positive goals, positive social impact and public good; 
a. Increased effectiveness in use of resources; 
 
13.6 CONSOLIDATED SUCCESS FACTORS FROM CHAPTER 6 
1) Formal agreements are not necessarily required to make a partnership 
successful; 
2) Circumstances that force a collective response: 
a. Common fear of an external threat can motivate parties to form 
partnerships and ensure that such partnerships work; 
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b. The need for a survival strategy can be an indicator for motivation to 
ensure success – a crisis ensures focused collaboration and increase 
the chance of success; 
3) Real collaboration: 
a. Honest, sincere and respectful collaboration in meetings; 
4) Procurement / contracting: 
a. Robust internal process to evaluate proposals; 
5) Financial control: 
a. Transparency in financial management; 
b. Joint control of partnership funds; 
c. Joint prioritization of spending; 
6) Internal relationship management: 
a. Equality within the partnership; 
b. Openness and communication; 
c. Conflict management; 
d. Positive attitudes; 
e. Goodwill; 
f. Transparent decision-making processes; 
g. Willingness and ability to trust the partnership; 
7) Structuring partnership processes: 
a. Established, respected processes; 
b. Participation in rule-setting; 
c. Transparency and peer review within partnership; 
d. Clear purpose, roles and responsibilities; 
e. Joint decision-making; 
i. Purposeful collaboration; 
8) Customer service focus: 
a. Right service at the right place at the right time; 
b. Understanding the value of clients‘ perspectives;  
c. Focus on high priority areas and clients (e.g. deprived areas for social 
programmes); 
9) Collaborative innovation: 
a. Flexibility to exploit opportunities; 
b. Focus on innovation and improving the status quo; 
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10) Satisfying context-specific legal requirements, such as BEE In South Africa; 
11) Comprehensive preparations for programme conceptualization: 
a. Pre-contract / Conceptualization: 
i. Proposed public partners need to agree to establishment; 
ii. Availability of financing; 
iii. Following due legal process; 
iv. Properly mandated representatives; 
v. Market research; 
b. Well-defined procurement process; 
c. Source expert advice in contracting phase; 
d. Transparency and accountability; 
12) Benefits and incentives: 
a. All partners should be able to benefit; 
13) Supportive environment: 
a. The project is a priority within a strategic plan; 
b. Stakeholder and community support and involvement; 
c. Stakeholder support; 
14) Supportive public sector: 
a. Public political will; 
b. High-level political leadership / champion; 
c. Active public sector involvement; 
15) A public need exists which was not satisfied by government: 
a. A market or demand exists for the service; 
b. A public need must exist; 
c. A market exists for the service being delivered; 
d. Sufficient public users of the service (market);  
e. Satisfying a public necessity - modern cities require modern transport 
structure; 
f. If a sector (either public or private) fails to provide a required service 
and the need still exists, PPPs are possible; 
g. A market for a specific public service exists but is not satisfied by the 
existing public or private sector; 
16) Commitment: 
a. Commitment to partnership goals; 
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17) Partner selection: 
a. Experience in the service to be delivered; 
b. Partners contribute according to their strengths; each partner to 
contribute according to its own strengths; 
c. Different types of risk are carried by the partner most suitable for it; 
d. Available potential partners with the capacity to participate; 
e. Local entrepreneurship. 
 
13.7 CONSOLIDATED SUCCESS FACTORS AT END OF CHAPTER 6 
1) Leadership: 
a. Strong leadership to overcome institutional inertia / resistance to 
change: 
i. Good leadership and interpersonal relationships; 
ii. Clear direction; 
b. Strong champion or driver: 
i. Strong individual champions in the private partner; 
c. Visible political leadership: 
i. Well-informed political leadership involvement from public 
partner; 
ii. Stable political leadership; 
iii. Appropriate levels of political involvement;  
iv. Protection against political interference; 
v. Policy consistency; 
d. Recognize the importance of perceptions among leadership; 
e. Commitment of and leadership from top management in the public 
partner; 
f. Clear division of responsibility of functions; 
g. High-profile proponents / champions of the model; 
h. Competent, motivated management; 
i. Favourable internal political environment;  
2) Partners ready for partnership: 
a. Partners able to pursue individual goals; 
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b. Partners contribute portions of resources; 
c. Partners contribute according to own comparative advantage; 
d. Available potential partners; 
e. Previous partnership experience; 
f. Trust built on reciprocity; 
g. Organizational cultures receptive for partnership; 
h. Public sector understanding of private sector incentives and NGO 
approaches; 
i. Genuine engagement of public sector with policies promoting 
partnership;  
j. Public sector inter-departmental cooperation in support of partnership;  
k. Price flexibility from private partner; 
l. Effective change management;  
m. Commitment: 
i. Willingness to invest time and effort; 
ii. Support of stakeholders; 
iii. Continued active involvement of public partner; 
iv. Commitment to the partnership process by all partners;  
v. Public sector commitment; 
3) Learning: 
a. Use lessons from private enterprise; 
b. Observe the ―generic observations‖ on partnership success; 
4) Common purpose, goal alignment, synergy and mutual benefit: 
a. The existence of potential for synergy between partners; 
b. Clarity and openness about individual and collective agendas and 
purpose; 
c. Confirm each partner‘s individual goals; 
d. Confirm the collective goal of the partnership; 
e. Synergy between individual and collective agendas; 
f. Synergy between individual, collective and societal benefits; 
g. Build real partnership, with shared burdens and shared rewards; 
h. Mutual benefit: 
i. Satisfaction of consumers, decision-makers and private partner; 
ii. The partnership should deliver mutual benefit; 
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iii. All partners obtain pre-defined benefit; 
iv. Private sector receives benefit / award; 
v. All partners should be able to benefit; 
5) Goal achievement: 
a. Achievement by the partnership of desired goals or outcomes; 
b. Role-players achieve common goals; 
6) Partnership establishment: 
a. Seeing partnership formation as the formation of new for-profit 
enterprises based on social or environmental objectives and values; 
b. Support in the implementation of partnerships; 
c. Rationalize the number of partners; 
d. Understanding of the original partnering motivations and conditions; 
e. Focus the scope and content of the partnership arrangement; 
f. Establish appropriate organizational and contractual arrangements; 
g. Establish sound partnership principles; 
h. Expedite access to staff and premises for new suppliers; 
i. Confirm / ensure statutory and regulatory authorization; 
j. Create teams with diversity to encourage creativity; 
k. Focus on discovering and exploiting partnership opportunities; 
l. Structure the venture with an outcomes focus; 
m. Developing effective knowledge-sharing practices;  
n. Clear lines of accountability; 
o. Comprehensive all-stakeholder calculation of total benefit; 
p. Effective contractual arrangements; 
q. Access to learning experiences from other partnerships; 
r. Appropriate delegation of powers from parent organizations: 
i. The representatives of the partners in the partnership have 
sufficient delegated decision-making powers; 
ii. Policy-making powers are delegated with care, if at all; 
s. Partnership design: 
i. Conduct a pre-partnership viability assessment; 
ii. PPPs should be chosen as delivery mechanism only when the 
PPP model is appropriate to the circumstances; 
t. Structuring the partnership: 
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i. Create new organizational collaboration and innovation space; 
ii. Clearly defined project organization structure; 
iii. Organizational flexibility; 
iv. Structure partnerships for success; 
v. Symmetry of information; 
vi. Establish institutional arrangements with care; 
u. Comprehensive partner-selection process; 
i. Previous experience of partners in partnerships; 
ii. Open competition in the selection of partners; 
iii. An experienced and competent private partner; 
iv. Selecting partners with experience in the applicable field; 
v. Selecting a partner that can contribute the most value to the 
partnership; 
vi. Partners contribute according to their strengths; 
vii. Different types of risk are carried by the partner most suitable for 
it; 
viii. Available potential partners with the capacity to participate; 
ix. Local entrepreneurship; 
v. Recognizable institutional form created: 
i. Involvement of both public and private sectors; 
ii. Several stakeholders involved; 
iii. Contractual arrangement in place; 
iv. Defined structural relationships; 
v. Limited governance and delivery gaps; 
vi. Low overlap and duplication; 
7) Power relationships: 
a. Understanding and adjusting for the influence of power relationships 
upon partnership governance; 
b. Capacity should be balanced in a partnership; 
c. Equality within partnership;  
d. Power sharing; 
e. Balancing of power; 
f. Balanced representivity; 
8) Transparency and accountability: 
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a. Transparent procurement processes; 
b. Stakeholders should be empowered to understand that which is 
supposed to be transparent; 
c. Fully transparent procurement system; 
d. Fighting corruption: 
i. Procedural disincentives for corruption; 
ii. Blacklisting of corrupt contractors; 
9) Performance management: 
a. Civil society assistance with performance measurement; 
b. Evaluation system (which could include inspection); 
c. Regular partnership review and reconsideration; 
d. Ongoing performance management; 
e. Shared and agreed performance measurement indicators; 
f. Measure performance against individual and combined goals; 
g. Shared success or failure evaluation; 
h. Performance oriented goals; 
i. Clearly delineated metrics for performance and reporting; 
j. Outcomes-based performance measurement and management; 
k. Measure performance against mission / objectives; 
l. Effective, unbiased programme evaluation; 
m. Programme impact is aligned to outputs specified in programme theory; 
n. Goals are actively pursued and performance of the partnership is 
monitored and evaluated against these goals; 
o. Deliver to service standards; 
p. Match performance to promises; 
10) Internal governance: 
a. Correct choice of partnership model; 
b. Clear objectives, policies and principles; 
c. Simplified joint decision-making; 
d. Devolve authority for decision-making to the lowest possible level; 
e. Joint capacity building session; 
f. Environmental monitoring: 
i. Sensitivity to the environment and its influence on the 
partnership; 
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ii. Ability to adapt to environmental changes; 
iii. Consider the impact of external factors (environment / 
stakeholders); 
g. Sensitivity to environment / context: 
i. Achieve a fit between the industry evolution context, personal 
networks of entrepreneurs, behaviours of entrepreneurs, 
motivations of stakeholders, and the structures and strategies of 
the organization; 
ii. Consider political acceptability; 
h. Establish single coordination point; 
i. Manage authority vacuum through collegiate decision-making; 
j. Choose optimal organizational structure; 
k. Clearly defined method of dispute resolution; 
l. Reducing and managing complexity; 
m. Streamlined, appropriate, respected procedures; 
n. Effective performance management; 
o. Formalized inclusive and consensual decision-making; 
p. Clear assignment of specific decision-making powers; 
q. Improved effectiveness and efficiency; 
r. Adequate skills and managerial capacity;  
s. Efficient knowledge and information management; 
t. Defined and efficient decision-making; 
u. Use of appropriate management instruments; 
v. Appropriate levels of formality; 
w. Participate rule-setting; 
x. Transparency and peer review within partnership; 
y. Clear purpose, roles and responsibilities; 
z. Purposeful collaboration; 
11) Contracting: 
a. Ensure tender invitations are complete with all necessary information; 
b. Standardized forms and methodology for bid adjudication; 
c. Fair contract enforcement mechanisms; 
d. Contract management to ensure adherence and punish non-
compliance; 
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e. Contract design should reflect conditions; 
f. Contract management; 
g. Contract negotiations; 
h. Don‘t get lost in the fine print; 
i. Detailed specifications; 
j. Simplify specifications by focusing on outputs and outcomes; 
k. Flexible contracts with simple, robust contract variation procedures; 
l. Properly designed contract; 
m. Clear description of the responsibilities of each partner; 
n. Open procurement process; 
o. Bid evaluation: 
i. Considering the appointment of external consultants to work with 
the government agency on the evaluation of bids; 
p. Robust internal process to evaluate proposals; 
12) Cost management: 
a. Increased awareness of cost management among public staff; 
b. Integration of activities to enable cost sharing; 
c. Compare costs and performance with alternatives; 
d. Reduced transaction cost; 
e. Cost of product and service production must be determined; 
f. Compare information costs under alternatives; 
13) Stakeholder engagement: 
a. Clear identification of all stakeholders; 
b. Open and candid communication with all stakeholders, taking into 
regard the concerns and priorities of each stakeholder; 
c. Conscious stakeholder relationship management; 
d. Keep all stakeholders informed of all aspects of project, with specific 
focus on the intent, purpose, and means of implementation of the 
project; 
e. Counter misperceptions and myths through audience-appropriate, 
candid and factual information; 
f. Recognizing the role of civil society to act on behalf of the community; 
g. Policy statement to all stakeholders; 
h. Effective communication with all stakeholders;  
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i. Engagement with organized labour: 
i. Consider organized labour opinions; 
ii. Positive engagement with organized labour; 
iii. Seeking labour support; 
iv. Having due consideration for labour concerns and priorities; 
j. Reduction in potential for political interference; 
k. Honest, positive, transparent and constructive consultation with 
stakeholders; 
l. Real engagement of excluded voices;  
m. Understanding of and capacity for engagement with external and 
internal stakeholders;  
n. Effective communication across barriers such as language; 
o. Absence of gatekeepers and allegiances; 
14) Effective communication: 
a. Communication responsibility should be shared among partners, and 
communication should come from the most appropriate partner for the 
specific communication; 
15) Purposeful collaboration: 
a. Develop a collaborative process; 
b. Provide incentives for effective collaboration; 
c. Experiment with collaboration options; 
d. Build interpersonal skills for collaboration; 
e. Build on the assets of potential partners; 
f. Appropriate levels of integration and coordination; 
g. Appropriate levels of interdependence; 
h. Sustained collaborative effort; 
i. Intra-partnership awareness of other partners‘ missions, goals and 
objectives; 
j. Role-players pool and share resources; 
k. Public sector remains significant role-player; 
l. Mobilization of a coalition of interests drawn from more than one sector; 
16) Supportive systems: 
a. Procurement systems that support the partnership approach; 
b. Rally public, political and administrative support; 
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c. Establish support mechanisms / partnership enablers; 
d. Strong local ownership; 
e. Community support; 
17) Supportive environment: 
a. Supportive policy and political environment; 
b. Supportive models of public-private interaction; 
c. Sufficient social capital to accommodate the social capital requirements 
of the partnership and/or sufficient time to build social capital;  
d. Supportive, enabling legal environment: 
i. A statutory foundation (enabling legal environment); 
ii. Public officials must identify and remove legislative, regulatory 
and administrative impediments; 
iii. Access to fair and unbiased judicial relief; 
iv. Regulation to prevent abuse; 
e. Stakeholder support; 
f. Citizen and community interest and involvement; 
g. The project is a priority within a strategic plan; 
h. Stakeholder and community support and involvement; 
18) Flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances: 
a. Flexibility - renegotiating outcomes based on changing conditions; 
b. Manage flexibly around key values and performance objectives; 
c. Achieving context specific requirements, such as black economic 
empowerment in South Africa; 
19) Financial analysis, control, planning and sustainability: 
a. Early appointment of a designated team or individual to identify finance 
sources; 
b. An assured income stream for the duration of the partnership; 
c. Transparency in financial management; 
d. Joint control of partnership funds; 
e. Joint prioritization of spending; 
20) Service delivery: 
a. Understanding the business at hand, e.g. water and sanitation; 
b. Quality focus; 
c. Services should be delivered in a manner that is safe to users; 
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d. Delivery of services that are accessible - easy to use and delivered in a 
manner and at a place which is convenient for the target market they 
are intended for; 
21) Human resources: 
a. Skills: 
i. Strategic and financial skills within the public sector partner; 
ii. Strategic human capital plan to acquire the correct skills; 
iii. Appropriate skills within the public sector partner; 
iv. Build entrepreneurial skills; 
v. Workforce development plan; 
vi. Acquire new governance skills set; 
vii. Private sector experience for the public sector; 
viii. Invest in the best and brightest human capital for the public 
sector; 
ix. Develop appropriate set of core competencies; 
x. Appoint individuals with entrepreneurial experience and skills; 
xi. Invest in skills and competencies; 
xii. Public sector human capital in contract and network 
management; 
xiii. Improve capacity for tactical decision-making; 
b. Use people with a collaborative mindset; 
c. Skills transfer possible from public to private sector; 
d. Financial capacity; 
22) Partners contribute according to their capacity: 
a. Focus on the required public outcome; 
b. Aim to make meaningful enhancements to the status quo; 
c. Make meaningful, even if imperfect, enhancements to the status quo; 
d. First focus on public value, what public outcome must be produced; 
e. Manage around key values and performance objectives; 
23) Use public resources effectively and judiciously: 
a. Efficient utilization of scarce resources; 
b. Use land ownership as a way for the public to control the projects; 
24) Use all available resources, not only monetary, to bring partnerships together: 
a. Consider finance as a tool among many others; 
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25) Willing private partner: 
a. Appropriate incentive and reward structures; 
b. Profit potential for private sector; 
c. Fair returns for private partners; 
d. Real incentives for the private sector; 
e. Market opportunity: 
i. Reasonable expectation of private sector interest due to potential 
market; 
26) Willing public partner: 
a. Strategic understanding of partnerships within the public sector partner; 
b. Minimizing the bureaucratic procedures that can cripple a project; 
c. Support for public managers to explore and implement the PPP option; 
d. Public political will; 
e. High-level political leadership / champion; 
f. Active public sector involvement; 
27) Compatibility: 
a. Shared applications (e.g. software); 
b. Similar technologies, procedures, systems and equipment; 
c. Shared communication channels; 
d. Shared semantics; 
e. A well-developed shared vocabulary; 
f. Shared experiences in field; 
g. Similar cultures or overcoming cultural and institutional differences;  
h. Cultures that embrace collaboration; 
i. Similar measurements of success; 
j. Synchronization of partners‘ business processes; 
k. Philosophical match between the private and public partners or 
overcoming potential conflict caused by differences in philosophy; 
l. Common ground in terms of political doctrine;  
m. Compatible levels of technical expertise; 
n. A common understanding of the concept of public-private partnership; 
28) Value for money: 
a. Delivery of affordable services not exceeding public provision costs; 
b. Robust procurement methodology that ensures value for money; 
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29) Risk management: 
a. Integrated risk management - clear and fair risk balance; 
b. Identify and actively manage risks; 
c. Clear risk allocation; 
d. Risk transfer to private sector; 
e. Risk sharing; 
30) Government oversight; 
31) Strong programme conceptualization: 
a. A public need is met: 
i. Private sector provides a traditionally public service against an 
outputs-based specification for a significant period of time; 
b. Prepare and oversee an agreed strategy; 
c. Common vision and objective; 
d. Defined purpose; 
e. Clearly identified pre-determined goals or outcomes for the partnership; 
f. Clear mandates and authority; 
g. Clarity, plausibility, feasibility and appropriateness of programme theory 
which shows cause-effect relationships leading to required outcome; 
h. Shared project design and planning; 
i. Consider context in establishing mission and objectives; 
j. Appropriate performance indicators for which data is available and 
collection is feasible;  
k. Government must be sure of what it wants; 
l. Known outputs; 
m. Quantified process; 
n. Clear project definition and scope management; 
o. Ensure appropriate project handover that empowers the client; 
p. Focus on appropriate product development and service delivery; 
q. Know what customers expect; 
r. Select correct service design standards; 
s. Comprehensive preparations for programme conceptualization: 
i. Pre-contract / Conceptualization: 
1. Proposed public partners need to agree to establishment; 
2. Availability of financing; 
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3. Following due legal process; 
4. Properly mandated representatives; 
5. Market research; 
ii. Well-defined procurement process; 
iii. Source expert advice in contracting phase; 
iv. Transparency and accountability; 
32) Look at complete product life cycle, not only project life cycle; 
33) Pursue the triple bottom line: 
a. Greater environmental responsibility;  
b. Protection of the environment; 
c. Social equity and economic empowerment focus; 
34) Partnership character: 
a. The service involved is appropriate for delivery through partnership; 
b. Reasonable resource costs; 
c. Clear, agreed goals; 
d. Achievement of an important social benefit; 
e. A focus on positive goals, positive social impact and public good; 
f. Increased effectiveness in use of resources; 
35) Formal agreements are not necessarily required to make a partnership 
successful; 
36) A public need exists which is not satisfied by the public sector: 
a. A market or demand exists for the service; 
b. A public need must exist; 
c. A market exists for the service being delivered; 
d. Sufficient public users of the service (market);  
e. Satisfying a public necessity - modern cities require modern transport 
structure; 
f. If a sector (either public or private) fails to provide a required service 
and the need still exists, PPPs are possible; 
g. A market for a specific public service exists but is not satisfied by the 
existing public or private sector; 
37) Circumstances that force a collective response: 
a. Common fear of an external threat can motivate parties to form 
partnerships and ensure that such partnerships work; 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 632 
b. The need for a survival strategy can be an indicator for motivation to 
ensure success – crisis ensures focused collaboration and increases 
the chance of success; 
38) Real collaboration: 
a. Honest, sincere and respectful collaboration in meetings; 
39) Internal relationship management: 
a. Equality within the partnership; 
b. Openness and communication; 
c. Conflict management; 
d. Positive attitudes; 
e. Goodwill; 
f. Transparent decision-making processes; 
g. Willingness and ability to trust the partnership; 
40) Customer service focus: 
a. Right service at the right place at the right time; 
b. Understanding the value of clients‘ perspectives;  
c. Focus on high priority areas and clients (e.g. deprived areas for social 
programmes); 
41) Collaborative innovation: 
a. Flexibility to exploit opportunities; 
b. Focus on innovation and improving the status quo; 
42) Satisfying context specific legal requirements, such as BEE In South Africa; 
43) Commitment: 
a. Commitment to partnership goals. 
 
13.8 CONSOLIDATED SUCCESS FACTORS AT END OF CHAPTER 7 
 
1) Leadership: 
a. Strong leadership to overcome institutional inertia / resistance to 
change: 
i. Good leadership and interpersonal relationships; 
ii. Clear direction; 
b. Strong champion or driver: 
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i. Strong individual champions in the private partner; 
c. Visible political leadership: 
i. Well-informed political leadership involvement from public 
partner; 
ii. Stable political leadership; 
iii. Appropriate levels of political involvement;  
iv. Protection against political interference; 
v. Policy consistency; 
vi. Reduce vulnerability to political pressure; 
d. Recognize the importance of perceptions among leadership; 
e. Commitment of and leadership from top management in the public 
partner; 
f. Clear division of responsibility of functions; 
g. High-profile proponents / champions of the model; 
h. Competent, motivated management; 
i. Favourable internal political environment; 
j.  Motivation; 
2) Partners ready for partnership: 
a. Partners able to pursue individual goals; 
b. Partners contribute portions of resources; 
c. Partners contribute according to own comparative advantage; 
d. Available potential partners; 
e. Understanding the other partner;  
f. Previous partnership experience; 
g. Relationship of trust: 
i. Trust built on reciprocity; 
ii. Mutual trust and respect between / among leaders;  
h. Organizational cultures receptive for partnership; 
i. Public sector understanding of private sector incentives and NGO 
approaches; 
j. Genuine engagement of public sector with policies promoting 
partnership;  
k. Public sector inter-departmental cooperation in support of partnership;  
l. Price flexibility from private partner; 
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m. Effective change management;  
n. Commitment: 
i. Willingness to invest time and effort; 
ii. Support of stakeholders; 
iii. Continued active involvement of public partner; 
iv. Commitment to the partnership process by all partners;  
v. Public sector commitment; 
3) Learning: 
a. Use lessons from private enterprise; 
b. Observe the ―generic observations‖ on partnership success; 
4) Common purpose, goal alignment, synergy and mutual benefit: 
a. The existence of potential for synergy between partners; 
b. Clarity and openness about individual and collective agendas and 
purpose; 
c. Confirm each partner‘s individual goals; 
d. Confirm the collective goal of the partnership; 
e. Synergy between individual and collective agendas; 
f. Synergy between individual, collective and societal benefits; 
g. Build real partnership, with shared burdens and shared rewards; 
h. Common goals: Goal alignment between partners and partnership;  
i. Realistic joint goal setting; 
j. Mutual benefit: 
i. Satisfaction of consumers, decision-makers and private partner; 
ii. The partnership should deliver mutual benefit; 
iii. All partners obtain pre-defined benefit; 
iv. Private sector receives benefit / award; 
v. All partners should be able to benefit; 
5) Goal achievement: 
a. Achievement by the partnership of desired goals or outcomes; 
b. Role-players achieve common goals; 
6) Partnership establishment: 
a. Seeing partnership formation as the formation of new for-profit 
enterprises based on social or environmental objectives and values; 
b. Support in the implementation of partnerships; 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 635 
c. Rationalize the number of partners; 
d. Understanding of the original partnering motivations and conditions; 
e. Focus the scope and content of the partnership arrangement; 
f. Establish appropriate organizational and contractual arrangements; 
g. Establish sound partnership principles; 
h. Expedite access to staff and premises for new suppliers; 
i. Confirm / ensure statutory and regulatory authorization; 
j. Create teams with diversity to encourage creativity; 
k. Focus on discovering and exploiting partnership opportunities; 
l. Structure the venture with a focus on outcomes; 
m. Develop effective knowledge-sharing practices;  
n. Clear lines of accountability; 
o. Comprehensive all-stakeholder calculation of total benefit; 
p. Effective contractual arrangements; 
q. Access to learning experiences from other partnerships; 
r. Appropriate delegation of powers from parent organizations: 
i. The representatives of the partners in the partnership have 
sufficient delegated decision-making powers; 
ii. Policy-making powers are delegated with care, if at all; 
s. Partnership design: 
i. Conduct a pre-partnership viability assessment; 
ii. PPPs should be chosen as delivery mechanism only when the 
PPP model is appropriate to the circumstances; 
t. Structuring the partnership: 
i. Create new organizational collaboration and innovation space; 
ii. Clearly defined project organization structure; 
iii. Organizational flexibility; 
iv. Structure partnerships for success; 
v. Symmetry of information; 
vi. Establish institutional arrangements with care; 
vii. Lean and focused organization;  
u. Comprehensive partner-selection process: 
i. Previous experience of partners in partnerships; 
ii. Open competition in the selection of partners; 
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iii. An experienced and competent private partner; 
iv. Selecting partners with experience in the applicable field; 
v. Selecting a partner that can contribute the most value to the 
partnership; 
vi. Partners contribute according to their strengths; 
vii. Different types of risk are carried by the partner most suitable for 
it; 
viii. Available potential partners with the capacity to participate; 
ix. Local entrepreneurship; 
v. Recognizable institutional form created: 
i. Involvement of both public and private sectors; 
ii. Several stakeholders involved; 
iii. Contractual arrangement in place; 
iv. Defined structural relationships; 
v. Limited governance and delivery gaps; 
vi. Low overlap and duplication; 
7) Power relationships: 
a. Understanding and adjusting for the influence of power relationships 
upon partnership governance; 
b. Capacity should be balanced in a partnership; 
c. Equality within partnership;  
d. Power sharing; 
e. Balancing of power; 
f. Balanced representivity. 
g. Manage power relations to ensure equality, mutual respect and shared 
goals and objectives; 
8) Transparency and accountability: 
a. Transparent procurement processes; 
b. Stakeholders should be empowered to understand that which is 
supposed to be transparent; 
c. Fully transparent procurement system; 
d. Fighting corruption: 
i. Procedural disincentives for corruption; 
ii. Blacklisting of corrupt contractors; 
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e. Ethical conduct; 
f. Addressing vulnerability to corruption and nepotism; 
9) Performance management: 
a. Civil society assistance with performance measurement; 
b. Evaluation system (which could include inspection); 
c. Regular partnership review and reconsideration; 
d. Ongoing performance management; 
e. Shared and agreed performance measurement indicators; 
f. Measure performance against individual and combined goals; 
g. Shared success or failure evaluation; 
h. Performance oriented goals; 
i. Clearly delineated metrics for performance and reporting; 
j. Outcomes-based performance measurement and management; 
k. Measure performance against mission / objectives; 
l. Effective, unbiased programme evaluation; 
m. Programme impact is aligned to outputs specified in programme theory; 
n. Goals are actively pursued and performance of the partnership is 
monitored and evaluated against these goals; 
o. Deliver to service standards; 
p. Match performance to promises; 
q. Focus on long-term sustainability instead of quick wins; 
10) Internal governance: 
a. Correct choice of partnership model; 
b. Clear objectives, policies and principles; 
c. Simplified joint decision-making; 
d. Devolve authority for decision-making to the lowest possible level; 
e. Joint capacity building session; 
f. Environmental monitoring: 
i. Sensitivity to the environment and its influence on the 
partnership; 
ii. Ability to adapt to environmental changes; 
iii. Consider the impact of external factors (environment / 
stakeholders); 
g. Sensitivity to environment / context: 
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i. Achieve a fit between the industry evolution context, personal 
networks of entrepreneurs, behaviours of entrepreneurs, motives 
of stakeholders, and the structures and strategies of the 
organization; 
ii. Consider political acceptability; 
h. Establish single coordination point; 
i. Manage authority vacuum through collegiate decision-making; 
j. Choose optimal organizational structure; 
k. Clearly defined method of dispute resolution; 
l. Reducing and managing complexity; 
m. Streamlined, appropriate, respected procedures; 
n. Effective performance management; 
o. Formalized inclusive and consensual decision-making; 
p. Clear assignment of specific decision-making powers; 
q. Improved effectiveness and efficiency; 
r. Adequate skills and managerial capacity;  
s. Efficient knowledge and information management; 
t. Defined and efficient decision-making; 
u. Use of appropriate management instruments; 
v. Appropriate levels of formality; 
w. Participation in rule-setting; 
x. Transparency and peer review within partnership; 
y. Clear purpose, roles and responsibilities; 
z. Purposeful collaboration;  
aa. Clear organizational structure with clear responsibility lines within the 
PPP; 
bb. Realistic promises, full delivery; 
cc. Realistic objectives and expectations; 
dd. Time management; 
ee. Resource planning (material, human or financial); 
11) Contracting: 
a. Ensure tender invitations are complete with all necessary information; 
b. Standardized forms and methodology for bid adjudication; 
c. Fair contract enforcement mechanisms; 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
F:\PhD Final\PhD Proefskrif JA Minnie PPP 2011-11-13.docx 639 
d. Contract management to ensure adherence and punish non-compliance; 
e. Contract design should reflect conditions; 
f. Contract management; 
g. Contract negotiations; 
h. Don‘t get lost in the fine print; 
i. Detailed specifications; 
j. Simplify specifications by focusing on outputs and outcomes; 
k. Flexible contracts with simple, robust contract variation procedures; 
l. Properly designed contract; 
m. Clear description of the responsibilities of each partner; 
n. Open procurement process; 
o. Bid evaluation: 
i. Considering the appointment of external consultants to work with 
the government agency on the evaluation of bids; 
p. Robust internal process to evaluate proposals; 
q. Efficient tender process; 
r. Optimized tender processes; 
12) Cost management: 
a. Increased awareness of cost management among public staff; 
b. Integration of activities to enable cost sharing; 
c. Compare costs and performance with alternatives; 
d. Reduced transaction cost; 
e. Cost of product and service production must be determined; 
f. Compare information costs under alternatives; 
13) Stakeholder engagement: 
a. Clear identification of all stakeholders; 
b. Open and candid communication with all stakeholders, taking into 
regard the concerns and priorities of each stakeholder; 
c. Conscious stakeholder relationship management; 
d. Keep all stakeholders informed of all aspects of project, with specific 
focus on the intent, purpose, and means of implementation of the 
project; 
e. Counter misperceptions and myths through audience-appropriate, 
candid and factual information; 
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f. Recognizing the role of civil society to act on behalf of the community; 
g. Policy statement to all stakeholders; 
h. Effective communication with all stakeholders;  
i. Engagement with organized labour: 
i. Consider organized labour opinions; 
ii. Positive engagement with organized labour: 
iii. Seeking labour support; 
iv. Having due consideration for labour concerns and priorities; 
j. Reduction in potential for political interference; 
k. Honest, positive, transparent and constructive consultation with 
stakeholders; 
l. Real engagement of excluded voices;  
m. Understanding of and capacity for engagement with external and 
internal stakeholders;  
n. Effective communication across barriers such as language; 
o. Absence of gatekeepers and allegiances; 
p. Manage public and stakeholder expectations; 
q. Selling your plan;  
14) Effective communication: 
a. Communication responsibility should be shared among partners, and 
communication should come from the most appropriate partner for the 
specific communication; 
15) Purposeful collaboration: 
a. Develop a collaborative process; 
b. Provide incentives for effective collaboration; 
c. Experiment with collaboration options; 
d. Build interpersonal skills for collaboration. 
e. Build on the assets of potential partners; 
f. Appropriate levels of integration and coordination; 
g. Appropriate levels of interdependence; 
h. Sustained collaborative effort; 
i. Intra-partnership awareness of other partners‘ missions, goals and 
objectives; 
j. Role-players pool and share resources; 
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k. Public sector remains significant role-player; 
l. Mobilization of a coalition of interests drawn from more than one sector; 
m. Real collaboration; 
n. Honest, sincere and respectful collaboration in meetings; 
o. Purposeful maintenance of the partnership; 
16) Supportive systems: 
a. Procurement systems that support the partnership approach; 
b. Rally public, political and administrative support; 
c. Establish support mechanisms / partnership enablers; 
d. Strong local ownership: 
e. Community support; 
17) Supportive environment: 
a. Supportive policy and political environment; 
b. Supportive models of public-private interaction; 
c. Sufficient social capital to accommodate the social capital requirements 
of the partnership and / or sufficient time to build social capital;  
d. Supportive, enabling legal environment: 
i. A statutory foundation (enabling legal environment); 
ii. Public officials must identify and remove legislative, regulatory 
and administrative impediments; 
iii. Access to fair and unbiased judicial relief; 
iv. Regulation to prevent abuse; 
e. Stakeholder support; 
f. Citizen and community interest and involvement; 
g. The project is a priority within a strategic plan; 
h. Stakeholder and community support and involvement; 
18) Flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances: 
a. Flexibility - renegotiating outcomes based on changing conditions; 
b. Manage flexibly around key values and performance objectives; 
c. Achieving context specific requirements, such as black economic 
empowerment in South Africa; 
d. Flexibility to address changing financial conditions; 
19) Financial analysis, control, planning and sustainability: 
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a. Early appointment of a designated team or individual to identify finance 
sources; 
b. An assured income stream for the duration of the partnership; 
c. Transparency in financial management; 
d. Joint control of partnership funds; 
e. Joint prioritization of spending; 
f. Financial control, discipline and transparency; 
g. Improved financial planning / awareness; 
h. Financial backing;  
20) Service delivery: 
a. Understanding the business at hand, for example water and sanitation; 
b. Quality focus; 
c. Services should be delivered in a manner that is safe to users; 
d. Delivery of services that are accessible - easy to use and delivered in a 
manner and at a place which is convenient for the target market they are 
intended for; 
e. Delivery management; 
21) Human resources: 
a. Skills: 
i. Strategic and financial skills within the public sector partner; 
ii. Strategic human capital plan to acquire the correct skills; 
iii. Appropriate skills within the public sector partner; 
iv. Build entrepreneurial skills; 
v. Workforce development plan; 
vi. Acquire new governance skills set; 
vii. Private sector experience for the public sector; 
viii. Invest in the best and brightest human capital for the public 
sector; 
ix. Develop appropriate set of core competencies; 
x. Appoint individuals with entrepreneurial experience and skills; 
xi. Invest in skills and competencies; 
xii. Public sector human capital in contract and network 
management; 
xiii. Improve capacity for tactical decision-making; 
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xiv. Training and education; 
xv. Training and skills development for partnership participation; 
b. Use people with a collaborative mindset; 
c. Continuity and succession planning; 
d. Skills transfer possible from public to private sector; 
e. Optimal human resource utilization;  
f. Financial capacity; 
22) Partners contribute according to their capacity: 
a. Focus on the required public outcome; 
b. Aim to make meaningful enhancements to the status quo; 
c. Make meaningful, even if imperfect, enhancements to the status quo; 
d. First focus on public value, what public outcome must be produced; 
e. Manage around key values and performance objectives; 
f. Clarity on resource contributions;  
23) Use public resources effectively and judiciously: 
a. Efficient utilization of scarce resources; 
b. Use land ownership as a way for the public to control the projects; 
24) Use all available resources, not only monetary, to bring partnerships together; 
a. Consider finance as a tool among many others; 
25) Willing private partner: 
a. Appropriate incentive and reward structures; 
b. Profit potential for private sector; 
c. Fair returns for private partners; 
d. Real incentives for the private sector; 
e. Market opportunity: 
i. Reasonable expectation of private sector interest due to potential 
market; 
26) Willing public partner: 
a. Strategic understanding of partnerships within the public sector partner; 
b. Minimizing the bureaucratic procedures that can cripple a project; 
c. Support for public managers to explore and implement the PPP option; 
d. Public political will; 
e. High-level political leadership / champion; 
f. Active public sector involvement; 
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g. Public sector commitment; 
h. Public sector flexibility and innovation; 
27) Compatibility: 
a. Shared applications (for example software); 
b. Similar technologies, procedures, systems and equipment; 
c. Shared communication channels; 
d. Shared semantics; 
e. A well-developed shared vocabulary; 
f. Shared experiences in field; 
g. Similar cultures or overcoming cultural and institutional differences;  
h. Cultures that embrace collaboration; 
i. Similar measurements of success; 
j. Synchronization of partners‘ business processes; 
k. Philosophical match between the private and public partners or 
overcoming potential conflict caused by differences in philosophy; 
l. Common ground in terms of political doctrine;  
m. Compatible levels of technical expertise; 
n. A common understanding of the concept of public-private partnership; 
28) Value for money: 
a. Delivery of affordable services not exceeding public provision costs; 
b. Robust procurement methodology that ensures value for money; 
29) Risk management: 
a. Integrated risk management - clear and fair risk balance; 
b. Identify and actively manage risks; 
c. Clear risk allocation; 
d. Risk transfer to private sector; 
e. Risk sharing; 
f. Planned shared risk management; 
30) Government oversight: 
31) Strong programme conceptualization: 
a. A public need is met: 
i. Private sector provides a traditionally public service against an 
output-based specification for a significant period of time; 
b. Prepare and oversee an agreed strategy; 
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c. Common vision and objective; 
d. Defined purpose; 
e. Clearly identified pre-determined goals or outcomes for the partnership; 
f. Clear mandates and authority; 
g. Clarity, plausibility, feasibility, and appropriateness of programme theory 
which shows cause-effect relationships leading to required outcome; 
h. Shared project design and planning; 
i. Consider context in establishing mission and objectives; 
j. Appropriate performance indicators for which data is available and 
collection is feasible; 
k. Government must be sure of what it wants; 
l. Known outputs; 
m. Focus on outcomes; 
n. Quantified process; 
o. Clear project definition and scope management; 
p. Ensure appropriate project handover that empowers the client; 
q. Focus on appropriate product development and service delivery; 
r. Know what customers expect; 
s. Select correct service design standards; 
t. Comprehensive preparations for programme conceptualization: 
i. Pre-contract / Conceptualization: 
1. Proposed public partners need to agree to establishment; 
2. Availability of financing; 
3. Following due legal process; 
4. Properly mandated representatives; 
5. Market research; 
ii. Well-defined procurement process; 
iii. Source expert advice in contracting phase; 
u. Transparency and accountability; 
v. Conduct appropriate business case research; 
32) Look at complete product life cycle, not only project life cycle; 
33) Pursue the triple bottom line: 
a. Greater environmental responsibility;  
b. Protection of the environment; 
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c. Social equity and economic empowerment focus; 
34) Partnership character: 
a. The service involved is appropriate for delivery through partnership; 
b. Reasonable resource costs; 
c. Clear, agreed goals; 
d. Achievement of an important social benefit; 
e. A focus on positive goals, positive social impact and public good; 
f. Increased effectiveness in use of resources; 
35) Formal agreements are not necessarily required to make a partnership 
successful; 
36) A public need exists which is not satisfied by the public sector: 
a. A public need must exist; 
b. A market exists for the service being delivered; 
c. Sufficient public users of the service (market);  
d. Satisfying a public necessity; 
e. If a sector (either public or private) fails to provide a required service and 
the need still exists, PPPs are possible;   
f. A market for a specific public service exists but is not satisfied by the 
existing public or private sector; 
g. Clearly defined unsatisfied need for a product or a service;  
37) Circumstances that force a collective response: 
a. Common fear of an external threat can motivate parties to form 
partnerships and ensure that such partnerships work; 
b. The need for a survival strategy can be an indicator for motivation to 
ensure success – crisis ensures focused collaboration and increase the 
chance of success; 
38) Internal relationship management: 
a. Equality within the partnership; 
b. Openness and communication; 
c. Conflict management; 
d. Positive attitudes; 
e. Goodwill; 
f. Transparent decision-making processes; 
g. Willingness and ability to trust the partnership; 
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h. Allow time for processes, attempt synchronization;  
39) Customer service focus: 
a. Right service at the right place at the right time; 
b. Understanding the value of clients‘ perspectives;  
c. Focus on high priority areas and clients (for example, deprived areas for 
social programmes); 
d. Customer satisfaction; 
e. Enhanced service delivery to communities;  
40) Collaborative innovation: 
a. Flexibility to exploit opportunities; 
b. Focus on innovation and improving the status quo; 
41) Satisfying context-specific legal requirements, such as BEE In South Africa; 
42) Commitment: 
a. Commitment to partnership goals; 
b. Commitment and resilience to setbacks;  
43) Knowing when to end a positive relationship: 
a. Post-project survival. 
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